UN News posted on 12 October 2026 an article titled "Sudan: Drought and War Push Darfur and Kordofan towards Famine."
A severe El Nino drought has added to Sudan's humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur and Kordofan regions. Drought now covers more than half of Sudan and adds to the humanitarian problems caused by the ongoing civil war.
Doctors Without Borders posted on 8 September 2026 an article titled "Aid Cuts Leave Millions Without Health Care Across Sudan."
The dismantling of USAID in 2025 resulted in the end of funding for many organizations working in Sudan. Although the United States continues to be the single largest donor to Sudan, many of the health care providers have been unable to find alternative funding and, as a result, health facilities are shutting down. The few remaining hospitals are reaching the breaking point, and local clinics are going unfunded. An estimated 37 percent of Sudan's health facilities are out of service.
The UN Human Rights Council published on 1 September 2026 a report of the independent international fact-finding mission for Sudan titled "Fuelling Sudan's Conflict: Weapons, Fighters, and External Support Networks."
This is the most detailed UN report so far detailing external support for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). It discusses Columbian mercenaries supporting the RSF, including the launching of drones, and the assistance of individuals and entities in the UAE. It also identifies support received by the RSF from individuals or entities in Libya, Chad, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Puntland in Somalia. It identifies less external support for the SAF but notes the use of drones manufactured in Turkey.
It concludes that external support is sustaining military operations and expanding the capabilities of both the RSF and SAF, with grave consequences for civilians. Increasingly sophisticated drone capabilities enabled both sides to strike far beyond immediate front lines. The report called for the Security Council to extend the arms embargo now imposed on Darfur throughout Sudan.
Militarnyi.com posted on 25 August 2026 an article titled "Chad Expands Its Fleet with Chinese CH-4 UAVs" by Vladyslav Khomenko.
The Chadian Air Force has acquired at least four Chinese-manufactured Caihong-4 long-endurance drones. Located at Abeche Airbase, the drones are designed for intelligence surveillance, target acquisition, and strike missions.
Business Insider Africa published on 26 August 2026 an article titled "Russia and China Push Back as Trump Administration Seeks Arms Embargo Across Sudan" by Ayodeji Adegboyega.
The Trump administration is seeking to expand a two-decade-old UN arms embargo on Darfur to all of Sudan and to explicitly cover drones. China, Russia, and the Sudan Armed Forces faction all oppose the initiative.
The International Crisis Group posted on 18 August 2026 an hour-long podcast titled "Sudan's Separation Fifteen Years Ago and Today's Disaster" with Alan Boswell, Alex de Waal, and Abdul Mohammed.
Alex de Waal and Abdul Mohammed review the background of South Sudan's independence from Sudan and the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki. They explained why negotiations ultimately failed to produce two viable states, and whether such coordinated high-level diplomacy is still possible in today's fragmented regional geopolitics.
Efforts to resolve the crises in Sudan and South Sudan today are experiencing greater involvement from the Gulf States and involve a larger number of competing actors. Mediation today is extremely difficult. The global environment is highly transactional. The situation also has the possibility of becoming a regional war. It is time for the African Union to step forward and play a stronger role in ending the conflicts.
Amnesty International published on 1 July 2026 a report titled "City Under Seige, Children Under Fire: Rapid Support Forces' Crimes Against Humanity in North Darfur."
This is a 202-page report on the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) atrocities in North Darfur based on 247 interviews, including 208 with survivors of the RSF seizure of El Fasher, capital of North Darfur.
UN News posted on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Sudan: Window Is Closing to Prevent Wider Escalation in El Obeid."
This is a useful update on the situation in Sudan that summarizes the fighting, use of drones, external interference, regional tensions, and status of efforts to mediate an end to the conflict.
UN News published on 9 June 2026 an article titled "Sudan War: Drone Attacks Damage Key Aid Routes."
Escalating drone attacks on key roads and bridges in Darfur and Kordofan are disrupting humanitarian access in Sudan and putting civilians at further risk.
UN News posted on 11 May 2026 an article titled "Armed Drones Are Leading Cause of Civilian Deaths in Sudan War: UN Rights Chief."
Drones launched by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the Sudan Armed Forces accounted for more than 80 percent of civilian deaths during the first four months of 2026, killing at least 880 people.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 21 May 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo.
Infighting between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leadership and three RSF field commanders resulted in their defection together with their troops to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).
The SAF is using defections to fracture the RSF and rapidly integrate their troops into SAF combat operations. The SAF is pursuing a military victory and showing no interest in peace talks. Bringing defectors into its senior ranks may, however, complicate its command-and-control challenges.
The New York Times published on 15 April 2026 an article titled "Sudan Enters Fourth Year of War Amid World's Most Severe Humanitarian Crisis" by Ephrat Livni ad Declan Walsh.
