Why Is China Less Active in Africa's 2026 Ebola Epidemic?

 The Diplomat published on 10 September 2026 a commentary titled "Why Is China Less Active in the 2026 Ebola Epidemic?" by Zhida Shang and Joanne Liu.

The 2026 Ebola outbreak in the DRC may result in more cases and deaths than the 2014-2016 West African outbreak, which China responded to quickly and in a major way.  Although China is better positioned to respond today, its assistance so far has been modest.

One explanation is that China faces less pressure to prove itself.  Second, scientific incentives for China's research have decreased.  Third, the Chinese public may want to see resources devoted to China and not foreign countries.  

Dealing with Gender Violence in Ethiopia

 Ethiopia Insight published on 1 September 2026 a commentary titled "'Let Her Be Heard' Unmasks a Power Struggle over Culture in Ethiopia" by Daniel Hailu.

The "Ler Her Be Heard" campaign urges the Ethiopian government to recognize violence against women and girls as a national crisis requiring coordinated action, accountable leadership, public funding, measurable implementation, and greater transparency.

US Critical Minerals Policy in Africa

 The Global South Policy Hub, a Washington-based nonpartisan think tank, published on 17 August 2026 a paper titled "Aligning U.S. Critical Minerals Policy with Africa's Development Agenda" by Alaka Lugonzo.  

Africa holds about 30 percent of the world's critical minerals that power renewable energy technology.  Africa's critical mineral wealth is rapidly reshaping its relationship with the United States.  The author argues that current US mineral partnerships remain heavily tilted toward securing supply chains rather than delivering shared economic benefits.  

The United States has an opportunity to rethink its approach by moving away from extractive relationships toward transparent industrial partnerships along the lines of the African Union's African Green Mineral Strategy (AGMS).  A more sustainable approach would align US strategic interests with Africa's development agenda.

Comment:  While this is sound advice, China is a much larger importer of Africa's critical minerals than the United States.  It would be useful if some organization, particularly one in Africa, could offer similar advice for Beijing.

Somali Public Opinion on Somalia's Political Future

 The Somali Public Agenda and Somali Dialogue Platform published in July 2026 a study titled "Navigating Political Transition: Citizens' Views on Elections, Legitimacy, and Governance in Somalia."

This study addresses how citizens understand democratic principles, electoral legitimacy, political mediation, and government accountability by means of a May-June 2026 public opinion poll conducted across Mogadishu and five Federal Member State capitals, reaching 928 respondents.  

The analysis examines which democratic principles citizens prioritize, which actors they trust to mediate political disputes, which institutions they trust to manage or oversee elections, and which issues they want political leaders to communicate about more openly.

The findings show that citizens express strong support for democratic reform in principle, but their preferences become more complex when democratic goals are weighed against peace, stability, term limits, press freedom, and public participation.

Major Fishing Powers Fail to Sign Mombasa Declaration

Oceana published on 17 June 2026 a news release titled "Sixteen Countries Adopt Mombasa Declaration to Advance Fisheries Transparency and Combat Illegal Fishing." 

Sixteen countries adopted the Mombasa Declaration at the 11th Our Ocean Conference committing to advance global fisheries transparency and strengthen efforts to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.  The countries that signed are Belgium, Cameroon, Chile, the Dominican Republic, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Republic of Congo, Somalia, and South Korea.  

Maritimes Crimes published on 19 June 2026 an article titled "Kenya: Illegal Fishing Fight Gains Mombasa Backing."

The article notes that the world's most significant fishing powers, who represent a major share of global catches, did not sign the Mombasa Declaration.  They include China, Indonesia, Russia, India, Vietnam, and the United States. 

Chinese Finance and Critical Mineral Access in Africa

 Boston University's Global Development Policy Center published in June 2026 a paper titled "Development Quid Pro Quo: Chinese Finance and Critical Mineral Access in Africa" by Congyi Dai.

The paper explores whether China's development finance agenda is motivated by its global quest for natural resources, facilitating mine acquisitions in Africa.  It uses four data sources to examine whether Chinese development finance is tied to the pursuit of critical minerals.

