China's Zero Tariffs for Africa Provide Positive Publicity at Little Cost (in French)

 Thierry Pairault posted on 28 March 2026 a working paper titled "Tarif zero: un petit geste qui ne coute presque rien."

This is the first of two analyses Thierry Pairault has posted on the impact of Beijing's decision to allow imports from 53 African countries to enter China duty free beginning 1 May.  He explains this is an inexpensive gesture that will not have much practical impact. The second working paper was reposted on 30 March below.

China's trade surplus with Africa continues to grow.  China exports value-added goods to Africa while Africa exports mostly raw materials and some agricultural products to China.  A small number of African countries account for most of the continent's exports to China.  

China's zero tariff treatment of African imports may benefit some agricultural products such as coffee and tobacco, but it will not change significantly existing China-Africa trade patterns.  

Ghanaian Professor Calls for Reassessment of Africa's Relations with China

 The Ghana News Agency posted on 18 February 2026 an article titled "Africa-China Relations Need Critical Review--Prof. Amoah" by Edward Acquah.

Prominent associate professor of political science at the University of Ghana, Lloyd George Adu Amoah, recently gave a key public lecture on China-Africa relations.  Amoah, who has a doctorate from Wuhan University in China, called for a critical reassessment of the relationship. He described current China-Africa relations as "heavy on form and very light on substance."

Amoah identified three phases of China-Africa relations with the last one beginning about 2011 when China became the world's second largest economy.  This phase has been marked by China's "obsession with the maintenance of its new superpower status."  He warned that trade with China may lock Africa into a source for commodities and result in diminished manufacturing opportunities.  

Amoah added Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows constitute less than 5 percent of its global FDI stock and they are concentrated in resource rich countries and sectors such as mining and construction.

Illegal Chinese Mining in Nigeria Results in Dustup with US

 China-Africa Security Radar published on 16 February 2026 an analysis titled "Beijing Rejects U.S. Allegations of Financing Terror in Nigeria's Illegal Mining Sector--The Reality Is More Complex."

Prominent Republican members of the US Congress have sponsored a bill that alleges Chinese individuals and companies involved in illegal mining pay "protection money" to Fulani militias and other armed groups to secure access to lithium and gold deposits.  The bill links these militias to terrorist violence that has impacted Nigerian Christian communities.

The Chinese embassy in Abuja issued a strongly worded statement refuting allegations that Chinese nationals are funding militant groups to gain access to minerals in Nigeria's Middle Belt and northwestern region.  

China-Africa Security Radar concludes that it is generally agreed there is illegal Chinese mining in Nigeria, but the culprits are pragmatically paying "rent" to armed groups to access the minerals.

China's Ability to Impact Iron Ore Prices with Guinea Project

 Mining.com posted on 3 November 2025 an article titled "China's Massive African Mine Threatens to Upend Iron Ore Market" by Thomas Biesheuval and William Cloves.  

Simandou mine in Guinea is the world's largest untapped iron ore deposit with estimated reserves of 3 billion tons.  Its iron content is among the world's highest, and its development could impact the global market.  Chinese firms own most of the project.  China will be in a strong position to influence iron ore prices once production advances further.

China's Minerals for Infrastructure Deal in DRC Under Fire Again

 Africa News published on 25 August 2025 an article titled "DR Congo: Civil Society Groups Call for Reassessment of China Mining Deal."

Civil society groups and NGOs in the Democratic Republic of Congo are calling for another reassessment of the controversial $7.5 billion "minerals for infrastructure" deal with China.  

Chinese Diplomacy in Africa

 The LSE Blog posted on 6 August 2025 a commentary titled "China is Reshaping Global Power Dynamics through Diplomatic Ritual" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah, Lingnan University, and Christian Kaunert, Dublin City University.

In January 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made his first overseas trip of the year to Africa--Chad, Republic of Congo, Namibia, and Nigeria--a practice the Chinese foreign minister has done every year since 1991.  The author argues that Wang Yi's trip represents a systematic erosion of Western influence in Africa.

China Looks to Africa in Global Trade War

 The Economist published on 19 June 2025 a commentary titled "China Is Trying to Win Over Africa in the Global Trade War."

As the United States ends its duty-free policy with many African states when the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act expires in September, China is eliminating tariffs on African countries.  China already has much higher total trade with Africa than does the United States, but it consists heavily of Chinese exports to Africa and fewer African exports to China.  The US has a trade deficit with Africa.  Ultimately, Africa must produce those things that China wants to buy to eliminate its trade deficit.

Ethiopia Signs $1.7 Billion in Investment Deals, Mostly with Chinese Companies

 Reuters published on 14 May 2025 an article titled "Ethiopia Agrees Minerals, Energy Deals Worth $1.7 Billion, Chiefly with Chinese Companies" by Dawit Endeshaw.  

Companies attending a two-day investment conference in Addis Ababa signed agreements valued at $1.7 billion for a variety of mineral, coal, and solar energy deals.  Chinese companies were well represented.  

China Walks Fine Line in DRC-Rwanda Dispute

 The BBC posted on 26 March 2025 an article titled "DR Congo Conflict Tests China's Diplomatic Balancing Act" by Jack Lau.

Chinese companies are significantly engaged in the mineral-rich eastern DRC where a Rwanda-supported M23 rebel group is militarily opposing DRC security forces.  China has for years maintained good relations with both countries and remained neutral in the dispute.  Until recently, China cited unnamed "foreign forces" as supporting the M23 rebels. Now it is naming Rwanda as the source of that support and publicly hoping that the government will end the relationship.  China provides weapons to both countries.  

