Foreign Affairs published on 6 October 2026 an article titled "The New Red Sea Wars" by Alan Boswell.
Policymakers for too long treated the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula as separate strategic regions divided by the Red Sea. That distinction is evaporating as wars on one side of the sea increasingly alter the military calculations on the other. US policy rarely treated the two regions as linked.
The Italian Institute for International Political Studies published on 5 August 2026 an analysis titled "Iran and the Horn of Africa: Evolving Interests Since the Current Conflict" by Eric Lob.
This study suggested the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen would open a second maritime front by disrupting commercial shipping in the Red Sea and that Teheran will try to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa. It will be constrained, however, by the geopolitical complications of its relations with the region and by its own economic challenges.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 22 September 2026 an analysis titled "Houthi Leverage over the Red Sea Escalates Threats for Africa."
Iran-backed Houthi rebel attacks on shipping in the red Sea and Gulf of Aden are intensifying pressure on global supply chains. The attacks also have direct security and economic implications for many African countries, especially in the Horn of Africa.
There has been a resurgence in Somali piracy, growing cooperation between the Houthis and al-Shabaab in Somalia, and rising prices for refined oil products, fertilizer, and imported manufactured goods that previously transited the Suez Canal.
African Arguments published on 16 September 2026 a commentary titled "The Horn of Africa's Age of Permanent Conflict" by Matthew de Waal.
Foreign patrons have progressively co-opted economic and military architecture in the Horn of Africa. The Horn now faces a transformed conflict system in which the boundaries of war and peace, state and non-state, and domestic and external are breaking down. Drones have exacerbated the situation.
This is not a passing phase of instability but a structural recalibration of politics, with wars becoming harder to contain, distinguish from peace, and end.
Al-Estiklal, a Turkish daily based in Istanbul, published on 24 August 2026 an article titled "Houthi Expansion in the Horn of Africa: From Arms Smuggling to a Cross-Border Network of Influence."
Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi outreach to the Horn of Africa is an attempt to build a human, logistical, and intelligence network that can be utilized on both sides of the Red Sea. It involves collaboration with al-Shabaab in Somalia and sympathetic individuals in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
It is part of Iran's broader strategy in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The Houthis monitor the movements of countries allied with Saudi Arabia and the United States and secure supply lines to ensure the continued flow of weapons and supplies.
Higher Education Today posted about a month ago a 29-minute podcast titled "Culture and History of Somaliland" hosted by Steven Roy Goodman with Jama Musa Jama, Hargeisa Cultural Centre, and Lee Cassanelli, professor emeritus at the University of Pennsylvania.
This is a positive account filmed in Hargeisa of Somaliland's history and culture, interspersed with video clips of the country.
Fronts, an independent online news source owned by a privately held Czech company, posted on 15 June 2026 a commentary titled "The Egypt-Ethiopia Cold War Is Key to the Horn's Growing Conflicts" by Liam Karr.
The author suggests a "cold war" between Ethiopia and Egypt is a battle for regional dominance, touches nearly every conflict in the Horn of Africa, and is fueling tensions in an already unstable region. Control over Nile waters and landlocked Ethiopia's desire to obtain access to the sea loom large in this cold war.
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 15 April 2026 a paper titled "Instability in the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia Borderlands" by Christopher Hockey, Timothy Kimaiyo, and Martine Zeuthen.
The paper provides critical insights into the complex dynamics of instability in the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia borderlands. It highlights the interconnected challenges of violent extremism, gender-based violence, ethnic tensions, political instability and resource pressures, offering practical recommendations for future interventions.
World Politics Review published on 26 March 2026 an article titled "A Looming 'Mega-War' in the Horn of Africa" by Elliot Waldman.
The author is of the view that Ethiopian support for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan's civil war and growing internal conflict in Ethiopia open the prospect for a "regional mega-war."
The Emirates Policy Center published on 27 March 2026 an analysis titled "Exacerbating the Risk of Fragility: Consequences of Iran War on the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa Region."
The Horn of Africa and Red Sea may become an arena for escalating regional and international conflict as Iran seeks to expand its confrontation with the US and Israel. It could escalate existing local conflicts, intensify competition by regional powers such as Türkiye and Egypt, and cause a recalibration of foreign policy alignments.
The International Crisis Group posted on 11 March 2026 a commentary titled "Sudan's Devastating War Rages on as Regional Rivalries Deepen" by Shewit Woldemichael.
