Reuters published on 29 April 2026 an article titled "Mali Turmoil Threatens Russian Push for Influence and Mineral Wealth in Africa" by Andrew Osborn and Anna Peverieri.
A series of reversals suffered by Mali's Moscow-backed military government has dented Russia's image and threatens its strategic and economic interests in Africa. Mali's military junta's future is now in jeopardy and Russia's military presence in Mali is also on the line.
The Sentry published in April 2026 a study titled "Doubling Down: Russia's Military Network in West Africa."
Russia's Wagner Group withdrew from Mali in June 2025, largely handing over operations to the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps, which has about the same number of troops as Wagner and many of them are former Wagner fighters. Some core leadership also remains the same.
The Africa Corps has been moving a large quantity of weapons into Mali, which suggests that Russia is doubling down on Mali, despite the concurrent withdrawal and multiple failures of the Wagner Group.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File published on 21 April 2026 an article titled "US Competes with Russia and Others as It Engages African Autocrats" by Liam Karr, Yale Ford, and Zoe Sommer.
The Trump administration has put the United States in more direct competition with Russia in Africa, especially in states that have come under military control. The US is primarily pursuing security-related interests and exploring opportunities for cooperation on critical minerals.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 16 April 2026 an analysis titled "Turkey Expands Influence in Africa" by Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo.
Turkey recently advanced economic and security ties with Somalia and Niger. Both countries now serve as Ankara's anchors for further advancing its strategic interests in Africa. In the case of Somalia, Turkey has assumed responsibility for managing and protecting its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) while it helps rebuild the defunct Somali navy in exchange for 30 percent of EEZ revenues.
The Institute for Economics and Peace posted on 30 March 2026 its "Global Terrorism Index 2026."
Of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism globally in 2025, six were in Africa: Burkina Faso (2), Niger (3), Nigeria (4), Mali (5), Somalia (7) and Democratic Republic of Congo (8). Nevertheless, deaths in sub-Saharan Africa fell in ten countries while rising in just four. Deaths in the Sahel region, however, accounted for more than half of all terrorism-related deaths globally.
Terrorism remains highly concentrated. Just under 70 percent of deaths from terrorism occurred in only five countries: Pakistan, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, and the DRC. Nigeria recorded the largest increase in 2025, with fatalities rising by 46 percent to 750. Islamic State West Africa Province and Boko Haram were responsible for 80 percent of all terrorism deaths in Nigeria.
The DRC also reported a significant increase in terrorism, reaching its worst ever position on the index. Deaths in the DRC rose by nearly 28 percent to 467, driven by attacks carried out by the IS-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces, which targeted civilians, churches, hospitals, and funerals.
Somalia's al-Shabaab, while experiencing a decline in terrorist deaths for the third consecutive year, launched its Shabelle Offensive in early 2025.
The South African Institute of International Affairs published in February 2026 a study titled "Back to the Shadows: Russia's African Security Engagements Since Prigozhin" by Ivan U. Klyszcz, Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn, Estonia.
Russia continues to deploy military personnel and conduct information operations to shape regional politics in Africa. Since 2023, Moscow has taken tighter control, with Kremlin-linked figures, state agencies, and federal funding driving these efforts. Russian activities reflect the Kremlin's top foreign policy priorities but are constrained by competing demands, especially the war in Ukraine.
Foreign Affairs published on 25 March 2026 an article titled "Why Russia Is Losing the Sahel" by Frederic Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss, both at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
As Russia confronts shortcomings in its own capacity and the complexities of an environment it never fully understood, its expansion into the Sahel is on the verge of stalling, if not unraveling entirely. Moscow's initiatives should serve as a cautionary tale for other African states contemplating whether to accept Russian security assistance. This is also an opportunity for the United States to return.
WinBuzzer posted on 12 March 2026 an article titled "Microsoft Trains Millions in Africa to Counter DeepSeek" by Markus Kasanmascheff.
US Microsoft is racing to train millions of Africans on its artificial intelligence (AI) tools before Chinese rivals led by DeepSeek lock in the continent's fastest growing user base. DeepSeek has already captured 11 to 14 percent of the AI market in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Niger.
Modern Diplomacy published on 27 February 2026 a commentary titled "Africa's Rise: The 21st Century Story that Leaves Russia Behind" by Kester Kenn Klomegah, an independent researcher.
Russia has focused on a limited part of Africa. About 80 percent of its trade is with North African countries and South Africa. It has sent the Africa Corps to Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. But it has largely ignored the rest of the continent.
The South China Morning Post published on 27 February 2026 an article titled "Why Beijing's US$4.5 Billion Niger-Benin Oil Pipeline Is Being Attacked by Rebels" by Jevans Nyabiage.
