Africa News published on 7 April 2026 an article titled "War in Ukraine: Cameroon Confirms Death of 16 Nationals Enlisted in Russian Army" by Sarah Miansoni.
Cameroon's Minister of External Affairs confirmed the death of 16 of its nationals fighting for Russia in its war against Ukraine.
The American Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) published on 2 April 2026 a paper titled "False Promises: Russian Military Trafficking in Africa" by Sarahelena Marrapodi, FPRI.
Some 1,800 African men signed contracts to work in Russia as drivers, security guards, and other civilian jobs only to find themselves shipped off to the frontlines of Russia's war against Ukraine. The story provides background on the recruitment efforts and suggests that it may constitute human trafficking.
Aljazeera published on 5 March 2026 an article titled "'Our Children Were Sold Off': The South Africans Sent to Fight Russia's War" by Chris Makhaye.
Russia recruited South Africans to become VIP bodyguards who were then given brief military training and conscripted by a paramilitary group to fight in Ukraine. Most of the South Africans became cannon fodder on the Russian front lines. An appeal by South Africa's president to Vladimir Putin managed to get their return to their families.
An Africanist Perspective posted on 27 February 2026 a commentary titled "Conflict in the Horn of Africa Isn't Inevitable. People Can Choose Peace" by Ken Opalo.
The fundamental drivers of conflict in the Horn of Africa are domestic. Once rebellions start, they tend to acquire lives of their own. A neighborhood of weak states with porous borders contributes to the problem, making it easy for regional rivals and foreign governments to interfere.
Too many people in the Horn are convinced that organized violence is a legitimate response to losing in the political arena. That has to change before there will be peace.
The BBC posted on 19 February 2026 an article titled "Over 1,000 Kenyans Enlisted to Fight in Russia-Ukraine War, Report Says" by Wycliffe Muia.
Kenya's National Intelligence Service reported that 89 Kenyans were on the frontlines of Russia's war with Ukraine in February, but 1,000 Kenyans have been recruited to fight for Russia. Kenya asked Russia to stop the conscription of its nationals.
Foreign Policy posted on 21 October 2025 an article titled "The Risk of a New Ethiopian-Eritrean War Is Growing" by Michael Woldemariam, University of Maryland, and Abate Demissie, Chatham House.
Recent developments in Ethiopia's Tigray Region, which borders Eritrea, are eroding relations between the two countries, and the risk of open conflict is growing. Reviving the dialogue between the Ethiopian federal government and Tigray Region is the first step in forestalling conflict. Providing landlocked Ethiopia guaranteed options for Red Sea port access is also essential.
Population Health Metrics published on 14 March 2025 a study titled "Civilian Death and Injury from Airstrikes: Evidence from the War in Tigray, Ethiopia" by Mulugeta Gebregziabher et al.
The study assessed the impact of airstrikes on civilians from June 2021 until November 2022 during the war between the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front. A total of 1,143 casualties from airstrikes were reported from six zones and 24 districts of Tigray Region. Almost a third of the victims were children under the age of 18 and 45 percent of the casualties were female.
The New York Times published on 26 August 2024 a commentary titled "The Coming War Nobody Is Talking About" by Afyare A. Elmi and Yusuf Hassan, both at the City University of Mogadishu.
The authors charge that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's obsession with making landlocked Ethiopia a coastal state by opening a naval base in Somaliland will create conditions for a potential war between Ethiopia and Somalia.
Chatham House posted on 15 March 2024 a 35-minute podcast titled "How Gold Fuels the War in Sudan" with Ahmed Soliman, Suliman Baldo, and Denise Sprimont-Vasquez.
Military business networks controlled by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are financing much of the cost of war in Sudan, which is the third largest gold producer in Africa after Ghana and South Africa. An estimated 50 to 80 percent of gold production is smuggled out of Sudan illegally. It is a critical source of income for both the RSF and SAF. Neither oil nor gum Arabic, once important foreign exchange earners for Sudan, are significant income sources today.
The RSF controls gold produced at a half dozen locations in Darfur. Most of the gold smuggled by the RSF through the Central African Republic, Chad, and Libya ends up in the UAE for refining. Some of it is smuggled out by Russia's Wagner Group.
The SAF exports its gold through Port Sudan and most of it goes to Egypt. Before the conflict between the RSF and the SAF, Sudan's gold tended to be handled by the Wagner Group.
