China-Africa Security Radar posted on 1 October 2025 an article titled "China's Cybersecurity Partnerships in Africa."
China hosted a forum devoted to cyberspace in September attended by representatives from 32 African countries. Beijing unveiled an action plan for cooperation in digital economy development, cybersecurity, AI governance, and media exchanges. The forum marks an effort by China to become the primary partner shaping Africa's digital future.
The American Security Project published on 10 February 2025 a commentary titled "The Unseen Cost of Dismantling USAID: A Strategic Setback for U.S. Tech Leadership" by Sam Dumesh.
USAID has been a driver of embedding US standards for digital and financial systems into emerging markets before China-backed systems can take hold. The dismantlement of USAID digital programs threatens to end this tool of American foreign policy.
The Atlantic Council published in October 2022 an issue brief titled "China's Surveillance Ecosystem & the Global Spread of Its Tools" by Bulelani Jili.
This paper offers insights into China's domestic surveillance market and cyber capability ecosystem, especially given the limited number of systematic studies on the industry and its growing influence in the Global South. What is unique about Beijing is how it goes about promoting public security systems in the Global South.
In an important speech in London on 11 October 2022 before the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Sir Jeremy Fleming, Director of Government Communications Headquarters (the UK's intelligence, cyber, and security agency) warned that China is working hard to exploit information covertly in countries big and small.
China is deliberately and patiently trying to gain strategic advantage by shaping the world's technology ecosystems. Technology has become not just an area for opportunity, for competition and for collaboration, it's become a battleground for control, values and influence.
Fleming argued that "we must conclude that Beijing is using all of the levers to challenge the international post-war consensus on economics and technology. And that it intends to rewrite the rules of international security, both close to home and further afield, in ways frankly that none of us have ever faced before." The Communist Party of China is using "its resources to implement draconian national security laws, a surveillance culture, and an increasingly aggressive military." Fleming added that "in a future crisis, Beijing could exploit information covertly. One only needs to look at how China has already sought to do just this, leveraging its influence over many smaller nations in votes over technology, ethics and foreign policy."
Fleming concluded that "this isn't a call to exclude or marginalize China -- even if we could. It's a call for a China to recognize that it's to its advantage to play responsibly inside the global system. If it does so it can help to co-create the rules of tomorrow. But if it chooses not to. To play a disruptive role in international security, technology and markets, then that will come at a cost too."
Senators Robert Menendez (Democrat of New Jersey) and James Risch (Republican of Idaho) have introduced the "Strategic Competition Act of 2021," which is designed to counter China globally.
The proposed legislation contains sections (271-276) on Sub-Sahara Africa that call for a series of actions by elements of the US government. They include:
--A report that assesses the nature and impact of Chinese political, economic, and security sector activity in Africa, and its impact on US strategic interests;
--A report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing US economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in the investment climate in Africa, including through support for democratic institutions, the rule of law, improved transparency, anti-corruption, and governance;
--A review of the number of Foreign Commercial Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at US embassies in Sub-Sahara Africa;
--Establishment of an interagency working group to counter Chinese cyber aggression with respect to Africa;
--The commitment of resources to enhance the entrepreneurship and leadership skills of African youth with the objective of enhancing their ability to serve as leaders in the public and private sectors. This will include the establishment of the Young African Leaders Initiative. (This is a return to a key component of President Obama's Africa policy); and
--A report by the US Agency for Global Media on the resources and timeline needed to establish an organization whose mission is to promote democratic values and institutions in Africa.
The Bill contains less detailed sections (281-282) for the Middle East and North Africa.
Comment: While it is too soon to predict where this Bill is headed, it has bipartisan sponsorship. It also deals with one of the major omissions of the Trump administration's efforts to counter China in Africa: no new proactive American programs except for the US International Development Finance Corporation. The reports requested in this Bill are aimed at creating new programs and adding resources.
The China Africa Project posted on 20 January 2021 a commentary titled "The Huawei Fuss and Implications for Africa's Cyber Security" by Henri Kouam, a Yaounde-based research fellow for the Denis and Lenora Foretia Foundations.
The author offers suggestions for African countries to deal with the cyber security issues surrounding China's Huawei company to control the 5G market on the continent.
Reuters published on 16 December 2020 an article titled "Exclusive-Suspected Chinese Hackers Stole Camera Footage from African Union-Memo" by Raphael Satter.
According to an internal African Union memo, a Chinese hacking group nicknamed "Bronze President" rigged servers in the basement of an administrative annex to the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa to siphon videos from surveillance cameras covering the AU's offices, parking areas, corridors, and meeting rooms. Japan's Computer Emergency Response Team alerted AU officials to the security breach. The Chinese mission to the AU denied the charge.
This incident recalls a credible report in 2018 that China, which built the AU headquarters free of charge and installed the communications system, had been downloading and sending to China for years sensitive communications leaving and entering the AU until a report in Le Monde brought it to an end. Both China and the AU denied the report.
According to the Reuters' report, a former AU official stated that any official protest over the spying is unlikely because of China's significant financial contributions to the AU.
My Broadband posted on 18 August 2020 an article titled "Huawei 5G Equipment Not Under Threat in South Africa" by Bradley Prior.
Huawei equipment is prevalent in South African 5G networks and is a key part of bringing faster mobile connectivity to the country. My Broadband interviewed three primary consumer 5G network providers--Vodacom, MTN, and Rain--about their views on the use of Huawei equipment. All three are using Huawei equipment and expect to continue the practice although they said they take security issues seriously.
The Asia Society Policy Institute Published in September 2020 a study titled "Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative" by Daniel R. Russel and Blake H. Berger.
The study argues that China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the embodiment of a whole-of-government effort to develop close coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and legal efforts to foster a strategic environment conducive to China's rise. Whether China can effectively weaponize the BRI by creating a Sino-centric ecosystem of trade, technology, finance, and strategic strongpoints will be a function of Beijing's choices and those made in Washington.
The South China Morning Post published a story on 11 September 2020 on this report titled "China's Belt and Road Builds Network Its Military Could Use: US Report" by Catherine Wong.
