What's Preventing Houthi Attacks on Red Sea Shipping?

 The American Security Project published on 7 May 2026 a commentary titled "What's Holding the Houthis Back in Bab al-Mandeb?" by Laura Bucci.

The Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have so far refrained from attacking international shipping in the Red Sea following U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran.  The author suggests this is due to ongoing reconstruction in Yemen following earlier attacks on the Houthis by the United States and Israel, an interrupted weapons supply chain from Iran, and concern that the U.S. and Israel would resume airstrikes.  The author does not, however, rule out a resumption of Houthi attacks.

Will US Blockade of Hormuz Stir Houthi Response in Red Sea?

 The Independent published on 14 April 2026 an article titled "What Is the 'Gate of Tears'? Key Shipping Route that Could Be Attacked by Houthis and Disrupt Global Economy" by Bryony Gooch and Harry Cockburn.

The authors speculate on the possibility of Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis attacking international shipping in the Red Sea following a US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Oman.

Why Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis Have Not Yet Resumed Attacks on Red Sea Shipping

 The House of Saud published on 27 March 2026 an analysis titled "The Houthis Could End Saudi Arabia's War in Forty-Eight Hours" by Abdul Mohammed.

Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis have not resumed attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea since the United States and Israel began bombing Iran.  The Houthis did recently resume attacks, however, against Israel.  The question is why the Houthis have not supported Iran by resuming the disruption of shipping through the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb choke point, putting even greater pressure on oil prices.

The reasons why the Houthis have held back so far include (1) they may be holding fire in order to serve as a strategic card to be played later by Iran; (2) they experienced earlier bombing by the United States that resulted in significant damage and don't want to deal with that situation again; (3) they see value in maintaining the detente they have with Saudi Arabia; and (4) they control a large civilian population which they don't want to endanger by attacks from Saudi Arabia or the United States.

The author also identifies four possible triggers that could lead to a resumption of Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.  

Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis Resume Attacks on Israel; Is Red Sea Next?

 The Times of Israel published on 28 March 2026 an article titled "Houthi Missile Attack on Israel Stokes Fears of Renewed Strikes on Red Sea Shipping."

Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen launched missile and drone attacks on Israel on 28 March, marking the first Houthi response since the United States and Israel began bombing Iran.  The strikes raise the specter of renewed Houthi attacks to disrupt international shipping in the Red Sea.  About 12 percent of world trade passes through the Suez Canal and Red Sea.

Israel's Recognition of Somaliland Creates Challenges in Horn of Africa (in Arabic)

 Egypt's Al Dostor published on 29 December 2025 an article titled "A Dangerous Gamble. Two International Experts: Israeli Recognition of 'Somaliland' Turns It into a Military Base."

The Arabic-language article draws on analysis by me and an analyst at the Atlantic Council in Washington on the implications of Israel's formal recognition of Somaliland, the first such recognition by another country.  It raises the question of possible recognition by other countries and identifies some of the challenges and new strategic considerations in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region.

Israel's Recognition of Somaliland Changes Dynamic in Horn of Africa

 Abren, a group of Ethiopian Americans, posted on 27 December 2025 an analysis titled "Israel's Recognition of Somaliland: A Game-Changer in Horn of Africa Geopolitics."

Israel's diplomatic recognition of Somaliland is a monumental shift in the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa.  The analysis looks at the positions of Turkey, Russia, China, US, and Ethiopia with the latter playing a pivotal role in this evolving situation.

Pirate Attack in Bab el-Mandeb Strait

 The Week magazine published on 6 December 2025 an article titled "Battle of Sea: Bulk Carrier 'Bobic' Fends Off 15 Pirate Boats Twice; Netizens Call It Swarm Attack."

The Barbados-flagged, Turkish-owned bulk carrier was attacked on 5 December in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait by 15 small boats of unknown origin.  The armed security team on the bulk carrier managed to repel all 15 boats; there were no casualties and the bulk carrier continued to its next port of call.  

