A Comprehensive Report on Russia's Africa Corps

 The Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey published in August 2025 a study titled "Putin's New Frontier: The Prospects and Limitations of Africa Corps" by Hanna Notte. 

This timely and well researched study concludes that Russia's Africa Corps is a bureaucratic restructuring and rebranding of the Wagner Goup, which only continues to function in the Central African Republic.  It employs many former Wagner mercenary fighters and has taken control of its recruitment infrastructure. 

The Africa Corps is tethered closer to the Russian military's chain of command. It prioritizes training and routine security assistance rather than the high-risk missions of the Wagner Group.  It apparently relies on funding from Russia's state budget.  The Africa Corps might face future competition from countries such as Turkey, Iran, and China.  

Russia's Africa Corps Taking Over from Wagner Group

 Foreign Policy published on 3 September 2025 an article titled "Prigozhin's Ghost Haunts Africa Corps" by Christopher Faulkner, US Naval War College.

The Central Africa Republic (CAR) stands as the sole remaining foothold of the Wagner Group.  Its successor, the Africa Corps, is replacing it, but so far it has served as little more than a praetorian guard for autocrats seeking regime survival and deeper relations with Russia. Moscow has even asked the CAR to cut ties with the Wagner Group and sign a contract with the Africa Corps, which will pose serious challenges for Russia's policy on the continent.

Russia Tries to Improve Security in Africa's Sahel Region

 Al-Estiklal published on 29 August 2025 an article titled "Sahel States and Russia Establish Strategic Partnership: Messages and Objectives."

In mid-August, Russia invited the defense ministers of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to Moscow to discuss strengthening security ties.  Russia reportedly is prepared to provide comprehensive support to these countries as they battle terrorist threats and armed groups.  The meeting also signaled the transfer of security support from Russia's Wagner Group to its Africa Corps replacement. 

The Wagner Group's Failure in Mali

 The Sentry published in August 2025 a report titled "Mercenary Meltdown: The Wagner Group's Failure in Mali."

Wagner Group forces were unable to take control of areas in the north and center of Mali where armed terrorist and separatist groups continue to challenge Malian security forces.  There has been a significant increase in attacks on civilians and in civilian casualties since Wagner's arrival in Mali, and this, in turn, has severely undermined relations between the Malian military and the Malian public.

The Wagner Group became more reactive and violent, allowing the terrorist groups they were hired to neutralize to gain more control and increase recruitment in Mali.  Wagner failed in its task of eliminating terrorist groups in Mali.  Its deployment in Mali has not been a worthwhile investment for any party involved.  Russia's Africa Corps is replacing the Wagner Group.   

Russia Transitions Wagner Group to Africa Corps in Africa

 AEI's Critical Threats published on 12 June 2025 an analysis titled "Wagner Out, Africa Corps In" by Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson.  

Russia's Wagner Group formally withdrew from Mali and transitioned the Russian military presence to the Africa Corps.  As the Wagner Group pulls out of Mali, al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated insurgents are stronger than ever.  

Russia is also trying to transition from the Wagner Group to the Africa Corps in the Central African Republic.  Responsibility for Russian operations in Africa will now rest squarely with the Kremlin although Russian billionaire Gennady Timchenko may play a key role in the operations.  

Russia-Africa Relations

 The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) posted on 14 May 2025 a one hour televised interview titled "Why Is Russia Deepening Its Engagement with Africa?" with Steven Gruzd, SAIIA.

Following intense engagement by the Soviet Union in Africa during the Cold War, Russian interest dropped dramatically in the 1990s and and only began to return in the 21st century under the rule of Vladimir Putin.  The Wagner Group is an example of the new interest.  Russia still has a small trade and economic footprint in Africa and provides very little foreign aid.  Egypt is its most important partner.  It has developed partnerships in the nuclear power field and and remains an important source of arms for Africa.  The African countries have very little contact with the former Soviet republics.   

Is Chinese Company Helping the Houthis Target Ships in Red Sea?

 The National Interest published on 22 April 2025 an article titled "Is a Chinese Satellite Firm Helping the Houthis Target U.S. Ships?" by Brandon J. Weichert, senior national security editor at The National Interest.

