Downsizing Oversees State Department Missions: Trim but Don't Eliminate Embassies

The National Interest published on 19 March 2025 a commentary titled "Trim Embassies, Don't Close Them" by Ronald Neumann and Gregory Starr. 

As the Trump administration reduces US diplomatic and consular representation abroad, the authors argue persuasively that some consulates can be closed but America's 173 embassies should be retained although some staff can be trimmed.

Will China Help Secure Commercial Shipping in the Red Sea?

 Because of the large volume of Chinese exports and imports that pass through the Red Sea and Suez Canal and the relationship of this geostrategic territory to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative, China probably has more interest from a commercial point of view than any other country in the safety and freedom of navigation through these waters.  China is also in a position to contribute to the protection of shipping in the Red Sea.  It maintains a three-ship PLA naval task force in the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea region as a hangover from the days of Somali piracy.  It has a naval base in Djibouti at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. It has constructed and owns extensive commercial shipping infrastructure in the Suez Canal Zone, Djibouti, and along Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast.  The Gulf International Forum spelled out China's commercial and military interests in the region in a 21 July 2023 article titled "China's Dual Strategy in the Red Sea: Balancing Economic Expansion and Military Presence" by Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco.  

Recent drone and missile attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea by Iranian-supported Houthis in Yemen, which borders the southern end of the waterway, do not appear to exempt vessels from any particular country. The United States also has naval ships in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden and is part of Combined Task Force 153, which is designed to ensure freedom of navigation in the region.  Washington is trying to expand the task force so that there are sufficient military assets in place to deter Houthi threats to maritime trade in these waters.  The Washington Post reported on this effort in an article dated 10 December 2023 titled "U.S. Seeking Partners to Safeguard Ships after Red Sea Attacks" by Dan Lamothe and Kareem Fahim.  

This raises the question what China is prepared to do to protect shipping through the Red Sea.  Although it is highly unlikely that China would participate in the American-influenced Combined Task Force 153, it is in Beijing's interest to take some kind of action.  China has leverage with Iran, which controls Yemen's Houthis.  China is now the largest purchaser of Iranian crude and early this year brokered a diplomatic reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia.  If China is not prepared to join the international naval effort, it should, at a minimum, use its leverage with Iran to reign in the Houthis.    

Sudan-Iran Rapprochement Complicates Horn of Africa Geostrategy

 Modern Diplomacy published on 19 September 2023 a commentary titled "Iran and Sudan's Rapprochement in 2023: New Changes in the Regional Geopolitics of the Middle East" by Aishwarya Sanjukta Roy Proma, research associate at the Bangladesh-based BRAC Institute of Governance and Development.  

Written before Sudan and Iran recently reestablished diplomatic relations after a seven year break, this commentary takes on added importance and adds a new dimension to the regional geopolitics of the region.  Sudan, although currently embroiled in war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, can provide Iran with access to the Red Sea at Port Sudan.  The Suez Canal and Red Sea are vital to Iran's oil exports and maritime trade.  

Depending on how Iran's relationship develops with the SAF, which is also supported by Egypt, Tehran could complicate an already complicated geopolitical situation in the Horn of Africa.  Saudi Arabia and the UAE are deeply involved in Sudan.  A rapprochement between Iran and Sudan might also undermine an already fraught US relationship with Sudan.   

UK Cutting Aid to Africa; Will China Fill Void?

 The China Africa Project posted on 26 April 2021 a brief Q and A with Pippa Morgan, Duke Kunshan University in China, titled "China Likely to See the Cut in UK Aid Spending as Opportunity and a Loss."

China is not looking to replace British aid cuts in Africa, but does want to play a major role in global development by mixing aid and commerce.  

Putin's African Dream

Modern Diplomacy has just published a handbook titled "Putin's African Dream and the New Dawn: Challenges and Emerging Opportunities" by Kester Kenn Klomegah, an independent research writer and a policy consultant in the Russian Federation and Eurasian Union. Modern Diplomacy is a platform that publishes "international issues that are often outside the boundaries of mainstream Western media and academia." Partner organizations include the Russian International Affairs Council.

