World Politics Review posted on 8 October 2026 a commentary titled "The Red Sea Is the New Epicenter of Conflict in the Middle East" by Frida Ghitis.
While the Strait of Hormuz continues to be the focus of attention, the economically vital Red Sea with conflicts raging on both sides of the waterway could erupt into an out-of-control wildfire with global repercussions.
Semafor published on 6 October 2026 an article titled "Sahel States Launch Russia-backed TV Station" by Alexander Onukwue.
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger launched a joint television channel to offer programming that de-emphasizes Western viewpoints. Tafouk TV signed a cooperation agreement with the parent company of Moscow's RT to jointly cover events.
The International Crisis Group posted on 1 October 2026 a 58-minute podcast titled "Inside Sudan's War" with Alan Boswell and Sudanese national Yousra Elbagir, Sky News Africa correspondent.
The podcast draws on Yousra Elbagir's visits to Port Sudan, ransacked family home in Khartoum, road trip from Khartoum to El Obeid following a sustained aerial attack on the city, and other locations in Sudan. Some of her insights involved the personal impact of the war on her reporting.
Russia has long been rumored to have obtained agreement from Sudanese authorities to establish a naval base in Port Sudan. During an escorted visit to the Sudan Navy's base in Port Sudan, she saw no evidence of a Russian presence but understood that Russian military personnel had been at the facility in recent years. She also learned that Saudi Arabia strongly opposes any foreign naval base in the Red Sea, whether by Russia, Turkey, Iran or any other country. Saudi Arabia has considerable influence over the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) that controls Port Sudan.
There have been recent rumors of SAF cooperation with the rebel Houthis in Yemen. She neither saw nor heard any evidence of such cooperation, which would also be strongly opposed by Saudi Arabia and is effectively at war with the Houthis.
When asked about an end to the war between the SAF and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), she commented that the RSF is eroding internally. Consequently, it is possible the RSF may choose to negotiate with the SAF. But the SAF has no plan to achieve a lasting peace. Both sides increasingly realize that they cannot fight forever. In the meantime, the Sudanese people see themselves as pawns at the mercy of the SAF and RSF.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 29 September 2026 an analysis titled "The Raging Information Battle in Nigeria" by Mark Duerksen.
Russia and China are targeting Nigeria with manipulative information operations to erode trust, deepen polarization, and shape security narratives to gain greater leverage over Nigeria's political and economic trajectory. The barrage of inauthentic content targeting Nigeria frequently portrays the country as chaotic, overrun by violence, and beyond repair through democratic means.
Russia is the most active foreign actor distorting Nigeria's information space. Ghost reporters launder Russian narratives through Nigerian media. Generative AI creates local content and fake experts. Nigerian social media mobilizes influence-for-hire networks to advance Russia's geostrategic agenda. Russia's campaign aims to establish an anti-Western bloc across West Africa.
China has become more aggressive in utilizing inauthentic networks. Chinese-linked systems operate as part of a larger information ecosystem through state media, paid content, and elite relationships, including China's United Front. China uses these networks to insert geopolitical objectives into Nigerian domestic protests and election-related conversations.
Ukraine's Defense Express posted on 27 September 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia Gets Chinese Pantsir Clone FK-2000 Despite Having Six Real Ones, UAE May Be Middleman" by Ivan Kyrychevskiy.
Ethiopia received at least two Chinese FK-2000 anti-aircraft missile gun systems, which are essentially clones of Russia's Pantsir system. The systems may have been provided by the UAE. Ethiopia probably intends to use them for drone protection.
Pressenza published on 13 September 2026 an article titled "Geopolitics: Africa Deserves Its Own Position on Russia's Policy Agenda" by Kester Kenn Klomegah.
Russia's policy towards Africa lacks coordination and adequate information. This makes it even more important that Africa avoid the mistakes of its interaction with the former colonial powers and ensures that Russia treats African natural resources in a way that contributes to local manufacturing and processing of raw materials.
Radar Africa published on 10 September 2026 an article titled "Russia to Open Eight New Cultural Centres across Africa."
Russia plans to open new cultural centers in the DRC, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. This will add to the 16 it already has in Africa.
Firstpost posted on 1 September 2026 a 15-minute podcast titled "Trump Targets Zambia, Ethiopia, and Kenya" with Alyson Le Grange.
The podcast reviews US ties with Zambia, Ethiopia, and Kenya as US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Frank Garcia, makes his inaugural visit to those countries. Le Grange discusses critical minerals in Zambia, Red Sea security with Ethiopia, and Kenya's status as the only US non-NATO ally in sub-Saharan Africa. She asks about Washington's "trade not aid" policy and wonders what Africa wants out of its relationship with the United States.
France 24 posted on 30 August 2026 an article titled "Niger Junta Puts Down Mutiny with Help from Russia's Africa Corps."
Niger authorities thwarted a mutiny by young soldiers on 28-29 August with the help of Russia's Africa Corps. Moscow's ambassador to Niger said the military government requested help, and the mutineers were "neutralised particularly thanks to the intervention of Africa Corps."
Military Africa posted on 26 August 2026 an article titled "Algeria Likely Buyer of Russia's New IL-78 Aerial Tanker" by Israel Chukwuma.
Algeria's Air Force may be the first buyer of Russia's IL-78MK-90A aerial refueling tanker, adding to its Russian-supplied fleet. Algeria devoted $25.4 billion to military spending in 2025, the highest amount for any country in Africa.
