Caixin Global published on 17 March 2026 an article titled "Chinese Supertanker Changes Route and Takes Oil Without Passing through Hormuz."
A Chinese supertanker originally scheduled to load crude oil in the UAE rerouted to the Saudi Arabian Red Sea port of Yanbu. Other vessels are taking a similar action, causing a bottleneck at the port, which is served by an oil pipeline with limited capacity.
The African News Agency published on 16 March 2026 an article titled "Africa's Manufacturing Moment and Why It Keeps Slipping Away" by Chloe Maluleke.
Africa accounts for only 2 percent of manufacturing value added and 1.3 percent of global manufacturing exports. As companies move manufacturing out of countries like China, North Africa is capturing some of the shift, but sub-Saharan Africa is largely missing out.
Africa continues to export raw materials and import manufactured products. China's zero tariffs on African goods beginning May 1st are not likely to change significantly the structural problems of processing capacity, power shortages, and harmonized trade frameworks.
The BBC posted on 15 March 2026 an article titled "'We Will Go Wherever They Hide': Rooting Out IS in Somalia" by Sahnun Ahmed and Scarlett Barter.
In 2025, there were an estimated 800 Islamic State fighters in the Puntland region of Somalia, more than half of them foreigners. The Puntland Defense Forces and American drones are committed to tracking them down.
WinBuzzer posted on 12 March 2026 an article titled "Microsoft Trains Millions in Africa to Counter DeepSeek" by Markus Kasanmascheff.
US Microsoft is racing to train millions of Africans on its artificial intelligence (AI) tools before Chinese rivals led by DeepSeek lock in the continent's fastest growing user base. DeepSeek has already captured 11 to 14 percent of the AI market in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Niger.
Delaware-incorporated Farmonaut posted on 7 March 2026 a promotional piece titled "Cobalt Shares: China, Africa and the Global 2026 Refining Share."
In 2026, China will control over 75 percent of global cobalt refining capacity, although it mines less than 2 percent domestically. Africa, especially the Democratic Republic of Congo, supplies more than 70 percent of the world's cobalt, but refines less than 5 percent of its own product. This promotion looks especially at the use of cobalt in the agricultural and forestry sectors.
The Conversation published on 12 March 2026 a commentary titled "China's New Tariff-free Regime for Africa: The Potential Upside and Downside" by Lauren Johnston, University of Sydney.
When China's zero-tariff policy for Africa kicks in on 1 May, the author suggests there will be two major likely outcomes. On the positive side, zero tariffs could provide incentives for cross-country export cooperation within Africa. On the negative, it risks creating conditions in which Africa's strong economies such as South Africa, Morocco, and Kenya capture the most gain at the expense of weaker economies.
The International Crisis Group posted on 11 March 2026 a commentary titled "Sudan's Devastating War Rages on as Regional Rivalries Deepen" by Shewit Woldemichael.
As Sudan's civil war nears its fourth year, the conflict is steadily regionalizing into the Horn of Africa and Gulf States, making any settlement harder to achieve. Supporting the Sudan Armed Forces are Egypt, Eritrea, Turkiye, Qatar, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. The principal backer of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces is the UAE. The feud between the UAE and Saudi Arabia now risks deepening the intractable nature of the war.
The Conversation published on 10 March 2026 a commentary titled "China in Africa: Investment and Trade Work Well When There's Strong Oversight, and Badly When There Isn't" by Vincent Tawiah, Dublin City University.
The author concludes that Chinese investment, loans, and trade in Africa offer substantial economic opportunity, but they can also lead to the rapid depletion of vital energy and forestry resources, undermining long-term development goals if institutional guardrails are weak.
China-Africa Security Radar published on 10 March 2026 an article titled "Will China Pursue a Military Base in Africa's Atlantic Ocean?" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.
The author argues that contrary to conventional wisdom in US military circles, China is not particularly interested in having a military base on Africa's Atlantic coast. It would represent a massive logistical overextension at a time when China needs to concentrate naval power close to home. Such a base would be highly exposed and vulnerable to attack, making it a strategic liability rather than an asset. In any event, by investing extensively in West African commercial ports, China has access, at least in peace time, for PLA Navy port calls.
Comment: While the author makes some good points, it was generally thought that China, which professed publicly that it did not believe in military bases outside China, would not establish a military base in Djibouti--until it did.
