Modern Diplomacy published on 14 September 2026 a commentary titled "Is China Turning Economic Influence in Africa into Strategic Power?" by Nadia Helmy.
The author argues that China is leveraging its membership in BRICS and its direct investment in Africa as tools to build economic influence that gradually translate into sustainable political, security, and strategic influence.
Fana Media Corporation, an Ethiopian government affiliated company, posted on 4 September 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia Places Red Sea Access at the Heart of National Security and Regional Stability."
Ethiopia plans to use its BRICS' membership to press its case for peaceful access to the Red Sea at the BRICS' summit in New Delhi on 12-13 September. Ethiopia's charge d'affaires in New Delhi recently underscored the importance Ethiopia attaches to this issue.
China-Africa Security Radar posted on 4 September 2026 an article titled "Eagles of Civilization 2026: Beyond the J-16 vs Rafale Dogfight."
The People's Liberation Army Air Force participated in the Eagles of Civilization joint air exercise with the Egyptian Air Force. For Beijing, the exercise is about building mutual trust, strengthening Sino-Egyptian friendship, expanding practical cooperation, and promoting regional peace. For Egypt, it is about exchanging expertise and developing operational skills.
Beijing is also recasting this exercise as evidence of China's emergence as a provider of integrated military capability, strategic autonomy, and security far beyond its borders.
Brookings published on 27 August 2026 a commentary titled "Don't Let the Iran War Distract the United States from Africa" by Landry Signe.
The Iran war risks distracting the United States from Africa when competition for critical minerals, trade, and alliances with African countries become more intense. China, France, Russia, UAE, and India are accelerating their engagement on the continent, meaning any American retreat will come at a high geopolitical opportunity cost.
The BBC posted on 26 August 2026 an article titled "China Advises Its Citizens to Leave Taiwan Ally Eswatini Over 'Security Risks'" by Basillioh Rukanga.
China's Foreign Ministry told its citizens to leave Eswatini, the only country in Africa that recognizes Taiwan, citing "rampant cyber fraud and criminal activities associated with gambling." Eswatini had earlier arrested 40 Chinese nationals during raids on alleged illegal online gambling centers.
The Economist published on 20 August 2026 an article titled "Somaliland Wants to Help Secure the Red Sea."
Somaliland's president says his country can help secure the Red Sea by offering military bases to global powers along its coastline. Somaliland is prepared to offer both the United States and Israel bases at the port of Berbera.
The Congressional Research Service published on 6 August 2026 a paper titled "China-Sub-Saharan Africa Ties and U.S. Policy" by Nicolas Cook, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, and Michael D. Sutherland.
China presents its engagement in Africa as promoting mutually beneficial economic development without imposing political conditions. In practice, China seeks to use integrated multidimensional engagement to advance its broader global strategic goals of expanding its international influence, strengthening its access to natural resources, and challenging US global leadership.
Economic activity is a central pillar of China's activity in Africa. Beijing's policy banks and state-backed lenders have extended numerous loans to African governments and other actors, making China a key bilateral creditor on the continent. China engages in education and media cooperation, and provides development aid via grants and concessional loans, technical assistance, and humanitarian programs. Security cooperation between China and African countries has grown, especially over the last decade.
Horn Review published on 12 August 2026 a commentary titled "South Sudan and China's Evolving Overseas Security Strategy" by Abraham Abebe.
In July, China committed to deepening military cooperation with South Sudan by continuing its support for the UN peacekeeping mission as the backbone of its contribution. Beyond this, China's support seems to be limited to expanding its military dialogue with South Sudan and increasing military exchanges.
Global Views World published on 10 August 2026 a commentary titled "Africa's 2026 Geopolitics: China's $282B Pull" by Alonso Reyes.
The author argues Africa's geopolitical alignment is undergoing significant transformation by moving away from traditional Western allies and towards emerging powers such as China, India, Russia, and the Gulf States.
