France 24 posted on 30 August 2026 an article titled "Niger Junta Puts Down Mutiny with Help from Russia's Africa Corps."
Niger authorities thwarted a mutiny by young soldiers on 28-29 August with the help of Russia's Africa Corps. Moscow's ambassador to Niger said the military government requested help, and the mutineers were "neutralised particularly thanks to the intervention of Africa Corps."
Military Africa posted on 26 August 2026 an article titled "Algeria Likely Buyer of Russia's New IL-78 Aerial Tanker" by Israel Chukwuma.
Algeria's Air Force may be the first buyer of Russia's IL-78MK-90A aerial refueling tanker, adding to its Russian-supplied fleet. Algeria devoted $25.4 billion to military spending in 2025, the highest amount for any country in Africa.
Defence Web published on 18 August 2026 an article titled "Cote d'Ivoire Boosts Military Capabilities with New Chinese Patrol Vessels and Drones" by Armand Liebenberg.
Cote d'Ivoire recently took possession of two Chinese donated Predator-class coastal patrol vessels and purchased at least two advanced Chinese-made Wing Loong II drones. China earlier supplied Cote d'Ivoire with 9 assault vehicles and 27 armored personnel carriers.
Business Insider Africa published on 11 August 2026 an article titled "China Delivers Its Famous Wing Loong II Combat Drones to Another African Country in Growing Challenge to America's MQ-9 Reaper" by Olamilekan Okebiorun.
Nigeria, Morocco, and Algeria previously received China's Wing Loong II combat drones. It is a lower cost alternative to the US-produced MQ-1 Predator and the MQ-9 Reaper drones.
Military Africa recently posted the "Africa Drone Procurement Report 2026." The dataset comprises 234 procurement records across 34 African nations from at least 21 supplier countries spanning 1980 to 2026. During this period, it identified 1,959 drone units obtained by African countries. From 2020 to 2026, African countries procured 1,054 drone units or 53 percent of the total since 1980.
China was the leading supplier at 587 drones or just under 30 percent of the total procured in Africa. Its Wing Loong armed drones and Rainbow CH series drones went primarily to Egypt (126 units), Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (80), Nigeria (72), Ethiopia (57), and Algeria (49). Chinese drones appeared extensively in active combat zones (Libya, Ethiopia, and Sudan). They are particularly favored for their low cost, availability, and lack of human rights conditionality.
The next most important suppliers after China are Israel (325 drones), Türkiye (291), US (247), and locally manufactured (216). Iran and Russia supply drones to active conflict-zone actors through more opaque channels. Israeli drones have gone primarily to Morocco, with smaller numbers to Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia, and Libya's Government of National Unity.
Thierry Pairault just posted a paper titled "The Tariff Exemption Saga and the Results for the First Half of 2026."
China's zero tariff policy for all countries in Africa except Eswatini took effect on 1 May. During the first half of 2026 Africa's trade deficit with China widened from $44.7 billion to $57.9 billion as of the end of the first half of 2026 compared with the first half of 2025. Chinese exports to Africa rose by 21.8 percent and imports from Africa by 16.3 percent compared with the same period in 2025.
Eight African countries (South Africa, DRC, Zambia, South Sudan, Nigeria, Chad, Algeria, and Zimbabwe) accounted for about 94 percent of the increase in Chinese imports from Africa during this period. Almost the entire increase in the value of African exports to China was due to the shock in world commodity prices, largely independent of the zero-tariff policy.
The Torino World Affairs Institute published in 2026 a study titled "The Sino-Moroccan Rapprochement: An Analysis of Geoeconomic Convergence, Diplomatic Calibration and Media Narratives in a Changing Maghreb" by Bianca Pasquier and Imane Ezzehouany, edited by Amanda Chen and Leonardo Bruni.
