The Complexities of the China-Libya Relationship

 The ChinaMed Project published on 30 January 2026 an analysis titled "China and the Libyan Crisis: Maintaining a Foot in the Door in a Changing Region" by Bianca Pasquier and Leonardo Bruni.  

This paper revisits the past decade of Chinese engagement in Libya, tracing Beijing's evolving relations with the country's factions and situating them within a regional context.  It concludes that China is unlikely to engage deeply in Libya's power struggles.  Beijing will likely keep its options open, be present but uncommitted.  

Ethiopia: New Conflict in Tigray Region?

 The Associated Press published on 30 January 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia's National Carrier Cancels Flights to Tigray Region as Fears Grow of Renewed Fighting" by Samuel Getachew.  

Beginning on 29 January, Ethiopian Airlines canceled flights to and from Tigray region as fears increased of renewed fighting between federal government and regional Tigray forces, possibly supported by neighboring Eritrea.  

China's Distant-Water Fishing in Indian Ocean Has Multiple Motives

 Mizzima, a non-profit foundation that supports social change and development in Myanmar, published on 28 January 2026 a commentary titled "Weaponising the Trawl: China's Maritime Militia, Distant-Water Fishing, and the Strategic Contest in the Indian Ocean."

Chinese fishing fleets maintain a massive presence in the Indian Ocean region.  What appears on the surface as fishing is, in practice, a grey-zone strategy, blending economic exploitation, intelligence gathering, and coercive presence to reshape the maritime realities without triggering open conflict.

In addition, see Sweekriti Pathak's "Fishing and Force: China's Dark Fleets and Maritime Militias" dated 29 January 2026 published by India's Observer Research Foundation.  

Somaliland Just Became More Complicated

AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 29 January 2026 an analysis titled "Somalia" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.   

The federal government of Somalia in Mogadishu inaugurated North East state as a federal member state amid political disputes with Somaliland, which has claimed the territory since it declared independence from Somalia in 1991, and the autonomous neighboring state of Puntland, which has claims on parts of North East state.  North East state, which is home to a different clan than the rest of Somaliland, has been a location of periodic conflict for many years.  This situation significantly complicates the situation in Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland.

Hong Kong Gold Company Acquires Canadian Company with African Assets

 Discovery Alert, an AI -powered mining news publisher, posted on 27 January 2026 an article titled "Zijin Mining's $4 Billion Allied Gold Acquisition Reshapes African Mining" by Muflih Hidayat.  

Hong Kong's Zijin Gold International Company signed an agreement to acquire all outstanding shares in Canadian company Allied Gold for an equity value of about $4 billion in an all-cash deal.  Allied Gold has assets in gold mines in Ethiopia, Mali, and Cote d'Ivoire.  This acquisition represents a sophisticated deployment of Chinese capital in African mining consolidation.

Putin to Attend Third Russia-Africa Summit

 African Initiative published on 27 January 2026 an article titled "Putin to Take Part in Third Russia-Africa Summit in 2026--Ambassador" by Evgeniya Mylnikova.  

Russian President Vladimir Putin will attend the Third Russia-Africa Summit, which will take place at a yet to be named country in Africa during 2026.  

Growing Geopolitical Complexities in Red Sea Region

 Foreign Policy published on 27 January 2026 an article titled "Red Sea Rivalries Risk Unraveling the Horn of Africa" by Cameron Hudson and Liam Karr. 

The civil war in Sudan between the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces is increasingly becoming a proxy war for regional players Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, UAE, Turkey, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, among others.  The authors argue it is time for the Trump administration to designate a Senate-confirmed presidential special envoy for the Horn of Africa and Red Sea.  

Can BRICS Lead to a New World Security Order?

 The Diplomat published on 27 January 2026 a commentary titled "BRICS Holds a Maritime Exercise at the Indo-Atlantic Crossroads - Without India" by Vrinda Malik, University of Delhi.  

The BRICS--China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the UAE--held a maritime exercise in South African waters in January.  This was the first time the BRICS expanded into the security domain.

India was the only member to totally absent itself from the naval exercise, suggesting a refusal to be part of a security exercise led by China.  Enduring China-India rivalry limits the BRICS' ability to emerge as a cohesive force capable of shaping a new world order.  

Africa's Debt Repayment to China Now Exceeds New Loans

 One Data published on 27 January 2026 an article titled "One Data and Rockefeller Foundation to Launch New Development Finance Observatory in 2026."

China went from being a net provider of finance--transferring $48 billion to low- and lower-middle-income countries (via official and private lenders) a decade ago--to a net extractor of $24 billion.  Africa has experienced the most dramatic reversal in Chinese finance.  It went from receiving $30 billion to paying out $22 billion, a $52 billion swing.  

