A Comprehensive Report on Russia's Africa Corps

 The Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey published in August 2025 a study titled "Putin's New Frontier: The Prospects and Limitations of Africa Corps" by Hanna Notte. 

This timely and well researched study concludes that Russia's Africa Corps is a bureaucratic restructuring and rebranding of the Wagner Goup, which only continues to function in the Central African Republic.  It employs many former Wagner mercenary fighters and has taken control of its recruitment infrastructure. 

The Africa Corps is tethered closer to the Russian military's chain of command. It prioritizes training and routine security assistance rather than the high-risk missions of the Wagner Group.  It apparently relies on funding from Russia's state budget.  The Africa Corps might face future competition from countries such as Turkey, Iran, and China.  

Russia's Africa Corps Taking Over from Wagner Group

 Foreign Policy published on 3 September 2025 an article titled "Prigozhin's Ghost Haunts Africa Corps" by Christopher Faulkner, US Naval War College.

The Central Africa Republic (CAR) stands as the sole remaining foothold of the Wagner Group.  Its successor, the Africa Corps, is replacing it, but so far it has served as little more than a praetorian guard for autocrats seeking regime survival and deeper relations with Russia. Moscow has even asked the CAR to cut ties with the Wagner Group and sign a contract with the Africa Corps, which will pose serious challenges for Russia's policy on the continent.

Russia Transitions Wagner Group to Africa Corps in Africa

 AEI's Critical Threats published on 12 June 2025 an analysis titled "Wagner Out, Africa Corps In" by Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson.  

Russia's Wagner Group formally withdrew from Mali and transitioned the Russian military presence to the Africa Corps.  As the Wagner Group pulls out of Mali, al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated insurgents are stronger than ever.  

Russia is also trying to transition from the Wagner Group to the Africa Corps in the Central African Republic.  Responsibility for Russian operations in Africa will now rest squarely with the Kremlin although Russian billionaire Gennady Timchenko may play a key role in the operations.  

Illegal Logging, China, Africa, and the US

 Foreign Affairs published on 2 June 2025 an article titled "The War on Trees: How Illegal Logging Funds Cartels, Terrorists, and Rogue Regimes" by Justyna Gudzowska and Laura Ferris. 

China is a major player in the global illegal logging industry.  Much of the timber comes from Africa.  Without a concerted effort by China to stop the trade, demand will ensure that it continues. The United States is complicit in that American consumers purchase many of the Chinese products manufactured with illegal timber.  

USAID Dismantled and Children Die

 The Associated Press published on 16 May 2025 an article titled "Children Die as USAID Cuts Snap a Lifeline for the World's Most Malnourished" by Taiwo Adebayo.

Drawing on a program implemented by Mercy Corps in Nigeria to feed malnourished children, the article documents the damage caused by dismantling USAID.  It also looks at the closure of global programs administered by Helen Keller International.  

Closing US Embassies: Penny Wise and Pound Foolish

 The New York Times published on 15 April 2025 an article titled "State Dept. Expands Plans for Closing Embassies and Consulates" by Karoun Demirjian.

The New York Times has viewed an internal State Department memo that says the Trump administration is considering plans to close 10 embassies and 17 consulates and reduce or consolidate the staff of several other foreign missions.  Six of the embassies up for closure are in Africa (Central African Republic, Eritrea, Gambia, Lesotho, the Republic of Congo, and South Sudan) and two in Europe (Luxembourg and Malta) as well as Grenada and the Maldives.  Most of the consulates are in Europe.

Comment:  If these closures are carried out, China will have wider diplomatic representation globally than the United States.  Beijing currently has an embassy in all 54 African countries except Eswatini, which recognizes Taiwan. This puts China ahead of the United States today in Africa.  Closing six more US embassies in Africa will leave Washington at a distinct disadvantage.  Gambia has the same voting power in the UN General Assembly as the United States or China. For minimal savings, the Trump administration would alienate ten countries.  The party goes on in Beijing and Moscow.  

Sudan Is Now World's Largest Humanitarian Crisis

 The Associated Press published on 10 April 2025 an article titled "Sudan Faces the World's Worst Humanitarian Crisis as Second Anniversary of War Nears, UN Says" by Edith M. Lederer.  

