The Council on Foreign Relations published on 8 October 2026 a background piece titled "Another Hormuz? What to Know About the Houthi Threat to the Red Sea" by Diana Roy.
Each year, approximately 12 to 15 percent of global maritime trade worth more than $1 trillion, including 30 percent of global container traffic transits the Red Sea. This is an excellent summary of the threat posed by the Iran-backed and Yemen-based Houthis to international shipping through the Red Sea.
CNBC published on 12 August 2026 an article titled "Saudi Arabia Ramps Up Oil Exports Through Mediterranean Pipeline to Avoid Attacks in Red Sea" by Spencer Kimball and Deena Zaidi.
Following the Iranian-supported Houthi blockade of Saudi ships passing through the south end of the Red Sea, Riyadh is rerouting oil supertankers north through the Suez Canal even for oil destined for Asia.
The problem is that fully loaded supertankers sit too deep in the water to transit the Suez Canal. Consequently, they pump half the Saudi oil cargo into a pipeline on Egypt's Red Sea coast that conveys it across Egypt to an outlet in the Mediterranean Sea. The supertankers then transit the Suez Canal half loaded and reload the oil at the other end of the pipeline in the Mediterranean. Saudi oil exports departing the south end of the Red Sea are down 90 percent.
Because of the Houthi blockade, a higher percentage of Saudi oil is now going north to Europe rather than south to Asia. This may result in a boon for West African oil by making transport to Asia more competitive than oil originating in Saudi Arabia.
The Indian Express published on 22 July 2026 an article titled "India-bound Oil Tanker Takes U-turn in Red Sea after Houthi Threat."
Two oil tankers headed south for India and one for China toward the Bab el-Mandeb choke point from the Saudi oil terminal of Yanbu in the Red Sea turned around and headed north through the Suez Canal following threats from the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.
The tankers must now transit the Mediterranean Sea, sail around Africa, and pass the Cape of Good Hope before reaching India or China, adding significantly to shipping costs. These are the first Saudi oil laden tankers to respond to the Houthi threat.
Another oil tanker scheduled to load Saudi crude at Yanbu by entering the Red Sea through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point turned back off the coast of Oman.
The Council on Foreign Relations published on 20 July 2026 a background piece titled "Another Hormuz? What to Know About the Houthi Threat to the Red Sea" by Diana Roy.
The Yemen-based and Iranian-backed Houthis' decision to impose a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia opens a new front in the U.S.-Iran war and threatens to choke off the Red Sea's 20-mile-wide Bab el-Mandeb Strait, with potentially major consequences for the global economy.
The Hause of Saud, a Saudi Royal Family news and information platform, posted on 6 March 2026 an analysis titled "The Houthi Trigger--Why Yemen's Decision Could Be More Dangerous Than the Iran War Itself" by Abdul Mohammed.
In an excellent and timely analysis, the author explains that the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen are debating whether to join the Iran war. If they resume attacks on Red Sea international shipping alongside the Hormuz closure, 28 percent of global oil trade faces simultaneous disruption.
The Houthis are engaged in the single most important strategic decision facing any non-state actor in the current conflict. Their choice to enter or abstain from the Iran war will determine whether the world faces an unprecedented dual-chokepoint crisis, whether Saudi Arabia's $500 billion NEOM megaproject becomes a frontline target, and whether the global economy tips from disruption into recession.
The Houthis must decide whether to join Iran in opposing Operation Epic Fury or abandon Iran. There are apparently sharp disagreements among Houthi factions over how to respond.
The Washington Post published on 21 January 2026 an article titled "How Egypt Is Reviving the Suez Canal after Maritime Attacks Sank Traffic" by Claire Parker and Heba Farouk Mahfouz.
Attacks beginning in 2023 by the Houthis in Yemen on international shipping in the Red Sea interrupted maritime traffic through the Suez Canal, forcing most ships to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope. The Suez Canal provided Egypt in 2023 with $10.2 billion in revenue and accounted for 12 to 15 percent of global maritime trade.
The Houthis have ended most attacks, maritime traffic is increasing, and Suez Canal revenue for Egypt is picking up. If the Gaza ceasefire holds, international shipping through the Red Sea and Suez Canal is expected to increase further, adding to Egyptian revenue.
The Insurance Business Magazine published on 1 August 2025 an article titled "Escalating Houthi Attacks in Red Sea Trigger New Global Supply Chain and Insurance Challenges" by Gia Snape.
The renewed Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea by Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have the potential to raise energy costs and disrupt supply chains. Many shipping companies are once again diverting cargo around the Cape of Good Hope. Insurers have increased their marine risk premiums.
Bloomberg published on 1 May 2025 an article titled "How the Houthi Red Sea Ship Attacks Upended Global Trade" by Alex Langley, Paul Wallace, and Caroline Alexander.
Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea have caused the biggest disruption to global trade since the COVID-19 pandemic, forcing many ships to reroute around the southern tip of Africa. Since November 2023, the Iranian-backed Houthis attacked more than 130 vessels in the Red Sea as of early March 2025. Traffic through the Red Sea is 71 percent lower than 2023 levels and insurance is as much as ten times higher.