The paper concludes that minerals needed for clean energy technologies such as copper, cobalt, nickel, and platinum group metals are associated with Chinese loan commitments to recipient countries.  Specifically, uranium is the mineral most strongly linked to Chinese development projects, particularly those including a substantial grant component and highly concessional repayment terms.

Chinese Companies Expand Surveillance Projects in Africa

 China-Africa Security Radar published on 21 March 2026 an article titled "Guinea's New Safe City Deal Pushes China's Surveillance Footprint to Nearly Half of Africa."

Guinea obtained a loan from China's Export-Import Bank to install urban surveillance systems across 324 sites in 8 cities.  The stated purpose is to enhance public security, emergency response, urban planning, and governance.

At least 26 African countries now have Chinese safe city systems either operational, planned, or stalled.  A key feature of these systems is facial recognition. The systems are often installed in a weak regulatory environment leaving them open to abuse.

China-Africa Relations Will Focus on Digital Silk Road

 Memesita, an independent digital news organization based in New York, posted on 1 February 2026 an article titled "China-Africa Relations: Trade, Investment & the Global South (2026)."

The China-Africa relationship in 2026 will not be about concrete and steel but rather silicon and signals.  A revolution is underway driven by digital infrastructure, fintech innovation, and a burgeoning tech ecosystem that is rapidly reshaping the economic and political landscape of the Global South.

What Africa Wants from China in 2026

 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 16 January 2026 an analysis titled "What to Expect from Africa-China Relations in 2026."

The focus of the analysis is what Africa hopes to get from China in 2026.  In summary, Africa seeks to rebalance its ties with China concerning debt sustainability, value addition, and industrialization and to move toward a more equal and transparent partnership that prioritizes long-term African development.  Africa wants a strategic partnership aligned with Agenda 2063.

Resetting US-China Competition in Africa

The National Interest published on 19 December 2025 an article titled "How to Reset US-China Competition in Africa" by Dan M. Ford and Wenjing Wang, both at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. 

The authors argue that the United States can compete more effectively with Chinese engagement in Africa if it sheds its security-focused, all-or-nothing mindset.  

Nigeria at Center of China-linked Cybercrime Networks

 Lokmat Times published on 5 December 2025 an article titled "Africa Faces Growing Cybercrime as China Linked Syndicates Expand Operations."

Nigeria is emerging as the epicenter of a cybercrime crisis that is engulfing Africa.  In late 2024 and early 2025, coordinated raids in Lagos and Abuja resulted in the arrest of nearly 1,000 suspects, including 177 Chinese nationals.  These syndicates siphon tens of billions of dollars annually through fake investments, romance schemes, and cryptocurrency fraud.

African governments are operating in an uncomfortable situation.  They are dependent on Chinese economic partnerships while they need to confront criminal networks that involve Chinese nationals.  

Chinese Involvement with Sensitive Security Project Offends South Africa's Opposition Party

 Defence Web posted on 4 November 2025 an article titled "Chinese Involvement in SA Defence Infrastructure Compared to Projects Kgala and Thusano."

An opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) representative has called out the South African ANC-led government for seeking China's technical help at the sensitive De Brug Army Mobilisation Centre. He charged the Chinese assistance at the clandestine facility lacks transparency and likened it to some earlier technical help from Cuba.   

China's Proxy Investment in Africa and the Need for Transparency

 Daily Caller News Foundation published on 4 November 2025 an article titled "It's Time to Wake Up--China Is Taking Over Africa but It's Not Too Late" by Jacob Choe, Eurasia Center's Asia Program director, and James Carter, Navigators Global.  

China is engaging in proxy investment through Dubai, Hong Kong, Mauritius, and Singapore in order to obscure its investing footprint in Africa.  There is no coordinated US effort to track Chinese proxy flows.  The authors call for creation of a US-Africa transparency task force to monitor these flows.  

Nigeria Seeks to Maximize Benefits of Relations with US and China

 Nigeria's P.M. News published on 16 September 2025 an article titled "Beyond Dependency: US-China Trade Rivalry as Opportunity for Nigeria" by Emmanuel Yashim.  

