Maritime Multilateralism in the Indian Ocean

 The Diplomat published on 16 January 2026 an analysis titled "The New Age of Maritime Multilateralism in the Indian Ocean" by Gayathry Gopal, KCC Institute of Law, Greater Noida.  

The Indian Ocean is not dominated by a single power but by a multitude of actors of varying capabilities and interests, thereby making the emerging order not only polycentric but also highly fragile.  India is the resident and traditional security provider.  The United States has a strong presence in the Indian Ocean.  

No actor, however, matches China in the scale and pace of its expansion.  It now has embassies in all Indian Ocean littoral states, participates in all regional organizations, has invested in some 17 ports around the rim of the Indian Ocean, and has a permanent military base in Djibouti.

Increasingly, smaller states are engaging in the region.  This interplay of great power competition and small states' quest for influence has produced a polycentric security order that is dynamic and structurally fragmented.  

China-India Competition in the Western Indian Ocean

 Stimson published on 20 August 2025 a commentary titled "India Must Level Up to Compete with China in the Western Indian Ocean" by Radhey Tambi.

The author argues that India is falling behind China's influence in the Western Indian Ocean and needs to step up its diplomatic, political, institutional, military, economic, and soft power engagement with the island countries if it intends to compete with Beijing.  

Contest for the Indian Ocean

 The July 2025 issue of Asia Policy contains a book review roundtable of Darshana M. Baruah's book titled The Contest for the Indian Ocean and the Making of a New World Order (Yale University Press 2024).  The focus of the book is great power competition and the role of the island countries in the Indian Ocean.

The roundtable consists of the following brief discussions:

--Power Asymmetry and Competition in the Indo-Pacific: The Island States of the Indian Ocean by Frederic Grare.

--Prioritizing the Indian Ocean in the Indo-Pacific by Nilanthi Samaranayake.

--The Agency of Island States in the Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean by Isabelle Saint-Mezard.

--The Island States Have Agency in the Contest for the Indian Ocean--But How? by Pradeep Taneja.

--Opening, Broadening, and Deepening the 'Geo' in the Geoppolitics of the Indian Ocean by Sanjay Chaturvedi.

--Author's Response: Reframing the Indian Ocean Debate by Darshana M. Baruah.

China and India Compete in Indian Ocean

 The Diplomat published on 14 March 2024 a commentary titled "China and India's Intense Contest for Influence" by Jabin T. Jacob, Shiv Nadar University.

India has been closely watching Chinese actions in the Indian Ocean in island countries such as Maldives and Mauritius and has responded strongly in cases where its security was directly affected.  

China Maps Indian Ocean for Submarine Warfare

 The Washington Post published on 10 January 2024 an article titled "Chinese PLA-linked Vessels Map the Indian Ocean for Submarine Warfare" by Cate Cadell.

The Indian Ocean is critical to China's strategic and economic interests, as well as its geopolitical rivalry with India.  Consequently, the Indian Ocean is fast becoming one of the biggest domains for Chinese oceanic surveys, which are ostensibly civilian in nature but tied to the People's Liberation Army and Beijing's military-civil fusion program -- a national strategic plan to advance China's military by acquiring technology and research from civilian groups.

Red Sea Attracting More Naval Vessels: Sri Lanka and Iran

 Maritime Insight published on 9 January 2024 an article titled "Sri Lanka to Send Naval Ship to Red Sea for Protecting Ships from Houthi Attacks."

The Sri Lankan Navy said it intends to send a naval vessel to the Red Sea to protect international maritime lanes from Houthi attacks.  The announcement seemed to suggest that the ship will become part of the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian.  

Foreign Policy published on 8 January 2024 an article titled "Red Sea Shipping Takes Another Blow from Iran" by Elisabeth Braw.

This article reports the arrival in the Red Sea of the Iranian frigate Alborz, which raises concerning questions about its intentions.  Iran supports the Houthis in Yemen and is believed to have provided most of the drones and missiles they are using to attack international shipping in the Red Sea.  Tehran has used the Alborz in the past to escort Iranian merchant vessels suspected of transporting arms to the Houthis.  

India and Australia Respond to China in the Indian Ocean

 The Foreign Policy Research Institute published on 6 November 2023 an analysis titled "Australia and India's New Military Bases: Responses to China's Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean" by Felix K. Chang.

The article outlines steps India and Australia are taking to counter a growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.  

Where Will China Locate Future Naval Bases?

 AidData, a research lab at William & Mary, published in July 2023 a study titled "Harboring Global Ambitions: China's Ports Footprint and Implications for Future Overseas Naval Bases" by Alexander Wooley, Sheng Zhang, Rory Fedorochko, and Sarina Patterson.  

At the moment, China's only naval base outside China is located in Djibouti.  The study provides a shortlist of the most likely basing options in the order in which they might be prioritized by Beijing.  Four of the eight ports on the short list are located in Africa.

The eight prospects in priority order are:

--Hambantota, Sri Lanka

--Bata, Equatorial Guinea

--Gwadar, Pakistan

--Kribi, Cameroon

--Ream, Cambodia

--Luganville, Vanuatu

--Nacala Mozambique

--Nouakchott, Mauritania

Chinese Port Construction and Overseas Naval Bases

 AidData, a research lab at William & Mary, published on 25 July 2023 a study titled "Harboring Global Ambitions: China's Ports Footprint and Implications for Future Overseas Naval Bases" by Alexander Wooley, Sheng Zhang, Rory Fedorochko, and Sarina Patterson.  

