Agence France Presse published on 5 September 2025 an article titled "Chinese Firms Pay Price of Jihadist Strikes against Mali Junta."
Jihadis linked to al-Qaeda have targeted all foreign companies in Mali in an effort to force the military junta to accept sharia law. Chinese operated gold and lithium operations have experienced the brunt of these attacks. Jihadis have kidnapped at least 11 Chinese nationals.
Africa News published on 25 August 2025 an article titled "DR Congo: Civil Society Groups Call for Reassessment of China Mining Deal."
Civil society groups and NGOs in the Democratic Republic of Congo are calling for another reassessment of the controversial $7.5 billion "minerals for infrastructure" deal with China.
Stimson published on 20 August 2025 a commentary titled "India Must Level Up to Compete with China in the Western Indian Ocean" by Radhey Tambi.
The author argues that India is falling behind China's influence in the Western Indian Ocean and needs to step up its diplomatic, political, institutional, military, economic, and soft power engagement with the island countries if it intends to compete with Beijing.
RAND published on 15 July 2025 a study titled "Chinese Engagement with Africa: A RAND Research Primer" by Oluwetimilehin Sotubo and Cortez A. Cooper III.
The study presents an historical overview of the China-Africa relationship since the middle of the 20th century that includes the economic, humanitarian, and political aspects. It highlights trade and investment flows and summarizes Chinese medical and military cooperation with Africa.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 8 July 2025 a survey titled "Mapping Gulf State Actors' Expanding Engagements in East Africa."
The Gulf States, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are becoming increasingly important sources of investment and capital in the Horn of Africa and East Africa.
News Diggers recently aired a 54-minute video documentary titled "Chinese Investment in Zambia -- the Good, the Bad, and the Dangerous" by Joseph Mwenda.
The documentary focuses on environmental damage caused by the collapse of a copper mine tailing dam controlled by Sino-Metals Ltd., sulfur dioxide released into the air by Avocado Mining Ltd., and dangerous working conditions in artisanal copper mines where Rong Xing Investment buys much of the production.
China's embassy in Lusaka tried to prevent the airing of this controversial documentary.
The Diplomat published on 14 July 2025 an article titled "Africa and China: Turning FOCAC's Strategic Upgrades into Real Outcomes" by Huiyi Chen, Development Reimagined.
Every African country except Eswatini, which recognizes Taiwan, now has at least a "strategic partnership" with China and many have a more elevated status such as "comprehensive strategic partnership," "comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership," and a special status for Ethiopia and South Africa.
The author argues that African countries must now sharpen their strategies to maximize the new framework with China. The year 2025 will test whether these upgraded ties can deliver real outcomes.
The Atlantic Council published on 11 July 2025 an article titled "Guinea-Bissau's President on His Meeting with Trump, Relations with Russia and China, and Whether He Will Accept US Deportees" by Katherine Golden.
President Umaro Sissoco Embalo, who met President Trump with four other African presidents at the White House, subsequently noted that he also met with the presidents of China and Russia. Embalo expressed the desire for more American investment and said now is not the right time for the West to end the battle against terrorism in Africa.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 8 July 2025 a study titled "Mapping Gulf State Actors' Expanding Engagements in East Africa."
The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have become the leading sources of capital, private sector engagement, and weapons flows into East Africa in recent years. The UAE is by far the most engaged actor in East Africa with $47 billion in projects and about 60 percent of all Gulf region capital inflows. Saudi Arabia is second with an estimated $16 billion in investments across East Africa.
UAE-based The National published on 9 July 2025 an article titled "Chinese Premier Li Qiang Visits Egypt to Deepen Ties as US Relations Sour" by Kamal Tabikha.
Chinese Premier Li Qiang is visiting Egypt on a visit to strengthen relations. The article concludes that Egypt's growing frustration with Israel's polices in Gaza and its perception of US inaction have driven Cairo to recalibrate its foreign policy, resulting in Egypt prioritizing partnerships with China and BRICS nations to reduce reliance on Washington.
The Organization for World Peace published on 25 June 2025 an analysis titled "China and Egypt: A Strategic Embrace at the Crossroads of Power and Infrastructure" by Anson Zhang.
This is an updated account of the China-Egypt relationship with an emphasis on the increasing influence of China in Egypt. At the same time, Egypt has concerns over its large, persistent trade deficit with China and its ability to repay $8 billion in loans to Chinese banks.
The South China Morning Post published on 2 July 2025 an article titled "Move to Shore Up Supply of Copper from African Mines" by Jevans Nyabiage.
China is positioning itself to secure more copper from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Botswana in an effort to dominate the transition to green energy.
Business Insider Africa published on 1 July 2025 an article titled "Ghana and China Trade Blame as Tensions Rise over Surging Galamsey Activities" by Dorcas Agambila.
