Hellenic Shipping Lines posted on 11 July 2026 an article titled "Tanker Market: West African Crude Oil Exports Nosediving in 2026."
China's crude oil imports from the west coast of Africa during the first half of 2026 dropped to 19.5 million tons from 27.9 million tons during the same period in 2025 and 25.3 million tons in the first half of 2024. In 2026, China was the second largest importer of west coast crude after the European Union.
Al-Monitor published on 29 July 2026 an article titled "China in Touch with Yemen's Houthis to Allow Ships to Sail Through Red Sea, Sources Say" by Jonathan Saul, Parisa Hafezi, Timour Azhari, and Chen Aizhu.
Beijing has asked the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen to promise safe passage for its oil tankers transporting crude from Saudi Arabia's Yanbu terminal in the Red Sea south through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point. China clears each shipment with the Houthis, who have developed good relations with Beijing.
The Indian Express published on 22 July 2026 an article titled "India-bound Oil Tanker Takes U-turn in Red Sea after Houthi Threat."
Two oil tankers headed south for India and one for China toward the Bab el-Mandeb choke point from the Saudi oil terminal of Yanbu in the Red Sea turned around and headed north through the Suez Canal following threats from the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.
The tankers must now transit the Mediterranean Sea, sail around Africa, and pass the Cape of Good Hope before reaching India or China, adding significantly to shipping costs. These are the first Saudi oil laden tankers to respond to the Houthi threat.
Another oil tanker scheduled to load Saudi crude at Yanbu by entering the Red Sea through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point turned back off the coast of Oman.
The International Crisis Group posted on 2 April 2026 a 36-minute podcast titled "How the Iran War Is Reshaping the Region" with Alan Boswell and Hafsa Halawa, independent political analyst.
The war in Iran is already resulting in shortages of fuel, energy, and electricity in the Red Sea region. Over the longer term, it will likely cause higher inflation and food shortages due to diminished access to imported food and fertilizer, 40 percent of which passes through the Strait of Hormuz. The fertilizer issue is exacerbated because it does not have a long shelf life.
Large diasporas in the Gulf states from countries like Ethiopia may start returning home as jobs shut down. Gulf state investment in the Horn of Africa, which had been growing rapidly, is likely to fall significantly.
The war may force Gulf states to refocus their national security strategies as they assess freedom of navigation and support for factions or governments in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Saudi support for the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) may decline because of Iran's ties with the SAF. The UAE is likely to continue its support for Ethiopia.
The war is likely to exacerbate existing tension between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Egypt and Turkey will need to reassess their strategies in the region. The war comes on top of Israel's recognition of Somaliland, which already exacerbated Gulf state security relationships.
Saudi Arabia has shifted oil exports to the port of Yanbu in the Red Sea. If the Houthis decide to attack international shipping in the Red Sea, this could end the shipment of oil to Asia by closing the Bab el-Mandeb choke point. It would still be possible to ship oil from Yanbu north through the Suez Canal to Europe.
The Iran war makes clear that the regional security situation is now completely interconnected.
The Stimson Center published on 27 March 2026 a paper titled "How Iran War Is Reshaping China's Geo-Economic Cooperation with North Africa" by Chuchu Zhang, Fudan University.
The war in Iran and closure of the Strait of Hormuz have caused China to pursue a dual-track strategy of multi-source procurement and accelerated green transformation, deliberately broadening its oil and gas import footprint while fast tracking the development of new energy technologies. North Africa has emerged as a pivotal arena for deepened geo-economic cooperation.
Caixin Global published on 17 March 2026 an article titled "Chinese Supertanker Changes Route and Takes Oil Without Passing through Hormuz."
A Chinese supertanker originally scheduled to load crude oil in the UAE rerouted to the Saudi Arabian Red Sea port of Yanbu. Other vessels are taking a similar action, causing a bottleneck at the port, which is served by an oil pipeline with limited capacity.
Military Africa published on 5 January 2026 an article titled "Pakistan to Supply 16 JF-17s and 12 Super Mushshak Aircraft to Libyan Faction."
