Hellenic Shipping Lines posted on 11 July 2026 an article titled "Tanker Market: West African Crude Oil Exports Nosediving in 2026."
China's crude oil imports from the west coast of Africa during the first half of 2026 dropped to 19.5 million tons from 27.9 million tons during the same period in 2025 and 25.3 million tons in the first half of 2024. In 2026, China was the second largest importer of west coast crude after the European Union.
Launch Base Africa published on 22 June 2026 an article titled "NewTrails Capital, Backed by Africa's Leading Smartphone Manufacturer, Invests $55M in EV Startup Spiro."
China's Transsion Holdings, Africa's biggest smartphone seller, currently commands nearly half of the continent's market. Through its stake in a Chinese growth-stage fund called NewTrails Capital, Transsion is investing $55 million in Spiro, Africa's largest electric vehicle and battery-swapping company. For Spiro, the relationship opens doors to Chinese suppliers that could be decisive as it scales.
Thierry Pairault posted on 13 June 2026 an analysis titled "The African Cocoa Industry and the Chinese Tariff Exemption."
He concludes that an African entrepreneur manufacturing chocolate for export to Europe would face a 30 percent customs duty, whereas the Chinese market is now tariff free. For exporters capable of meeting Chinese customs standards, there is a real comparative advantage. However, the tariff exemption does not create the productive and logistical capacities necessary to exploit this advantage. The risk is therefore a consolidation of primary commodity specialization rather than its attenuation.
The true obstacle is structural, not tariff related. The fundamental difference between African and Asian supply chains is not access to raw materials, but where value is created through processing.
Blitz published on 24 May 2026 an article titled "Africa's Growing Appetite for Russian Grain Signals a New Economic Reality" by M.A. Hossain.
Russian grain exports to Africa are expanding at an unprecedented pace because of competitive pricing and a desire by African countries to diversify sourcing.
The New York Times published on 4 May 2026 an article titled "'The Death Zone': How Russia Is Luring Africans to Ukraine" by Matthew Mpoke Bigg, John Eligon, and Zimasa Matiwane.
An estimated 1,000 Kenyans went to Russia and ended up in the war against Ukraine. Only 30 have returned to Kenya alive. In addition, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Botswana, Mali, and Cameroon have reported men being falsely recruited into the Russian army.
Global Issues posted on 20 April 2026 an article titled "Russia's African Cannon Fodder" by Andrew Firmin.
The article reviews Russia's program to recruit Africans, often based on disinformation, to fight for Moscow in its war with Ukraine. The top African countries for providing mercenaries to fight in Ukraine are Egypt, Cameroon, and Ghana.
Africa News published on 7 April 2026 an article titled "War in Ukraine: Cameroon Confirms Death of 16 Nationals Enlisted in Russian Army" by Sarah Miansoni.
Cameroon's Minister of External Affairs confirmed the death of 16 of its nationals fighting for Russia in its war against Ukraine.
The National Interest published on 11 March 2026 an article titled "Why African Leaders Are Beginning to Speak Out Against Russia" by Thomas Kent.
African leaders are increasingly speaking up about a pattern in which paid recruiters in Russia and Africa coax young men to come to Russia with promises of civilian jobs or training. Once they arrive, they are urged or forced to join the Russian Arny and are then sent to the frontlines in Ukraine.
Ghana Web posted on 1 March 2026 an article titled "Two Ugandans Reported Killed in Ukraine-Russia War."
The article indicates that Russia has recruited Africans to fight in Ukraine from Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Egypt, Cameroon, Ghana, and South Africa.
Comment: This is not a complete list of African countries where Russia has recruited mercenaries.
Press TV posted on 23 February 2026 an article titled "Trump Admin Terminates 'Lifesaving' Aid Programs to Seven African Countries: Report."
The Atlantic magazine reported that the Trump administration has decided to end humanitarian aid programs in seven African countries because there is no strong connection between the humanitarian response and US national interests. The seven countries are Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Somalia, and Zimbabwe.
The Washington Post published on 2 February 2026 an article titled "Kenyan Job Seekers Were Lured to Russia, Then Sent to Die in Ukraine" by Rael Ombuor and Katharine Houreld.
