The Council on Foreign Relations published on 8 October 2026 a background piece titled "Another Hormuz? What to Know About the Houthi Threat to the Red Sea" by Diana Roy.
Each year, approximately 12 to 15 percent of global maritime trade worth more than $1 trillion, including 30 percent of global container traffic transits the Red Sea. This is an excellent summary of the threat posed by the Iran-backed and Yemen-based Houthis to international shipping through the Red Sea.
The New York Times published on 6 October 2026 an article titled "How the Houthis Triumphed on the Red Sea and Sparked a New War in Yemen" by Vivian Nereim, Saeed Al-Batiti, and Shuaib Almosawa.
This is an account of the seizure by Iranian-backed Houthi forces in Yemen of territory bordering Bab el-Mandeb, the southern choke point of the Red Sea. Yemeni government forces that were holding the territory requested assistance from Saudi Arabia and the United States to prevent the Houthi offensive. The United States provided intelligence support, but both Saudi Arabia and the United States failed to provide air support.
The International Crisis Group posted on 1 October 2026 a 58-minute podcast titled "Inside Sudan's War" with Alan Boswell and Sudanese national Yousra Elbagir, Sky News Africa correspondent.
The podcast draws on Yousra Elbagir's visits to Port Sudan, ransacked family home in Khartoum, road trip from Khartoum to El Obeid following a sustained aerial attack on the city, and other locations in Sudan. Some of her insights involved the personal impact of the war on her reporting.
Russia has long been rumored to have obtained agreement from Sudanese authorities to establish a naval base in Port Sudan. During an escorted visit to the Sudan Navy's base in Port Sudan, she saw no evidence of a Russian presence but understood that Russian military personnel had been at the facility in recent years. She also learned that Saudi Arabia strongly opposes any foreign naval base in the Red Sea, whether by Russia, Turkey, Iran or any other country. Saudi Arabia has considerable influence over the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) that controls Port Sudan.
There have been recent rumors of SAF cooperation with the rebel Houthis in Yemen. She neither saw nor heard any evidence of such cooperation, which would also be strongly opposed by Saudi Arabia and is effectively at war with the Houthis.
When asked about an end to the war between the SAF and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), she commented that the RSF is eroding internally. Consequently, it is possible the RSF may choose to negotiate with the SAF. But the SAF has no plan to achieve a lasting peace. Both sides increasingly realize that they cannot fight forever. In the meantime, the Sudanese people see themselves as pawns at the mercy of the SAF and RSF.
The Italian Institute for International Political Studies published on 5 August 2026 an analysis titled "Iran and the Horn of Africa: Evolving Interests Since the Current Conflict" by Eric Lob.
This study suggested the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen would open a second maritime front by disrupting commercial shipping in the Red Sea and that Teheran will try to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa. It will be constrained, however, by the geopolitical complications of its relations with the region and by its own economic challenges.
The Emirates Policy Center published on 2 October 2026 an analysis titled "Iran and the 'Straits Game' in Hormuz and Bab El-Mandeb: Calculating the Impact and Consequences" by Mohammad Alzghool.
The author concluded that Iran's strategy relies on the assumption that rising energy prices, market uncertainty and public pressure will increase the political costs borne by its adversaries. In contrast, the United States and the Gulf countries are investing in alternative oil-export routes while preparing for countermeasures, including a potential counter blockade and military action aimed at neutralizing threats.
Iran International posted on 1 October 2026 an article titled "Iranian Weapons, Chinese Supplies Fuel Houthi Advance in Yemen--WSJ" drawing on a 29 September Wall Street Journal article (behind a paywall) by Andrew Barnett, Daniel Kiss, and Benoit Faucon.
Iranian weapons and growing supplies of Chinese dual-use components helped Yemen's Houthis expand their territory and increase their ability to threaten shipping through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The Houthis rely on Iranian-designed missiles, drones, sea mines, armed fast boats, and drone boats. They build weapons themselves. Chinese companies supply dual-use goods that can serve civilian and military purposes.
The American Security Project published on 23 September 2026 an article titled "Two Shores, One Chokepoint: The Houthi-al-Shabaab Nexus" by Joshua Perez.
The alliance between the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen and al-Shabaab in Somalia demonstrates that the Bab el Mandeb chokepoint at the south end of the Red Sea has two gatekeepers.
CNN published on 12 September 2026 an article titled "'A F***-up of Epic Proportions': Blame Game Begins after Iran-backed Houthis' Lightning Advance Down Red Sea Coast" by Nic Robertson and Lauren Kent.
The quick seizure of strategic Red Sea coastline by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen has led to recriminations as to how it happened. There were no airstrikes by Saudi Arabia or the United States in support of Yemeni government forces to halt the Houthi advance. Yemen and the Red Sea now have the potential to become the second front in the Iran war.
The New York Times published on 11 September 2026 an article titled "Why the Houthis' Lightning Advance Threatens Global Shipping" by Sergio Pecanha, Lazaro Gamio, and Weiyi Cai.
The Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen now have firm control of the Bab el Mandeb choke point at the south end of the Red Sea, having captured Perim Island. A distance of only 12.5 miles now separates Perim Island from Djibouti across the Red Sea in Africa. Shipping lanes through the Bab el Mandeb Strait run less than 3 miles from Perim Island, within easy range of Houthi drones.