Maritime Multilateralism in the Indian Ocean

 The Diplomat published on 16 January 2026 an analysis titled "The New Age of Maritime Multilateralism in the Indian Ocean" by Gayathry Gopal, KCC Institute of Law, Greater Noida.  

The Indian Ocean is not dominated by a single power but by a multitude of actors of varying capabilities and interests, thereby making the emerging order not only polycentric but also highly fragile.  India is the resident and traditional security provider.  The United States has a strong presence in the Indian Ocean.  

No actor, however, matches China in the scale and pace of its expansion.  It now has embassies in all Indian Ocean littoral states, participates in all regional organizations, has invested in some 17 ports around the rim of the Indian Ocean, and has a permanent military base in Djibouti.

Increasingly, smaller states are engaging in the region.  This interplay of great power competition and small states' quest for influence has produced a polycentric security order that is dynamic and structurally fragmented.  

Geopolitical Change in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf States

 African Arguments published on 21 January 2026 a commentary titled "The Horn and the Gulf: How a New Geopolitical Confluence Is Emerging" by Ngala Chome, former research fellow at Ghent University.

Israel's recognition of Somaliland is reverberating across the Red Sea.  Networks of influence in the Horn of Africa and Gulf States are resulting in new power configurations.  This is impacting traditional outside powers and changing the relations of newer ones with major consequences for the future of the region.  

US-China Competition for Africa's Critical Minerals

 Business Insider Africa posted on 26 January 2026 an article titled "US-China Mineral Race Heats Up as Africa's Top Mining Nations Head to Washington" by Solomon Ekanem.

US officials are accelerating direct engagement in the mining sector of African governments and promoting investment-led partnerships with American companies.  

Will Russian Mercenaries Protect Madagascar's Interim President?

 El Pais published on 24 January 2026 an article titled "Russian Africa Corps Mercenaries Incorporate Madagascar into Their Expansion Across the Continent" by Jose Naranjo.

A 40-member Russian delegation led by the head of the Africa Corps militia met in late December with Madagascar's interim president and offered personal protection to the Malagasy leader as the Africa Corps has done in the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Libya, and Equatorial Guinea.  

US Objects to South African Firm Export to China of Anti-Submarine Warfare Simulators

 Defence Worlds blog posted on 22 January 2026 an article titled "South African Firm's Attempt to Sell P-8A Poseidon-style Simulators to China Raises Serious Strategic and Export Control Concerns."

A South African aviation training company attempted to export maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare simulators modeled on the Boeing P-8A Poseidon to China.  The U.S. Department of Justice has taken legal action to stop the indirect transfer of sensitive technology.  The transfer has significant implications for India, which is one of the largest operators of the P-81 Neptune, a variant of the P-8A.

Naval Exercise Splits BRICS

 Aljazeera published on 23 January 2026 an article titled "Why Is South Africa Upset about Iran Joining BRICS Naval Drills?" by Shola Lawal.

A BRICS naval exercise in South Africa that included 3 warships from Iran as its government crushed protestors at home sparked a sharp rebuke from the United States, prompted internal debates in South Africa, and caused India to point out that BRICS was not established to host war games.  

Somalia: Al-Shabaab Steps Up Attacks in Middle Shebelle

 AEI's Critical Threats Africa File published on 22 January 2026 an article titled "Somalia" by Michael De Angelo.

Al-Shabaab has stepped up its attacks northeast of Mogadishu in Middle Shabelle Region.  The article includes a map of al-Shabaab attacks since December 2025.

Future of the China-Africa Relationship

 The Africa-China Centre for Policy & Advisory, an Accra-based think tank, published in January 2026 a paper titled "Why People Matter: Reimagining the Future of Africa-China Cooperation" by Paul Frimpong.

The Africa-China connection needs to shift from a primarily state-to-state model toward a society-to-society approach.  Governments remain essential, but durable cooperation is built when universities, collaborate, journalists exchange perspectives, businesses form partnerships, and communities interact directly.

A second shift is from delivery-focused engagement to experience and impact-focused cooperation.  Success should be measured not only by outputs--kilometers of road or megawatts of power--but by outcomes such as skills development, technology absorption, and local enterprise growth.

The third shift is from delivery exposure to mutual learning.  People-to-people exchanges are most effective when they are reciprocal, allowing Africans and Chinese alike to learn, adapt, and innovate together.  This mutuality strengthens trust and reinforces the principle of partnership.

Africa's AI Future: China or the West?