The World Food Program's emergency coordinator for Sudan reports that half of Sudan's 25 million people face extreme hunger after two years of war, making it the world's largest humanitarian crisis.  

Are China and Russia on a Collision Course in Africa?

 Foreign Policy published on 31 March 2025 a commentary titled "Are China and Russia on a Collision Course in Africa?" by Jessica Moody.

China and Russia, although committed to countering Western influence, have fundamentally different objectives in Africa.  China seeks political stability to protect and advance its economic investments.  Russia thrives on instability and insecurity on the continent.  The two countries typically do not work together in Africa but keep out of each other's way.

Authoritarian African Governments Join US and Russia on Ukraine Vote

 The Hill published on 24 February 2025 an article titled "These 17 Countries Voted with US Against Ukraine UN Resolution" by Elizabeth Crisp.

Seventeen countries joined the US at the UN General Assembly in voting against a resolution condemning Russia as the aggressor in the war against Ukraine.  Eight of these countries--almost half the total--are among the most authoritarian in Africa: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Sudan, Eritrea, and Mali.

Comment:  Burkina Faso, CAR, Niger, Mali, and Sudan receive military support from Russia's Wagner Group or its Africa Corps. Is the US trying to build a new group of "friends" in Africa?  

An Analysis of the Business Model of Russia's Wagner Group

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 6 February 2025 a study titled "Wagner's Business Model in Syria and Africa: Profit and Patronage" by Olivia Allison, Nick Connon, Antonio Giustozzi, and James Pascall.  

The paper examines whether the Wagner Group was profitable under its founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, what its business model meant for Russia and Russia's geopolitical rivals in the recent past, and what the model could mean for the future.  It draws primarily on three case studies: Syria, the Central African Republic, and Mali.  

It concludes that Wagner Group ventures in Africa and the Middle East did not contribute significantly to Russia's coffers, but that does not appear to have been the purpose.  Rather, they were intended to sustain Russia's foreign policy initiatives.

Prigozhin's death raised serious questions about the sustainability of the Wagner business model.  With Prigozhin gone and given the lack of appetite for his neocolonial approach among governments that might make use of Wagner's style of operations, a more feasible approach for achieving substantial profits in the future would be a focus on smuggling. 

Russia Expands Influence Across Africa

 CNN posted on 18 January 2025 a commentary titled "Across Africa, Russia Is Growing in Influence.  What Might Moscow Want?" by Nimi Princewill.  

Moscow is seeking to expand its influence beyond the Sahel region of Africa, sometimes offering to serve essentially as a Praetorian Guard for authoritarian African leaders.  It also seeks to control African natural resources for economic gain.  

Evaluation of Russia's Wagner Group in Mali, CAR, Mozambique and Syria

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published in January 2025 an analysis titled "Did Wagner Succeed in the Eyes of Its African and Middle Eastern Clients?" by Antonio Giustozzi, Joana de Deus Pereira, and David Lewis.  

This Whitehall Report looks at the Wagner Group from the perspective of its clients in four case studies: Mali, Central African Republic, Mozambique, and Syria.  In terms of support services such as training, advising and maintenance, Wagner's performance was rather undistinguished in the view of its clients.  After the mutiny in 2023, most of Wagner's support services contracts were taken over without much trouble by the Russian Ministry of Defense.  

With regard to Wagner's provision of ready-to-deploy combat units, as of 2024 it remained one of few entities willing to offer this service, as well as the most willing to deploy in very challenging environments.  Attempts by the Russian Ministry of Defense to replace Wagner in such tasks following the mutiny were met with stubborn resistance by the Malian and CAR governments.  The Syrian government, by contrast, was happy to see Wagner leave in 2023.  In Mozambique, it was Wagner's leader Yevgeny Prigozhin who decided to bail out.  

Overall, while Wagner was fairly successful in providing ready-to-deploy small armies in challenging environments, it was clearly exposed to the risk of ending up seriously embattled.  

Growing Concerns about Russia's Ability to Provide Security in Africa

 Foreign Policy published on 31 December 2024 an analysis titled "The Illusion of Russian Security in Africa Has Been Shattered" by Samuel Ramani, CEO of Pangea Geopolitical Risk.  

