The Intel Drop posted on 31 March 2026 an article titled "Russia-Africa Summit: Russia's New Chapter on Africa Trade and Economic Collaboration" by Kester Kenn Klomegah.
If Russia intends to be a major player in Africa, it must open Russia to imports from Africa and increase significantly Russian foreign direct investment in the continent. Otherwise, it will increasingly fall behind the economic engagement efforts of China, the United States, and India.
Caixin Global published on 17 March 2026 an article titled "Chinese Supertanker Changes Route and Takes Oil Without Passing through Hormuz."
A Chinese supertanker originally scheduled to load crude oil in the UAE rerouted to the Saudi Arabian Red Sea port of Yanbu. Other vessels are taking a similar action, causing a bottleneck at the port, which is served by an oil pipeline with limited capacity.
Afro Barometer posted on 27 February 2026 a survey titled "Popular Perceptions of Russia Lag Even as Its Influence grows Across Africa" by Aubrey Ghambi, Alfred Kwadzo, and Carolyn Logan.
While most of the analysis is about the position of Russia in Africa, this survey of 38 African countries found that China received the best marks on positive influence (62 percent). The United States has fallen behind at 52 percent positive rating, the European Union at 50 percent, India 39 percent, and Russia 36 percent. The negative perceptions were more similar with China (17 percent), US (20 percent), EU (17 percent), India (20 percent), and Russia (23 percent).
Semafor published on 2 March 2026 an article titled "China's Media Push in Africa Has Largely Failed, Analysts Say" by Jeronimo Gonzalez.
Although Africans perceived China's influence positively in a recent Afro Barometer poll, a Nigerian analyst believes Beijing's multi-billion media campaign to attract an audience has largely failed. African audiences still prefer news from the West.
Comment: The fact remains that the Afro Barometer poll of 29 countries indicates Africans have a more positive perception of China's influence in Africa than of US or EU influence. The negative perception of all three is about the same.
Modern Diplomacy published on 27 February 2026 a commentary titled "Africa's Rise: The 21st Century Story that Leaves Russia Behind" by Kester Kenn Klomegah, an independent researcher.
Russia has focused on a limited part of Africa. About 80 percent of its trade is with North African countries and South Africa. It has sent the Africa Corps to Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. But it has largely ignored the rest of the continent.
Discovery Alert posted on 1 March 2026 an analysis titled "China Becomes World's Leading Chrome Processor Overtaking South Africa" by Muflih Hidayat.
Ferrochrome production, which is essential for stainless steel, requires consistent, energy-intensive processing. Although South Africa is the source of much of the world's chrome ore, China's coal-based power generation is more reliable and cheaper than South Africa's electricity. Consequently, processing of the ore has shifted from South Africa to China.
The Emirates Policy Center posted on 27 February 2026 an analysis titled "The Economics of Deterrence: How Corridors and Alliances Are Reshaping Geopolitics" by Ebtesam AlKetbi.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are frameworks for redistributing centers of gravity and influence, diversifying states' strategic options, and embedding long-term investment commitments.
The world is shifting from rigid alignments to flexible alliances that integrate economy and technology with digital and maritime security. Power is no longer defined solely by territorial control but by the management of flows--trade, energy, data, and capital. A state that positions itself as a central node within these networks gains strategic weight.
In the Indian Ocean region, both the Indian-led IMEC and the better known and more expansive Chinese BRI are efforts to achieve these objectives.
Mizzima, a non-profit foundation that supports social change and development in Myanmar, published on 28 January 2026 a commentary titled "Weaponising the Trawl: China's Maritime Militia, Distant-Water Fishing, and the Strategic Contest in the Indian Ocean."
Chinese fishing fleets maintain a massive presence in the Indian Ocean region. What appears on the surface as fishing is, in practice, a grey-zone strategy, blending economic exploitation, intelligence gathering, and coercive presence to reshape the maritime realities without triggering open conflict.
In addition, see Sweekriti Pathak's "Fishing and Force: China's Dark Fleets and Maritime Militias" dated 29 January 2026 published by India's Observer Research Foundation.
The Diplomat published on 27 January 2026 a commentary titled "BRICS Holds a Maritime Exercise at the Indo-Atlantic Crossroads - Without India" by Vrinda Malik, University of Delhi.
The BRICS--China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the UAE--held a maritime exercise in South African waters in January. This was the first time the BRICS expanded into the security domain.
India was the only member to totally absent itself from the naval exercise, suggesting a refusal to be part of a security exercise led by China. Enduring China-India rivalry limits the BRICS' ability to emerge as a cohesive force capable of shaping a new world order.
The Diplomat published on 16 January 2026 an analysis titled "The New Age of Maritime Multilateralism in the Indian Ocean" by Gayathry Gopal, KCC Institute of Law, Greater Noida.
The Indian Ocean is not dominated by a single power but by a multitude of actors of varying capabilities and interests, thereby making the emerging order not only polycentric but also highly fragile. India is the resident and traditional security provider. The United States has a strong presence in the Indian Ocean.