Chang Guang Satellite Technology (CGST), a Chinese satellite company, has been "directly aiding Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen by providing satellite imagery used to target U.S. and international vessels in the Red Sea," according to Tammy Bruce, the spokeswoman for the United States Department of State.  CGST denies the allegation, although it was previously accused of assisting Russia's Wagner Group in 2023 during the Ukraine War.  The Houthis have exempted from attack ships associated with China, Russia, and Iran.  

China Filling Arms Supply Gap in Africa's Sahel Left by France and Russia

 The South China Morning Post published on 19 April 2025 an article titled "How China Is Filling a Weapons Supply Gap in Africa's Sahel Left by France and Russia" by Jevans Nyabiage.

As France and Russia lose arms supply market share in the Sahel region of Africa, China is stepping in to fill the gap.  China offers a large variety of weapons of reasonable quality, fast delivery, and low prices.  

Are China and Russia on a Collision Course in Africa?

 Foreign Policy published on 31 March 2025 a commentary titled "Are China and Russia on a Collision Course in Africa?" by Jessica Moody.

China and Russia, although committed to countering Western influence, have fundamentally different objectives in Africa.  China seeks political stability to protect and advance its economic investments.  Russia thrives on instability and insecurity on the continent.  The two countries typically do not work together in Africa but keep out of each other's way.

China and Russia Work to Fill US Void in Africa

 The Washington Post published on 24 March 2025 an article titled "Trump's Global Funding Cuts Leave a Void in Africa for Rivals to Exploit" by Katharine Houreld and Robyn Dixon.

About one-quarter of the US foreign aid budget was devoted to Africa.  Russia and China have been expanding their influence in Africa and are now using the dismantlement of USAID to further increase their efforts while not adding meaningfully to their humanitarian commitments.  They are also stepping up their propaganda programs as the United States shuts down the Voice of America.  

Russia's Wagner Group Mercenaries Conduct Terror Campaign in Mali

 The Washington Post published on 11 March 2025 an article titled "Russia's Wagner Mercenaries Are Leading a Campaign of Terror in Mali" by Rachel Chason and Sarah Cahlan.  

An estimated 1,500 Wagner Group mercenaries are fighting alongside Malian forces to defeat an al-Qaeda-affiliated organization.  In the process, the Wagner Group mercenaries are engaging in draconian practices that are driving ordinary Malians to neighboring Mauritania.  Malian refugees who have arrived in Mauritania since 2023 said it was attacks by Mali's military and its Russian allies--not Islamist militants--that made them flee.

The Malian government pays about $10 million a month for Wagner's services.  Russia has also been awarded concessions at several gold mines, giving it a material stake in Mali's security.  

Will China (or Russia) Fill French and American Void in Africa's Sahel Region?

 The South China Morning Post published on 25 February 2025 an article titled "How China Is Filling Void Left by France, US with Strong Military Ties to Africa's Sahel" by Jevans Nyabiage.

The assignment of China's first military attache to Niger raises questions about China's military engagement with Niger as French and American forces were pushed out by Niamey's authoritarian military government.  China is likely to step up arms sales and military training but will likely continue to avoid the kinetic military engagement previously provided by French and American troops. They will leave this to Russia. 

An Analysis of the Business Model of Russia's Wagner Group

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 6 February 2025 a study titled "Wagner's Business Model in Syria and Africa: Profit and Patronage" by Olivia Allison, Nick Connon, Antonio Giustozzi, and James Pascall.  

The paper examines whether the Wagner Group was profitable under its founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, what its business model meant for Russia and Russia's geopolitical rivals in the recent past, and what the model could mean for the future.  It draws primarily on three case studies: Syria, the Central African Republic, and Mali.  

It concludes that Wagner Group ventures in Africa and the Middle East did not contribute significantly to Russia's coffers, but that does not appear to have been the purpose.  Rather, they were intended to sustain Russia's foreign policy initiatives.

Prigozhin's death raised serious questions about the sustainability of the Wagner business model.  With Prigozhin gone and given the lack of appetite for his neocolonial approach among governments that might make use of Wagner's style of operations, a more feasible approach for achieving substantial profits in the future would be a focus on smuggling. 

Russia Expands Influence Across Africa

 CNN posted on 18 January 2025 a commentary titled "Across Africa, Russia Is Growing in Influence.  What Might Moscow Want?" by Nimi Princewill.  

Moscow is seeking to expand its influence beyond the Sahel region of Africa, sometimes offering to serve essentially as a Praetorian Guard for authoritarian African leaders.  It also seeks to control African natural resources for economic gain.  