This is part 2 of the Tigray Press interview with me on 9 March 2026 hosted by Bisrat Kebede. Part 1 is posted below on 10 March.
This 44-minute segment focuses on the current situation in the Horn of Africa and the engagement in Africa of the United States, China, and Russia.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute published in March 2026 its "Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025" by Mathew George, Katarina Djokic, Zain Hussain, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman.
During the period 2021-2025, the largest supplier of major weapons to all of Africa was the United States (19 percent), followed by China (17 percent), and Russia (15 percent). Nearly all of the American weapons went to Morocco and Egypt. These percentages do not include small arms and light weapons, which would drive up percentages for China and Russia.
The largest supplier of major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa during this period was China (22 percent), Russia (12 percent), and Turkiye (11 percent). The three countries receiving the most major weapons were Nigeria (16 percent), Senegal (9 percent), and Mali (8 percent).
The Washington Post published on 13 March 2026 an article titled "Trump Picks Head for VOA Parent Amid Lake Legal Battle" by Scott Nover and Adam Taylor.
The Trump administration nominated defeated Arizona candidate for governor and US senator, Kari Lake, to oversee the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which runs the Voice of America (VOA) and several other organizations such as Radio Free Asia. The idea was to put Lake in charge to shut down these semi-independent government media outlets.
US District Judge Royce Lamberth recently ruled that Lake has been illegally running USAGM and nullified months of Lake's actions, including a mass layoff of hundreds of employees. The Trump administration has now responded by naming Sarah B. Rogers, undersecretary of state for public diplomacy, as the new chief executive of USAGM. She will apparently keep her current position in the State Department while assuming her new role as CEO of USAGM.
The White House only provided enough funding to shut down USAGM, but the US Congress rejected that approach and appropriated $653 million for the agency's operations this year.
Comment: This development keeps the VOA and its sister organizations alive but now under the direct supervision of the State Department. USAGM and its media organizations will apparently lose much of their previous independence. It is also not clear how many of the USAGM work force have remained during this demoralizing and unsettled past year.
Business Insider Africa published on 10 March 2026 an article titled "Africa's Second-largest Oil Producer Says China Dominated $21.88 Investment Proposals Over Five Years" by Solomon Ekanem.
Angola has received 596 investment proposals worth an estimated $21.8 billion over the past five years. with Chinese investors accounting for 80 percent of the total.
The Guardian published on 9 March 2026 an investigative report titled "How the 'Galapagos of West Africa' Is Plundered by Floating Fish Factories" by Davide Mancini.
Floating Chinese-owned factory ships longer than a football field illegally process sardinella for fishmeal in the waters off Guinea-Bissau. The Chinese fishmeal factories are supported by Turkish purse seiners that illegally supply them with fish.
The offshore fish processing operation has both negative food security implications for the people of Guinea-Bissau and for artisanal fisherman in the country. Fish are the source of a third of animal protein consumed and the informal fishing industry employs 225,000 people from a population of 2.2 million.
Semafor published on 13 March 2026 an article titled "Zimbabwe's Lithium Upgrade Still Runs Through China" by Ray Mwayera.
Zimbabwe produced almost 10 percent of global mined lithium last year and provided about 15 percent of processed lithium in China. Harare banned exports of raw lithium ore in 2022 and plans to prohibit exports of lithium concentrates by 2027, forcing companies to invest in local processing. The companies building the lithium infrastructure in Zimbabwe are overwhelmingly Chinese. This raises the question whether Zimbabwe is building an independent refining sector or simply deepening its role inside China's battery ecosystem.
Foreign Policy published on 11 March 2026 an analysis titled "Why Haven't the Houthis Fired?" by Fatima Abo Alasrar.
In 2025, Israeli airstrikes killed Iranian-backed Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed el-Rahawi and other key officials. US airstrikes significantly degraded their military capacity.
Iran is now bombing Arab cities, resulting is less enthusiasm by the Houthis to support Tehran. The Houthis also fear that Iranian attacks on the UAE and Saudi Arabia will drive them closer together, possibly recreating the original alliance against the Houthis. While this changing political situation in the region does not guarantee the Houthis will stay out of the conflict, it has given the leadership reason to tread carefully.
The National Interest published on 11 March 2026 an article titled "Why African Leaders Are Beginning to Speak Out Against Russia" by Thomas Kent.