Aljazeera published on 16 March an article titled "UN Warns Five Million Could Suffer 'Catastrophic ' Hunger in Sudan Amid War."
Following the refusal of the Sudan Armed Forces and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces to observe a Ramadan ceasefire, the UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator declared half of Sudan's 50 million people now require food aid and almost 18 million "are on the road to famine."
Aljazeera published on 15 March 2024 an article titled "Can the Sudanese Army Sustain Its Recent Battlefield Success?" by Mat Nashed.
The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) recaptured on 12 March the national radio and television building in Omdurman from the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The SAF's recent victory casts doubt on the RSF's ability to control Sudan but leaves open whether this is a turning point in the war.
Reuters published on 6 March 2024 an article titled "Millions of Sudanese Go Hungary as War Disrupts Food Supply" by Nafisa Eltahir.
Aid agencies are now unable to deliver food to many areas of war-torn Sudan. At least one aid agency is suggesting the possibility of a biblical style famine in Sudan.
Refugees International published a report dated March 2024 titled "Scars of War and Depravations: An Urgent Call to Reverse Tigray's Humanitarian Crisis" by Sarah Miller.
The report argues that aid has not scaled up to meet the need of Tigray Region's internally displaced people (IDP). If relief does not come, many will die, and some even fear that the fragile Pretoria Peace Agreement could be in jeopardy. Much of the region remains in dire straits, and many IDPs are languishing in very difficult conditions.
The New York Times published on 27 February 2024 an article titled "Hunger, Terrorism and the Threat of War: Somalia's Year of Crises" by Abdi Latif Dahir and Brian Otieno.
The article suggests that drought, the continuing challenge of the al-Shabaab terrorist group, and possible conflict with Ethiopia following its Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland could create a difficult year for Somalia.
The Indian news channel Times Now posted on 26 December 2023 a 4-minute video titled "War in the Red Sea?" showing US naval vessels countering Houthi drone and missile attacks on shipping off the coast of Yemen.
Aljazeera published on 17 December 2023 an article titled "Thousands Flee as War Reaches Sudan's Second-largest City."
Sudan's civil war has reached Wad Madani, Sudan's second-largest city located 85 miles southeast of Khartoum. With a population of 700,000 and another 86,000 internally displaced persons who fled the conflict in the Khartoum region, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces is approaching Wad Madani, which had been held by the Sudan Armed Forces until now. Consequently, some residents are fleeing further south.
Reuters published on 13 December 2023 an analysis titled "Why the Indian Ocean Could Be China's Achilles' Heel in a Taiwan War" by Greg Torode.
China has little power projection capability in the Indian Ocean, especially compared to the United States. Much of its crude oil, gas, and mineral imports cross the Indian Ocean. In a wartime situation, China would be hard pressed to keep open these sea lines of communication (SLOCs).
The ChinaMed Observer posted on 13 December 2023 an analysis titled "High Hopes and Great Opportunities: The Egyptian Press Reflects on China's Role in the Israel-Hamas War" by Mariateresa Natuzzi.
The analysis looks at the Egyptian media's coverage of China's position on the Israel-Hamas war. It concludes, on the one hand, that Egyptian media appreciates Beijing's position on the war, which aligns closely with that of the Egyptian government. On the other hand, there is some skepticism that China will become an influential actor in this conflict.
Ethiopia Insight published on 26 November 2023 a commentary titled "The Horn of Africa Needs More Trade--But Not at the Cost of More War" by Muktar Ismail, former UN staff member.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's pursuit, by force if necessary, of access to the Red Sea is ill-timed following major conflict in the country. Ethiopia needs to pursue this goal peacefully, perhaps through the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea legal framework that permits landlocked countries like Ethiopia to assert their access rights.
Foreign Policy posted on 7 November 2023 a commentary titled "Are Ethiopia and Eritrea on the Path to War?" by Mohamed Kheir Omer, former member of the Eritrean Liberation Front.
The author says Eritrean military sources suggest the country is now bracing for a potential war as Ethiopia amasses troops near the Eritrean border in Zalembessa, which is 45 miles from the Eritrean port of Assab. Eritrea has reportedly located 40,000 troops along the Tigray-Eritrea border. The author concludes that "the current trajectory suggests a probable collision course that could have devastating regional implications."