But this is not a zero-sum game. African leaders are not choosing sides. They are diversifying their partnerships to maximize their own national interests.
The Congressional Research Service published on 6 August 2026 a report titled "China-Sub-Saharan Africa Ties and U.S. Policy" by Nicolas Cook, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, and Michael D. Sutherland.
This is a comprehensive overview of China's relations with Sub-Saharan Africa and guidance for US policymakers.
China-Africa Security Radar published on 3 August 2026 an article titled "Fragmented Leverage: Why African States Call for Collective Bargaining but Prefer Bilateralism in Critical Minerals Negotiations" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.
The author explains how China and the United States seek advantage with African countries in bilateral negotiations in their quest for critical minerals. China exploits bilateral negotiations through processing dominance and bundled infrastructure-mineral deals. The United States pursues selective frameworks and corridor diplomacy.
The Congressional Research Service published on 21 July 2026 a brief titled "Yemen: Conflict, Red Sea Security, and U.S. Policy" by Christopher M. Blanchard.
In March 2025, the Trump administration designated the Iranian-backed Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization. On March 15, 2025, U.S. forces began a military campaign against the Houthis which the administration said was intended to compel them to end attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. The United States and the Houthis agreed to a truce in May 2025, which continues to hold.
The State Department published on 15 July 2026 an announcement titled "Realignment of U.S. Visa Services in Africa to Regional Hubs."
Effective August 1, the Department of State ended routine visa services at the following 25 US embassies and consulates in Sub-Saharan Africa: Antananarivo (Madagascar), Abuja (Nigeria), Asmara (Eritrea), Bamako (Mali), Banjul (The Gambia), Brazzaville (Republic of Congo), Bujumbura (Burundi), Conakry (Guinea), Cotonou (Benin), Durban (South Africa), Freetown (Sierra Leone), Gaborone (Botswana), Harare (Zimbabwe), Juba (South Sudan), Libreville (Gabon), Lilongwe (Malawi), Lusaka (Zambia), Maputo (Mozambique), Maseru (Lesotho), Mbabane (Eswatini), N'Djamena (Chad), Niamey (Niger), Nouakchott (Mauritania), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), and Windhoek (Namibia).
Instead, persons seeking visas to visit the United States in the countries cited above will have to travel to a regional visa hub in one of the following 20 cities: Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire), Accra (Ghana), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Cape Town (South Africa), Dakar (Senegal), Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania), Djibouti (Djibouti), Johannesburg (South Africa), Kampala (Uganda), Kigali (Rwanda), Kinshasa (DRC), Lagos (Nigeria), Lome (Togo), Luanda (Angola), Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), Monrovia (Liberia), Nairobi (Kenya), Port Louis (Mauritius), Praia (Cape Verde), and Yaoundé (Cameroon).
The Department of State said it is realigning visa operations in Sub-Saharan Africa as "part of a long-standing Department practice that strengthens national security by promoting more uniform screening, vetting, and adjudication standards, as well as improves efficiency."
Comment: The national security explanation is not convincing. For example, a consular officer located in Lusaka can adjudicate a visa application just as uniformly and accurately as one at a visa hub in Johannesburg. In fact, a consular officer located in the country of application has a better understanding of the applicant's background than a consular officer in another country. Nor is the realignment likely to save much money. US embassies and consulates are still expected to provide routine passport and protection services for American citizens. The consular sections in most embassies and consulates in Africa are small with one individual often handling both visa services and assistance to American citizens.
What the realignment will do is make it more difficult for many Africans to visit relatives in the United States, study at American universities, and travel for tourism and business. The geography of the realignment means, for example, that the entire Sahel region and all of southern Africa except South Africa and Angola will no longer have local non-immigrant and immigrant visa services provided by US embassies and consulates. This raises the question. Is the real reason for this realignment to make it more difficult for Sub-Saharan Africans to come to the United States? Whatever the rationale, the State Department has just handed another victory to China and Russia.