The study concludes that by deepening its engagement with China, Morocco is reengineering its agency and room for maneuver while maintaining its traditional ties with the United States and Europe. China's economic presence in the Kingdom, albeit still limited compared to European and Gulf partners in overall investment terms, has rapidly expanded in industrial sectors critical for the green transition and the restructuring of global value chains.
Defence Security Asia posted on 25 June 2026 an article titled "Algeria's J-10C and KJ-500 Deal Signals China's Biggest Air Power Breakthrough."
Algeria is apparently prepared to buy Chinese Chengdu J-10C multirole fighters and Shaanxi KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft beginning in 2027. This acquisition would make Algeria's air force one of the most advanced air powers in the region and challenge Russia as the traditional supplier of its air force.
Min.com posted on 25 June 2026 an article titled "China Won a Large Order in Algeria, 24 Pterosaur 2, Frigates and Anti-ship Missiles Are on the List."
Recent purchases of Chinese arms by Algeria include frigates, missile systems, and drones.
The China-Africa Security Radar posted on 19 June 2026 an article titled "China's Health Diplomacy in Africa: Health Security, Infrastructure, and Strategic Competition" by Lungani Hlongwa.
A small team of Chinese health experts has arrived in the Democratic Republic of Congo to help the country combat the Ebola outbreak. This is part of China's long standing health diplomacy in Africa, which follows familiar patterns as the United States cuts back its health care assistance and alters its approach.
Blitz published on 24 May 2026 an article titled "Africa's Growing Appetite for Russian Grain Signals a New Economic Reality" by M.A. Hossain.
Russian grain exports to Africa are expanding at an unprecedented pace because of competitive pricing and a desire by African countries to diversify sourcing.
GeopoWeb posted on 18 May 2026 an analysis titled "Africa, China, and Zero Tariffs: A Diplomatic Gesture Put to the Test by the Data" by Thierry Pairault.
Effective on May 1, China began a policy of zero tariffs on imports from all African countries except Eswatini, which recognizes Taiwan. Six African countries (South Africa, DRC, Angola, Guinea, Zambia, and Congo Brazzaville) now supply three quarters of China's imports from Africa. Most of these imports consist of minerals, metals, and crude oil, which already enter China duty free.
A modest quantity of African agricultural products will benefit from the zero-tariff policy. Landlocked African countries, which tend to be among the poorest, will receive little or no benefit from the zero-tariff policy because of transportation constraints. In addition, non-tariff barriers such as sanitary standards remain in effect. Thierry identifies several other barriers to increased African exports to China that will limit the impact of the zero-tariff policy. He also compares the impact of EU and Chinese imports from Africa.
Thierry concludes the zero-tariff policy has less to do with rebalancing trade between China and Africa than it is an effective diplomatic tool at little cost to China but also limited in its economic impact.
Defense News published on 30 April 2026 an article titled "Investigation: Russia Shadow Airlines Use Algeria as Base for Secretive Missions" by Linus Holler.
A fleet of Russian military-affiliated cargo aircraft is using Algeria as a hub to project Russia's power deeper into Africa and as far as Latin America. In return, Algeria is receiving Russia's latest fighter aircraft.
The ChinaMed Project published on 7 May 2026 an analysis titled "From Neutrality to Strategic Ambiguity: China and the Western Sahara Conflict" by Imane Ezzehouany, Bianca Pasquier, and Amanda Chen.
This analysis examines the evolution of China's position on the Western Sahara and the growing tension between diplomatic neutrality, geoeconomics, and geopolitical competition in the Maghreb. The rapid expansion of Sino-Moroccan relations in recent years raise questions whether Beijing may be adopting a calibrated ambiguity compatible with Morocco's autonomy plan, allowing China to safeguard its strategic interests without incurring meaningful political costs.
Ecofin Agency published on 27 April 2026 an article titled "China-Africa Trade in 2026: Cooperation, but Not on Equal Terms" by Idriss Linge.
