Modern Diplomacy published on 20 September 2026 a commentary titled "China-Africa Defense Ties Deepen after Beijing Security Forum" by Nadia Helmy.
The 4th China-Africa Peace and Security Forum took place in Beijing in mid-September. Military representatives and defense officials from the African Union and 41 African nations participated. The event reflects growing interest in security cooperation with China and diversification away from Western countries.
Tech Review Africa published on 21 September 2026 an article titled "China Expands Satellite Remote Sensing Cooperation with Mauritania and Madagascar" by Nana Appiah Acquaye.
China recently signed memoranda of conversation with Madagascar and Mauritania to deepen satellite remote-sensing applications. This occurred during a conference with representatives from 23 African countries in Beijing hosted by China's National Land Satellite Remote Sensing Application Center.
Pressenza published on 13 September 2026 an article titled "Geopolitics: Africa Deserves Its Own Position on Russia's Policy Agenda" by Kester Kenn Klomegah.
Russia's policy towards Africa lacks coordination and adequate information. This makes it even more important that Africa avoid the mistakes of its interaction with the former colonial powers and ensures that Russia treats African natural resources in a way that contributes to local manufacturing and processing of raw materials.
Modern Diplomacy published on 14 September 2026 a commentary titled "Is China Turning Economic Influence in Africa into Strategic Power?" by Nadia Helmy.
The author argues that China is leveraging its membership in BRICS and its direct investment in Africa as tools to build economic influence that gradually translate into sustainable political, security, and strategic influence.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies published on 17 September 2026 an article titled "Extended Range: China Upgrades Its Military Base in Djibouti" by Matthew Funaiole, Brian Hart, Aidan Powers-Riggs, and Douglas Comstock.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has installed new equipment at its military base in Djibouti that will strengthen its internal communications capabilities and enable signals intelligence collection.
This new equipment allows the PLA to maintain redundant over-the-horizon communications with Chinese ships and aircraft operating in the region and provides secure communications channels with command headquarters in China. It probably enables the PLA to monitor the activities of other military bases in Djibouti.
The Rhodium Group published on 14 September 2026 an analysis titled "Monitoring China-Africa Trade Spillovers" by Jeremy Smith.
The analysis focuses on the impact of changes in China's economy on trade with South Africa, Angola, and the DRC. China's slowing growth and worsening trade imbalances are rapidly reshaping its economic relationship with Africa. China's export surge to Africa lowers the cost of goods for consumers but makes domestic industrialization harder. Africa should no longer expect the rising tide of Chinese demand to lift all boats for commodity exporters.
The Diplomat published on 16 September 2026 an article titled "China's Free-Trade Offer to Africa Won't Solve the Trade Imbalance" by Matthew J. Rochat.
China's new zero tariff policy across 100 percent of tariff lines for 53 African countries will not resolve the large trade deficits that most African countries have with China. Extractive products, especially minerals and oil, account for 89 percent of African exports to China, while 94 percent of African imports from China are manufactured goods. Duty free tariffs have done little to alter this pattern.
Kairos: A Journal of Critical Symposium devoted its volume 11 (2) 2026 issue to Eastern Africa-China relations. The open access articles are:
--The Dynamics of Eastern Africa-China Transoceanic and Digital Connections Across Centuries by Oduor Obura and James Odhiambo Ogone.
--Enduring Entanglements between Eastern Africa and China: Conversation with Yvonne Adhiambo Owuor by James Odhiambo Ogone and Oduor Ogone.
--Digital Culture and Popular Diplomacy: Bridging the Eastern African China Divide through Cultural Exchanges on Social Media by James Odhiambo Ogone.
--Eating Frogs with Your Online Friends: Cultural Mobility and Soft Cosmopolitanism between Eastern Africa and China by Oduor Obura.
--'Welcome to Milele'--Chinese TV Goes to Tanzania by Anke Bartels.
--Ecocide and Sino-East African Relations in Yvonne Owuor's The Dragonfly Sea by Edgar Fred Nabutanyi.
--Framing the Dragon: Popular Local Tales about Chinese at Ahero Highway Interchange Site in Kenya by George Otieno Odhaimbo.
--Intercultural Communication Strategies: Between Kenyan Kiswahili-Speaking Workers and Chinese Construction Workers by John Obiero Ogone.
The Atlantic Council published on 11 September 2026 a commentary titled "The US Must Become Africa's Partner on Technology and AI. It Can Do So with Soft Power" by Troy Fitrell and Kathryn Fitrell.
China has a digital strategy for Africa, but the United States does not. It recently cancelled a useful component for such a strategy, but it is not too late to revive it.
Time published on 11 September 2026 an article titled "The Power to Unite Africa" by Josh Wilson.
This is a highly positive article on the recently completed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the largest hydropower project in Africa. Constructed on the Blue Nile, which provides more than half of the fresh water reaching the Aswan Dam, Egypt has been highly critical of the project.
The author emphasizes that the GERD should be looked at in terms of the additional electricity the project brings to the wider region.
The Diplomat published on 10 September 2026 a commentary titled "Why Is China Less Active in the 2026 Ebola Epidemic?" by Zhida Shang and Joanne Liu.
The 2026 Ebola outbreak in the DRC may result in more cases and deaths than the 2014-2016 West African outbreak, which China responded to quickly and in a major way. Although China is better positioned to respond today, its assistance so far has been modest.
