Saudi Workaround for Exporting Oil from Red Sea

 CNBC published on 12 August 2026 an article titled "Saudi Arabia Ramps Up Oil Exports Through Mediterranean Pipeline to Avoid Attacks in Red Sea" by Spencer Kimball and Deena Zaidi.

Following the Iranian-supported Houthi blockade of Saudi ships passing through the south end of the Red Sea, Riyadh is rerouting oil supertankers north through the Suez Canal even for oil destined for Asia.

The problem is that fully loaded supertankers sit too deep in the water to transit the Suez Canal.  Consequently, they pump half the Saudi oil cargo into a pipeline on Egypt's Red Sea coast that conveys it across Egypt to an outlet in the Mediterranean Sea.  The supertankers then transit the Suez Canal half loaded and reload the oil at the other end of the pipeline in the Mediterranean.  Saudi oil exports departing the south end of the Red Sea are down 90 percent.

Because of the Houthi blockade, a higher percentage of Saudi oil is now going north to Europe rather than south to Asia.  This may result in a boon for West African oil by making transport to Asia more competitive than oil originating in Saudi Arabia. 

An Analysis of the Houthi Red Sea Blockade

 Chatham House published on 24 July 2026 an analysis titled "The Houthi Red Sea Blockade: Will Collective Maritime Security Be Defended or Break Down?" by Nitya Labh and Farea Al-Muslimi.

The rebel Houthis are part of Iran's "Axis of Resistance" but retain significant autonomy.  The Houthi blockade of Saudi ships in the Red Sea acts as a deterrent against regional adversaries and reinforces their legitimacy in Yemen.

The Houthi objective is not to sink large numbers of ships, but to create enough uncertainty for commercial shipping that insurers raise premiums, companies reroute vessels, and governments absorb mounting economic costs.

Background of Houthis' Red Sea Blockade

 Pakistan's South Asian Chronicle published on 1 August 2026 an article titled "Houthi Red Sea Crisis."

This is a nice summary of the background of the Houthi blockade of the Red Sea and relations with Saudi Arabia.  

Impact of Houthi Blockade in Red Sea

 AEIs Critical Threats posted on 23 July 2026 an analysis titled "Houthi Blockade in the Red Sea" by Michael DeAngelo, Liam Karr, and Alexsandar Wiebler.

The Iranian-backed Houthi blockade of the south end of the Red Sea has already disrupted shipping in the Red Sea, causing increased costs and transit delays.  The Houthi blockade will further increase fuel shortages, negatively impact African countries that rely on Saudi fuel shipments, and strain the global economy.  

Houthis Claim to Have Attacked Two Saudi Oil Tankers in Red Sea

 The Hill published on 23 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis Say 2 Saudi Oil Tankers Attacked in Red Sea" by Max Rego.

Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen say they struck two Saudi oil tankers, named Encelia and Layla, using ballistic and cruise missiles in the Red Sea earlier this week. So far, they have forced at least 10 other ships to turn around rather than pass through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point.  

Yemen's Houthis Reportedly Ready to Attack Shipping in Southern Red Sea

 CNBC posted on 22 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis Deploy Missiles and Drones to Attack Ships in Southern Red Sea, Naval Group Says" by Spencer Kimball.

Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen have completed preparations to attack shipping, including the deployment of missiles and drones positioned near the Bab el-Mandeb choke point at the south end of the Red Sea. 

The European Union's naval mission in the Middle East warned commercial ships linked to Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States to avoid transiting the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden.

Oil Tankers Avoiding South End of Red Sea Following Houthi Threats

 The Indian Express published on 22 July 2026 an article titled "India-bound Oil Tanker Takes U-turn in Red Sea after Houthi Threat."

Two oil tankers headed south for India and one for China toward the Bab el-Mandeb choke point from the Saudi oil terminal of Yanbu in the Red Sea turned around and headed north through the Suez Canal following threats from the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.

The tankers must now transit the Mediterranean Sea, sail around Africa, and pass the Cape of Good Hope before reaching India or China, adding significantly to shipping costs.  These are the first Saudi oil laden tankers to respond to the Houthi threat. 

Another oil tanker scheduled to load Saudi crude at Yanbu by entering the Red Sea through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point turned back off the coast of Oman.     

Houthi Threat to the Red Sea

 The Council on Foreign Relations published on 20 July 2026 a background piece titled "Another Hormuz? What to Know About the Houthi Threat to the Red Sea" by Diana Roy.

The Yemen-based and Iranian-backed Houthis' decision to impose a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia opens a new front in the U.S.-Iran war and threatens to choke off the Red Sea's 20-mile-wide Bab el-Mandeb Strait, with potentially major consequences for the global economy.

Iran War Moves to Houthis and Red Sea

 Al-Monitor published on 20 July 2026 an article titled "As Houthis Declare Red Sea Blockade on Saudi Arabia, Oil Markets Brace for Impact" by Jack Dutton.  

Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi rebels said on 20 July that it was imposing a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, as the regional war widens to threaten another key route for global oil supplies following disruption in the Strait of Hormuz.  Because of the problems in the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia has redirected much of its crude exports by pipeline through its Red Sea terminal at Yanbu.  

Ships sailing north of Yanbu for Europe through the Suez Canal will not be impacted by this Houthi action.  Those headed south for Asia through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point will be impacted and the Saudis may put at risk a large percentage of current crude exports.  If the Houthis successfully prevent the Saudis from passing through Bab el-Mandeb, global supplies could fall by as much as 7 percent.  

Iran War Intensifies US-China Competition in Africa

 The Middle East Council on Global Affairs, a policy research institution based in Doha, Qatar, published on 16 July 2026 a commentary titled "Iran War Intensifies U.S.-China Rivalry in Africa" by Mustapha Boudoumi.

Disruptions to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz have highlighted the strategic importance of African choke points such as the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb.  The situation in Iran has put increasing focus on China-US competition for critical minerals in Africa.  

Will the Houthis Shut Down the Red Sea/Suez Canal Waterway?

 Reuters published on 14 July 2026 an article titled "After Hormuz, Iran Turns to Red Sea Gateway as New Pressure Point" by Samia Nakhoul.

Depending on US and Saudi actions related to the Strait of Hormuz, Iran may ask its Houthi allies in Yemen to shut down the Bab el-Mandeb choke point, which controls international shipping through the Red Sea and Suez Canal.

What's Preventing Houthi Attacks on Red Sea Shipping?

 The American Security Project published on 7 May 2026 a commentary titled "What's Holding the Houthis Back in Bab al-Mandeb?" by Laura Bucci.

The Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have so far refrained from attacking international shipping in the Red Sea following U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran.  The author suggests this is due to ongoing reconstruction in Yemen following earlier attacks on the Houthis by the United States and Israel, an interrupted weapons supply chain from Iran, and concern that the U.S. and Israel would resume airstrikes.  The author does not, however, rule out a resumption of Houthi attacks.

Will US Blockade of Hormuz Stir Houthi Response in Red Sea?

 The Independent published on 14 April 2026 an article titled "What Is the 'Gate of Tears'? Key Shipping Route that Could Be Attacked by Houthis and Disrupt Global Economy" by Bryony Gooch and Harry Cockburn.

The authors speculate on the possibility of Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis attacking international shipping in the Red Sea following a US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Oman.

New China-Libya Shipping Route via Suez Canal

 The Libyan Express published on 4 April 2026 an article titled "New Maritime Corridor Links China to Libya via Suez."

China is opening a new shipping route from its port of Qingdao on the Yellow Sea through the Red Sea and Suez Canal to connect with the ports of Benghazi and Misrata in Libya. The route strengthens trade between Asia and the Mediterranean and offers an alternative to traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.   

Iran War Increases China's Interaction with North Africa

 The Stimson Center published on 27 March 2026 a paper titled "How Iran War Is Reshaping China's Geo-Economic Cooperation with North Africa" by Chuchu Zhang, Fudan University.

The war in Iran and closure of the Strait of Hormuz have caused China to pursue a dual-track strategy of multi-source procurement and accelerated green transformation, deliberately broadening its oil and gas import footprint while fast tracking the development of new energy technologies.  North Africa has emerged as a pivotal arena for deepened geo-economic cooperation.  

China's Oil Tankers Take on Saudi Crude in Red Sea to Avoid Hormuz

 Caixin Global published on 17 March 2026 an article titled "Chinese Supertanker Changes Route and Takes Oil Without Passing through Hormuz."

A Chinese supertanker originally scheduled to load crude oil in the UAE rerouted to the Saudi Arabian Red Sea port of Yanbu.  Other vessels are taking a similar action, causing a bottleneck at the port, which is served by an oil pipeline with limited capacity.  

China's Port Network Clusters Near Chokepoints

 The Conversation published on 4 March 2026 an analysis titled "Far from Random, China's Global Port Network Is Clustering Near the World's Riskiest Trade Routes" by Dylan Spencer, Georgia Southern University, Gohar Petrossian, John Jay School of Criminal Justice, and Stephen Pires, Florida International University.

Chinese companies now own or operate terminals at more than 90 ports worldwide.  This program is not random; the investments cluster near maritime chokepoints and piracy-prone shipping corridors such as the Suez Canal/Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, and Strait of Malacca.  Proximity to critical trade bottlenecks strongly predicts Chinese port investment.  

China Expands Marine Corps to Deploy in Locations Such as Djibouti

The South China Morning Post published on 13 March 2017 an article titled "As Overseas Ambitions Expand, China Plans 400 Per Cent Increase to Marine Corps Numbers, Sources Say" by Minnie Chan.

The article says China plans to increase the size of its Marine Corps from about 20,000 to 100,000 personnel to protect the nation's maritime lifelines and its growing interests overseas. Some of these personnel will be stationed at ports China will operate in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa and Gwadar in southwest Pakistan. One analyst suggests these forces could help maintain security for China's "One Belt, One Road" initiative.