The article describes the humanitarian crisis as Sudan enters its fourth year of civil war. The international community recently pledged $1.3 billion in funding for Sudan, but only peace can bring this humanitarian disaster to a close.
The New York Times published on 15 April 2026 a guest essay titled "I have Watched the Catastrophe of My Country Be Reduced to Nothing" by Mohammed Ahmed.
The author takes issue with those who call what is happening in Sudan a "civil war." He argues it is "a resource war fought by proxy, playing out against the world's indifference." About the only thing sustaining Sudan today is communal mobilization or self-help by ordinary Sudanese.
Foreign Affairs published on 8 April 2026 an article titled "Don't Partition Sudan Again: Splitting It Didn't Work in the Past and Won't Work Now" by Francis M. Deng and Ahmed Kodouda.
Both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) insist they are fighting to preserve a unified Sudan, but the longer the current geographical division persists, the harder it will be to put the country together again.
The 2011 independence of South Sudan offers a cautionary tale. Any effort to formalize the split between the SAF and RSF-controlled parts of Sudan would not resolve the conflict's root causes. Another partition of Sudan would also destabilize its neighbors.
The International Crisis Group posted on 7 April 2026 a 42-minute podcast titled "After Three Years of War in Sudan, What Hope for a Ceasefire" hosted by Richard Atwood with Shewit Woldemichael and Alan Boswell.
The Iran war has not yet had a significant impact on the situation in Sudan beyond driving up prices of everything and causing fuel shortages. If the Iran war continues, it could have a huge negative impact on the food situation in Sudan.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) control most of Darfur and West Kordofan while the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) control most of the northeastern and eastern parts of the country. Sudan is effectively partitioned between the RSF and the SAF. The major battle fronts today are along the Chad border, South Sudan border, and Ethiopian border.
The RSF political program has been a failure. Noone has recognized the RSF government. The SAF has improved its position and is the dominant actor in the country today. While SAF fortunes have improved most Sudanese probably do not want the military to remain in power indefinitely.
The RSF continues to receive strong support from the UAE while the SAF has a degree of support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Eritrea. The most worrying new dynamic is the deterioration of relations between the SAF and Ethiopia. Differences over Nile water usage and Egyptian and Eritrean support for the SAF contribute to Ethiopia's concerns.
Massad Boulos, President Trump's special envoy for Africa, continues to seek a ceasefire as part of the Quad (US, Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia). The effort is currently lacking high level pressure. RSF and SAF positions on a ceasefire remain far apart. Both sides believe they hold a strong military position. Only major outside pressure on them will likely change the situation.
There is considerable concern among the outside actors about the role of Islamist forces in the SAF, which complicates a resolution. In the meantime, the Sudan conflict continues to destabilize the Red Sea region.
Medicins san Frontieres just published a study titled "'There Is Something I Want to Tell You . . .' Surviving the Sexual Violence Crisis in Darfur."
Accounts of sexual violence in Darfur have surfaced most visibly during moments of intense fighting in Sudan's Darfur region, often along ethnic lines as a form of collective punishment, part of the broader pattern of atrocities inflicted on civilians. But in the long shadow of conflict, women and girls continue to face sexual violence as a routine and inescapable reality even after the fighting subsides: on roads, in markets, in fields, in their homes, and during displacement.
The testimonies shared in this report demonstrate that sexual violence in Darfur is both woven into daily life and has become a defining feature of the war itself. These voices leave no doubt as to the gravity of this crisis, revealing the scale, pervasiveness, and deliberate nature of sexual violence in Darfur.
Most of the perpetrators were armed, non-civilian men and the survivors often identified paramilitary Rapid Support Force fighters as the attackers.
The Rift Vally Institute published in October 2025 a study titled "Political Economy of Cash and Markets in Sudan" by Omer Egemi and Calum McLean.
Sudan is the world's largest displacement and humanitarian crisis. The study covers Khartoum, the political and economic hub of the country, and the two regions of Kordofan and Darfur in western Sudan during the period from February to April 2025.
Sudan's economy is largely controlled by warring parties, especially the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. The study analyses the political economy dynamics shaping Sudan's crisis with particular focus on aspects affecting cash and markets.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 26 February 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Elliot Nazar.
Chad closed its border with Sudan following two attacks by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on Chadian troops inside Chad. The RSF relies on supply lines through Chad for its weapons and equipment.
The Associated Press published on 25 February 2026 an article titled "UN Sanctions 4 Commanders in Sudan's Paramilitary Force Accused of Atrocities in Sudan" by Edith M. Lederer."
The UN Security Council imposed sanctions on 4 commanders of Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces suspected of atrocities against civilians. They face UN travel bans and financial freezes.
The Sentry published in February 2026 a report titled "Dubai Properties Linked to Hemedti."
Mohamed "Hemedti" Hamdan Dagalo, the leader of Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is closely linked to a $1.7 million property portfolio in the United Arab Emirates.
