Don’t ignore Somalia

Mwangi S. Kimenyi (pictured), senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, laid out the case for increased international attention to Somalia in a Feb. 4, 2010, analysis.

Published by the Brookings Institution, Kimenyi's essay summarizes the challenges facing Somalia and concludes that it is "like a tick that kills a big animal." Somalia can destabilize an entire region and endanger the international community. You can access the analysis, titled "Fractionalized, Armed and Lethal: Why Somalia Matters" here.

Critique of party-owned businesses in Ethiopia

Ethiopia allows foundations that are controlled by political parties to own enterprises that compete with the private sector. The most important of these organizations is the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT) controlled by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the party of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.

In a January 31, 2010, critical analysis of this system titled "The Rise of an Ethnic Oligarchy" (PDF file), Genet Mersha questions whether organizations like EFFORT are in the best interest of Ethiopia’s national development.

Image: "TPLF Museum, Mekele, Tigray," creative commons licensed Flickr content.

Another al-Shabaab announcement that probably doesn't represent any significant change in Somalia

The BBC Focus on Africa program asked me to comment yesterday on the announcement by the Somali extremist organization, al-Shabaab, that it must join officially with al Qaeda to confront "international crusaders and their aggression against Muslim people."

I responded that al-Shabaab has claimed to have a link with al Qaeda for more than a year. This announcement is an effort to formalize something that already existed in principle. It remains to be seen if this will result in more support, for example more foreign fighters, and direction from al Qaeda.

There might be a situation where al-Shabaab begins to look like a group primarily active in Algeria known as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The al-Shabaab announcement could even result eventually in a name change to something like al Qaeda in Somalia. The announcement probably does not portend any significant change of activity in Somalia, where al-Shabaab strongly opposes the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union troops in Mogadishu from Uganda and Burundi that support the TFG.

On the other hand, it may have an impact on countries in the region. Al-Shabaab might try to carry out attacks in neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia and against Uganda and Burundi, which provides troops for the African Union in Mogadishu.

Once al-Shabaab establishes a formal link with al Qaeda, there almost certainly will be a greater effort by the West in general and the United States in particular to counter al-Shabaab. African countries in the region may also step up their activity against al-Shabaab.

Analysis of the failure to end the conflict in Darfur

The Small Arms Survey, an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, published in January 2010 an analysis of the failure to achieve peace in Darfur.

Written by Julie Flint, a journalist and Sudan researcher, it is called "Rhetoric and Reality: The Failure to Resolve the Darfur Conflict" (PDF file). The paper examines mediation efforts since the talks in Abuja, Nigeria, and suggests why they have failed.

The study notes that since the end of the Abuja negotiations in 2006, and the collapse of the agreement concluded there, the largest humanitarian operation in the world has kept hundreds of thousands of Darfurians alive and the region has settled into a confused, usually low-level conflict of all against all. But efforts to reach the sustainable political agreement that eluded Abuja have made no progress.

Among Flint’s key findings are:

• Neither the government nor the armed movements have relinquished the military option and committed fully to peace. While international management of the peace process has been flawed, the absence of will among the Sudanese themselves is the key reason for the failure of peacemaking efforts.
• External involvement in peacemaking has itself been a driver of conflict. A multiplicity of mediators and conflicting agendas has allowed the government and armed movements to appear to cooperate without in fact doing so.
• The subordination of peacemaking to peacekeeping, driven in part by advocacy campaigns to 'save' Darfur through military intervention and/or robust peacekeeping, has hardened rebel intransigence and strengthened the government’s belief that the West has a half-hidden agenda of regime change.

Image: Creative commons licensed content by Flickr user marrngtn (Manuel).

Interpeace emphasizes local peacemaking in Somalia

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington hosted a session on Jan. 28, 2010, about local peace making in Somalia that highlighted the efforts of Interpeace, a non-governmental organization dedicated to local level peace making around the world. This organization has done some excellent work in Somalia. It operates on the assumption that peace is sustainable only if it is owned by the local people. Interpeace only works through local organizations.

I recommend the organization’s most recent research concerning Somalia. You can access "A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988" in PDF format here. In order to see "The Search for Peace: A Synthesis Report of the Peace Mapping Study" for Somalia, visit visit this link (PDF). Finally, Issue 21 of Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives edited by Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy is devoted to Somalia and titled "Whose Peace Is It Anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking." This issue contains an informative series of essays and interviews on the peace process in Somalia. You can access it here.

