Semafor published on 16 September 2026 an article titled "Somaliland's President Puts Everything on the Table for Trump" by Yinka Adegoke.
Somaliland's President Abdirahmin Mohamed Abdullahi "Irro" is in Washington pressing his case for diplomatic recognition. Irro is signaling that Somaliland is open to an American military base in the port of Berbera.
Irro said that Somaliland intends to maintain a relationship with Taiwan, but it welcomes investment from China.
The BBC posted on 26 August 2026 an article titled "China Advises Its Citizens to Leave Taiwan Ally Eswatini Over 'Security Risks'" by Basillioh Rukanga.
China's Foreign Ministry told its citizens to leave Eswatini, the only country in Africa that recognizes Taiwan, citing "rampant cyber fraud and criminal activities associated with gambling." Eswatini had earlier arrested 40 Chinese nationals during raids on alleged illegal online gambling centers.
The Environmental Justice Foundation published on 16 July 2026 a report titled "Cut and Run: Exposing Senegal as a Gateway for the Global Shark Fin Trade."
This report examines the nature and extent of shark finning on board foreign vessels that call at Dakar, Senegal. Shark finning is the practice of cutting off a shark's fins before throwing the body overboard. The fins are then sold for human consumption.
The Environmental Justice Foundation conducted 124 interviews with Indonesian and Filipino fishers who worked on board Chinese and Taiwanese tuna longliners operating in the region. The Chinese and Taiwanese fleets are repeatedly linked to shark finning in the region.
African Arguments published on 25 June 2026 a commentary titled "Xi's Zero Tariff Offer to Africa and the Political Boundaries of Eswatini's Exclusion" by Francis Annagu, a freelance journalist.
China made imports from Africa duty free as of May 1 for all countries except Eswatini, which recognizes Taiwan. The author suggests Eswatini decided to maintain its relationship with Taiwan because of its long friendship with Taipei that began well before China became a major economic power in Africa.
Aljazeera published on 17 June 2026 an article titled "Taiwan Accuse Kenya of Deporting Conference Delegates on China's Behalf."
Taiwan accused Kenya of deporting two of its nationals who planned to attend a global oceans conference in Mombasa and blamed Beijing for pressuring Kenya to take this action. Kenya defended its decision by stating that it recognizes only one China.
Just Security published on 2 June 2026 a commentary titled "In Addition to Chinese Pressure, a Backsliding Democracy May Explain Zambia's Decision to Cancel a Major Human Rights Summit" by Jane Munga and Steve Feldstein.
Days before 2,600 human rights defenders, technologists, and policymakers were expected in Lusaka, Zambia, on April 30, the Zambian government called off RightsCon, the world's largest conference on digital rights.
According to the summit organizers, the cancellation was due to foreign interference from China "because Taiwanese civil society participants were planning to join us in person." But a closer look reveals a more complicated picture linked to Zambia's democratic decline and more repressive policies.
Horn Diplomat published on 12 June 2026 an article titled "Somaliland Opens New Representative Office in Taiwan as Ties Deepen" by Mohamed Duale.
On June 12, breakaway Somaliland opened the new premises of its Representative Office in Taiwan as officials from both sides pledged to expand cooperation across security, trade, healthcare, and development sectors.
The new office reflected the steady expansion of relations between Somaliland and Taiwan since the two sides established reciprocal representative offices in 2020.
The Interpreter, produced by Australia's Lowy Institute, published on 22 May 2026 a commentary titled "China's Influence in Africa Is No Longer Just Economic" by Isel Van Zyl.
The author argues that the cancellation of overflight permission by Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar for Taiwan's president to visit Eswatini, the only country in Africa that recognizes Taiwan, highlights that China's influence in Africa is no longer confined to the economic sector.
China's growing leverage in Africa is now expressed through diplomatic pressure, political signaling, and the ability to shape what governments, organizations, and even international conferences can and cannot do.
Comment: Beijing has exercised political influence in Africa for decades. One only need compare African country voting patterns in the UN General Assembly or consider the publicly stated policy of most countries on China's core domestic issues such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang, human rights, and island building in the South China Sea.
The New York Times published on 14 May 2026 an article titled "Inside the Secret Mission to Fly Taiwan's President to Africa" by Chris Buckley and Amy Chang Chien.
Taiwan President Lai Ching-te's first attempt to visit Eswatini, the only African country that recognizes Taipei, was aborted when Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar at the last-minute revoked permission to overfly their airspace. This account details how Lai Ching-te managed subsequently to circumvent these denials by flying secretly on the royal jet that brought Eswatini's deputy prime minister to Taiwan for a visit.
Reuters published on 6 May 2026 an article titled "China Condemns Eswatini for Being 'Kept and Fed' by Taiwan in Travel Row" by Liz Lee, Ben Blanchard, and Lunga Masuku.
Beijing used strong language in condemning Eswatini, the only country in Africa that recognizes Taiwan, for receiving President Lai Ching-te. Eswatini responded that Beijing's response falls short of the standards expected in respectful international discourse from a country that positions itself as a responsible global actor.
Comment: Ouch! Score one for Eswatini.
