A Visit to Eritrea

 The International Crisis Group posted on 30 October 2026 a 38-minute podcast titled "The View from Eritrea" with Alan Boswell and Giulia Paravicini, Reuters senior correspondent.

Giulia Paravicini offers her impressions of life in Eritrea following a recent 10-day visit to Asmara.  She noted the limited access by Eritreans to the internet and how little the city has changed over the years.

Eritrean officials made clear that they are not an existential threat to Ethiopia and have no interest in toppling the Abiy Ahmed government.  They said no channels of communication are open with the Ethiopian government.  

Eritrea believes Ethiopia is threatening Eritrean sovereignty by seeking access to the sea and implying that could include militarily taking the port of Assab. Eritrean officials denied training and arming Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) forces but acknowledged they are in contact with them.

Paravicini concluded that it appears Eritrea did help organize the anti-government coalition groups in Ethiopia.  At the beginning of the most recent conflict in Tigray Region, Eritrean forces apparently entered Ethiopia in support of the TPLF but subsequently retreated to Eritrea.  Asmara denied that its forces entered Ethiopia.  Global diplomacy was probably instrumental in preventing another war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and any effort by Ethiopia to seize Assab.

Eritrean officials had no interest in discussing relations with the Gulf States or the ongoing conflict in neighboring Sudan.  They did underscore close ties with Egypt and Cairo's support for Eritrea.  They also said they are ready to improve ties with any country, including the United States.

Somalia: Al-Shabaab Attack in South West State

 AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 29 October 2026 an article titled "Somalia" by Michael DeAngelo and Ziv Zellars.

Al-Shabaab reportedly inflicted heavy losses on Somali National Army forces in South West State.  Al- Shabaab used attack drones acquired from the Houthis in Yemen during the fighting.  Al-Shabaab is taking advantage of tension between the central government in Mogadishu and opposition elements in South West State, who may have aligned with al-Shabaab.

Threat to Red Sea Undersea Cables

 The Hudson Institute published on 28 October 2026 an analysis titled "Iran's Maritime Threat and the Conflict in the Red Sea" by Can Kasapoglu.

Working with its Houthi allies in Yemen, Iran may be able to damage undersea cables that pass through the Red Sea, which carry about 90 percent of the Europe-Asia capacity.  Multiple cuts in the cables could disrupt internet services, E-commerce, finance, and cloud computing across the globe.

China and Djibouti Concerned about Red Sea Shipping but Leave Action to Others

 The Diplomat published on 23 October 2026 an article titled "China, Djibouti Express 'Serious Concern' Over Threats to Red Sea Shipping" by Shannon Tiezzi.

During a visit to Beijing, the Djiboutian foreign minister met with his Chinese counterpart.  They issued a joint communique on the threat to shipping in the Red Sea.  It made clear that the onus is on other countries to solve the problem.  Neither China nor Djibouti plans to take any action.  

Red Sea Shipping and Regional Conflict

 For profit SeaVantage published a guide titled "Red Sea Ports: Full List, Trade Data & 2006 Disruption Guide."

The Red Sea is a strategic artery for global trade, but shipping is being interrupted by the Houthis in Yemen following the US-Israel attack on Iran and closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

The commercially motivated guide identifies the key ports in the Red Sea, discusses the significance of the current conflict, and explains why supply chains are struggling.

New Somali Piracy Has Different Characteristics

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 23 September 2026 an analysis titled "Somali Piracy in 2026 Is Not Just a Resurgence of a Past Problem" by Christopher Hockey.

The resurgence in 2026 of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden is occurring due to complacency by shipowners, fewer international warships in local waters, and new circumstances in the region.  The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted the status quo.  There are credible reports of Houthi, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula support for the pirates. 

Iran War Puts New Focus on Eritrea

 Reuters published on 5 October 2026 a photo essay titled "As Iran War Smolders, Shunned Eritrea Looks to Come in from the Cold" by Monicah Mwangi and Giulia Paravicini.  

Eritrea has acquired new geopolitical significance following the war in Iran and owing to its 1,000 kilometers of coastline along the Red Sea shipping route between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.  With the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea has become an important alternative route for Gulf energy shipments.  Outside powers are paying more attention to Eritrea.

