Foreign Policy published on 9 September 2025 an article titled "China's Appetite for Rosewood Is Causing Chaos in Africa" by Caroline Costello and Joshua Eisenman.
China imported an estimated $2 billion of rosewood from Africa between 2017 and 2022. Much of the logging for this rare timber is illegal. Extreme drought and flooding linked to the loss of rosewood trees have had devastating agricultural impacts.
Agence France Presse published on 5 September 2025 an article titled "Chinese Firms Pay Price of Jihadist Strikes against Mali Junta."
Jihadis linked to al-Qaeda have targeted all foreign companies in Mali in an effort to force the military junta to accept sharia law. Chinese operated gold and lithium operations have experienced the brunt of these attacks. Jihadis have kidnapped at least 11 Chinese nationals.
The Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey published in August 2025 a study titled "Putin's New Frontier: The Prospects and Limitations of Africa Corps" by Hanna Notte.
This timely and well researched study concludes that Russia's Africa Corps is a bureaucratic restructuring and rebranding of the Wagner Goup, which only continues to function in the Central African Republic. It employs many former Wagner mercenary fighters and has taken control of its recruitment infrastructure.
The Africa Corps is tethered closer to the Russian military's chain of command. It prioritizes training and routine security assistance rather than the high-risk missions of the Wagner Group. It apparently relies on funding from Russia's state budget. The Africa Corps might face future competition from countries such as Turkey, Iran, and China.
Foreign Policy published on 3 September 2025 an article titled "Prigozhin's Ghost Haunts Africa Corps" by Christopher Faulkner, US Naval War College.
The Central Africa Republic (CAR) stands as the sole remaining foothold of the Wagner Group. Its successor, the Africa Corps, is replacing it, but so far it has served as little more than a praetorian guard for autocrats seeking regime survival and deeper relations with Russia. Moscow has even asked the CAR to cut ties with the Wagner Group and sign a contract with the Africa Corps, which will pose serious challenges for Russia's policy on the continent.
Al-Estiklal published on 29 August 2025 an article titled "Sahel States and Russia Establish Strategic Partnership: Messages and Objectives."
In mid-August, Russia invited the defense ministers of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to Moscow to discuss strengthening security ties. Russia reportedly is prepared to provide comprehensive support to these countries as they battle terrorist threats and armed groups. The meeting also signaled the transfer of security support from Russia's Wagner Group to its Africa Corps replacement.
The Sentry published in August 2025 a report titled "Mercenary Meltdown: The Wagner Group's Failure in Mali."
Wagner Group forces were unable to take control of areas in the north and center of Mali where armed terrorist and separatist groups continue to challenge Malian security forces. There has been a significant increase in attacks on civilians and in civilian casualties since Wagner's arrival in Mali, and this, in turn, has severely undermined relations between the Malian military and the Malian public.
The Wagner Group became more reactive and violent, allowing the terrorist groups they were hired to neutralize to gain more control and increase recruitment in Mali. Wagner failed in its task of eliminating terrorist groups in Mali. Its deployment in Mali has not been a worthwhile investment for any party involved. Russia's Africa Corps is replacing the Wagner Group.
Pressreader reprinted a South China Morning Post article dated 16 August 2025 titled "China Arms Burkina Faso in Sahel Drive" by Jevans Nyabiage.
Burkina Faso has received at least 4 major consignments of arms from China since early 2024. The latest delivery included VN22B fire support vehicles, PLL-05 120mm self-propelled gun mortar systems, and SR5 rocket launch systems.
The CTC Sentinel published in its August 2025 issue an article titled "Understanding China's New Counterterrorism Ambitions in Africa" by Jason Warner.
The author argues that despite ostensible rationales related to self-defense of economic interests and solidarity with African states, at its core, Beijing's primary motivations for entering the African counterterrorism space are to diversify its means of influence in Africa beyond its historical economics first approach.
Beijing likely believes it has a new genre of counterterrorism assistance--less kinetic, more economic, and rooted in equitable partnerships--that represents a fundamentally new and productive means of gaining influence in Africa.
Ghana's Citi Newsroom posted on 11 August 2025 an article titled "Troubled Skies: Spotlight on China's Z-9 Helicopter after Ghana's Tragedy" by Kobina Welsing.
A crash of a Ghana Air Force Z-9 helicopter manufactured by China's Harbin Aircraft Industry Group resulted in the death of 8 persons, including two government ministers. A series of other incidents in Africa involving the Z-9 is raising questions about its performance.