Economic Consequences of Houthi Attacks on Red Sea Shipping

 The Center for Strategic and International Studies published on 22 January 2024 a study titled "The Global Economic Consequences of the Attacks on Red Sea Shipping Lanes" by Thibault Denamiel, Matthew Schleich, William Alan Reinsch, and Will Todman.  

Ship traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point at the southern end of the Red Sea has dropped 46 percent compared to the same period in 2023.  Cape of Good Hope passages around Africa are up 70 percent. Suez Canal revenues are down 40 percent.  Global shipping costs are rising, and Egypt is experiencing significant losses.   

China Uses Middle East Crisis to Raise Its Profile but Its Ships Fail to Respond to Attack

 The Soufan Center, an independent non-profit research organization based in New York, published on 4 December 2023 an intelligence brief titled "China Uses Middle East Crisis to Raise Its Global Profile."

Beijing sees the crisis in Gaza as an opportunity to advance its efforts to undermine U.S. and European dominance of the global order.  But Beijing has been unwilling or unable to rein in Iran's attempts to expand the conflict and is reluctant to become militarily involved in stabilizing the region.

When a commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden came under attack on 26 November by five Somali pirates based in Yemen, a US naval vessel thwarted the seizure and arrested the five assailants.  Three vessels from the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy were also near the distressed ship but did not respond to a call for help.  

Sudan-Iran Rapprochement Complicates Horn of Africa Geostrategy

 Modern Diplomacy published on 19 September 2023 a commentary titled "Iran and Sudan's Rapprochement in 2023: New Changes in the Regional Geopolitics of the Middle East" by Aishwarya Sanjukta Roy Proma, research associate at the Bangladesh-based BRAC Institute of Governance and Development.  

Written before Sudan and Iran recently reestablished diplomatic relations after a seven year break, this commentary takes on added importance and adds a new dimension to the regional geopolitics of the region.  Sudan, although currently embroiled in war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, can provide Iran with access to the Red Sea at Port Sudan.  The Suez Canal and Red Sea are vital to Iran's oil exports and maritime trade.  

Depending on how Iran's relationship develops with the SAF, which is also supported by Egypt, Tehran could complicate an already complicated geopolitical situation in the Horn of Africa.  Saudi Arabia and the UAE are deeply involved in Sudan.  A rapprochement between Iran and Sudan might also undermine an already fraught US relationship with Sudan.   

US Navy to Establish New Red Sea Task Force

 Defense News published on 13 April 2022 an article titled "Combined Maritime Forces Establishes New Naval Group to Patrol Red Sea Region" by Megan Eckstein.  

The multinational Combined Maritime Forces in the Middle East will stand up a new Combined Task Force-153 to address maritime threats in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.  The U.S. Navy will lead the task force initially, but will hand leadership over to a regional partner.  At any given time, the task force will consist of two to eight ships, which is not an increase in the present number of ships in the region but an effort to improve coordination and effectiveness.  They will operate from the Suez Canal through the Bab el-Mandeb strait to the Yemen-Oman border and will address human trafficking and smuggling of both legal materials like coal and illegal weapons and drugs.  

Great Power Rivalry in the Red Sea

Global China published in June 2020 an analysis titled "Great Power Rivalry in the Red Sea: China's Experiment in Djibouti and Implications for the United States" by Zach Vertin, Brookings Doha Center. 

The analysis looks at the presence of US and Chinese forces in the region, especially in Djibouti, and considers what China's engagement means for the United States.  The author concludes that China's growing profile in Djibouti and the Red Sea region warrants new Western vigilance, but it need not elicit alarm. 

Red Sea Security

The Great Decisions organization in Reston, Virginia, in cooperation with the Fairfax County Public Library interviewed me on the subject of "Red Sea Security."  The 118 minute podcast, moderated by Michael Carpenter of Great Decisions, took place via Zoom on 27 April 2020 but did not appear on You Tube until 22 May 2020.

