China's Approach to Counterterrorism in Africa

 The CTC Sentinel published in its August 2025 issue an article titled "Understanding China's New Counterterrorism Ambitions in Africa" by Jason Warner.

The author argues that despite ostensible rationales related to self-defense of economic interests and solidarity with African states, at its core, Beijing's primary motivations for entering the African counterterrorism space are to diversify its means of influence in Africa beyond its historical economics first approach.

Beijing likely believes it has a new genre of counterterrorism assistance--less kinetic, more economic, and rooted in equitable partnerships--that represents a fundamentally new and productive means of gaining influence in Africa.  

Africa and China's Global Security Initiative

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 4 August 2025 a paper titled "Africa as a Testing Ground for China's Global Security Initiative" by Paul Nantulya. 

China's Global Security Initiative (GSI) is slowly taking on concrete structure.  GSI principles are designed to appeal to the Global South and are being integrated into the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.  African governments also see GSI as another source of security assistance.  

Can China's Internet Programs Catch Up to Elon Musk's Starlink?

 Swarajya, an Indian right-wing monthly magazine, published on 23 July 2025 an article titled "Xi Jinping's Starlink Challenge Stalls as China's Satellite Constellation Projects Face Launch Bottlenecks; India's Private Sector Advances."

Elon Musk's Starlink, the pioneering satellite internet service, faces competition from China's state-led Guowang and the Shanghai-backed Qianfan.  Musk's Starlink has launched more than 7,000 satellites providing connectivity to over five million customers in more than 100 countries.

Both of the Chinese projects face delays caused by rocket shortages, sluggish deployment rates, and internal competition.  As of July 2025, Guowang had launched only about 40 satellites in a program that envisages a network of over 13,000 that will provide high-speed internet for civilian and military use.

Qianfan, also known as SpaceSail and G60 Starlink, is backed by the Shanghai municipal government and plans to have 15,000 satellites by 2030.  To date, it has launched about 90 satellites and at least 17 of them have failed to reach their intended orbits.  State-backed Guowang receives launch priority, repeatedly pushing Qianfan to the sidelines.  

These problems in China's satellite programs may be alleviated, however, as Xi Jinping has reportedly instructed the People's Liberation Army to accelerate space-based communication systems in order to build a Chinese alternative to Starlink.  

Comment:  All of this has important implications for the Global South, and especially Africa, where Starlink has been slow to take hold and Chinese competition could challenge it.    

The China-Africa Security Relationship

 The China Global South Project posted on 23 July 2025 a Q & A titled "China's 'Feeling the Stones' Approach to African Security Takes Shape" with Lungani Hlongwa, China-Africa Security Radar, and Paul Nantulya, Africa Center for Security Studies in Washington.

China sees Africa as central to the future of the international order.  Because of increasing threats to Chinese nationals and interests in Africa, the security element of China's engagement has become more important.  But China is not following a single strategy for dealing with the security challenges that it faces.  Chinese policy is usually aligned at the strategic level but often encounters fragmentation at the level of execution.  

China's PLA Trains African Military Officers

 China-Africa Security Radar posted on 21 July 2025 an article titled "'Africanizing' Security: Charting the Future of China-Africa Peace Cooperation."

The People's Liberation Army Command College in Nanjing hosted in July the Young Leaders Conference of the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum for mid and senior-level military officers from more than 40 countries.  It is part of Beijing's pledge to implement the Global Security Initiative (GSI).  The article concludes that the long-term impact of the GSI will depend on how effectively African stakeholders can adapt and sustain the initiative for their own purposes.  

China's PLA Troops March in Comoros Independence Day Ceremony

 China Military Online published on 7 July 2025 an article titled "PLA Support Base in Djibouti Participates in 50th Anniversary of Comoros' Independence" by Wang Zongyang and Dong Mingli.

Following its participation in Madagascar's Independence Day celebration (see 4 July below), a unit of PLA troops from China's military base in Djibouti repeated the performance on 7 July at the 50th anniversary of the independence of the Comoro Islands.  On this occasion, they joined marching units from Tanzania and Morocco.

Comment:  This is another example of PLA military diplomacy in the Indian Ocean region.  

China-Tanzania Military Cooperation

 The South China Morning Post published on 6 July 2025 an article titled "Inside China and Tanzania's 'Very Special Relationship'--Found Nowhere Else in Africa" by Jevans Nyabiage.

Of all the countries in Africa, Tanzania has perhaps the longest, continuous military cooperation relationship with China.  It dates back to the early 1970s and involves all elements of Tanzania's military.

Rwanda's Military Follows China's PLA Example

 China-Africa Security Radar published on 6 July 2025 an article titled "Rwanda Celebrated for Copying China's Homework in Military Development."  

An article published in China praises Rwanda for modeling its military development on the example of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).  The article claims that about 73 percent of Rwanda's active-duty officers have undergone Chinese military training.  Much of Rwanda's military equipment is Chinese and its military doctrine and culture look much like the PLA's.  

Chinese Military Detachment from Djibouti Marches in Madagascar Parade

 China Military Online published on 27 June 2025 an article titled "PLA Support Base in Djibouti Participates in Military Parade Marking 65th Anniversary of Madagascar's Independence."