Quote on Libya's Qaddafi in Bloomberg

I'm quoted in Jason McLure's Bloomberg story "Libya’s Qaddafi May Plunge African Union Summit Into Conflict."

Here's my quote:

"I think Qaddafi has had grand ideas from the day he took power in Libya," said David Shinn a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, in a Jan. 27 phone interview. "During his incumbency at the African Union I think he continued to propagate those ideas maybe knowing full well they were not going to come to fruition."

Image: "Muammar al-Gaddafi pictured at the 12th African Union summit February.02.2009 in Addis Ababa." Flickr Creative Commons-licensed content.

One year anniversary for Somali president

Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed celebrates one year as president of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as of January 2010. The Somali service of the Voice of America asked me on January 28, 2010, to comment on this anniversary and whether his stewardship has been a success or failure.



I noted that many observers were suggesting only six months ago that the TFG under President Ahmed would not be in existence by the end of 2009. He is still standing, and the TFG seems to be in a somewhat stronger position today than it was just a few months ago. In my view, the biggest mistake the TFG made in its first nine months was to spend so much time traveling around the region and the world seeking sources of funding. This was time that President Ahmed and senior TFG officials should have been on the ground in Somalia developing credibility with the Somali people. In the process, the TFG did not obtain much funding and lost a lot of valuable time.

The TFG seems to have learned this lesson in recent months and has been devoting more time to resolving issues in Somalia. For this, it deserves a lot of credit.

Image: "Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, President of the Somali Republic, addresses the general debate of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly.
25/Sep/2009. United Nations, New York. UN Photo/Marco Castro." Flickr Creative Commons-licensed content.

African conflicts and choices for U.S. diplomacy

The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the American Academy of Diplomacy co-hosted a conference on October 29, 2009, to examine the role of diplomacy in U.S. relations with Africa. The final report titled "African Conflicts and U.S. Diplomacy: Roles and Choices" (PDF file) appeared in January 2010. I made the presentation at the conference concerning the Horn of Africa.

The participants concluded that the United States faces a far more competitive environment in Africa than in previous decades, with emerging powers — most notably China, India, Brazil and a number of smaller Asian states — making major political and economic plays, and with regional organizations, transnational influences and African civil societies asserting themselves more and more in national affairs. As a result, the United States will need to identify how best to use its influence in Africa, which policy areas and places it should prioritize and how to balance effectively the use of diplomatic, military, and developmental tools.

The report picks out the major topics to emerge from the conference and presents a collage of the main opinions and the points of consensus that emerged.

Click here to listen to a recording of the conference.

President Barack Obama's State of the Union Address

I was struck by the relative absence of comment on the international situation. In view of the continuing economic problems in the United States and their impact on the upcoming elections, this was not surprising. Nevertheless, it was striking. I would not be surprised if the percentage of the president’s remarks on international affairs was the lowest for State of the Union speeches over the past decade. In a speech with so little emphasis on foreign affairs, it was also interesting that he singled out South Korea, Panama and Columbia.

Image: Official White House Photo by Pete Souza.

More recommendations for assuring peace in Sudan

The U.S. Institute of Peace issued a short paper on January 22, 2010 titled "Negotiating Sudan’s Post-Referendum Arrangements by Jon Temin, USIP’s Sudan program officer, which is based on meetings in Khartoum, Juba, Washington and elsewhere between August 2009 and January 2010.

These balanced and thoughtful suggestions merit close attention.

Recommendations for dealing with Somali piracy

Twenty-five scholars, diplomats, lawyers, military officers, shipping industry officials and other experts on maritime piracy and Somalia convened at the Harvard Kennedy School in December 2009 under the auspices of the World Peace Foundation as the Cambridge Coalition to Combat Piracy. The final product from this event was a policy brief titled "Combating Maritime Piracy" (PDF file).



I was one of the participants at the conference. While I agree with 90 percent of the recommendations, I take exception to several of them. My concerns follow.

1. Recommendation #10: "If local authorities are to take charge, they will need justice systems, policy forces, jails and so on. The forces of world order should assist local developmental and institutional building efforts that appear sincere and plausible."
   