At the same time, mandatory National Service continues to cause numerous departures from Eritrea and requests for asylum and refugee status in other countries.

Backgrounder on the Houthi Threat to the Red Sea

 The Council on Foreign Relations published on 8 October 2026 a background piece titled "Another Hormuz? What to Know About the Houthi Threat to the Red Sea" by Diana Roy.

Each year, approximately 12 to 15 percent of global maritime trade worth more than $1 trillion, including 30 percent of global container traffic transits the Red Sea.  This is an excellent summary of the threat posed by the Iran-backed and Yemen-based Houthis to international shipping through the Red Sea.

Are Ethiopia and Eritrea Close to All-Out War?

 The International Crisis Group posted on 9 October 2026 a 39-minute podcast titled "How Close Are Ethiopia and Eritrea to All-out War?" with Richard Atwood and Alan Boswell.

Eritrean Defense Forces are aligned with the Tigray People's Liberation Front forces against the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and an opposition Tigrayan contingent.  The war in Tigray Region is nearing the Ethiopia-Eritrea border as ENDF troops advance and raises the possibility of extending into Eritrea.

Landlocked Ethiopia remains committed to obtaining permanent access to the Red Sea, although Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed says he will seek maritime access through negotiation and not force. Does the war in Tigray change the equation? 

Analysis of Somaliland President's Visit to US

 The Emirates Policy Center published on 9 October 2026 an analysis titled "Visit of Somaliland's President to Washington: Testing Potential Shifts in US Policy and the Trajectory of Bilateral Ties."

Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi visited the US in September in hopes of advancing the country's goal of diplomatic recognition.  A meeting with President Trump was not promised and it did not happen.

The analysis concludes that Washington is likely to adopt a policy of calculated openness toward Somaliland while stopping short of formal recognition.  Bilateral relations could gradually evolve into a strategic partnership, with the path toward recognition potentially accelerating should sufficient security, political, and regional drivers converge.

Attention Turns to Red Sea Conflicts

 World Politics Review posted on 8 October 2026 a commentary titled "The Red Sea Is the New Epicenter of Conflict in the Middle East" by Frida Ghitis.

While the Strait of Hormuz continues to be the focus of attention, the economically vital Red Sea with conflicts raging on both sides of the waterway could erupt into an out-of-control wildfire with global repercussions.

Account of Houthi Capture of Territory Near Entrance to Red Sea

 The New York Times published on 6 October 2026 an article titled "How the Houthis Triumphed on the Red Sea and Sparked a New War in Yemen" by Vivian Nereim, Saeed Al-Batiti, and Shuaib Almosawa. 

This is an account of the seizure by Iranian-backed Houthi forces in Yemen of territory bordering Bab el-Mandeb, the southern choke point of the Red Sea.  Yemeni government forces that were holding the territory requested assistance from Saudi Arabia and the United States to prevent the Houthi offensive.  The United States provided intelligence support, but both Saudi Arabia and the United States failed to provide air support. 

The New Red Sea Wars

 Foreign Affairs published on 6 October 2026 an article titled "The New Red Sea Wars" by Alan Boswell.

Policymakers for too long treated the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula as separate strategic regions divided by the Red Sea.  That distinction is evaporating as wars on one side of the sea increasingly alter the military calculations on the other.  US policy rarely treated the two regions as linked.  

Podcast Inside Sudan's War

 The International Crisis Group posted on 1 October 2026 a 58-minute podcast titled "Inside Sudan's War" with Alan Boswell and Sudanese national Yousra Elbagir, Sky News Africa correspondent.

The podcast draws on Yousra Elbagir's visits to Port Sudan, ransacked family home in Khartoum, road trip from Khartoum to El Obeid following a sustained aerial attack on the city, and other locations in Sudan.  Some of her insights involved the personal impact of the war on her reporting.  