No actor, however, matches China in the scale and pace of its expansion. It now has embassies in all Indian Ocean littoral states, participates in all regional organizations, has invested in some 17 ports around the rim of the Indian Ocean, and has a permanent military base in Djibouti.
Increasingly, smaller states are engaging in the region. This interplay of great power competition and small states' quest for influence has produced a polycentric security order that is dynamic and structurally fragmented.
Defence Worlds blog posted on 22 January 2026 an article titled "South African Firm's Attempt to Sell P-8A Poseidon-style Simulators to China Raises Serious Strategic and Export Control Concerns."
A South African aviation training company attempted to export maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare simulators modeled on the Boeing P-8A Poseidon to China. The U.S. Department of Justice has taken legal action to stop the indirect transfer of sensitive technology. The transfer has significant implications for India, which is one of the largest operators of the P-81 Neptune, a variant of the P-8A.
Aljazeera published on 23 January 2026 an article titled "Why Is South Africa Upset about Iran Joining BRICS Naval Drills?" by Shola Lawal.
A BRICS naval exercise in South Africa that included 3 warships from Iran as its government crushed protestors at home sparked a sharp rebuke from the United States, prompted internal debates in South Africa, and caused India to point out that BRICS was not established to host war games.
Armada International posted on 20 January 2026 an article titled "China and Russia in BRICS Naval Exercise Hosted by South Africa -- Iran Drops Out" by David Oliver.
South Africa hosted from 9 to 16 January a naval exercise for BRICS member states. China and Russia sent warships that participated. Iran sent three ships but was asked to drop out after their arrival. The UAE sent a naval vessel that did not participate. Brazil and India chose not to send ships.
The ships that participated conducted drills on communication, formation maneuver, maritime strike, hijacked vessel rescue, helicopter-borne casualty transfer and treatment.
Comment: If one of the goals of the BRICS is to create a military alliance, this event did not offer a good omen.
The Indian website Firstpost published on 16 January 2026 a commentary titled "China Recalibrates Its Africa Outreach: Insights from Wang Yi's Tour" by Gurgit Singh, former Indian ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, ASEAN, and the Africa Union.
China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi has just completed a visit to Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Lesotho and skipped Somalia at the last minute. Wang Yi's visit demonstrated that China is adjusting its methods in Africa to reflect debt fatigue, security volatility, and intensifying great power competition.
Aljazeera published on 11 January 2026 an article titled "BRICS Wargames: Why They Matter, Why India Opted Out" by Yasraj Sharma.
Weeklong naval drills involving BRICS' members China, Russia, Iran, and the UAE opened in the waters off South Africa. China and Iran sent destroyers, Russia and the UAE sent corvettes, and South Africa deployed a mid-sized frigate. Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, and Ethiopia joined the drills as observers. India chose not to participate. The Trump administration accused some BRICS members of pursuing anti-American policies.
The BBC published on 25 November 2025 an article titled "Ethiopian Volcano Eruption Sends Ash to Delhi, Hitting Flight Operations" by Abhishek Dey.
An Ethiopian volcano dormant for several thousand years recently erupted sending an ash column to India, where it interrupted air travel.
Independent Online published on 14 November 2025 an article titled "'What Snub?' Analyst Dismisses Claims China Is Snubbing South Africa over President Xi's G20 Absence" by Jonisayi Maromo.
China's President Xi Jinping will not attend the G-20 summit in Johannesburg this month. Vice President Li Qiang will represent Beijing, which expressed strong support for both the summit and South Africa's leadership of the organization this year. Unlike the United States, which is boycotting the summit, China insists that this decision does not constitute a snub of South Africa.
China-Africa Security Radar posted on 26 October 2025 a commentary titled "Strategic Subcontracting: Could This Be China's New Maritime Strategy in the Indian Ocean?"
Pakistan has agreed to provide Somalia with comprehensive assistance to its navy, including general military training, officer education at Pakistan's staff and war colleges, vessel maintenance, equipment modernization, and technology transfer. Pakistan is also heavily dependent on Chinese military equipment and platforms and is deeply embedded in China's strategic frameworks.
This arrangement with Somalia has raised the question, especially in India, if Beijing is behind Pakistan's naval support for the Somali navy as a way to subcontract strategically.
BusinessTech published on 16 October 2025 an article titled "China's Largest Car Company Unveils Big Plans for South Africa" by Luke Fraser.
China's BYD, he world's largest maker of new energy vehicles, plans to open hundreds of charging stations in South Africa. It is also looking to expand its solar coverage across the country.
Foreign Policy Watchdog posted on 16 October 2025 a commentary titled "The Alckmin Accord: Redefining Strategic Alignment in the Indian Ocean."
Brazil's Vice President Geraldo Alckmin visited India and reportedly solidified a strategic Indian Ocean alliance built on mutual economic benefit and collaborative defense strategies. This alliance developed as a counter to growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. All three countries are members of BRICS.