Defence Web posted on 5 August 2025 an article titled "Mali Receives CS/VP14 Armoured Vehicles from China" by Guy Martin.
The Malian Armed Forces has taken delivery of Chinese armored personnel carriers manufactured by Norinco as part of its campaign to combat terrorist groups.
The China Global South Project published on 26 July 2025 an article titled "Chinese, Iranian and Turkish Drones Fuel Africa's New Era of Low-cost Warfare" by Celia Lebur and Mathieu Rabechault.
Some 30 African governments have acquired drones, giving them access to more affordable air power. China, Turkey, and Iran sell them without any political conditionality. They are often used to defeat internal dissident movements.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 30 June 2025 an analysis titled "The Limits to China's Transactional Diplomacy in Africa" by Paul Nantulya.
After supporting the democratically elected government in Niger, China has become the main financial backer of the military regime that overthrew the democratic government. Beijing's transactional approach to Niger has turned sour. Jihadism is thriving in Niger, including attacks on China's oil investment. Niger is also having difficulty repaying its debt to China.
The South China Morning Post published on 22 June 2025 an article titled "Routine or Rising Tensions? Chinese Ambassadors in Exodus from West African Nations" by Jevans Nyabiage.
Chinese ambassadors in Senegal, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger returned to Beijing at about the same time. It raises the question whether their return was coincidental or is intended to send some kind of subtle message to the region.
The London School of Economics and Political Science blog posted on 11 June 2025 a commentary titled "Military Takeovers in West Africa Are Reshaping Diplomatic Ties" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah and Christian Kaunert, both at Dublin City University.
Military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have upended democratic governance, enabling China to deepen economic and strategic engagement as Western influence wanes. At the same time, there is growing concern over China's policies on debt and labor relations.
AEI's Critical Threats published on 12 June 2025 an analysis titled "Wagner Out, Africa Corps In" by Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson.
Russia's Wagner Group formally withdrew from Mali and transitioned the Russian military presence to the Africa Corps. As the Wagner Group pulls out of Mali, al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated insurgents are stronger than ever.
Russia is also trying to transition from the Wagner Group to the Africa Corps in the Central African Republic. Responsibility for Russian operations in Africa will now rest squarely with the Kremlin although Russian billionaire Gennady Timchenko may play a key role in the operations.
Foreign Affairs published on 2 June 2025 an article titled "The War on Trees: How Illegal Logging Funds Cartels, Terrorists, and Rogue Regimes" by Justyna Gudzowska and Laura Ferris.
China is a major player in the global illegal logging industry. Much of the timber comes from Africa. Without a concerted effort by China to stop the trade, demand will ensure that it continues. The United States is complicit in that American consumers purchase many of the Chinese products manufactured with illegal timber.
The Associated Press published on 12 May 2025 an article titled "Armed Group Mounts Double Attack on Artisanal Mining Site in Mali, Leaving 3 Dead and Abducting 2" by Baba Ahmed.
An armed group, possibly associated with al-Qaeda, attacked a mining site in southern Mali on 12 May. They kidnapped two Chinese nationals and burned their heavy machinery used in gold mining.
The South China Morning Post published on 19 April 2025 an article titled "How China Is Filling a Weapons Supply Gap in Africa's Sahel Left by France and Russia" by Jevans Nyabiage.
As France and Russia lose arms supply market share in the Sahel region of Africa, China is stepping in to fill the gap. China offers a large variety of weapons of reasonable quality, fast delivery, and low prices.
Foreign Policy published on 31 March 2025 a commentary titled "Are China and Russia on a Collision Course in Africa?" by Jessica Moody.
China and Russia, although committed to countering Western influence, have fundamentally different objectives in Africa. China seeks political stability to protect and advance its economic investments. Russia thrives on instability and insecurity on the continent. The two countries typically do not work together in Africa but keep out of each other's way.
The Washington Post published on 11 March 2025 an article titled "Russia's Wagner Mercenaries Are Leading a Campaign of Terror in Mali" by Rachel Chason and Sarah Cahlan.
An estimated 1,500 Wagner Group mercenaries are fighting alongside Malian forces to defeat an al-Qaeda-affiliated organization. In the process, the Wagner Group mercenaries are engaging in draconian practices that are driving ordinary Malians to neighboring Mauritania. Malian refugees who have arrived in Mauritania since 2023 said it was attacks by Mali's military and its Russian allies--not Islamist militants--that made them flee.
The Malian government pays about $10 million a month for Wagner's services. Russia has also been awarded concessions at several gold mines, giving it a material stake in Mali's security.