Russia has long been rumored to have obtained agreement from Sudanese authorities to establish a naval base in Port Sudan.  During an escorted visit to the Sudan Navy's base in Port Sudan, she saw no evidence of a Russian presence but understood that Russian military personnel had been at the facility in recent years.  She also learned that Saudi Arabia strongly opposes any foreign naval base in the Red Sea, whether by Russia, Turkey, Iran or any other country.  Saudi Arabia has considerable influence over the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) that controls Port Sudan.  

There have been recent rumors of SAF cooperation with the rebel Houthis in Yemen.  She neither saw nor heard any evidence of such cooperation, which would also be strongly opposed by Saudi Arabia and is effectively at war with the Houthis.

When asked about an end to the war between the SAF and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), she commented that the RSF is eroding internally.  Consequently, it is possible the RSF may choose to negotiate with the SAF.  But the SAF has no plan to achieve a lasting peace.  Both sides increasingly realize that they cannot fight forever.  In the meantime, the Sudanese people see themselves as pawns at the mercy of the SAF and RSF. 

Iran and the Horn of Africa

 The Italian Institute for International Political Studies published on 5 August 2026 an analysis titled "Iran and the Horn of Africa: Evolving Interests Since the Current Conflict" by Eric Lob.

This study suggested the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen would open a second maritime front by disrupting commercial shipping in the Red Sea and that Teheran will try to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa.  It will be constrained, however, by the geopolitical complications of its relations with the region and by its own economic challenges.

Iran and the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb

 The Emirates Policy Center published on 2 October 2026 an analysis titled "Iran and the 'Straits Game' in Hormuz and Bab El-Mandeb: Calculating the Impact and Consequences" by Mohammad Alzghool.  

The author concluded that Iran's strategy relies on the assumption that rising energy prices, market uncertainty and public pressure will increase the political costs borne by its adversaries.  In contrast, the United States and the Gulf countries are investing in alternative oil-export routes while preparing for countermeasures, including a potential counter blockade and military action aimed at neutralizing threats.

Iranian Weapons and Chinese Dual-Use Components Enable Houthi Victories

Iran International posted on 1 October 2026 an article titled "Iranian Weapons, Chinese Supplies Fuel Houthi Advance in Yemen--WSJ" drawing on a 29 September Wall Street Journal article (behind a paywall) by Andrew Barnett, Daniel Kiss, and Benoit Faucon.  

Iranian weapons and growing supplies of Chinese dual-use components helped Yemen's Houthis expand their territory and increase their ability to threaten shipping through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.  The Houthis rely on Iranian-designed missiles, drones, sea mines, armed fast boats, and drone boats. They build weapons themselves.  Chinese companies supply dual-use goods that can serve civilian and military purposes.

Impacts of Houthi Red Sea Attacks on African Countries

 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 22 September 2026 an analysis titled "Houthi Leverage over the Red Sea Escalates Threats for Africa."

Iran-backed Houthi rebel attacks on shipping in the red Sea and Gulf of Aden are intensifying pressure on global supply chains.  The attacks also have direct security and economic implications for many African countries, especially in the Horn of Africa.

There has been a resurgence in Somali piracy, growing cooperation between the Houthis and al-Shabaab in Somalia, and rising prices for refined oil products, fertilizer, and imported manufactured goods that previously transited the Suez Canal.  

Fighting in Ethiopia Could Lead to Wider Conflict

 African Arguments posted on 26 September 2026 a commentary titled "Ethiopia's Foretold War Arrives" by Matthew de Waal.

Although the strength of Ethiopia's new anti-government alliance is questionable and the Tigray People's Liberation Front is divided, the current conflict in Ethiopia is occurring during a war in neighboring Sudan, Houthi attacks disrupting shipping in the Red Sea, and ongoing terrorist activity in Somalia.  The conflict in Ethiopia could metastasize into a regional conflagration.

Houthi Attacks on Saudi Arabia Complicate Situation in Horn of Africa

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 23 September 2026 an analysis titled "The Impacts of the Houthis' Advance Could Extend Well Beyond Saudi Arabia" by Andrew Leber and Lesley Anne Warner. 

Connections between the Houthis in Yemen and terrorist organizations in Somalia, renewed conflict and insecurity in the Horn of Africa, and a revival of Somali piracy raise the question whether the worsening situation in the Red Sea region will lead to increased US engagement.