This wide ranging discussion covers both sides of the Red Sea, the war in Yemen, the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other, the Qatar/Turkey versus Saudi Arabia/UAE alignments, freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, the military bases in Djibouti, Israel's role in Africa, and recent developments in Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan.

China and the Red Sea Region

The US Institute of Peace (USIP) published on 27 April 2020 a major report titled "China's Impact on Conflict Dynamics in the Red Sea Arena" by the USIP China-Red Sea Arena Senior Study Group.

China has become a significant player in the Red Sea arena over the last two decades, driven most recently by the Belt and Road Initiative. This report examines China's interests and activities in the region, their impact on intrastate and regional conflict dynamics, and implications for the United States.

China's Impact on Conflict Dynamics in the Red Sea Arena

The US Institute of Peace is hosting on 28 April 2020 from 11:00 am to 12:00 pm an online discussion titled "China's Impact on Conflict Dynamics in the Red Sea Arena." The occasion is the launch of an in-depth report of the same title that will be available to the public. Please go to the link for details.

A great deal of work has gone into this report. For anyone even slightly interested in the broader Red Sea region, both the report and the one hour discussion on 28 April should be worth your time. And besides, we are all a captive audience.

Both Sides of Red Sea Form Red Sea Pact

The National Interest published on 29 March 2020 an analysis titled "Here Comes Saudi Arabia's African Offensive" by Ilan Berman and Jacob McCarty, both with the American Foreign Policy Council.

Five African nations--Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt--and three Middle Eastern countries--Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Jordan--signed in January the Red Sea Pact to enhance trade and diplomacy along the Red Sea corridor. The Pact lays the groundwork for what Saudi officials hope will become a new cooperative regime for the area. The objective is to increase trade and security along and within this important waterway that has choke points at each end--the Suez Canal in the north and Bab el-Mandeb in the south.

China's Military Presence in the Red Sea Region

The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington published in January 2020 a study titled "The PLA Beyond Asia: China's Growing Military Presence in the Red Sea Region" by Joel Wuthnow, National Defense University.

The key finding is that China's People's Liberation Army presence in the Red Sea area, while currently modest, creates several challenges that U.S. officials will have to address. This includes questions of operational safety as U.S. and Chinese forces come into contact, risks of exposing the PLA to sensitive U.S. operations and capabilities, and the possibility that the attractiveness of the United States as a regional security partner could wane as China takes on increasing roles in the area.

Regional and Great Power Rivalries in the Red Sea Basin

The Middle East Institute published on 29 January 2020 an analysis titled "The Bab el-Mandeb Strait: Regional and Great Power Rivalries on the Shores of the Red Sea" by John Calabrese, American University.

The author surveys the complicated relationships between the Gulf States and the Horn of Africa and the increasing great power competition, especially between the United States and China, in the Red Sea region.

Architecture for a New Regional Order in the Red Sea

Brookings published in November 2019 a study titled "Toward a Red Sea Forum: The Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and Architecture for a New Regional Order" by Zach Vertin.

Freedom of navigation is at stake in the Red Sea as is the protection of maritime trade and control of a major strategic chokepoint, Bab el-Mandeb, at the south end. The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden represent the western flank of an emering theater of competition among global powers in the Indian Ocean. This paper surveys the changing Red Sea context and offers the rationale for a trans-regional governance framework.

A New Political Order in the Red Sea Basin?

African Arguments posted on 11 July 2018 an analysis titled "Beyond the Red Sea: A New Driving Force in the Politics of the Horn" by Alex de Waal.

There is a chasm between the multilateralism of states in the Horn of Africa and the types of relationships cultivated by the Gulf States where politics are transactional and bilateral. A short-term "Pax Arabica" may emerge based on Gulf State money used to meet African leaders' urgent cash needs. But this is not a foundation for durable peace and security.