As Sudan's civil war nears its fourth year, the conflict is steadily regionalizing into the Horn of Africa and Gulf States, making any settlement harder to achieve. Supporting the Sudan Armed Forces are Egypt, Eritrea, Turkiye, Qatar, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. The principal backer of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces is the UAE. The feud between the UAE and Saudi Arabia now risks deepening the intractable nature of the war.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 4 March 2026 an analysis titled "Iran War's Impact on the Red Sea and Horn of Africa" by Liam Karr.
The Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen could resume missile strikes on Israel or initiate strikes on the UAE but have not yet done so. The US military base in Djibouti is another possible target. For its part, Iran may engage in terrorist attacks on US interests in Africa.
An Africanist Perspective posted on 27 February 2026 a commentary titled "Conflict in the Horn of Africa Isn't Inevitable. People Can Choose Peace" by Ken Opalo.
The fundamental drivers of conflict in the Horn of Africa are domestic. Once rebellions start, they tend to acquire lives of their own. A neighborhood of weak states with porous borders contributes to the problem, making it easy for regional rivals and foreign governments to interfere.
Too many people in the Horn are convinced that organized violence is a legitimate response to losing in the political arena. That has to change before there will be peace.
The University of Nottingham Taiwan Research Hub's Taiwan Insight published on 23 February 2026 a commentary titled "Taiwan's Diplomatic Bridge: Taiwan-Somaliland-Israel vs China in the Horn of Africa" by Faisal Abdirashid Adam.
Taiwan, which established a liaison office in Somaliland in 2020, has embraced Israel's diplomatic recognition of Somaliland, framing it as a major step forward for the emerging "democratic triangle" of Taiwan, Israel, and Somaliland, which now positions itself as a powerful new alliance for trilateral cooperation in technology, agriculture, and Red Sea security.
The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats published in March 2026 a major report titled "Fault Lines in the Horn of Africa: The Gulf States, Turkey and Israel Battle for Red Sea Influence" by Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo.
This is an extensive study on the current situation in the Horn of Africa with special reference to the roles of Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. It includes detailed recommendations for US policy.
The New Arab published on 9 February 2026 an article titled "The Growing Saudi-UAE Power Struggle in the Horn of Africa" by Jonathan Fenton-Harvey.
The author reviews the Horn of Africa from the standpoint of Saudi-UAE involvement in the numerous disputes in the region and increasing competition, especially in Sudan and Somalia/Somaliland.
Defence Web published on 30 January 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia Acquires Yak-130 Trainer, Orion-E UAVs from Russia" by Guy Martin.
The Ethiopian Air Force has acquired the Orion-E unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and the Yak-130 jet trainer and ground attack aircraft from Russia.
The Robert Lansing Institute published on 30 January 2026 an article titled "Russia's Arms Exports to Ethiopia and the Erosion of U.S. Leverage in the Horn of Africa."
The article notes that the transfer of Russian drones undermines US efforts to promote standards for responsible use and control over the equipment.
Foreign Policy published on 27 January 2026 an article titled "Red Sea Rivalries Risk Unraveling the Horn of Africa" by Cameron Hudson and Liam Karr.
The civil war in Sudan between the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces is increasingly becoming a proxy war for regional players Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, UAE, Turkey, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, among others. The authors argue it is time for the Trump administration to designate a Senate-confirmed presidential special envoy for the Horn of Africa and Red Sea.
The BBC posted on 12 December 2025 an article titled "Eritrea Quits Regional Bloc as Tensions Rise with Ethiopia" by Tesfalem Araia.
Eritrea has withdrawn from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), accusing the organization of "becoming a tool against" countries like itself. The withdrawal from the Horn of Africa organization follows a fierce war of words between Ethiopia, current chair of IGAD, and Eritrea.
Foreign Affairs published on 2 October 2025 an article titled "Sudan's War Is the Shape of Things to Come" by Alan Boswell, International Crisis Group.
The Quad (United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and UAE) has proposed a peace plan to end the conflict in Sudan. The author questions whether the United States is prepared for the long-term engagement required to achieve the goals of the plan.
The retreat from the region by the United States over the past 15 years has diminished its influence. Once strong US engagement in the Horn of Africa is no longer the case, and the region is suffering the consequences.
At the same time, regional middle powers are stepping in to fill the void. Sudan has become the center for this middle power contest. Peacemaking has become even more difficult in a region where it already was a major challenge.