US AFRICOM View of Security Situation in Africa

 The Center for Strategic and International Studies posted on 30 January 2025 a one hour and 15-minute podcast titled "AFRICOM at 17: Shaping U.S.-Africa Relations" with Mvemba Phezo Dizolele and Brigadier General Rose Lopez Keravuori, director of intelligence at U.S. AFRICOM.

This is a wide-ranging conversation with a person who has served for three and a half years as director of intelligence at U.S. AFRICOM.  It covers all parts of the continent and includes comments on other key external actors such as Russia, France, China, and Turkey.  

Evaluation of Russia's Wagner Group in Mali, CAR, Mozambique and Syria

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published in January 2025 an analysis titled "Did Wagner Succeed in the Eyes of Its African and Middle Eastern Clients?" by Antonio Giustozzi, Joana de Deus Pereira, and David Lewis.  

This Whitehall Report looks at the Wagner Group from the perspective of its clients in four case studies: Mali, Central African Republic, Mozambique, and Syria.  In terms of support services such as training, advising and maintenance, Wagner's performance was rather undistinguished in the view of its clients.  After the mutiny in 2023, most of Wagner's support services contracts were taken over without much trouble by the Russian Ministry of Defense.  

With regard to Wagner's provision of ready-to-deploy combat units, as of 2024 it remained one of few entities willing to offer this service, as well as the most willing to deploy in very challenging environments.  Attempts by the Russian Ministry of Defense to replace Wagner in such tasks following the mutiny were met with stubborn resistance by the Malian and CAR governments.  The Syrian government, by contrast, was happy to see Wagner leave in 2023.  In Mozambique, it was Wagner's leader Yevgeny Prigozhin who decided to bail out.  

Overall, while Wagner was fairly successful in providing ready-to-deploy small armies in challenging environments, it was clearly exposed to the risk of ending up seriously embattled.  

Russia Moves from Syria to Libya; Beware the Implications

 The Atlantic Council posted on 2 January 2025 an analysis titled "Russia Is Making a Fragile Pivot from Syria to Libya.  The West Should Beware Falling into a New Trap" by Emadeddin Badi.  

As Russian forces are being pushed out of Syria, Moscow is relocating troops and hardware in eastern Libya, controlled by Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army.  Libya should not be seen as a fallback but as part of a long-standing strategy to expand Moscow's strategic hold in the region and to project power beyond it, especially in Africa.  The West should avoid chasing a fleeting alliance with Haftar and focus on addressing the structural weaknesses that make Libya susceptible to external exploitation.

Growing Concerns about Russia's Ability to Provide Security in Africa

 Foreign Policy published on 31 December 2024 an analysis titled "The Illusion of Russian Security in Africa Has Been Shattered" by Samuel Ramani, CEO of Pangea Geopolitical Risk.  

Due to Russia's setback in Syria, African autocracies are second-guessing Moscow's ability to serve as their last line of defense in a moment of crisis.  In any event, Russia's track record for providing security in Africa has been underwhelming.  

Libya and Sudan are highly problematic as replacement locations for Russian air and naval bases in Syria should they be asked to leave.

Russia's Africa Corps Encounters Limits

 The CTC Sentinel published in December 2024 an analysis titled "Africa Corps: Has Russia Hit a Ceiling in Africa?" by Christopher Faulkner, Marcel Plichta, and Raphael Parens.  

Russia's Africa Corps deployment in Africa's Sahel region has done little to curb jihadi violence.  It is not even clear that Moscow has a Sahel strategy. Russia's recent setback in Syria will make success in the Sahel even more questionable.  The Africa Corps is encountering significant challenges.  In Niger and Burkina Faso, the Africa Corps looks more like a Praetorian Guard to keep military regime leaders in power.  

The UAE Casts Curious Shadow in Africa

 The Geneva-based The Responsible Security Association published on 4 December 2024 a commentary titled "Casting a Shadow: The UAE in Africa" by Raphael Parens, Foreign Policy Research Institute.  

The UAE is heavily involved in civil wars in Libya and Sudan.  Illicit gold flows through Abu Dhabi fund armed groups, mercenaries, and juntas in West Africa.  The UAE may even be considering establishing its own "foreign legions," drawing from the examples of the Russian Wagner Group and the French Foreign Legion to build the country's brand of aggressive foreign involvement.