Pan African Visions published on 29 August 2026 an article titled "Beyond Promises: Russia-Africa Summit 2026 Faces a Crucial Investment Test" by Kester Kenn Klomegah.
Russia remains a marginal player in African infrastructure, industry, and agriculture compared with China, the European Union, and the United States. Many announced projects have stalled, financing instruments are weak, and younger Africans see little contemporary economic impact of Russia beyond anti-Western messaging.
At the Russia-Africa Summit in October, Moscow needs to deliver on existing pledges with real capital and project execution and engage Africa's large youth and middle-class markets if it wishes to develop a sustained, mutually beneficial economic partnership with the continent.
Vietnam.vn published on 28 August 2026 an article titled "The Geopolitical Race for Influence, Resources, and Power in Africa" by Bao Quoc Te.
The competition for expanding influence in Africa involves more actors than ever before and is constantly evolving. Most African countries are benefiting from the increasing attention by more external countries.
Graphika, an intelligence platform based on digital relationships, coordination, and the movement of information across networks, published on 25 August 2026 an analysis titled "Umbrae Ex Machina: Mapping Russian Ghostwriting Operations Across African News Outlets."
Russia has been planting ghost reporters and fake experts in African media to advance its strategic interests on the continent. This report provides an overview of the English-and French-speaking network of Russian ghost reporters in Africa. It identified 44 ghost writers and fake experts who were active between 2021 and 2026. Their media content was duplicated or quoted on 138 websites and republished on at least 113 Facebook accounts.
Brookings published on 27 August 2026 a commentary titled "Don't Let the Iran War Distract the United States from Africa" by Landry Signe.
The Iran war risks distracting the United States from Africa when competition for critical minerals, trade, and alliances with African countries become more intense. China, France, Russia, UAE, and India are accelerating their engagement on the continent, meaning any American retreat will come at a high geopolitical opportunity cost.
Eurasia Review published on 26 August 2026 an article titled "Interview with Professor David Shinn" by Kester Kenn Klomegah.
This is a brief interview focused on the impact of Chinese and Russian-led multipolarity in Africa. While many African countries have taken advantage of the multipolar world to improve their situation, there is nothing static about the current engagement of external players in Africa. The alignments today may look very different in a year or two.
Business Insider Africa published on 26 August 2026 an article titled "Russia and China Push Back as Trump Administration Seeks Arms Embargo Across Sudan" by Ayodeji Adegboyega.
The Trump administration is seeking to expand a two-decade-old UN arms embargo on Darfur to all of Sudan and to explicitly cover drones. China, Russia, and the Sudan Armed Forces faction all oppose the initiative.
Military Africa recently posted the "Africa Drone Procurement Report 2026." The dataset comprises 234 procurement records across 34 African nations from at least 21 supplier countries spanning 1980 to 2026. During this period, it identified 1,959 drone units obtained by African countries. From 2020 to 2026, African countries procured 1,054 drone units or 53 percent of the total since 1980.
China was the leading supplier at 587 drones or just under 30 percent of the total procured in Africa. Its Wing Loong armed drones and Rainbow CH series drones went primarily to Egypt (126 units), Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (80), Nigeria (72), Ethiopia (57), and Algeria (49). Chinese drones appeared extensively in active combat zones (Libya, Ethiopia, and Sudan). They are particularly favored for their low cost, availability, and lack of human rights conditionality.
The next most important suppliers after China are Israel (325 drones), Türkiye (291), US (247), and locally manufactured (216). Iran and Russia supply drones to active conflict-zone actors through more opaque channels. Israeli drones have gone primarily to Morocco, with smaller numbers to Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia, and Libya's Government of National Unity.
The Foreign Policy Research Institute published on 29 July 2026 an article titled "How France's Fall Signals China's Rise in the Sahel" by Raghvendra Kumar.
China has seized on the decline of French and Western influence in Africa's Sahel to embed itself into the region's political, economic, and security structures. The article pays particular attention to China's role in Burkina Faso.
Global Views World published on 10 August 2026 a commentary titled "Africa's 2026 Geopolitics: China's $282B Pull" by Alonso Reyes.
The author argues Africa's geopolitical alignment is undergoing significant transformation by moving away from traditional Western allies and towards emerging powers such as China, India, Russia, and the Gulf States.
But this is not a zero-sum game. African leaders are not choosing sides. They are diversifying their partnerships to maximize their own national interests.
The Ichikowitz Family Foundation just published its massive African Youth Survey 2026. It held face-to-face interviews with about 5,000 Africans aged 18-24 from 16 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
It covers many issues, but the focus here is perceptions of China and the United States. African youth see China (79 percent) and the United States (81 percent) as the most influential foreign actors, although China's influence is seen as somewhat more positive.
The survey looked at the influence of the US, China, Brazil, EU, UK, Germany, France, India, and Russia. The only country whose influence was seen as less positive than the United States (85 percent) was Russia (83 percent).
About 3 in 5 youth are optimistic about Africa's future during the Trump administration, especially on military support and security. Just under half believe the closure of USAID will negatively impact their country, with healthcare and disease prevention seen as the areas most affected.
China and India are increasingly viewed as more favorable partners than the United States, a sentiment shaped in part by the return of the Trump administration.
