New Lines Magazine published on 16 September 2026 an article titled "Somaliland's Uphill Struggle for Recognition in Washington" by Theophile Simon.
Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi is on a month-long visit to the United States in an effort to obtain diplomatic recognition by the Trump administration. While his chances of succeeding are not high, he may well obtain some commitments from Washington that will strengthen Somaliland's relations with the United States.
African Arguments published on 16 September 2026 a commentary titled "The Horn of Africa's Age of Permanent Conflict" by Matthew de Waal.
Foreign patrons have progressively co-opted economic and military architecture in the Horn of Africa. The Horn now faces a transformed conflict system in which the boundaries of war and peace, state and non-state, and domestic and external are breaking down. Drones have exacerbated the situation.
This is not a passing phase of instability but a structural recalibration of politics, with wars becoming harder to contain, distinguish from peace, and end.
CNN published on 12 September 2026 an article titled "'A F***-up of Epic Proportions': Blame Game Begins after Iran-backed Houthis' Lightning Advance Down Red Sea Coast" by Nic Robertson and Lauren Kent.
The quick seizure of strategic Red Sea coastline by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen has led to recriminations as to how it happened. There were no airstrikes by Saudi Arabia or the United States in support of Yemeni government forces to halt the Houthi advance. Yemen and the Red Sea now have the potential to become the second front in the Iran war.
Firstpost posted on 10 September 2026 a 15-minute podcast titled "'Abiy Ahmed Unlocks the Sea': How BRICS Is Ending Ethiopia's Landlocked Curse" with Alyson Le Grange.
A BRICS' summit will take place in New Delhi 12-13 September. As a recent member, Ethiopia hopes to use the occasion to advance its arguments for obtaining access to the Red Sea. This may not, however, be an ideal time or place to move this goal forward. Most BRICS' members will be reluctant to get in the middle of this controversial issue and Egypt, a member of BRICS, will oppose it.
The Washington Post posted on 5 September 2026 an article titled "Trove of Documents Reveals Alleged Chemical Weapons Stockpile in Sudan" by Greg Miller and Elizabeth Dwoskin.
The Sudan Armed Forces has built a secret stockpile of chemical weapons that senior military officials sought to conceal after chlorine bombs were used against the Rapid Support Forces. Sudan developed the weapons by diverting shipments of chlorine meant to provide safe drinking water, hiding warhead production sites on military bases, testing bombs in remote desert locations, and drawing up lists of targets where toxic gas could penetrate enemy defenses.
The UN Human Rights Council published on 1 September 2026 a report of the independent international fact-finding mission for Sudan titled "Fuelling Sudan's Conflict: Weapons, Fighters, and External Support Networks."
This is the most detailed UN report so far detailing external support for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). It discusses Columbian mercenaries supporting the RSF, including the launching of drones, and the assistance of individuals and entities in the UAE. It also identifies support received by the RSF from individuals or entities in Libya, Chad, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Puntland in Somalia. It identifies less external support for the SAF but notes the use of drones manufactured in Turkey.
It concludes that external support is sustaining military operations and expanding the capabilities of both the RSF and SAF, with grave consequences for civilians. Increasingly sophisticated drone capabilities enabled both sides to strike far beyond immediate front lines. The report called for the Security Council to extend the arms embargo now imposed on Darfur throughout Sudan.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 3 September 2026 an article titled "The Sudanese War Threatens to Regionalize" by Michael DeAngelo.
The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) conducted its first drone strikes on the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Chad, striking a 200-vehicle convoy 50 miles west of the Sudanese border, raising tensions with its neighbor. The drones reportedly destroyed dozens of vehicles. The SAF then attacked the remnants of the RSF convoy.
In the meantime, the RSF stepped up its attacks on SAF forces in Blue Nile State that borders Ethiopia.
Brookings published on 27 August 2026 a commentary titled "Don't Let the Iran War Distract the United States from Africa" by Landry Signe.
The Iran war risks distracting the United States from Africa when competition for critical minerals, trade, and alliances with African countries become more intense. China, France, Russia, UAE, and India are accelerating their engagement on the continent, meaning any American retreat will come at a high geopolitical opportunity cost.
Business Insider Africa published on 26 August 2026 an article titled "Russia and China Push Back as Trump Administration Seeks Arms Embargo Across Sudan" by Ayodeji Adegboyega.
The Trump administration is seeking to expand a two-decade-old UN arms embargo on Darfur to all of Sudan and to explicitly cover drones. China, Russia, and the Sudan Armed Forces faction all oppose the initiative.
The Economist published on 20 August 2026 an article titled "Somaliland Wants to Help Secure the Red Sea."
Somaliland's president says his country can help secure the Red Sea by offering military bases to global powers along its coastline. Somaliland is prepared to offer both the United States and Israel bases at the port of Berbera.
The Middle East Eye published on 19 August 2026 an article titled "UAE-backed Chinese Company Acquires Stake in Ethiopian Gold Mine Near Sudan War Zone" by Zecharias Zelalem and Oscar Rickett.