Time published on 11 September 2026 an article titled "Yemen's Houthis Capture Red Sea Port City, Threatening New Front in War" by Miranda Jeyaretnam.
Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi rebels seized the port of Mokha on the Red Sea, giving the Houthis greater ability to control the Bab el Mandeb choke point. The Houthis reportedly received weapons and instructions from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to escalate their attacks on Saudi Arabia. The Houthis say they will continue to confine their attacks on international shipping to Saudi vessels.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 6 August 2026 an analysis titled "Countering Terrorism Financing in East Africa" by Daisy Muibu and Nicole Mazurova.
Al-Shabaab in Somalia has established a sophisticated revenue-generation capacity that includes criminal activities, illicit trade, smuggling, and money laundering. Al-Shahaab obtains annual revenue of up to $200 million annually. The Islamic State in Somalia generates between $100,000 and $360,000 monthly through extortion and illicit taxation.
Defeating these terrorist organizations will require degrading their revenue generation capacities through strengthened national and regional coordination.
Al-Estiklal, a Turkish daily based in Istanbul, published on 24 August 2026 an article titled "Houthi Expansion in the Horn of Africa: From Arms Smuggling to a Cross-Border Network of Influence."
Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi outreach to the Horn of Africa is an attempt to build a human, logistical, and intelligence network that can be utilized on both sides of the Red Sea. It involves collaboration with al-Shabaab in Somalia and sympathetic individuals in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
It is part of Iran's broader strategy in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The Houthis monitor the movements of countries allied with Saudi Arabia and the United States and secure supply lines to ensure the continued flow of weapons and supplies.
Military Africa recently posted the "Africa Drone Procurement Report 2026." The dataset comprises 234 procurement records across 34 African nations from at least 21 supplier countries spanning 1980 to 2026. During this period, it identified 1,959 drone units obtained by African countries. From 2020 to 2026, African countries procured 1,054 drone units or 53 percent of the total since 1980.
China was the leading supplier at 587 drones or just under 30 percent of the total procured in Africa. Its Wing Loong armed drones and Rainbow CH series drones went primarily to Egypt (126 units), Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (80), Nigeria (72), Ethiopia (57), and Algeria (49). Chinese drones appeared extensively in active combat zones (Libya, Ethiopia, and Sudan). They are particularly favored for their low cost, availability, and lack of human rights conditionality.
The next most important suppliers after China are Israel (325 drones), Türkiye (291), US (247), and locally manufactured (216). Iran and Russia supply drones to active conflict-zone actors through more opaque channels. Israeli drones have gone primarily to Morocco, with smaller numbers to Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia, and Libya's Government of National Unity.
The Congressional Research Service published on 21 July 2026 a brief titled "Yemen: Conflict, Red Sea Security, and U.S. Policy" by Christopher M. Blanchard.
In March 2025, the Trump administration designated the Iranian-backed Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization. On March 15, 2025, U.S. forces began a military campaign against the Houthis which the administration said was intended to compel them to end attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. The United States and the Houthis agreed to a truce in May 2025, which continues to hold.
Pakistan's South Asian Chronicle published on 1 August 2026 an article titled "Houthi Red Sea Crisis."
This is a nice summary of the background of the Houthi blockade of the Red Sea and relations with Saudi Arabia.
Al-Monitor published on 29 July 2026 an article titled "China in Touch with Yemen's Houthis to Allow Ships to Sail Through Red Sea, Sources Say" by Jonathan Saul, Parisa Hafezi, Timour Azhari, and Chen Aizhu.
Beijing has asked the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen to promise safe passage for its oil tankers transporting crude from Saudi Arabia's Yanbu terminal in the Red Sea south through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point. China clears each shipment with the Houthis, who have developed good relations with Beijing.
The Hill published on 23 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis Say 2 Saudi Oil Tankers Attacked in Red Sea" by Max Rego.
Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen say they struck two Saudi oil tankers, named Encelia and Layla, using ballistic and cruise missiles in the Red Sea earlier this week. So far, they have forced at least 10 other ships to turn around rather than pass through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point.
CNBC posted on 22 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis Deploy Missiles and Drones to Attack Ships in Southern Red Sea, Naval Group Says" by Spencer Kimball.
Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen have completed preparations to attack shipping, including the deployment of missiles and drones positioned near the Bab el-Mandeb choke point at the south end of the Red Sea.
The European Union's naval mission in the Middle East warned commercial ships linked to Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States to avoid transiting the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden.
The Council on Foreign Relations published on 20 July 2026 a background piece titled "Another Hormuz? What to Know About the Houthi Threat to the Red Sea" by Diana Roy.
The Yemen-based and Iranian-backed Houthis' decision to impose a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia opens a new front in the U.S.-Iran war and threatens to choke off the Red Sea's 20-mile-wide Bab el-Mandeb Strait, with potentially major consequences for the global economy.
Foreign Affairs published on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Who Is Winning Africa's Drone Wars?" by Nate Allen and Rida Lyammouri.
Inexpensive drones are fast becoming the weapon of choice in African conflicts. They are being deployed by both governments and insurgent groups. China is now Africa's largest supplier of drones, accounting for a quarter of those procured.
Foreign drones have turned African conflicts such as the civil war in Sudan into destabilizing proxy wars. At least eleven African countries now produce drones including Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Morocco.