Drawing on a thoughtful discussion of US and China relations with key countries in Latin America, the article emphasizes that the question for Nigeria is not which partner, the United States or China, to embrace but how to manage both relationships so they serve Nigeria's national development.  The article warns of the dangers of excessive debt and suggests that Nigeria's large trade deficit with China is unsustainable.  

Is US-China Cooperation in Africa Possible?

 The Asia Society Policy Institute posted this week a commentary titled "Avoiding Conflicts and Ensuring U.S.-China Cooperation in Africa: An African Perspective" by Abdeta Beyene, Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation in Addis Ababa.

The author argues that the United States and China have the potential to move beyond competition and instead foster meaningful cooperation in Africa.  He suggests a number of ways that China-US collaboration could work to the benefit of Africa.

Comment:  The author is correct that there is the potential for US-China cooperation in Africa and a number of years ago there actually was some modest cooperation.  The prospect for US-China cooperation in Africa is dependent, however, on the existing Sino-American bilateral relationship, which has been severely strained in recent years.  Until there is significant improvement in the China-US bilateral relationship, there is almost no prospect for collaboration in Africa.   

What Canada Can Learn from China's Engagement in Africa

 The Conversation posted on 28 April 2025 a commentary titled "What Canada Can Learn from China on Effectively Engaging with Africa" by Isaac Odoom, Carleton University.  

To build meaningful partnerships in Africa, Canada needs a more focused approach grounded in robust research, sharper priorities, and an informed understanding of Africa's political and economic realities. 

 The author argues Canada can draw important lessons from China's engagement in Africa.  The "countering China" narrative pursued by the United States ignores African agency and fails to acknowledge that African governments want a choice of partners and do not want to be forced to select just one.  Rather than compete with China in Africa, Canada can fill gaps left by China.  

What Has Been Accomplished with War on Houthis?

 Foreign Policy published on 22 April 2025 titled "Trump's War on the Houthis Is Going Nowhere" by Keith Johnson.

 The Trump administration has spent more than $1 billion in airstrikes on the Houthis, who remain as defiant as ever.  The Houthis charge that the administration has waded into a "quagmire."  There has been little transparency from the US side concerning the airstrikes, which are burning through precision munitions at a rapid rate. 

 

China Benefits Most from Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

 The Conversation published on 2 September 2024 a commentary titled "China Reaps Most of the Benefits of Its Relationship with Africa: What's Behind the Imbalance" by Bhaso Ndzendze, University of Johannesburg.  

At the 8 previous meetings of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China has reaped most of the benefits.  The fault lies with Africa's lack of a strategy for engagement with China.  The forum is a platform for China to dole out aid and loans to African countries, and to articulate priorities that serve its own broader ambitions.  Africa's voice is minimal in the agenda setting.  

Africa needs a concerted approach towards China and all of its so-called strategic partnerships.  The African Union Commission should negotiate and set the overall direction in these forums.  China has had a long-standing Africa strategy; Africa has none for China. The result is the imbalanced terms of trade between China and African countries.   

Can FOCAC Meet Africa's Current Needs?

 The Institute for Security Studies published on 28 August 2024 a paper titled "Can FOCAC Adapt to Meet Africa's Long-term Needs?" by Jana de Kluiver.  

African countries need to rethink the future direction of the China-Africa partnership.  As the geopolitical importance of Africa increases, African countries must align their effort at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation with the African Union's Agenda 2063.  FOCAC's success will depend on its ability to adapt to shifting global dynamics while meeting Africa's needs.  

China-Africa Debt Relations

 South Africa's Institute for Security Studies published on 2 November 2023 a brief paper titled "Navigating the Complex Terrain of China-Africa Debt Relations" by Jana De Kluiver.  

Public debt in Africa has surged to $1.8 trillion.  China extended loans exceeding $170 million to 49 African nations and regional institutions between 2000 and 2022.  This paper is a summary of a longer report that comments on China's role in African debt.