One explanation is that China faces less pressure to prove itself. Second, scientific incentives for China's research have decreased. Third, the Chinese public may want to see resources devoted to China and not foreign countries.
Radar Africa published on 10 September 2026 an article titled "Russia to Open Eight New Cultural Centres across Africa."
Russia plans to open new cultural centers in the DRC, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. This will add to the 16 it already has in Africa.
Semafor recently published a chart titled "Chinese versus US Foreign Direct Investment Flows into Africa."
The chart covers eleven years from 2014 through 2024. China had larger investment flows to Africa every year except for 2022 and 2023. The US actually had negative investment flows for four of the eleven years.
Comment: This is one more indication that the Trump administration's "trade not aid" (and FDI) approach to Africa has severe limitations. Not only has US trade with Africa dropped sharply this century, but FDI flows have also been on a downward trend. Both are determined primarily by private sector engagement. It will take a herculean effort to increase significantly both US trade and FDI.
Thierry Pairault posted on 7 September 2026 an analysis titled "African Copper and China."
China has become a major player in the copper industry. China accounts for 48 percent of the world's copper refining capacity, while its mine production is estimated at only 8 percent of world production and it holds only 4 percent of world reserves.
Africa's two major copper exporters, the DRC and Zambia, already had duty free access to China for copper in all its forms. China's recent removal of all tariffs on all African exports, except from Eswatini will not impact their export of copper to China. The main obstacle facing the DRC and Zambia is their ability to meet demand, whether through extracting more copper or withstanding competition from other suppliers such as Chile and Peru.
The Hill published on 5 September 2026 an article titled "US Only Country to Oppose UN Resolution Correcting Africa's Size on World Maps" by Sarah Davis.
The United States was the only country that failed to support a global map produced by the United Nations that replaces the Mercator projection and depicts more accurately the actual size of continents. As a result, countries in the northern hemisphere, including the United States, are accurately shown as smaller and those near the equator are larger. The Mercator projection shrunk Africa to the size of Greenland, when Africa is actually fourteen times larger than Greenland.
The US representative at the United Nations defended the sole US negative vote by complaining that the new map "mocks the work and purpose of this institution." She described it as part of an "ideological agenda" that helps explain why the United Nations is losing its legitimacy.
Comment: The US is the odd country out in this sad saga. It seems to take the position let the facts be damned.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 1 September 2026 an analysis titled "China's Expanding Military Reach in Africa: From Exercises to Expeditionary Power" by Paul Nantulya.
Africa is a testing ground for China's expeditionary capabilities and its military equipment. The People's Liberation Army's evolving training strategy in Africa is more relevant to building China's warfighting and expeditionary capabilities than to strengthening African force capacities. China's expanding military footprint and growing sophistication of military exercises in Africa have prompted deeper reflection on the strategic implications for Africa.
Firstpost posted on 1 September 2026 a 15-minute podcast titled "Trump Targets Zambia, Ethiopia, and Kenya" with Alyson Le Grange.
The podcast reviews US ties with Zambia, Ethiopia, and Kenya as US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Frank Garcia, makes his inaugural visit to those countries. Le Grange discusses critical minerals in Zambia, Red Sea security with Ethiopia, and Kenya's status as the only US non-NATO ally in sub-Saharan Africa. She asks about Washington's "trade not aid" policy and wonders what Africa wants out of its relationship with the United States.
The Global South Policy Hub, a Washington-based nonpartisan think tank, published on 17 August 2026 a paper titled "Aligning U.S. Critical Minerals Policy with Africa's Development Agenda" by Alaka Lugonzo.
Africa holds about 30 percent of the world's critical minerals that power renewable energy technology. Africa's critical mineral wealth is rapidly reshaping its relationship with the United States. The author argues that current US mineral partnerships remain heavily tilted toward securing supply chains rather than delivering shared economic benefits.
The United States has an opportunity to rethink its approach by moving away from extractive relationships toward transparent industrial partnerships along the lines of the African Union's African Green Mineral Strategy (AGMS). A more sustainable approach would align US strategic interests with Africa's development agenda.
Comment: While this is sound advice, China is a much larger importer of Africa's critical minerals than the United States. It would be useful if some organization, particularly one in Africa, could offer similar advice for Beijing.
Armstrong Economics posted on 24 August 2026 a commentary titled "China and Egypt Unite" by Martin Armstrong.
The author argues that Washington never seems to understand that trade and geopolitical influence go hand in hand, citing the case of China's influence in Egypt. The United States sees Egypt in a military context while China looks at Egypt as a commercial gateway connecting three continents.
Pan African Visions published on 29 August 2026 an article titled "Beyond Promises: Russia-Africa Summit 2026 Faces a Crucial Investment Test" by Kester Kenn Klomegah.
Russia remains a marginal player in African infrastructure, industry, and agriculture compared with China, the European Union, and the United States. Many announced projects have stalled, financing instruments are weak, and younger Africans see little contemporary economic impact of Russia beyond anti-Western messaging.
At the Russia-Africa Summit in October, Moscow needs to deliver on existing pledges with real capital and project execution and engage Africa's large youth and middle-class markets if it wishes to develop a sustained, mutually beneficial economic partnership with the continent.
