The Center for Maritime Security published on 6 May 2024 an analysis titled "China's Calculated Inaction in Red Sea Crisis" by David Scott, Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies.
China has maintained a deliberate distancing from the Red Sea crisis in spite of its considerable interest in keeping the waterway open. The author suggests a variety of reasons why China is pursuing this policy.
CNA Insider, a multinational news channel owned by Singapore's state-owned public broadcaster, posted on 6 April 2024 a nine-minute video titled "Why China's Navy Isn't Intervening in Red Sea Houthi Attacks."
The video points out that PLA Navy ships, although they are assigned in the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy duty, have not engaged in efforts to end Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. One Chinese commentator said China prefers to emphasize political communication and dialogue.
The South China Morning Post published on 8 March 2024 an article titled "China's 'Two Sessions' 2024: Red Sea Crisis 'a Big Challenge' for Beijing, Says Ambassador" by Zhao Ziwen.
China's ambassador to Egypt acknowledged on the sidelines of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing that Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea pose a huge challenge for China. Beijing's trade with Europe is being impacted negatively and its extensive investments in Egypt and the Suez Canal Zone are threatened.
The New York-based Soufan Center, an independent non-profit research organization, published on 6 February 2024 an analysis titled "Houthi Attacks Upend Beijing's Regional Strategy."
Even though the Houthis have attacked no Chinese-owned ships in the Red Sea, Beijing has become increasingly concerned about the economic costs of the Iran-endorsed Houthi campaign. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely this will cause China to join the Western effort to end militarily the attacks. Beijing may even be quietly applauding the regional instability created by the Houthis.
Project Syndicate published on 7 February 2024 an analysis titled "Why China Won't Fight the Houthis" by Yun Sun, Stimson Center.
Although Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping could eventually undermine China's economic recovery, Beijing's approach to the US-led effort to end the attacks is no cooperation, no support, and no confrontation. China welcomes the strain the US effort places on its relations with countries in the region other than Israel.
The Diplomat published on 30 January 2024 an analysis titled "China in the Red Sea: Beijing's Houthi Connection" by Barbara Keleman, Central European Institute of Asian Studies.
China began a relationship with the Houthis in Yemen in 2016. The Houthis announced that Chinese ships are exempt from attack and some of them continue to travel through the Red Sea. But China's influence over the Houthis appears to be limited and exercised primarily through its closer relationship with Iran.
CNN posted on 30 January 2024 an article titled "The Red Sea Crisis Tests China's Global Ambitions" by Nectar Gan.
China's public response to the Red Sea crisis has been limited to calls for an end to the attacks on civilian ships and veiled criticism of US-led military operations against the Houthis. In spite of the significant interest China has in maintaining freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, this response falls well short of Beijing's global ambitions. Regional leaders probably see China as a paper tiger.
The South China Morning Post published on 28 January 2024 an article titled "Great Power Lite? Why China Is Reluctant to Wade into the Red Sea Crisis and Join US-led Attacks on Houthis" by Dewey Sim.
China has called for an end to the Iran-backed Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea but is unwilling to join Western efforts to end the attacks with the use of force. China maintains 3 PLA Navy ships in the region that could engage militarily if authorized by Beijing.
While there are some practical reasons for refusing to engage militarily, observers point out that China's caution reflects a lack of leadership and capacity in a situation where its commercial ships have not yet been attacked by the Houthis. China has no desire to ensure freedom of navigation and is content to "free ride" on Western military responses. China's low-key response raises questions, however, about its ability or willingness to achieve its stated goal of becoming a global power.
Bloomberg published on 15 January 2024 an article titled "Xi Steers Chinese Navy Away from Red Sea Risk."
China has concluded that the costs are not yet high enough to outweigh the risks of getting involved in efforts to end Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping. China can freeload on responses by the United States, United Kingdom, and others while stoking anti-American sentiment in the region.
Reuters published on 15 January 2024 an article titled "Explainer: Houthi Attacks Expose China's Commercial Stakes in Red Sea" by Joe Cash.
The article identifies significant past and pending Chinese investments in the Suez Canal Zone, pointing out that Iran-supported Houthi attacks deterring commercial shipping from the Red Sea and Suez Canal could frustrate Chinese investors who have committed huge sums to the waterway's development to profit from their safe passage.
CCTV Video News Agency recently posted a short clip titled "China's 45th Naval Fleet Conducts Anti-Terrorism Drill in Gulf of Aden."
The video shows PLA Navy ships comprising the 45th Naval Fleet (destroyer Urumqi, frigate Linyi, and supply ship Dongpinghu) recently training in the Gulf of Aden for hypothetical antipiracy and counterterrorism operations. At the same time, Iranian-supported Houthis in Yemen are attacking with drones and missiles international shipping in the nearby Red Sea, forcing many shipping companies to reroute their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. China's state-owned COSCO and Orient Overseas Container Line, which is part of the COSCO Group, have rerouted their ships to avoid possible Houthi attacks.
The United States, which relies minimally on the Red Sea for commercial transport, is leading an international naval effort to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. China, which has a significant interest in Red Sea commercial shipping, has naval vessels in the area but apparently has decided not to use them even to protect vessels flagged and owned by China. Curious.