A surge in global gold prices has fueled a long-standing conflict in Ghana between illegal gold mining by Chinese nationals and the government of Ghana. China's ambassador to Ghana has tried to deflect blame.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 30 June 2025 an analysis titled "The Limits to China's Transactional Diplomacy in Africa" by Paul Nantulya.
After supporting the democratically elected government in Niger, China has become the main financial backer of the military regime that overthrew the democratic government. Beijing's transactional approach to Niger has turned sour. Jihadism is thriving in Niger, including attacks on China's oil investment. Niger is also having difficulty repaying its debt to China.
The Congressional Research Service posted on 6 June 2025 an article titled "China's Engagement in Djibouti" by Lauren Ploch Blanchard.
This is a nice, updated summary of China's economic, security, and political relations with Djibouti and a discussion of US concerns.
The Center for Global Development published in June 2025 a paper titled "China's Investment Pivot and Africa's Industrial Prospects: Any Hope for African 'Flying Geese'?" by Charles Kenny.
The paper examines the changing shape of Chinese investment in Africa as it evolves from largescale infrastructure toward small scale manufacturing. It looks at the opportunity for the region in the context of a deepening manufacturing labor shortage in China; discusses barriers to that opportunity in both China and Africa; and the potential response of Western countries.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on 4 June 2025 titled "China's Malign Influence in Africa." The senior Africa Bureau official in the State Department, Troy Fitrell, provided the testimony.
Responding to the title of the hearing, Fitrell denounced Beijing's assertive, government-backed strategies to capture African market share. He said China's strategy for economic dominance in Africa relies on a centralized, state-directed, and nationally resourced approach to dominating global markets and strategic supply chains.
Fitrell devoted most of his prepared testimony to the Trump administration's strategy for Africa, which will focus on investment-led and trade-driven growth. It will prioritize robust commercial engagement, recognizing and treating African nations as equal partners in trade and investment. He then identified six targeted actions:
1. Making commercial diplomacy a core priority across US embassies;
2. Promoting private-sector-identified market reforms with African governments;
3. Implementing high-quality infrastructure projects;
4. Sending commercial diplomacy missions with private sector representatives;
5. Connecting export-ready US companies with African opportunities; and
6. Reforming US trade and financing tools to better compete with China's swift and risk-tolerant financing model.
Fitrell rightly concludes that "the strategy's success relies on U.S. companies expanding into new markets and African partners enabling environments for transparent and lasting commerce."
Comment: As someone who has been following African affairs since the early 1960s, including 37 years in the State Department and most of it in the Africa Bureau, there is nothing new about this strategy except perhaps the emphasis being put on it by the Trump administration. But other administrations, especially the Reagan administration, also gave commercial diplomacy a high priority. All of them were disappointed with the results in Africa. In the final analysis, the strategy is highly dependent on the willingness of the American private sector to engage in Africa. Private sector enthusiasm will be determined not only by the priority given to it by the Trump administration, but the tangible incentives offered by the US government. This is where China has a big advantage.
Is the US government prepared to provide sufficient on the ground staffing at all embassies in Africa? Will it increase resources for the US Export-Import Bank, US International Development Finance Corporation, and Millennium Challege Corporation? Will high level Trump administration officials lead trade and investment missions to Africa? If the response to all of these questions is affirmative, the strategy might make a difference.
But it does not help when the announcement of the Africa commercial strategy is immediately followed by a full or partial ban on travel to the United States by 10 African countries. Even if they are not among the most important trade and investment prospects, it sends the wrong message to all of Africa that America is not really open for business.
The Committee to Protect Journalists posted on 6 June 2025 a press release titled "Zambia Court Blocks Film Investigating Chinese Businesses."
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Zambia sued a privately-owned news outlet and obtained a gag order from the Lusaka High Court to prevent airing of a documentary titled "Chinese investment in Zambia: the good, the bad, and the dangerous." The Chinese Chamber of Commerce said the documentary disparages and demeans Chinese investment in Zambia.
Semafor posted on 21 May 2025 a commentary titled "Analysis: The Challenge with Trump's 'Trade Not Aid' African Strategy" by W. Gyude Moore.
The author suggests that while there may be merit in the Trump administration's Africa strategy, it is almost impossible to implement it when you dismantle the institutions designed to do so.
The China Global South Project posted on 16 May 2025 a 55-minute podcast titled "Somaliland's Strategic Gamble: Betting on Trump, Backing Taiwan, Defying China" hosted by Eric Orlander and Cobus van Staden with Moustafa Ahmad and Sacad Muhumed, both Somaliland foreign policy researchers in Hargeisa.
Most of the podcast, which also includes a written transcript, focuses on the complex nexus of Somaliland's relationship with Taiwan, Beijing's reaction to that relationship, speculation that the Trump administration might recognize Somaliland, and how all of this would play out in the Horn of Africa and in China. It's complicated.