The authors suggest a list of port locations--where China has invested significant resources and maintains relationships with local elites--that may be favorable locations for future Chinese naval bases.

Where Is China Looking for Its Next Overseas Naval Base?

Foreign Policy published on 27 July 2023 a commentary titled "Beijing Is Going Places--and Building Naval Bases" by Alexander Wooley and Sheng Zhang.

Based on new AidData information, the authors offer the following short list for likely future PLA Navy bases outside China: Hambantota, Sri Lanka; Bata, Equatorial Guinea; Gwadar, Pakistan; Kribi, Cameroon; Ream, Cambodia; Luganville, Vanuatu; Nacala, Mozambique; and Nouakchott, Mauritania.  

China's Port Power

 Foreign Affairs published on 22 May 2023 an article titled "China's Port Power" by Isaac Kardon, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Wendy Leutert, Indiana University.

Chinese firms with close links to Beijing have become leaders in financing, designing, building, operating, and owning port terminals around the world, including Africa.  Although China has only one foreign military base--in Djibouti--, it can leverage dual civilian-military  uses of Chinese firms' extensive international network of ocean port infrastructure.  

By the end of 2022, Chinese firms had acquired ownership and/or operational stakes in 95 ports in 53 countries.  A Chinese firm is the majority shareholder in at least one terminal at 55 of the 95 ports and 24 of them are wholly owned.  Chinese firms operate all terminals in 29 of these ports, for example, in Hambantota, Sri Lanka, and in Kribi, Cameroon.

China has demonstrated that the familiar American model of power projection through overseas military bases is not the only pathway to establishing a global military presence.  

Military Cooperation and Competition in the Indian Ocean

 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published on 2 June 2023 a paper titled "The State of Defence Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region" by Antoine Levesques and Viraj Solanki.

Looking to the early June IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, the authors noted the increased tempo of defense cooperation initiatives in the Indian Ocean region as relations between Bejing and New Delhi became more conflictual beginning in May 2020 in the aftermath of border clashes that led to a zero-sum mentality.  India thus turned to the US-aligned Quad to bolster its regional strategy while China took a series of tangible steps in the Indian Ocean region to improve its security presence.  

Chinese Satellite Tracking Ship Visits South Africa

 The Maritime Executive published on 5 April 2023 an article titled "Controversial Chinese 'Spy Ship' Calls at Durban."

On 29 March, the Chinese satellite tracking and missile telemetry ship Yuan Wang 5 called at the Port of Durban in South Africa.  The ship belongs to the People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force.  The visit signals South Africa's increasing alignment with Chinese and Russian interests following a trilateral naval exercise among the three nations in February.  

Where is China's Belt and Road Initiative Going?

 Foreign Policy posted on 13 February 2023 a commentary titled "China's Belt and Road to Nowhere" by Christina Lu. 

The author refers to Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a "floundering initiative" that is facing slumping lending and stalling projects.  Nevertheless, for many countries the BRI has offered a lot.  

Impact of China on African Debt

 The New York Times published on 3 December 2022 an article titled "Defaults Loom as Poor Countries Face an Economic Storm" by Alan Rappeport.  

Developing nations are facing a catastrophic debt crisis in the coming months as rapid inflation, slowing growth, rising interest rates, and a strengthening dollar create a perfect storm.  Many of the most at risk countries are in Africa where Chinese loans play a major role.  

African Sovereignty and Chinese Debt

 The Africa Report published on 15 August 2022 a commentary titled "Is Africa Undercutting Its Sovereignty with China's Debt-trap Diplomacy?" by Sally Boyani.

To the extent African countries get into difficulty with China over debt, these are choices African leaders have made freely.  African sovereignty was undercut over a century ago but African leaders need to be careful not to lease their independence for the next 100 years.  

China, Africa, and Debt Trap Diplomacy

 The South China Morning Post published on 21 February 2021 an article titled "'Debt-trap Diplomacy' a Myth: No Evidence China Pushes Poor Nations to Seize Their Assets, Says Academic" by Jevans Nyabiage.  

While there is no evidence of China exercising debt trap diplomacy in Africa, Beijing does hold about 20 percent of the external debt of African countries and recently raised the possibility of debt-for-equity swaps.  

China, Djibouti, Sri Lanka and Debt Equity Swaps

China Brief published on 13 April 2020 an article titled "Mind the Trap: What Basing Rights in Djibouti and Sri Lanka Reveal about the Limitations of Debt as a Tool of Chinese Military Expansion" by Scott Wingo, PhD candidate at the University of Pennsylvania.

The author looks at China's debt equity swap with Sri Lanka for a 99 year lease over the Hambantota Port and suggests it will not necessarily lead to guaranteed naval access by China. He describes China's position in Djibouti as not a "debt trap" but a voluntary exchange of bank credit for Chinese naval access.

African Debt, China, and Coronavirus

The Diplomat posted on 15 April 2020 an analysis titled "Chinese Debt Relief: Fact and Fiction" by Deborah Brautigam, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

The author discusses the facts and fiction of China's debt management in troubled times. She identifies three myths:

--China frequently cancels debt.
--Chinese debt negotiations are easy.
--China will seize strategic assets in lieu of loan payments.

China and Debt Trap Diplomacy

Area Development and Policy published in December 2019 an article titled "A Critical Look at Chinese 'Debt-trap Diplomacy': The Rise of a Meme" by Deborah Brautigam.

The article looks at the claim that China deliberately seeks to entrap countries in a web of debt to secure some kind of strategic advantage. The author largely debunks this claim.