African leaders are increasingly speaking up about a pattern in which paid recruiters in Russia and Africa coax young men to come to Russia with promises of civilian jobs or training. Once they arrive, they are urged or forced to join the Russian Arny and are then sent to the frontlines in Ukraine.
The National Interest published on 11 March 2026 a commentary titled "How Ethiopia's Involvement in the Sudanese Civil War Threatens US Interests" by Liam Karr.
Ethiopian support for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in neighboring Sudan threatens US private and public investment in Ethiopia. Ethiopian Airlines support for the RSF could additionally cause reputational and legal liability for US interests.
African Business published on 11 March 2026 an article titled "Why Tensions Between Ethiopia and Eritrea Are Rising Again" by Harry Clynch.
Ethiopia and Eritrea have amassed troops on their shared border, leading some analysts to fear that war could be on its way. Other analysts are less convinced that war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is likely.
The Habesha published on 10 March 2026 a commentary titled "Legitimacy and the Limits of Political Experimentation in Welkait" by Sisay Mulu.
The author disagrees at both the analytical and policy level with the conclusions of Zola Moges's "The Welkait Quagmire Neither Ballots nor Bullets Can Resolve" reposted below on 2 March.
Sisay Mulu argues that Zola Moges downplayed the importance of historical administrative continuity, discussed legal and constitutional issues in abstract terms, and failed to fairly consider the practical challenges of governing a contested post-conflict area.
South Africa's The Mail & Guardian published on 11 March 2026 an article titled "China Announces Major Push to Strengthen Its Partnership with Africa Amid US Trade Tension" by Brian Sokutu.
Amid strained ties between Africa and the Trump administration, China has announced a new economic package that includes full zero-tariff access for 100 percent of African imports, effective from 1 May. It has also declared 2026 as "China-Africa Year of People-to-People Exchanges" with some 600 events planned.
Comment: China is cleverly taking advantage of the downturn in US-Africa relations and especially the decision by the Trump administration to increase tariffs on goods imported from most African countries. Beijing announced the zero-tariff policy at the beginning of 2026 and the people-to-people exchanges early last year. These are not particularly new initiatives.
It should also be noted that China has had a trade surplus with Africa for the past 15 years and the size of that surplus has been growing steadily. A number of African countries have expressed concern over the size of their trade deficit with China. China's tariffs have not been the primary obstacle to importing more from Africa. Africa has to have what China wants and historically, with the exception of raw materials such as critical minerals, that has limited its exports to China.
Nevertheless, China is able to make an invidious comparison with the current state of US-Africa relations, and at minimal cost.
Europe Says posted on 10 March 2026 an article titled "China's Geely Expands Satellite Partnerships with Morocco, Algeria."
China's Geely Auto and its aerospace division, Time Space Daoyu Technology Company, signed separate partnership agreements with Morocco and Algeria to strengthen satellite-related technology and infrastructure.
In Algeria, the cooperation focuses on building domestic aerospace manufacturing capacity. In Morocco, the emphasis is on satellite connectivity services rather than manufacturing.
The Environmental Investigation Agency and PremiCongo published in March 2026 a report titled "Toxic Transition: How the World's Largest Cobalt Producer Has Allegedly Poisoned Communities for Years."
A Chinese company, CMOC Group Ltd., controls two of the world's largest copper-cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Thousands of people live within a few kilometers of the operations and its massive processing plant. Local communities and civil society groups have sounded the alarm about severe health issues. Since 2023, doctors and nurses near the mines have treated a growing list of patients.
The Rift Vally Institute published in October 2025 a study titled "Political Economy of Cash and Markets in Sudan" by Omer Egemi and Calum McLean.
Sudan is the world's largest displacement and humanitarian crisis. The study covers Khartoum, the political and economic hub of the country, and the two regions of Kordofan and Darfur in western Sudan during the period from February to April 2025.
Sudan's economy is largely controlled by warring parties, especially the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. The study analyses the political economy dynamics shaping Sudan's crisis with particular focus on aspects affecting cash and markets.
Bisrat Kebede of Tigray News interviewed me on 9 March 2026; the title of the 50-minute video is "Iran Conflict: Sparking a Global Conflict."
The first forty minutes dealt with the on-going war in Iran while the final ten minutes focused on the situation in the Horn of Africa. I began my remarks on Iran with the caveat that this is not my area of specialization although I try to follow developments in the Middle East as well as the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region.