Last week, Canadian mining company Allied Gold sold a 9.2 percent stake to China's Zijin Gold International. This gives Zijin partial ownership of mines in Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and near Kurmuk in Ethiopia. The Kurmuk mine is in Ethiopia's Benishangul-Gumuz region, which hosts at least one base used by Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The UAE supports the RSF and is the main buyer of gold coming from both Sudan and Ethiopia.
The UAE's sovereign wealth fund has a major share in the parent company of Zijin Gold International and in Canada's Allied Gold. The Ethiopian gold mine puts Chinese, Canadian, and UAE interests close to the civil war between the RSF and the Sudan Armed Forces in Sudan's Blue Nile State and raises further questions about the UAE's role in the conflict.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 20 August 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured two district capitals in Blue Nile State on the Ethiopian border. The SPLM-N supported the RSF in one of the operations. The RSF likely launched its operations from Ethiopian territory. The RSF's advance in Blue Nile State distracts the Sudan Armed Forces from consolidating recent gains in central Sudan.
The International Crisis Group posted on 18 August 2026 an hour-long podcast titled "Sudan's Separation Fifteen Years Ago and Today's Disaster" with Alan Boswell, Alex de Waal, and Abdul Mohammed.
Alex de Waal and Abdul Mohammed review the background of South Sudan's independence from Sudan and the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki. They explained why negotiations ultimately failed to produce two viable states, and whether such coordinated high-level diplomacy is still possible in today's fragmented regional geopolitics.
Efforts to resolve the crises in Sudan and South Sudan today are experiencing greater involvement from the Gulf States and involve a larger number of competing actors. Mediation today is extremely difficult. The global environment is highly transactional. The situation also has the possibility of becoming a regional war. It is time for the African Union to step forward and play a stronger role in ending the conflicts.
The Economist published on 6 August 2026 an article titled "The Ruin of Sudan."
Based on a visit to Khartoum and Omdurman, the article shows the devastation caused by more than three years of war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. The SAF is now in control of the capital region.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 6 August 2026 an article titled "Red Sea" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.
Saudi Arabia announced on 30 July the formation of a Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance to protect shipping in the Red Sea and adjacent waterways following the Bab el-Mandeb Strait blockade of Saudi ships by the Houthi rebels in Yemen. So far, 14 nations have joined the task force.
The Doha, Qatar-based Middle East Council on Global Affairs published in February 2026 an open access E-book titled "The Red Sea: Divided by Water, United by Opportunities" edited by Dalia Ghanem, Mehari Taddele Maru, Luigi Narbone, and Carlo Palleschi.
This book provides a comprehensive analysis that breaks down the silos between Middle Eastern countries (MECs) and the Horn of Africa (HOA). It argues that it is impossible to understand the region's trajectory by looking at one side of the Red Sea in isolation and examines interactions between the MECs and the HOA. It seeks to align visions and identify concrete steps toward realizing the vision of a region that, though divided by waters, is united by opportunities.
The UK government published on 16 July 2026 a press release titled "UK Sanctions Illicit Gold Networks Fueling Sudan's War Amid Crisis around El Obeid."
The UK government announced sanctions targeting the conflict gold trade in Sudan, procurement networks, and financial facilitators that are fueling the civil war in Sudan. The sanctions focus primarily on the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and UAE-based companies, but they include the Sudan Armed Forces and one Hong Kong-based company.
Radio France Internationale posted on 3 August 2026 an article titled "Hundreds Flee Ethiopia to War-torn Sudan Following New Fighting in Tigray."
Hundreds of Ethiopians fled to Sudan following the outbreak of conflict on 1 August between federal government troops and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in western Tigray region. They joined thousands of Ethiopian refugees inside Sudan from the 2020-2022 war between the Ethiopian army and the TPLF.
The Congressional Research Service published on 21 July 2026 a brief titled "Yemen: Conflict, Red Sea Security, and U.S. Policy" by Christopher M. Blanchard.
In March 2025, the Trump administration designated the Iranian-backed Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization. On March 15, 2025, U.S. forces began a military campaign against the Houthis which the administration said was intended to compel them to end attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. The United States and the Houthis agreed to a truce in May 2025, which continues to hold.
The China Global South Project published on 31 July 2026 an analysis titled "Are Chinese and Turkish Drones Fueling Conflicts in Africa?" by Christian Geraud Neema Byamungu.
China and Türkiye are Africa's primary supplier of drones, which increasingly are used in conflict situations. Türkiye sells them directly to African militaries engaged in conflict, including in Libya, Sudan, DRC, and Rwanda. China sells them directly to both conflicting parties in the DRC and Rwanda but those used by Marshall Haftar's army in Libya and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan were transferred by the UAE.
The author concluded that while these drone sales do not start wars, both China and Türkiye insert themselves into pre-existing conflicts fueled by political rivalries, regional tensions, and economic interests.