As exports to the United States fall sharply, China is turning increasingly to Africa to export its consumer and industrial products. During the first quarter of 2026, China-Africa trade reached $92 billion, up 27 percent year on year. But while Chinese exports to Africa rose 32 percent, African exports to China increased by only 18 percent. Africa's trade deficit with China for the quarter reached $29 billion, nearly $10 billion higher than a year earlier.
The zero-tariff policy announced for Africa by Xi Jinping beginning 1 May 2026 is largely cosmetic and will make little difference in the trade relationship because 95 percent of African exports to China already enter the country duty free.
Global China Pulse published on 20 April 2026 an article titled "Queering Chinese in Africa: The Unintended Sexual Migration of Chinese Gay Men" by Cai Chen, Universite libre de Bruxelles.
In an unusual piece of research, the author examines the migration trajectories, motivations, and experiences of three self-identified gay Chinese men who have lived in one or more African country.
The Stimson Center published on 27 March 2026 a paper titled "How Iran War Is Reshaping China's Geo-Economic Cooperation with North Africa" by Chuchu Zhang, Fudan University.
The war in Iran and closure of the Strait of Hormuz have caused China to pursue a dual-track strategy of multi-source procurement and accelerated green transformation, deliberately broadening its oil and gas import footprint while fast tracking the development of new energy technologies. North Africa has emerged as a pivotal arena for deepened geo-economic cooperation.
Thierry Pairault posted a working paper on 30 March 2026 titled "Tarif zero: Bruxelles face a Pekin."
Beginning on 1 May 2026, China will implement a zero-tariff policy for African countries. Pairault argues that in the few sectors where the zero tariff could theoretically encourage African exports of processed or manufactured goods to China, Beijing has little interest in allowing them to develop as they would compete with actively protected industries. He then demonstrates that the import structures of the European Union and China shed light on this asymmetry.
Global Firepower has released its "2026 Military Strength Ranking" that evaluates 145 countries based on 60 factors in the categories of manpower, military equipment, finances, logistics, natural resources, and geography. The ranking included 38 of the 54 countries in Africa.
The ten highest ranked African countries were Egypt (19), Algeria (27). Nigeria (33), South Africa (40), Ethiopia (47), Morocco (56), Angola (59), DRC (64), Sudan (66), and Tunisia (79).
Gallup just released its "World Happiness Report 2026" that assesses 147 countries from 2023 through 2025. The 2026 edition highlights the role social media plays in social connection, trust, and shared experiences worldwide.
The happiest African countries based on the social media focus were Mauritius (73), Libya (81), Algeria (83), Mozambique (93), and Gabon (96). The least happy African countries were DRC (140), Botswana (143), Zimbabwe (144), Malawi (145), and Sierra Leone (146).
Comment: There are surprises, at least for me, at both ends of the scale. The focus on social media probably accounts for them
The Institute of Development Studies published in March 2026 a major study titled "Smart City Surveillance in Africa: Mapping Chinese AI Surveillance Across 11 Countries" edited by Wairagala Wakabi and Tony Roberts.
The report provides a comprehensive account of smart city surveillance in Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. China is by far the largest supplier of AI surveillance technologies to African governments, including to all 11 covered in this study.
The rapid expansion of smart city surveillance is having a chilling effect on ordinary citizens and journalists. The scale and invasive nature of mass surveillance is often not legal, necessary, or proportionate. There is little evidence that the expansion of digital surveillance reduces overall crime.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute published in March 2026 its "Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025" by Mathew George, Katarina Djokic, Zain Hussain, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman.
During the period 2021-2025, the largest supplier of major weapons to all of Africa was the United States (19 percent), followed by China (17 percent), and Russia (15 percent). Nearly all of the American weapons went to Morocco and Egypt. These percentages do not include small arms and light weapons, which would drive up percentages for China and Russia.
The largest supplier of major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa during this period was China (22 percent), Russia (12 percent), and Turkiye (11 percent). The three countries receiving the most major weapons were Nigeria (16 percent), Senegal (9 percent), and Mali (8 percent).