The New York Times published on 24 January 2025 an article titled "More Ships May Return to the Red Sea If Houthis Hold Their Fire" by Peter Eavis.
The Houthis have signaled that they have suspended attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, but shipping lines say they will return only when they are convinced their vessels will not be attacked.
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy published on 16 December 2024 an analysis titled "Houthi Shipping Attacks: Patterns and Expectations for 2025" by Noam Raydan and Farzin Nadimi.
A ceasefire in Gaza could pave the way for a diplomatic solution to the Houthi Red Sea crisis. On the other hand, a tough policy towards Iran by the Trump administration could result in more attacks on commercial shipping in the region.
The International Institute of Strategic Studies published in December 2024 a research paper titled "Navigating Troubled Waters: The Houthis' Campaign in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden" by Wolf-Christian Paes, Edward Beales, Fabian Hinz, and Albert Vidal Ribe.
The paper examines the Houthis' attacks on ships since November 2023 and the international military responses, as well as the economic impact of the crisis. It also considers the Houthis' arsenal and the smuggling of weapons and their components to Yemen.
Although most attacks have missed or did little damage, the Houthis have sunk two ships, and four sailors have lost their lives. The economic impact of the crisis on global supply lines has been more limited than was first anticipated. After twelve months of sustained attacks on Western shipping, the current response by the international community has failed to reach its stated goals.
The Italian Institute for International Political Studies published on 24 November 2024 a paper titled "Blue Economy and the Mediterranean: How the Red Sea Crisis is Shaping the Region's Maritime Future (and What Is Next)" by Mario Mattioli.
Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping reduced transit through the Suez Canal by about 50 percent in 2023 and 70 percent in the first half of 2024. Transit around Africa's Cape of Good Hope adds 3,000 to 3,500 nautical miles to voyages connecting Europe and Asia, increasing travel time by about 10 days. This results in higher costs for fuel, wages, insurance, and freight borne by shipping companies.
Maersk posted on 12 June 2024 an update titled "Navigating Challenges in the Red Sea and Beyond."
About 30 percent of global container traffic previously travelled through the Suez Canal and Red Sea. Because of Houthi attacks on international shipping, Maersk, one of the largest users of this route, is now sailing around the Cape of Good Hope and avoiding the Suez Canal and Red Sea. This has increased fuel costs by about 40 percent, caused delays and congestion in key ports such as Singapore and Shanghai, and has reduced industry wide shipping capacity by 15-20 percent.
Reuters published on 6 May 2024 an article titled "Shipping Firms Respond to Houthi Attacks in Red Sea."
The article reports the response of many shipping companies to the continuing drone and missile attacks on international shipping passing through the Red Sea. Most companies have rerouted their ships around the Cape of Good Hope or otherwise stopped using the Suez Canal/Red Sea route.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 9 April 2024 an analysis titled "Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean Attacks Expose Africa's Maritime Vulnerability" by Francois Vrey, Stellenbosch University, and Mark Blaine, retired combat officer with the South African Navy.
African citizens are paying the price of delays, more expensive consumer goods, disruption to local economic entities, and polluted waterways from Houthi maritime attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Africa's ports are struggling to handle the current volume of freight and cope with the security impacts from these delays and late arrivals. The crisis calls for a recalibration of African maritime security efforts to help keep the trade routes open, safeguard communications cables, and protect the rule of law.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute published on 14 March 2024 a commentary titled "The Red Sea Crisis, Food Security and Conflict" by Saba Sinai, CQUniversity, Australia.
Houthi attacks on commercial shipping through the Red Sea are disrupting supply chains and contributing to global food insecurity and conflict, including the situation in Yemen itself.
Aljazeera posted on 22 February 2024 an interactive "Mapping the Red Sea Attacks" by Hanna Duggal and Mohammed Haddad. This informative presentation shows how Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have impacted international trade.
China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE) published on 15 February 2024 a commentary titled "China's Cautious Response to the Red Sea Crisis" by Dominika Urhova.
The author concluded that in spite of China's rhetoric and Global Security Initiative, Beijing's lack of capacity and interest in actively participating in the protection of Red Sea shipping lanes might be a sign of its inability to shape the global and regional security architecture.
Project Syndicate published on 7 February 2024 an analysis titled "Why China Won't Fight the Houthis" by Yun Sun, Stimson Center.
Although Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping could eventually undermine China's economic recovery, Beijing's approach to the US-led effort to end the attacks is no cooperation, no support, and no confrontation. China welcomes the strain the US effort places on its relations with countries in the region other than Israel.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies published on 22 January 2024 a study titled "The Global Economic Consequences of the Attacks on Red Sea Shipping Lanes" by Thibault Denamiel, Matthew Schleich, William Alan Reinsch, and Will Todman.
Ship traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point at the southern end of the Red Sea has dropped 46 percent compared to the same period in 2023. Cape of Good Hope passages around Africa are up 70 percent. Suez Canal revenues are down 40 percent. Global shipping costs are rising, and Egypt is experiencing significant losses.
