The Center for Maritime Security published on 6 May 2024 an analysis titled "China's Calculated Inaction in Red Sea Crisis" by David Scott, Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies.
China has maintained a deliberate distancing from the Red Sea crisis in spite of its considerable interest in keeping the waterway open. The author suggests a variety of reasons why China is pursuing this policy.
The Diplomat published on 16 January 2024 a commentary titled "China's Response to the Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea" by Mordechai Chaziza, Ashkelon Academic College.
Following the Iranian-backed Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes frequently used by Chinese vessels, China faces limitations in pursuing its global aspirations when substantial engagement is required. Its lack of action in responding to the attacks exposes its diplomatic rhetoric and initiatives, notably the Global Security Initiative, as empty slogans. Even when critical Chinese interests are at stake, Beijing relies on the efforts of other countries.
Military Review published in its May/June edition an article titled "China's Belt and Road Initiative in East Africa: Finding Success in Failure?" by Edward A. Lynch, Hollins University.
The author argues that to a considerable degree, China has supplanted U.S. influence in East Africa. If the Belt and Road Initiative is sustained over the next 10 years or so, China will have more global visibility and prestige than it has now.
India's Chanaka Forum published on 16 November 2022 an analysis titled "Rising Rivalry in the Indian Ocean" by Jay Maniyar.
The article discusses growing Indian and Chinese naval competition in the Indian Ocean. India is countering China's "string of pearls" strategy with its "double fish hook" strategy designed to strengthen New Delhi's naval presence in both the western and eastern Indian Ocean.
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs published on 3 November 2022 a "Joint Statement on Establishing a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership between the People's Republic of China and the United Republic of Tanzania."
The joint statement resulted from the visit to China by Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan beginning on 2 November 2022. There were surprisingly few new commitments in the joint statement and no direct reference to the controversial Bagamoyo port project. The most important new development was the elevation of Tanzania's bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. The other new developments were:
--Provision of duty-free treatment for 98 percent of tariff goods originating from Tanzania. (This will have limited impact, however, because Tanzania does not have much that China wants to purchase. Tanzania imports ten times more goods by value from China than it exports to China.)
--Upgrading and renovation of the TAZARA railway between Dar es Salaam and Zambia's copper mines. (China has done this before; it is not clear who is paying this time.)
--Providing an undetermined number of additional scholarships for Tanzanian students. (The joint statement provided no numbers on past scholarships or the future increase.)
--Invitation for Xi Jinping to visit Tanzania in 2024 as part of the celebration of the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations with China.
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy published in October 2022 a study titled "China's Security Presence in the Middle East: Redlines and Guidelines for the United States" by Grant Rumley.
China's security presence in the region comprises a traditional military footprint of naval deployments and exercises, arms sales, and critical infrastructure agreements. China's base in Djibouti and its naval task force are the most prominent features of its military presence in the Middle East and North Africa.
The Middle East Institute as part of its All About China series published on 18 May 2021 my analysis titled "China's Maritime Silk Road and Security in the Red Sea Region."
This is an overview of China's security interaction in the Red Sea region that includes the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden. It identifies the challenges facing China and how China has decided so far to face those challenges.
Amsterdam University Press published in 2021 a book containing a chapter titled "Ascertaining Agency: Africa and the Belt and Road Initiative" by Stacey Links, Leiden Asia Centre. To access, agree to terms.
The chapter explores Africa's [questionable in my view] centrality to the Belt and Road Initiative against the backdrop of intensifying China-Africa relations. The author makes a case for Africa as a fundamental cornerstone of understanding the Belt and Road Initiative in both its practical and more ideological facets.
The Asia Society Policy Institute Published in September 2020 a study titled "Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative" by Daniel R. Russel and Blake H. Berger.
The study argues that China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the embodiment of a whole-of-government effort to develop close coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and legal efforts to foster a strategic environment conducive to China's rise. Whether China can effectively weaponize the BRI by creating a Sino-centric ecosystem of trade, technology, finance, and strategic strongpoints will be a function of Beijing's choices and those made in Washington.
The South China Morning Post published a story on 11 September 2020 on this report titled "China's Belt and Road Builds Network Its Military Could Use: US Report" by Catherine Wong.
The Began-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies published on 4 August 2020 a commentary titled "The New Silk Road and the Maghreb Region" by Mordechai Chaziza, Ashkelon Academic College in Israel.
Since the 2013 launch of China's Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has shown great interest in the Maghreb region as an entry point to European and African markets. While China is gaining a foothold in the Maghreb, it cannot match US or European dominance in the region.