The Ichikowitz Family Foundation just published its massive African Youth Survey 2026. It held face-to-face interviews with about 5,000 Africans aged 18-24 from 16 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
It covers many issues, but the focus here is perceptions of China and the United States. African youth see China (79 percent) and the United States (81 percent) as the most influential foreign actors, although China's influence is seen as somewhat more positive.
The survey looked at the influence of the US, China, Brazil, EU, UK, Germany, France, India, and Russia. The only country whose influence was seen as less positive than the United States (85 percent) was Russia (83 percent).
About 3 in 5 youth are optimistic about Africa's future during the Trump administration, especially on military support and security. Just under half believe the closure of USAID will negatively impact their country, with healthcare and disease prevention seen as the areas most affected.
China and India are increasingly viewed as more favorable partners than the United States, a sentiment shaped in part by the return of the Trump administration.
The Middle East Council on Global Affairs, a policy research institution based in Doha, Qatar, published on 16 July 2026 a commentary titled "Iran War Intensifies U.S.-China Rivalry in Africa" by Mustapha Boudoumi.
Disruptions to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz have highlighted the strategic importance of African choke points such as the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb. The situation in Iran has put increasing focus on China-US competition for critical minerals in Africa.
List 25 published on 11 July 2026 an analysis titled "Navies Protect Cable Ships from Pirate Skiffs: The Full Story" by Anant Gupta.
Fiber-optic cable laying ships in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Guinea, and waters off Somalia are especially vulnerable to pirate attacks. This analysis explains why they are vulnerable and efforts to protect them as they perform their vital functions.
The Emirates Policy Center published on 7 July 2026 an analysis titled "Ethiopia's Seventh Elections: Challenges of Internal Stability and Repercussions on Regional Politics."
The huge victory by the ruling Prosperity Party in Ethiopia's recent parliamentary elections did not resolve the crisis of political legitimacy, as the electoral process remained characterized by a precarious security environment, inequitable competition, and a significant lack of voter turnout in numerous regions.
China-Africa Security Radar published on 5 July 2026 a commentary titled "China, the United States, and Africa's Green Minerals Vision" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.
In 2025, the African Union adopted a continental policy framework called Africa Green Minerals Strategy (AGMS), which aims to turn Africa's critical and green minerals endowment into sustainable, value-adding industrialization that supports a just energy transition and regional supply chain integration.
China has the processing capacity, investment scale, implementation speed, and institutional flexibility to advance African industrialization--but its commercial incentives run directly against allowing Africa to independently climb the value chain.
The US offers somewhat more transparent financing structures, stronger governance standards, and procedural models that on paper seem to better protect African states from debt traps--but it lacks the industrial ecosystem and the genuine political will to support African manufacturing rather than African extraction for American consumption.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 1 July 2026 an analysis titled "In the Middle East and North Africa, America and China Converge More Than They Diverge" by Amr Hamzawy and Kathryn Selfe.
Competition between the United States and China in the Middle East and North Africa is less a threat and more an opportunity. The region has important geostrategic significance for both countries. As great power competition develops globally, Washington and Beijing's positions in the region are increasingly converging.
The United States and China are united by their primary interest in maintaining free trade in the region. For both countries, a stable, peace-driven order is key. Washington is also driven by interest in Israel's security; Beijing is similarly driven by China's need for oil and liquid natural gas. These two interests are compatible and underscore the need for peace and stability in the region.
Horn Diplomat published on 12 June 2026 an article titled "Somaliland Opens New Representative Office in Taiwan as Ties Deepen" by Mohamed Duale.
On June 12, breakaway Somaliland opened the new premises of its Representative Office in Taiwan as officials from both sides pledged to expand cooperation across security, trade, healthcare, and development sectors.
The new office reflected the steady expansion of relations between Somaliland and Taiwan since the two sides established reciprocal representative offices in 2020.
