The New York Times published on 31 October 2025 an article titled "Twenty Years on, Darfur Tips into Chaos Again" by Declan Walsh.
Since the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces seized control of El Fasher, capital of North Darfur, its troops have been rampaging across Darfur. While atrocities are nothing new to Darfur, they are reaching new levels, and the international community seems unwilling or incapable of doing anything about it.
AllAfrica.com posted on 23 October 2025 a commentary titled "Africa Should Not Expect Much from Donald Trump" by Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the Obama administration.
Carson looks back and forwards, concluding that the Trump administration will be minimally engaged in Africa as programs from previous administrations shut down.
The UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs posted on 30 October 2025 remarks to the UN Security Council titled "'No One Is Safe in El Fasher': ASG Pobee Urges Collective International Efforts to End War in Sudan" by UN Assistant Secretary General for Africa, Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee
Pobee called on the UN Security Council to take decisive action on ending the conflict in Sudan, something it has failed to do for more than two years. She emphasized that unnamed "external support is enabling the conflict. Weapons and fighters continue to flow into Sudan contributing to the already desperate situation." The UN Security Council needs to pressure the enablers to end their support.
Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN) posted on 30 October 2024 an article titled "Khartoum Courts Washington" by Rasha Ibrahim.
A delegation representing the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) is in Washington meeting with Massad Boulos, the senior Trump administration official for Africa, on possible areas of collaboration. According to MBM, one of the items under discussion is the SAF's willingness to review its agreement with Moscow concerning a naval base in the Red Sea if the US pressures the UAE to end its military and logistical support for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.
The New York Times published on 30 October 2025 an article titled "Executions and Mass Casualties: Videos Show Horror Unfolding in Sudan" by Declan Walsh, Sanjana Varghese, and Pranav Baskar.
There are increasing accounts of atrocities in Sudan's Darfur region following the victory by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in taking El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 30 October 2025 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo.
It provides a discussion of the recent military gains in Darfur and Kordofan by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the atrocities that have followed these victories. It also provides an update on efforts by the Quad (US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt) to arrange a cease fire.
The International Crisis Group posted on 30 October 2025 a 33-minute podcast titled "The Trial of South Sudan's Vice President Riek Machar" with Alan Boswell and Edmund Yakani.
The podcast unpacks the charges against Vice President Riek Machar over his alleged role in a March 2025 attack on an army base in Nasir. It also discusses if there remains a viable path to avoid civil war in the country.
Middle East Eye published on 28 October 2025 an article titled "UAE Increasing Support to Sudan's RSF with New Chinese Drones: Report."
US intelligence reports that the UAE is supplying Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) with advanced Chinese drones, small arms, heavy machine guns, vehicles, artillery, mortars, and ammunition. This assistance contributed to the RSF's recent seizure of El Fasher, capital of North Darfur.
The International Crisis Group posted on 29 October 2025 a 25-minute podcast titled "Special Episode: What Does the RSF's Seizure of El Fasher Mean for Sudan's War" with Richard Atwood, Shewit Woldemichael, and Alan Boswell.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has taken control of El Fasher, capital of North Darfur, and nearly all of Darfur region. The result is a de facto, if fragile, partition of Sudan into a western region controlled by the RSF and most of the rest of Sudan still controlled by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and allied militia groups. The RSF succeeded in El Fasher by employing more advanced weapon systems, including drones, and the continuing assistance of the UAE.
The immediate result of the fall of El Fasher has been widespread RSF retribution and atrocities in the city and a dire humanitarian crisis. This event occurred as talks were taking place in Washington between the RSF and the SAF under the umbrella of the Quad (US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt). The collapse of SAF forces in El Fasher as the talks were taking place only added to the frustration of efforts to achieve peace. In any event, the ultimate goal of both the SAF and the RSF remains unchanged: control of all of Sudan.
The Wall Street Journal published on 27 October 2025 an article titled "China Pushes to Silence Victims of African Mining Disaster" by Nicholas Bariyo and Stanfrance Zulu.
The collapse in Zambia early this year of a toxic waste pool at a Chinese copper mine inundated homes and fields downstream and polluted a major river. Zambian authorities say it will take at least 3 years before the fields can be used to grow crops.
The Chinese company responsible for the spill is experiencing severe criticism for its handling of the disaster, the amount of compensation offered affected farmers, and an effort to silence any criticism of the company.
National Public Radio posted on 28 October 2025 an article titled "'Trapped and Terrified': Warnings as Sudanese Militia Seize Darfur City" by Kate Bartlett.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) finally seized control from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) on 26 October of El Fasher, capital of North Darfur. A growing humanitarian crisis and reports of atrocities by the RSF have followed.
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a statement on 27 October 2025 titled "Sudan: Appalling Reports of Summary Executions and Other Serious Violations, as RSF Makes Major Territorial Gains in El Fasher and North Kordofan."
This account provides additional evidence of the atrocities taking place in Darfur and North Kordofan.
The Calabash Newspaper published on 24 October 2025 an article titled "To Boost Sierra Leone-China Trade Relations . . . Vice President Hails Inauguration of 5th Chinese Chamber of Commerce" by Alvin Lansana Kargbo.
China is Sierra Leone's largest trading partner ($1.8 billion in 2024) and biggest source of foreign direct investment, which has surpassed $2 billion. The two countries recently inaugurated the 5th Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Sierra Leone, which brings together 17 Chinese companies.
Sierra Leone's vice president commented at the inauguration of the Chamber of Commerce that when development aid to Africa is declining, private sector investment becomes critical for Sierra Leone's economic resilience.
Comment: The vice president's comment is a lightly veiled reference to the dismantlement of USAID and cutbacks in development assistance by some European countries. The question now is whether Western private companies will actually step up investment in countries like Sierra Leone.