A rebel group has been attacking the oil pipeline from Niger's oilfields to an Atlantic port in Benin in an effort to restore a former elected president to power in Niger. China financed, built, and continues to have a management role in the pipeline, which provides a significant amount of revenue for Niger's military junta. Although the attacks are not aimed at China, the situation poses a dilemma for Beijing and its non-interference policy.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 26 February 2026 a study titled "Russia in Africa: Examining Moscow's Influence and Its Limits" edited by Nate Reynolds, Frances Z. Brown, Frederic Wehrey, and Andrew S. Weiss.
The study explores Russia's role, its appeal, and its limitations across Africa since the 2010s, drawing on contributions from a range of scholars. It also looks at the agency and interests of African governments and citizens.
Opportunism continues to define Russia's approach to Africa, as Moscow hones a set of tools designed to take advantage of instability and state fragility. African actors can--and do--instrumentalize Russian engagement on the continent and advance their own agency in the relationship. Geopolitical competition in Africa is widening and intensifying as middle powers emerge as important external partners, in addition to traditional powers. The West must evolve its approach accordingly.
These essays point to a complicated and mixed record for Russia in Africa that defies simple characterizations. Russia's influence in Africa has undoubtedly grown, but there are outstanding questions about whether it can translate its gains into stable, lasting relationships; whether its tools and symbolic gestures will gain further traction; and whether it can outcompete a crowded field of external powers that can deliver more than Russia, should they choose to.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 26 February 2026 an article titled "Sahel" by Liam Karr and Zoe Sommer.
Russia plans to send 1,000 more Africa Corps soldiers to Mali in the coming months, increasing Russian forces there to 3,500. The Africa Corps may also send more troops to Niger. Current Russian forces in the Sahel have failed to degrade the growing jihadi insurgencies in the region.
US Africa Command's Africa Defense Forum magazine published on 10 February 2026 an article titled "Rebels Target Niger Junta's Oil Revenue."
The Patriotic Movement for Freedom and Justice is engaged in a campaign to topple the military junta in Niger and restore elected President Mohamed Bazoum. A significant part of the junta's revenue is generated by the oil pipeline from Niger to Benin. The China National Petroleum Corporation and its subsidiary West African Oil Pipeline Company constructed the pipeline and continue to be engaged in its operations. Most of the exported crude goes to China.
China's involvement in the project has put Chinese oil companies in harm's way. Beijing now seeks to find a way to protect both its investment and personnel still involved in the project from attacks by the Patriotic Movement for Freedom and Justice.
Press TV posted on 23 February 2026 an article titled "Trump Admin Terminates 'Lifesaving' Aid Programs to Seven African Countries: Report."
The Atlantic magazine reported that the Trump administration has decided to end humanitarian aid programs in seven African countries because there is no strong connection between the humanitarian response and US national interests. The seven countries are Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Somalia, and Zimbabwe.
Nigeria's The Authority published on 20 February 2026 an article titled "As Russia Takes Over the Wagner Group: Implications for Africa" by Ipole Amajama.
The government of the Russian Federation has taken over the Wagner Group under the guidance of the Foreign Intelligence Service. As a result, it has become part of the state-led strategy of influence and power projection. Much of its effort in Africa is focused on a media campaign of disinformation.
Africa Business Insider published on 11 February 2026 an article titled "Following Massive Diplomatic Expulsions from Europe, Russia Redirects Its Envoys to Africa" by Chinedu Okafor.
Russia's TASS news service estimates that more than 500 Russian diplomats have been asked to leave European countries since the beginning of the war with Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia has shifted 120 to 150 diplomats from Europe and reassigned most of them to embassies in Africa, especially in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali.
The South China Morning Post published on 15 February 2026 an article titled "How a 'Military Vacuum' in West and Central Africa Opened New Markets for China" by Jevans Nyabiage.
As France retreats from parts of Africa and Russia is preoccupied with its war against Ukraine, Chinese companies have stepped up their arms transfers and military training. China's equipment is affordable and comes without conditions.
Politics Today published on 23 January 2026 an article titled "Africa's Quiet Power Shift: From Russian Gold Deals to China's Training Push" by Goktug Caliskan, International University of Rabat.
The author concluded the question among African governments is no longer whether Russia's Africa Corps, China's training offensive, Trump's transactional policy or Europe's climate money is most attractive. The question is how African governments use these choices to maneuver and quietly rewrite the rules. Africa is learning to say yes, no, or not yet--and to make everyone wait.
El Pais published on 24 January 2026 an article titled "Russian Africa Corps Mercenaries Incorporate Madagascar into Their Expansion Across the Continent" by Jose Naranjo.
A 40-member Russian delegation led by the head of the Africa Corps militia met in late December with Madagascar's interim president and offered personal protection to the Malagasy leader as the Africa Corps has done in the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Libya, and Equatorial Guinea.
Business Insider Africa published on 22 January 2026 an article titled "Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger Turn to Russia to Build the Sahel's First Shared Telecom Satellite" by Solomon Ekanem.
Russia is in discussion with the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger concerning joint satellite projects, including telecommunications and remote sensing satellites to expand broadband access, secure encrypted communications, and improve surveillance of under-serviced areas. This is a further indication of a shift by these countries away from the West.