The handbook looks at Russia-Africa relations mostly through the eyes of Russian officials, business persons, and academics and its release is timed to precede the Russia-Africa Summit at Sochi in October 2019. It is a helpful guide in explaining how Russia currently views Africa and what it hopes to achieve at Sochi and afterwards. Russia has not been particularly active in Africa since the end of the Cold War. It remains to be seen if its relationship with Africa will become a "new dawn."

Chinese Port Activity in the Indo-Pacific Region

Washington-based C4ADS, a non-profit organization dedicated to data-driven analysis, recently published a study titled "Harbored Ambitions: How China's Port Investments Are strategically Reshaping the Indo-Pacific" by Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack.

The report evaluates China's maritime infrastructure investment goals in the Indo-Pacific within the context of both policy from official documents and analyses from state- and Communist Party-affiliated publications. The authors found that Chinese analysts unofficially discussing port investments routinely prioritize China's national security interests over the objective of mutually beneficial economic development, contradicting the position of official policy documents.

China in Djibouti: Mixing Commerce and Security

The Council on Foreign Relations posted on 13 April 2018 a commentary titled "China's Strategy in Djibouti: Mixing Commercial and Military Interests" by Monica Wang, an intern at the Council on Foreign Relations.

The author concludes that the mixing of commercial and military interests that made Djibouti a possibility has become the model that China will replicate again in the Indian Ocean region, and soon.

Video Program on China Africa Relations

The Fairfax County, Virginia, public access channel aired on 5 December 2014 a 30 minute interview with me on China-Africa relations.  Called "Window to China," the hostess was Xinyu Zhang and other interviewers included Don Tepper and Winslow Robertson.  The interview covered a wide range of China-Africa issues.

RAND Report on Chinese Engagement in Africa

The RAND Corporation has just released an excellent 173 page report titled "Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy" by Larry Hanauer and Lyle Morris.  It is available on-line free of charge.  I had an opportunity to comment extensively on an early draft. 

It concludes that China has four overarching strategic interests in Africa: access to natural resources, particularly oil and gas; markets for Chinese exports; political legitimacy; and sufficient security and stability to continue its commercial activities.  It identifies the positive and negative impacts of Chinese engagement in Africa, the African perception of this engagement, and China's reaction to African perceptions.  It suggests implications for U.S. policy and offers a series of recommendations. 

This is a must read for anyone interested in this topic. 

Small Chinese Shops in Africa

The Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University published on 21 October 2013 a brief commentary titled "The Latest Victims of the Euro Crisis - Chinese Grocers in Africa" by Su Junxia and Daniel Krahl.  The authors report their impressions, primarily in Malawi, about the increasingly negative attitude of Africans towards small Chinese shopkeepers.

US, Africa and China Dialogue

The Washington-based think Tank, Brookings, held a conference on 13 May 2013 on the relationship among the US, China and Africa.  It just released the four conference papers under the title "A Trilateral Dialogue on the United States, Africa and China."  The four papers are:
--New Actors in International Development: The Case of China in Africa
--China and African Countries: Areas for Trilateral Cooperation
--The Role of China and the U.S. in Managing Ghana's Nonrenewable Natural Resources for Inclusive Development
--Perspectives on China-Africa Oil Ties

The China Africa Project focused on the Brookings paper in a 23 minute podcast titled "Can the US and China Work Together in Africa?"  with veteran journalists Eric Olander in Paris and Cobus van Staden in Cape Town.

Chinese Companies in South Sudan

Saferworld, an independent, international organization based in London and aimed at preventing violent conflict, is engaging with China and Chinese companies to promote a conflict sensitive approach to large infrastructure and mineral extraction projects in Africa.  By January 2013, about 100 Chinese companies had registered in South Sudan, mainly working in oil production and infrastructure construction.  Saferworld, in a 30 August 2013 piece titled "Conflict Sensitivity in South Sudan: Ensuring Economic Development Supports Peace," comments on its efforts so far to encourage Chinese companies to interact in a way that supports peace.