DR Congo Proposes Minerals for US Companies in Exchange for Military Support

 Kenya's The Eastleigh Voice published on 4 March 2025 an article titled "Tshisekedi Courts US: DRC Offers Minerals in Exchange for Military Backing in War against M23 Rebels."

An American lobbyist for the Felix Tshisekedi government in Kinshasa sent a letter on 21 February to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio proposing privileged access by US companies to DRC critical minerals while giving Kinshasa military support to secure its territory against M23 rebels supported by Rwanda.  The US would train and equip the Congolese Armed Forces.  If the deal were to go forward, it would reverse the DRC's reliance on mineral exploitation by Chinese and European companies.  

Africa-China Relations in 2025

 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 7 January 2025 a commentary titled "What to Expect from Africa-China Relations in 2025" by Paul Nantulya.

China will continue to promote its governance model in Africa, enlist support to reshape global norms, secure the supply of critical minerals, strengthen party-to-party ties, and increase military outreach.  The major items on the agenda of African countries are market access, balanced trade with China, and adding value to exports.

Impact of Red Sea Crisis on Chinese Investment in Djibouti

 The South China Morning Post published on 28 December 2024 an article titled "China's Faith in Djibouti Is Paying Off, But Could Red Sea Crisis Muddy the Waters?" by Enoch Wong.

The article notes that Chinese investments in Djibouti are generally profitable, but continuing Yemen-based Houth attacks on Red Sea shipping raise questions concerning the future of trade through Djibouti.  A Houthi-created crisis that continues for an extended period of time could have negative consequences for Chinese investments in the region.

Competing with China for Africa's Critical Minerals

 The European Council on Foreign Relations published on 7 November 2024 a paper titled "Material World: How Europe Can Compete with China in the Race for Africa's Critical Minerals" by Sarah Logan.

The author argues the European Union must enhance support to European companies to invest in securing access to critical raw materials.  This should include new financial incentives and measures to protect against China manipulating prices on international markets. 

The Nuanced Reality of China-Africa Relations

 American Diplomacy published in November 2024 a commentary titled "China in Africa: The Nuanced Reality of Belt and Road" by Hank Cohen, former US assistant secretary of state for African affairs.  

The author points out that China has shifted from doing infrastructure projects based on loans to working on a grant basis.  China is now providing much needed infrastructure for African countries without the harm of tying them up in debt.  He concludes that the reality of China's Africa policy contains more shades of grey than popularly understood.  The positives for Africans are real, but so are the potential pitfalls.

American and Chinese-financed Railway Projects in Southern Africa: Competition or Cooperation?

 The Center for Strategic and International Studies published on 10 October 2024 a commentary titled "Two Railroads, One Vision" by Judd Devermont.

The US has mobilized over $4 billion to develop the Lobito Economic Corridor, including refurbishing Angola's Benguela rail line and supporting a rail line expansion between the southern DRC and Zambia.  This project will improve the movement of minerals and goods to the Angolan port of Lobito on the Atlantic coast.  China is making available $1 billion to revitalize the Tanzania-Zambia Railway built in the 1970s that terminates in Dar es Salaam in the Indian Ocean.

While these projects are being framed in the context of great power competition, they offer the possibility of serving as an example of great power cooperation and one that accomplishes a Pan-African goal for a transcontinental rail link from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic that will expand economic development throughout the region.  This could be done by connecting the two projects if all parties were to agree.   

China Finances Rehab of Tan-Zam Railway

 Nanyang Technological University posted on 28 October 2024 an article titled "China to Revive East African Railway as Scramble over African Resources Intensifies."  

China signed a memorandum of conversation to upgrade at a cost of more than $1 billion the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) originally constructed with an interest free loan from China in the 1970s.  The line, designed to move copper from Zambia to the port of Dar es Salaam on Tanzania's Indian Ocean coast, has deteriorated and is operating at a fraction of its potential.

TAZARA will also compete in the years ahead with a new US and EU funded railway that will move minerals from the mining areas of Zambia and the DRC to the Angolan port of Lobito on the Atlantic coast.

Two Chinese Companies Sign Lithium Deal in Zimbabwe

 Bloomberg published on 24 September 2024 an article titled "China Mining Heavyweights Partner with Zimbabwe on Lithium Mine" by William Clowes and Godfrey Marawanyika.  

Despite low lithium prices, two Chinese mining companies are partnering with Zimbabwe's state-owned Kuvimba Mining House to build a mine and processing plant.  Even if lithium prices remain low, the Chinese companies look to make a profit and are predicting a strong recovery in 2026 and 2027.

How the US Can Compete More Effectively with China in Zambia

 The World Politics Review published on 29 August 2024 an article titled "The U.S. Can Provide an Alternative to China in Sub-Saharan Africa" by Ben Kallas, CEO of Searchlight, and Glenn Chafetz, director of the 2340 research group.

Drawing on lessons from Zambia, the authors argue that western companies can compete successfully with Chinese companies by following better business and labor practices, aided by more appropriate U.S. government funding and giving Africa more high-level attention.

Competition for Africa's Strategic Minerals

 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 15 August 2024 an analysis titled "Maximizing the Benefits of the Renewed Global Interest in Africa's Strategic Minerals" by Folashade Soule.

China is far ahead in building supply chains for Africa's cobalt, rare earth minerals, lithium, and several other metals and minerals.  Chinese companies are willing to take greater risks than their Western counterparts and adapt quickly to low environmental standards.

Chinese Company to Invest in Tanzanian Rare Earth Project

 Tanzania's The Guardian published on 29 July 2024 an article titled "Chinese Firm to Invest $63m on Tanzania's Mining Project."

Chinese mining company Shenghe Resources has signed a non-binding term sheet with Tanzania's Peak Rare Earths to develop a rare earth operation.