The story is based on interviews with four Kenyans who fought for Russia in Ukraine and family members of nine other Kenyan recruits. Ukraine sources have identified 1,436 nationals from 36 African countries fighting for Russia. Some of the Africans were recruited to fight on the side of Russia while others were lured to Russia for civilian employment and forced to fight for Russia.
China-Africa Security Radar published on 21 December 2025 an article titled "Cameroon Goes All In on Chinese Safe Cities, but at What Cost?"
Huawei is providing up to 24,000 CCTV cameras nationwide. Facial recognition is a key part of the program. The system is equipped with AI and predictive analytics capabilities, purportedly to detect behavior deemed harmful by the government.
Business in Cameroon published on 12 December 2025 an article titled "Cameroon-China Trade Pact Opens Door to Tarriff-Free Push for Cameroon Exports."
Cameroon and China have begun negotiations aimed at securing full, duty-free access for Cameroonian products to the Chinese market. China is Cameroon's largest trading partner and has a significant trade surplus with the country.
Semafor published on 3 December 2025 an article titled "Families of Kenyans Fighting for Russians Demand Their Return" by Vivianne Wandera.
More than 1,400 Africans from at least 36 countries--including Kenya, Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa--are fighting as mercenaries alongside Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine. The number includes an estimated 200 from Kenya, some of whom are former members of Kenya's armed forces.
The Robert Lansing Institute, an American nonprofit public policy research group, published on 30 September 2025 a detailed report titled "Russia's Africa Corps: Wagner's Successor in Africa (2022-2025)."
This in-depth account concludes that the Africa Corps has effectively taken over the Wagner Group's Africa program since late 2023. The Africa Corps maintains a presence in the CAR, Mali, Libya, Sudan, Niger, and Burkina Faso. It has a small engagement in Equatorial Guinea and prospective deals in Togo, Benin, and Cameroon.
The shift from the Wagner Group to the Africa Corps marked an effort to align African operations with Russia's state strategy. The goals of securing allies, resources, and strategic positioning remain, but the execution is now more systematic and overtly tied to the Kremlin. The Africa Corps is the beginning of a more ambitious Russian expeditionary posture.
The International Crisis Group posted on 2 October 2025 a 7-minute video titled "Russia's Growing Influence in Africa."
This is a brief survey of African countries where the Wagner Group was engaged, and its activities increasingly are being taken over by the Africa Corps. The video ties Russia's interests to the extraction of natural resources such as gold and strategic access in eastern Libya.
War on the Rocks published on 17 September 2025 a commentary titled "Russia Is Shrewdly Playing the Long Game in Africa" by Hanna Notte.
Russia's Africa Corps is methodically replacing the Wagner Group in Africa's Sahel region and is looking to expand elsewhere in West and Central Africa. Russia seeks to avoid high risk missions and focus on training of local military and law enforcement. Because of its preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, Russia is playing the long game in Africa.
Ghana's Citi Newsroom posted on 11 August 2025 an article titled "Troubled Skies: Spotlight on China's Z-9 Helicopter after Ghana's Tragedy" by Kobina Welsing.
A crash of a Ghana Air Force Z-9 helicopter manufactured by China's Harbin Aircraft Industry Group resulted in the death of 8 persons, including two government ministers. A series of other incidents in Africa involving the Z-9 is raising questions about its performance.
The Diplomat published on 11 February 2025 a commentary titled "China's Navy Steps Up Its Peace Ark Diplomacy" by Lea Thome.
The PLA Navy's hospital ship, Peace Ark, completed in December 2024 its six-month circumnavigation of Africa where it made stops of seven days each in the following ports: Victoria, Seychelles; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Antsiranana, Madagascar; Maputo, Mozambique; Cape Town, South Africa; Luanda, Angola; Brazzaville, Republic of Congo; Owendo, Gabon; Douala, Cameroon; Cotonou, Benin; Nouakchott, Mauritania; and Djibouti.
The New York Times published on 14 October 2024 an article titled "Russia's Latest Target in Africa: U.S.-funded Anti-Malaria Programs" by Elian Peltier.
A Russian disinformation program is attacking US-funded health care programs in Africa to weaken Western interests there. The disinformation can usually be traced back to someone close to the Russian government or Russian institutions.