 GZERO Media posted on 22 January 2026 a five-minute clip from a conversation titled "Africa's AI Future: China or the West?"

Africa's AI future is not predetermined by technology, but by who shows up, who invests, and who builds the infrastructure first.  China is showing up, the United States is not.  

Renewed Fighting in South Sudan

 The International Crisis Group posted on 21 January 2026 a commentary titled "Rebel Offensive Sounds Onset of War in South Sudan" by Daniel Akech.

Fighting has broken out between the Dinka forces of President Salva Kiir and the Nuer followers of Vice President Riek Machar.  The current situation is stoking ethnic grievances and will likely draw in South Sudan's neighbors in Uganda and factions fighting in Sudan.  

US Offer to Mediate Nile Waters Dispute: Egypt and Sudan Pleased While Ethiopia Is Silent

 The International Crisis Group published on 21 January 2026 an article titled "Egypt Applauds U.S. Promise to Mediate in Deadlocked Nile Dispute" by Michael Wahid Hanna.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomed the 16 January letter from President Donald Trump to mediate the Nile waters dispute involving Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia.  The mediation offer reflects Egypt's core concerns while giving little detail as to how Washington could broker a settlement.

People's Dispatch published on 20 January 2026 a commentary titled "US Re-Engages in GERD Dispute as Tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt Escalate" by Nicholas Mwangi.

The author notes that so far Ethiopia has not publicly commented on the most recent US offer to mediate the dispute.  

Comment: When the United States tried to mediate this dispute during the first Trump administration, Ethiopia perceived that Washington favored the Egyptian position and rejected the outcome.  It has little incentive for accepting US mediation in a second Trump administration.

Rapid Support Forces Attack on Chadians Complicates Relations

 AEI's Critical Threats Africa File published on 22 January 2026 an analysis titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.  

Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) conducted an attack on Chadian forces in Chad, raising tensions with a key partner amid disruptions to RSF supply lines.  The RSF claimed the attack was a mistake, but it has strained already complicated relations between Chad and the RSF.  Supply routes to the RSF through Chad are also under pressure.  

Ethiopia: Merger of Amhara Nationalist Groups

 AEI's Critical Threats Africa File published on 22 January 2026 an analysis titled "Ethiopia" by Michael DeAngelo.

The Amhara Fano Nationalist Force and the Amhara Fano Peace Organization merged on 17 January to form the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM).  The AFNM pledged to fight against Ethiopia's ruling Prosperity Party.  The merger may also result in closer collaboration with the Tigray People's Liberation Front and Eritrean forces.

Russia Talking with Sahel Countries on Satellite Cooperation

 Business Insider Africa published on 22 January 2026 an article titled "Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger Turn to Russia to Build the Sahel's First Shared Telecom Satellite" by Solomon Ekanem.

Russia is in discussion with the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger concerning joint satellite projects, including telecommunications and remote sensing satellites to expand broadband access, secure encrypted communications, and improve surveillance of under-serviced areas.  This is a further indication of a shift by these countries away from the West.

Egypt Reviving Suez Canal Following Houthi Red Sea Attacks

 The Washington Post published on 21 January 2026 an article titled "How Egypt Is Reviving the Suez Canal after Maritime Attacks Sank Traffic" by Claire Parker and Heba Farouk Mahfouz.

Attacks beginning in 2023 by the Houthis in Yemen on international shipping in the Red Sea interrupted maritime traffic through the Suez Canal, forcing most ships to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope.  The Suez Canal provided Egypt in 2023 with $10.2 billion in revenue and accounted for 12 to 15 percent of global maritime trade.  

The Houthis have ended most attacks, maritime traffic is increasing, and Suez Canal revenue for Egypt is picking up.  If the Gaza ceasefire holds, international shipping through the Red Sea and Suez Canal is expected to increase further, adding to Egyptian revenue.  

Chinese Loan Commitments to Africa Fall in 2024

 Reuters published on 22 January 2026 an article titled "China's Africa Lending Nearly Halved in 2024, Shifts to Yuan" by Colleen Goko.  

Chinese lending to Africa fell to $2.1 billion in 2024, almost 50 percent less than in 2023 and one-tenth of its peak lending year to Africa in 2016 when it loaned $28.8 billion.  The lower levels of lending reflect China's move away from large infrastructure projects such as railways and roads and toward smaller, commercially viable projects.

China has also increasingly pivoted away from dollar-denominated megaprojects characteristic of the early Belt and Road Initiative and toward smaller-scale financing denominated in yuan.  The five highest recipients of Chinese loans from 2000 through 2024 are Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia, and Nigeria.