Pakistan signed a $4 billion deal with Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) to supply advanced military hardware, including 16 JF-17 Thunder aircraft produced jointly by the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and China's Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group. The LNA controls the east and south of Libya, including critical oilfields. The LNA is a rival force to the United Nations-recognized Government of National Unity in Tripoli. The introduction of 16 JF-17s could radically alter the security landscape of North Africa.
The deal represents a sophisticated maneuver by Beijing to expand its influence in North Africa while avoiding direct violation of an arms embargo. By routing these sales through Pakistan, China can sidestep regulatory and political scrutiny that accompanies sales into sanctioned territory. Although the JF-17 incorporates Chinese radars, engines, and missiles, it is technically a Pakistani product. The LNA also has received Chinese drones and WRJ-Q02 anti-drone guns.
The UN Political and Peacebuilding Office posted on 22 December 2025 remarks titled "ASG Khiari Warns Indiscriminate Drone Strikes and Arms Flows Are Driving Sudan's War."
UN Assistant Secretary General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, Khaled Khiari, condemned the use of drones and foreign supply of increasingly sophisticated and deadly weapons to the belligerents in Sudan's civil war. Calls to end these flows have gone unheeded and there has been no accountability.
The Sudan Tribune posted on 9 December 2025 an article titled "China's Exit from Sudan Oil Fields Deepens Crisis for War-ravaged Economy."
Following the Rapid Support Forces' seizure of the strategic Heglig oil field in South Sudan, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) declared force majeure and dissolved ahead of schedule its production-sharing and pipeline partnership in Sudan's oil sector. This may end a vital revenue lifeline for both the Khartoum government and the government in South Sudan. The early exit of CNPC also sends a chilling signal to future investors.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 11 December 2025 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces' capture of the Heglig oil field in South Sudan has intensified the Sudan crisis and brought South Sudan to the brink of war.
Bloomberg published on 10 December 2025 an article titled "South Sudan Oil Exports at Risk" by Simon Marks and Salma El Wardany.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seized the strategic Heglig oil field in South Sudan near the border with Sudan. The crude from Heglig is transported by pipeline through Sudan to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. South Sudan obtains nearly all of its state revenue from oil exports. The seizure of the oil field by the RSF raises the prospect of a halt in South Sudanese oil exports and the loss of pipeline revenue for the Sudan Armed Forces.
Worldstopexports.com recently posted an article titled "Top 15 Crude Oil Suppliers to China" by Daniel Workman.
In 2023, 15 crude exporters accounted for 89 percent of China's total crude imports. The top supplier was Russia ($94 billion or 18.3 percent of China's imports in 2023), followed by Saudi Arabia ($55 billion or 10.7 percent), and Malaysia ($45.5 billion or 8.8 percent).
The only African country among the top 15 was Angola at number 12 ($18.8 billion or 3.7 percent). Even the United States surpassed Angola as a supplier of crude to China at number 9 ($22.4 billion or 4.3 percent). Angolan exports of crude to China in 2023 slipped 18.5 percent compared with 2022. China imported small amounts of crude from a few other African countries such as Congo Brazzaville. This is a sharp reversal of the situation earlier this century when briefly almost one-third of China's crude oil imports originated in Africa.
Although Iran was not included on the list of China's 15 top crude suppliers in 2023, it is estimated to have provided about 10 percent of the country's total imports. Small independent Chinese refiners known as "teapots" purchased at deep discount about 90 percent of Iran's crude destined for China. In order to avoid sanctions, this crude was passed off as originating in Malaysia or the UAE. For an account of Iranian exports to China, see "Exclusive: Iran's Oil Trade with China Stalls as Tehran Demands Higher Prices."
Comment: This significant reduction in China's crude oil imports from Africa may tend to diminish Beijing's strategic interest in the continent, although it continues to rely heavily on the importation of certain critical minerals such as cobalt, tantalum, and manganese. In addition, sourcing crude oil imports is a dynamic process with a history of quick movement in and out of markets. As the global political and economic situation evolves, Africa may one day return to favor as a major source of crude for China.