The New Republic Liberia published on 22 October 2025 an article titled "Liberia, China Strengthen Maritime Education, Training Ties."
The CEO of the Liberia Maritime Authority met with senior executives of the Shanghai Maritime University to discuss collaboration in maritime education, training, and technology exchange. They expect to sign a MOU in December.
The Guardian published on 26 October 2025 an article titled "Chinese Firms Invest $1.3b in Nigeria's Lithium Sector--Alake" by Ernest Nzor.
A number of Chinese companies have invested over $1.3 billion in Nigeria's lithium processing sector since September 2023.
Business Insider Africa published on 18 October 2025 an article titled "Russia Caught in Diplomatic Tightrope between Two North African Superpowers" by Olamilekan Okebiorun.
Russia has strong military relations with Algeria but has signaled support for Morocco's Sahara Autonomy Plan, a move that could strain relations with Algiers.
Fox News posted on 26 October 2025 an article titled "Trump Administration Works to Break China's Rare Earth Stranglehold on Africa" by Paul Tilsley.
Tanzania, Angola, Malawi, and South Africa expect to open rare earth mines by 2029. The United States now imports 70 percent of its rare earth elements from China but hopes to secure new sources in Africa.
If you can't access the article in the above link, try doing so here.
The Washington Post published on 27 October 2025 an article titled "Sudanese Paramilitary Enters Army's Last Stronghold in Darfur" by Katharine Houreld and Hafiz Haroun.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have taken control of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) military headquarters in El Fasher, capital of North Darfur. SAF soldiers moved to other parts of the city, and it is not clear who controls most of it. RSF control of El Fasher would consolidate a division of the country between the SAF and the RSF and could result in a bloodbath in the city.
The New York Times published on 27 October 2025 an article titled "Diphtheria, a Once Vanquished Killer of Children, Is Resurgent" by Stephanie Nolen.
Diphtheria returned to Somalia in 2023 and subsequently more than 2,000 cases have been reported. Outbreaks have also occurred in Nigeria, Sudan, and Chad as countries in conflict experience low levels of vaccination.
The South China Morning Post published on 26 October 2025 an article titled "Somali Piracy Has Waned, So Why Is China's Navy Still in the Gulf of Aden?" by Jevans Nyabiage.
The Somali piracy problem largely ended in 2013, but the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continues to send naval task forces on a regular basis to its naval base in Djibouti for patrolling in the Gulf of Aden.
The reasons for continuing the task forces are clear. The naval force for combatting a problem that mostly no longer exists provide a reason to show China's flag in the region, provide training for naval personnel in the far seas, and test ships and equipment under harsh climate conditions. It helps the PLAN build its blue water navy.
China-Africa Security Radar posted on 26 October 2025 a commentary titled "Strategic Subcontracting: Could This Be China's New Maritime Strategy in the Indian Ocean?"
Pakistan has agreed to provide Somalia with comprehensive assistance to its navy, including general military training, officer education at Pakistan's staff and war colleges, vessel maintenance, equipment modernization, and technology transfer. Pakistan is also heavily dependent on Chinese military equipment and platforms and is deeply embedded in China's strategic frameworks.
This arrangement with Somalia has raised the question, especially in India, if Beijing is behind Pakistan's naval support for the Somali navy as a way to subcontract strategically.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) published on 24 October 2025 a commentary titled "Retooling the Trump Administration's Somalia Policy."
Somalia has posed a dilemma for US policy for decades. The ICG urges the US to push Somalia's politicians to engage in good faith dialogue aimed at ending the chronic political infighting in the country. It should use its influence to encourage a reconciliation between Somalia and Puntland and help establish a modus vivendi between Somalia and Somaliland. Finally, it should urge Mogadishu to consider preparing steps toward a conversation with al-Shabaab about ending the war.
Ethiopia Insight published on 24 October 2025 an article titled "Egypt's Expanding Footprint in Somalia" by Sacad Kahin, security manager at the East African Storage Terminal in Berbera, Somaliland.
The author argues that Egypt is increasing its influence in Somalia in order to reassert its primacy along the Red Sea corridor and constrain landlocked Ethiopia's rise before it secures an outlet to the sea.
The Robert Lansing Institute (RLI) posted on 24 October 2025 remarks titled "Vacuum of Influence: Western Withdrawal and the Rise of New Powers in Africa."
RLI asked me to respond to several questions dealing with Russia's effort to increase its influence in Africa and why the West is losing influence on the continent. This piece is my response to the questions.
This is an updated version of my China-Africa bibliography that I began in 2006. It now consists of 387 pages. It is intended to serve as a resource for anyone interested in China-Africa studies.
The Emirates Policy Center posted on 24 October 2025 the English-language version of a study titled "China Exempts African Exports from Tariffs: Opportunities and Challenges for Gulf Countries."
China's decision to give full tariff exemptions for African exports could provide targeted benefits to specific sectors and countries. Some estimates suggest the tariff exemption could increase African exports to China from $170 billion annually to $250 billion. China's non-tariff barriers will continue, however, to limit imports from Africa.
Gulf state exporters may be able to re-export their products to China through Africa. Higher tariffs on African goods imposed by the Trump administration combined with China's elimination of tariffs creates favorable conditions for China to expand its influence in Africa.
Comment: While Beijing's decision should provide modest benefits for African countries, the fact remains that China has a significant trade surplus with Africa and this is not likely to change. Other than natural resources and some agricultural products, Africa just does not offer China exports that it wants to buy. China's elimination of tariffs will not make African value added and manufactured products sufficiently competitive in the Chinese market.