   I have no problem with the recommendation itself, but disagree with part of the analysis that led to the recommendation. The analysis concludes that the leaders of al-Shabaab have been publicly critical of pirate operations because the pirates support separate sources of power and, supposedly, because Islam does not condone piracy.
   
   I am not aware that al-Shabaab has ever been critical of pirate operations and, in fact, there are a couple of reports that link elements of al-Shabaab with at least one of the pirate operations. The former Islamic Courts did a good job of clamping down on piracy. There is no evidence that al-Shabaab has made any effort to stop piracy.


2. Recommendation #11: "If African states and the AU can be persuaded to recognize the now independent but otherwise unacknowledged polity of Somaliland, doing so will strengthen the incentives for Puntland, which aspires to greater autonomy, and parts or all of the remainder of Somalia to make similar progress in terms of political institution building. Recognition of Somaliland will thus assist in strengthening accountability and governance in regions that are now pirate infected. Indeed, if Puntland knew that international engagement were possible, following on a full recognition of Somaliland, a powerful incentive would exist for Puntland to exert control over and reduce the threat from pirates on its soil."
   
   While I am sympathetic to Somaliland and believe African states and the AU should give serious consideration to its formal recognition, I fail to see the connection between this possibility and a positive impact on the situation in Puntland. On the contrary, it could encourage the further breakup of Somalia, which I do not believe is in the long-term interest of the Somali people or the United States. The legal background of Somaliland is totally different. Puntland and Somaliland also have conflicting claims on Sool and parts of Sanag regions.


3. Recommendation #14 (in part): "We also urge the forging of a compact among ocean carriers, insurance companies, individuals and states to cease paying ransoms. If every major shipping firm is on record forbidding the paying of ransoms, and/or if the leading maritime nations agree to deter their own firms from responding to ransom requests, the profits of piracy will ebb."
   
   In theory, this is a fine recommendation. It is totally unrealistic and only detracts from the many good recommendations in this policy brief. Once pirates capture a ship, they have the owners over a barrel. The owners must either pay the ransom or the pirates hold the ship and crew. What are the owners to do? I agree that no government should ever pay a ransom, but ship owners should be allowed to take whatever action they believe is in their best interest.


4. Recommendation #19: "Ocean carriers and flag states should agree publicly that reasonable force may be used to combat attacks. Indeed, the crews, along with high value and/or highly vulnerable cargo, may merit armed security. Flag states (or, if necessary, the ship owners or operators) should issue rules for the use of force and escalation of force policies. In that context, properly trained sharpshooters, under the direction of the ship’s master and with clear rules for the use of force, should be authorized to shoot when menacing skiffs approach within 300-400 yards of a target vessel and present an imminent threat to a vessel or its crew. Those sharpshooters should be prepared to continue firing, if necessary."
   
   This was perhaps the most controversial recommendation. Many of the participants favored a softer response. I was in a tiny minority that favored a tougher response when these pirate attacks occur in international waters. In most cases, pirates on fast approaching skiffs are firing AK-47s and RPGs at the bridge of the vessel singled out for capture in order to encourage the ship’s master to stop. If the attacked ship has an armed security team on board, it should be authorized to respond with live ammunition as soon as the pirates begin firing at the targeted ship and/or when the skiffs are within 300-400 yards. Nor do I see any reason why these teams must consist of "sharpshooters." If they are trained in the use of automatic weapons, that is sufficient. This more robust response will send a powerful message to the pirates and significantly raise the cost of their criminal business.


5. Recommendation #31: "Task Force 151 and Operation Ocean Shield should consider the feasibility of blockading known piracy bases along the Somali and Yemeni coasts. Systematic surveillance, advanced reconnaissance, and blockades—if they could be enforced—could prevent mother ships from plying their trade far out to sea, or in the Gulf of Aden. Legal authority should flow from new UN resolutions."
   
   I agree with the recommendation, but do not believe it is realistic. I don’t see any willingness to implement such a recommendation and, therefore, question including it in the policy brief.

Image: "U.S. Coast Guardsmen with Maritime Safety and Security Team 91104 and visit, board, search and seizure team members approach a rigid-hull inflatable boat during a simulated boarding in the Gulf of Aden near the guided-missile cruiser USS Anzio (CG 68) Aug. 26, 2009. Anzio is the flagship for Combined Task Force 151, a multinational task force established to conduct counter-piracy operations under a mission-based mandate to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. (DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Brian K. Fromal, U.S. Navy/Released)." Licensed through creative commons on Flickr.