CNBC published on 8 January 2024 an article titled "China's Largest Shipper Reportedly Suspends Trips to Israel as Red Sea Tensions Mount" by Lee Ying Shan.
Israeli state media reported that Chinese state-owned shipping giant COSCO suspended shipping to Israel through the Red Sea as tensions rose due to continued attacks on shipping by Iran-supported Houthis in Yemen. Orient Overseas Container Line (OOCL), which is part of the COSCO Shipping Group, also suspended sailing to the Red Eas and stopped accepting Israel-bound cargo since December.
The timing of this information is curious in that Ships Go blog reported on 19 December 2023 a "List of Ships Affected on the Red Sea Route." It identified 177 ships that rerouted because of Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping. Included on the list are a number of COSCO and OOCL vessels. It would appear that COSCO and OOCL began avoiding the Red Sea well before this most recent announcement.
This also raises a question as to the role of the Chinese Navy's 45th anti-piracy Escort Task Force in the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea. As of 20 December, all three Task Force ships--the destroyer Urumqi, frigate Linyi, and supply ship Dongpinghu--were reportedly berthed at the Chinese naval base in Djibouti. They were not protecting Chinese or any ships in the Red Sea on that date.
All of this suggests that Chinese shipping companies are concerned their substantial traffic through the Suez Canal and Red Sea is at risk in spite of China's good relations with Iran and contacts with Houthis in Yemen. The Houthis have attacked ships associated with many different countries flying a wide variety of flags. In fact, one wonders if the Houthis have any idea about the origin of the ships they are attacking. In spite of the significantly higher shipping costs around South Africa, Chinese companies are probably wise to avoid the Red Sea, especially if the PLAN's 45th Escort Task Force remains docked at Djibouti.
The South China Morning Post published on 24 December 2023 a commentary titled "China's Inaction over Red Sea Shipping Attacks Could Exact a High Price" by Asma Khalid, independent researcher.
The author concludes that, for China, undermining American credibility and diverting its political and military resources away from the Western Pacific region is apparently more important than addressing the economic consequences of disrupting shipping through the Red Sea.
The Middle East Institue published on 3 November 2023 an analysis titled "China's Growing Maritime Presence in Egypt's Ports and the Suez Canal" by Amr Salah Mohamed.
China is an increasingly important presence in Egypt's strategic ports and the Suez Canal. The author warns that Egypt must weigh the potential downsides. Egypt's financial vulnerability, relatively weak bargaining position vis-a-vis China, and the risk of domination all require attention.
Foreign Affairs published on 22 May 2023 an article titled "China's Port Power" by Isaac Kardon, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Wendy Leutert, Indiana University.
Chinese firms with close links to Beijing have become leaders in financing, designing, building, operating, and owning port terminals around the world, including Africa. Although China has only one foreign military base--in Djibouti--, it can leverage dual civilian-military uses of Chinese firms' extensive international network of ocean port infrastructure.
By the end of 2022, Chinese firms had acquired ownership and/or operational stakes in 95 ports in 53 countries. A Chinese firm is the majority shareholder in at least one terminal at 55 of the 95 ports and 24 of them are wholly owned. Chinese firms operate all terminals in 29 of these ports, for example, in Hambantota, Sri Lanka, and in Kribi, Cameroon.
China has demonstrated that the familiar American model of power projection through overseas military bases is not the only pathway to establishing a global military presence.
Australian Outlook published on 6 April 2023 an article titled "China's Overseas Ports Acquisition Program" by Genevieve Donnellon-May, University of Oxford.
Chinese and Hong Kong-based companies own or operate more than 90 ports in 53 countries, including many in Africa. This article summarizes China's program to gain access to ports globally.
Al-Monitor published on 17 March 2023 an article titled "Egypt Signs $1.6 Billion Deals with China, EU Companies to Develop Sea Ports."
The Suez Canal Economic Zone signed an agreement to develop and manage the container terminal in the Sokhna Port in the Red Sea with the Hong Kong-based Hutchison Ports, the French shipping company CMA CGM, and the Chinese state-owned COSCO Shipping.
The Zone authority signed a second agreement to develop the Dekheila Port near Alexandria on the Mediterranean with Hutchison Ports and Switzerland-based Mediterranean Shipping Company.
YiCai Global published on 16 March 2023 an article titled "China's Cosco Shipping Ports to Buy 25% of Egypt's Sokhna Terminal to Boost Africa Trade" by Xu Wei.
Cosco Shipping Ports intends to buy a 25 percent stake in a new container terminal in Sokhna, Egypt, to improve trade links between China and Africa. The terminal in Sokhna, located on the western coast of the Gulf of Suez, will be built by the Egyptian government and operated by firms including Cosco Shipping Ports.
The Middle East Institute published on 18 August 2021 an analysis titled "The Race to Reset the Middle East's Maritime Map" by Michael Tanchum.
China's actual port development in Egypt and efforts to expand its port construction contracts in Israel and Lebanon underscore its goal to strengthen trade and political ties in the eastern Mediterranean.