A detachment of more than 50 People's Liberation Army troops from China's military base in Djibouti marched on 26 June in an Antananarivo military parade to mark the 65th anniversary of Madagascar's independence.  

China's Engagement in Djibouti

 The Congressional Research Service posted on 6 June 2025 an article titled "China's Engagement in Djibouti" by Lauren Ploch Blanchard.

This is a nice, updated summary of China's economic, security, and political relations with Djibouti and a discussion of US concerns.  

China Expands Security Engagements in Africa

 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 10 June 2025 an analysis titled "China Widening Its Influence in Africa through Expanded Security Engagements" by Paul Nantulya.

China is expanding across Africa its security relationships through training, military exercises, arms sales, party-to-party cooperation, and weapons production.  About 70 percent of African countries now operate Chinese armored vehicles.  Some 40 African countries have a relationship with Chinese public security agencies.  

Chinese and American Military Cooperation with Africa

 The South China Morning Post published on 7 June 2025 an article titled "China's Increased Training of African Military, Arms Sales and Aid 'Concerns' US" by Jevans Nyabiage.

The United States is becoming increasingly concerned at the increase in military training that China is offering to African military personnel.  Coupled with growing Chinese arms sales and other military to military cooperation, it suggests Beijing has become more involved in African security issues.  

Video Panel Discussion on China's Military Strategy

 The US Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, hosted on 13 March 2025 a two-hour panel discussion titled "What Is China's Military Strategy--Is It for Global Power Projection?"

The panelists included Dr. Barry M. Stentiford, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies; Lt. Col. Samuel Short, Australian Army, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; and me.  Each panelist opened with 10-minute comments.  Most of the session was Q & A.  The focus was China's security relations with Africa, China-Thailand relations, and military strategy and reform of the PLA.  

China Expands Military Influence in Africa and Beyond

 The London School of Economics blog posted on 22 January 2025 a commentary titled "China's Economic Boom Fuels Its Military Advancement and Influence in Africa" by Isaac Nunoo, University of Cape Coast, Ghana.

The commentary emphasizes the connection between China's economic and military influence in Africa in its effort to project global power.  The author concluded that it is not clear if China will become an offensive rising power or an ambitious but disciplined great power.

Africa-China Relations in 2025

 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 7 January 2025 a commentary titled "What to Expect from Africa-China Relations in 2025" by Paul Nantulya.

China will continue to promote its governance model in Africa, enlist support to reshape global norms, secure the supply of critical minerals, strengthen party-to-party ties, and increase military outreach.  The major items on the agenda of African countries are market access, balanced trade with China, and adding value to exports.

China Seeks to Improve Security in the Gulf of Guinea

 The South China Morning Post published on 29 December 2024 an article titled "In Africa's Gulf of Guinea, China Is Proving It Is Master of the Sea" by Jevans Nyabiage.  

China is paying increasing attention to security in the Gulf of Guinea where its shipping interests have been subject to attack and littoral African countries have requested assistance in preventing attacks on international shipping.  This is also in China's long-term interest to extend its military influence in the region.  

Will China Rely Increasingly on Private Companies for Security in Africa?

 Liechtenstein-based Geopolitical Intelligence Services published on 6 December 2024 a commentary titled "China's Military and Private Security Inroads in Africa" by Frederica Saini Fasanotti.  

As Chinese nationals residing and working in Africa face larger numbers of security threats, the author suggests China will turn increasingly to private security companies to protect them.

The Growing Militarization of China's Africa Policy

 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 2 December 2024 a paper titled "The Growing Militarization of China's Africa Policy" by Paul Nantulya.

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has increasingly taken on military dimensions.  The PLA's growing involvement in FOCAC speaks to the militarization of certain aspects of China's Africa policy. 

China's military strategy in Africa is advancing its goal of achieving "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049." To that end, the PLA is tasked with becoming a "world-class force" by 2030 with the requisite combat and power projection capabilities to defend China's expanding global interests and win future wars closer to home.

China's Security Engagement in Africa Challenges the West's Approach

 The European Hub for Contemporary China posted on 21 October 2024 a commentary titled "China's Security Engagement with Africa & the 'Global South' Narrative" by Fatoumata Diallo and Maud Deschamps.  

As African countries have grown increasingly disillusioned with Western security engagement, China has progressively assumed a more assertive role in African security, shifting from a norm-taker to a norm-shaper approach.  China's influence presents challenges for the EU's engagement in Africa, necessitating a reassessment of its approach to security cooperation with African nations  

China's Growing Military Footprint in Tanzania

 The US Army War College published on 9 October 2024 a paper titled "Peace and Unity: China's Growing Military Footprint in Tanzania" by Jake Vartanian.

The paper outlines the July/August 2024 Sino-Tanzanian exercise Peace Unity, which involved elements of the Tanzanian People's Defense Forces and the Mozambique Armed Forces in a land phase and a sea phase.  

The author concluded that the PLA has consolidated its military foothold in Tanzania, including a pro-PLA and pro-Chinese Communist Party sentiment through military aid and PLA-sponsored professional military education.  Tanzania also serves as an ideal proving ground for the PLA to execute military essential tasks in land operations and to test its joint expeditionary capabilities in an operational environment well beyond its borders.