The Associated Press published on 2 May 2026 an article titled "Taiwan's President Lands in Eswatini, under China's Shadow."
Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te finally made it to Eswatini, the only country in Africa that recognizes Taipei, on 2 May. He had to reschedule his original visit when three African countries, reportedly under pressure from Beijing, cancelled overflight permission for his aircraft.
Skift, a digital media company and travel website, posted on 1 May 2026 an article titled "China Quietly Cancels a Digital Rights Summit in Africa" by Miguel Neves.
Evidence is mounting that Beijing was behind Zambia's decision to cancel at the last minute RightsCon 2026 involving an estimated 2,000 international participants from over 150 countries. RightsCon bills itself as the "world's leading summit on human rights in the digital age."
Beijing's concern was apparently attendance by civil society representatives from Taiwan. The conference was scheduled to be held at the Mulungushi International Conference Center in Lusaka. China granted Zambia $30 million in 2022 to expand the facility, giving it considerable leverage to influence the cancellation of the summit by the government of Zambia.
The Zambian Observer published on 30 April 2026 an article titled "President Hichilema Cancels World's Largest Digital Rights Conference."
Zambia cancelled at the last minute the world's largest conference (2,000 delegates) on human rights in the digital age organized by Access Now, RightsCon scheduled for May 5-8 in Lusaka. A Zambian official said the "postponement" of the conference was "essential to ensure full alignment with Zambia's national values, policy priorities, and broader public interest considerations."
News Diggers published on 30 April 2026 an article titled "Govt Cancels RightsCon Summit Citing Security Concerns on Some Delegates" by Mwenya Mofya.
In 2025, the conference took place in Taiwan. The News Diggers account reported that the conference was cancelled because the program included Taiwanese delegates who could potentially speak ill of China at a venue donated by the Chinese government.
The Taipei Times published on 26 April 2026 an article titled "Lin Chia-lung Visits Eswatini as Envoy."
Following the cancellation of overflight permission by Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar for the president of Taiwan to attend the 40th anniversary of King Mswati III's accession to the throne, Taiwan's foreign minister arrived in Eswatini as his country's special envoy at the celebration.
Academicjobs.com posted on 23 April 2026 an article titled "China-Taiwan Tensions Escalate: African Airspace Denials Force President's Africa Trip Cancellation."
Taiwan President Lai Ching-te was set to attend the 40th anniversary of King Mswati III's accession to the throne in Eswatini. The president cancelled the visit at the last minute when Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar revoked overflight permission for the presidential aircraft.
Taipei charged that Beijing pressured the three countries to revoke the overflight permission. Beijing did not acknowledge any role but praised the action of the three countries. The United States condemned China's intimidation campaign.
The BBC published on 22 April 2026 an article titled "Taiwan President Cancels Trip after African Countries Revoke Flight Permits" by Yvette Tan.
Taiwan President Lai Ching-te cancelled a trip to Eswatini, accusing China of putting pressure on other countries to bar his aircraft from flying over their territories. A Taiwan official said Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar revoked Lai's flight permits after "intense pressure" and economic coercion from Beijing.
The Conversation published on 15 April 2026 a commentary titled "China's Military Support for Somalia Is on the Rise--What Taiwan and Somaliland Have to Do with It" by Brendon J. Cannon, Khalifa University.
Beijing has promised equipment, training, and closer security cooperation with Mogadishu. The author argues that China is increasingly involved in Somalia because breakaway Somaliland has established close ties with Taiwan.
China-Africa Security Radar published on 10 March 2026 an article titled "Will China Pursue a Military Base in Africa's Atlantic Ocean?" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.
The author argues that contrary to conventional wisdom in US military circles, China is not particularly interested in having a military base on Africa's Atlantic coast. It would represent a massive logistical overextension at a time when China needs to concentrate naval power close to home. Such a base would be highly exposed and vulnerable to attack, making it a strategic liability rather than an asset. In any event, by investing extensively in West African commercial ports, China has access, at least in peace time, for PLA Navy port calls.
Comment: While the author makes some good points, it was generally thought that China, which professed publicly that it did not believe in military bases outside China, would not establish a military base in Djibouti--until it did.
The University of Nottingham Taiwan Research Hub's Taiwan Insight published on 23 February 2026 a commentary titled "Taiwan's Diplomatic Bridge: Taiwan-Somaliland-Israel vs China in the Horn of Africa" by Faisal Abdirashid Adam.
Taiwan, which established a liaison office in Somaliland in 2020, has embraced Israel's diplomatic recognition of Somaliland, framing it as a major step forward for the emerging "democratic triangle" of Taiwan, Israel, and Somaliland, which now positions itself as a powerful new alliance for trilateral cooperation in technology, agriculture, and Red Sea security.
Kenya's The Star published on 14 February 2026 an article titled "China to AU: Xi Pledges Full Rollout of Zero Tariff Treatment for Africa" by Moses Ogada.
President Xi Jinping informed the African Union on 14 February that China starting on 1 May 2026 will fully implement zero-tariff treatment for the 53 African countries that recognize Beijing. This means that Eswatini, which recognizes Taiwan, is the only African country that will not benefit from zero tariff treatment.