Photos from my remarks to the Ethiopian American Youth Initiative at the Ethiopian Embassy

I joined representatives of the Ethiopian American Youth Initiative at a meeting in Washington on January 2, 2010, to encourage young Ethiopian-Americans to learn more about their homeland and to consider engaging in some positive way in Ethiopia. I was impressed by their enthusiasm and continuing interest in their country of origin. This event was strictly apolitical although it was criticized by some members of the diaspora because it took place at the Ethiopian embassy. As Samuel Gebru pointed out, the embassy belongs to all Ethiopians. You can read my remarks here.



Caption: "The Ethiopian American Youth Initiative held a public meeting in Washington, D.C. at the Embassy of Ethiopia on Saturday, January 2, 2010. The meeting featured Samuel Gebru, President of EAYI; David Shinn, former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia; Georgis Kefale, an Ethiopian physician; and Wondimu Asamnew, Ethiopia's charge d'affaires." Photo Credit: Rosa Pineda Photography.



Caption: "David Shinn, Ph.D., former United States Ambassador to Ethiopia, gives remarks on his involvement with Ethiopia, on how Ethiopian youth can contribute to the development of Ethiopia and what are some problems that need youth can become change agents for." Photo Credit: Rosa Pineda Photography.

Quote in Somaliland Press

The visit of Siilaano to the United States underscores the importance of proceeding on a timely basis with the often-postponed national elections.

I appreciate there are some technical issues that need clarification, but the longer the election is delayed, the more concerns Somaliland will raise among its friends outside the country. My comments and the posting of this article do not imply support for any candidate. What is important is moving forward with the democratic process in Somaliland.

Image from Somaliland Press.

Critical decisions in Sudan

The International Rescue Committee commissioned a report on Sudan by Edward Thomas, who worked in Sudan for several years as a teacher, human rights worker and researcher.

Dated January 2010 and titled “Decisions and Deadlines: A Critical Year for Sudan” (PDF file), the Chatham House Report discusses the upcoming January 2011 referendum in Southern Sudan that gives voters a choice between independent statehood or continued unity with Northern Sudan.

Although the SPLM initially committed to seeking the unity of Sudan, its senior leaders now voice a preference for secession as the referendum nears. The widespread Southern perception that the central government in Khartoum has failed to transform itself has strengthened the hand of the SPLM leadership in favoring secession. Many SPLM leaders privately express the view that any attempt to postpone the referendum will be a cause for war, according to Thomas.

Both parties have a history of bad faith and delay in negotiations. If the South secedes, the two parties will need to divide oil revenues, national infrastructure and decide on Nile water sharing. Nationality needs to be defined. Any new currency must come into circulation at a price that is sensitive to the interests of many different economic groups. Somaliland and Eritrea recently fought wars after secession because these issues were not addressed. Following secession, Eritrea fought a war with Ethiopia during 1998-2000 because some of these issues had not been dealt with in advance. Somaliland’s union with Somalia in 1960 and subsequent war between the two, led in 1991 to a unilateral declaration of independence by Somaliland, again because some basic issues had not been resolved in the beginning.

Thomas notes that these issues are not being discussed as the two sides turn their backs on their constituencies and ignore regional lessons in order to engage in brinkmanship over procedural questions.

Report on Muslim Brotherhood in Horn of Africa

The Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research published late in 2009 a study titled The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa" (PDF file).

Written by Stig Jarle Hansen and Atle Mesøy, it explores whether the Muslim Brotherhood can act as partners in the quest for development and peacemaking in the wider Horn of Africa (including Yemen). It explores the history of the various Brotherhoods in the wider Horn and finds that they have had the most impact in Somalia, Sudan and Yemen.

The report suggests that positive engagement, while taking the ideological foundation of the Brotherhood as well as the structure of various sub-groups into consideration, could benefit both the members of the Brotherhoods, Western partners and the local population, and enhance development efforts.

Image: "Hassan al-Banna: Charismatic Muslim leader and founder of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt" by Flickr user bismikaallahuma, creative commons licensed.