Due to Russia's setback in Syria, African autocracies are second-guessing Moscow's ability to serve as their last line of defense in a moment of crisis.  In any event, Russia's track record for providing security in Africa has been underwhelming.  

Libya and Sudan are highly problematic as replacement locations for Russian air and naval bases in Syria should they be asked to leave.

The UAE Casts Curious Shadow in Africa

 The Geneva-based The Responsible Security Association published on 4 December 2024 a commentary titled "Casting a Shadow: The UAE in Africa" by Raphael Parens, Foreign Policy Research Institute.  

The UAE is heavily involved in civil wars in Libya and Sudan.  Illicit gold flows through Abu Dhabi fund armed groups, mercenaries, and juntas in West Africa.  The UAE may even be considering establishing its own "foreign legions," drawing from the examples of the Russian Wagner Group and the French Foreign Legion to build the country's brand of aggressive foreign involvement.  

A Russian Analysis of Russia-Africa Relations

 The Valdai Discussion Club published in November 2024 a paper titled "Russia-Africa: Overcoming Challenges" by Vladimir Shubin, Institute of African Studies, Russian Academy of Science.

This paper offers a Russian view of Russia-Africa relations by a well known academic who has specialized in African affairs.  He offers a history of Soviet Union/Russia relations with Africa and operates on the assumption that "Russia and Africa need each other."

The author concludes that Russia has had more success enhancing political relations with Africa than economic ties.  Trade and Russian investment have fallen short of expectations.  Russia is expanding its soft power.  For example, 34,000 African students are now studying in Russia. He sees Russian advantages over the West because Moscow does not have a colonial history in the continent. 

Is the Wagner Group a Model for Mercenary Organizations?

 Stimson published on 25 October 2024 a commentary titled "Is Wagner a Model for Other Mercenary Groups?" by Brian Castner.  

Russia's mercenary Wagner Group gained much of its notoriety through its employment in African conflicts.  Wagner's strengths were its ability to recruit in Russia from military veterans and the prison population and to accomplish multiple lines of effort in a security-deficient space.  Wagner was both a military force and a business organization.  

Today, Wagner has split into multiple smaller organizations.  There are, however, situations where Wagner-like groups can thrive.  

Do Chinese Really Want Wagner Group Type Security to Protect Their Interests?

 Foreign Policy published on 21 October 2024 a commentary titled "Prigozhin's Ghost Lives on in China" by Alessandro Arduino.

Judging by social media comments, China's leading security pundits are enamored by Russian Wagner Group's bravado and believe China's approach to the protection of Chinese interests is too passive.  They see Wagner as the model for Chinese private security companies protecting projects across the globe in high-risk areas.   

Russia is Floundering in Africa

 The European Council on Foreign Relations published on 9 October 2024 a commentary titled "The Sweating Bear: Why Russia's Influence in Africa Is Under Threat" by Will Brown.

Russia's military operations in Africa are not succeeding, and Moscow is not setting itself up as a long-term partner for African governments.  Moscow is losing credibility as a reliable partner for African governments.  Everywhere Russia has sent troops, the security situation is dramatically worse than when international forces were present.  

Russia's Wagner Group Lives in Africa

 War on the Rocks published on 9 October 2024 a commentary titled "After Prigozhin, the Wagner Group's Enduring Impact" by Jack Margolin.  

The current iteration of the Wagner Group continues both military and commercial operations in Mali and the Central African Republic in close coordination with Russian security services.  Russia allows the Wagner Group to survive.  At the same time, there is no unified Russian plan for Africa.

Future of Russia's Wagner Group in Africa

 The Russia Program at George Washington University published in September 2024 a carefully researched study titled "After Prigozhin Does Wagner Group Have a Future?" by Antonio Giustozzi and David Lewis, Royal United Services Institute.

Following the assassination of Yevgeniy Prigozhin, his son Pavel, has been working to establish the Wagner business on more independent footing.  Th Russian government has accepted a compromise in the case of Mali and the Central African Republic and included the Wagner Group in its revised contracts.  Wagner proved irreplaceable as far as engaging in combat was concerned.  These African regimes showed a clear preference for trusting regime security to Wagner.  

After some months attempting to figure out how to move on from Wagner, the Russian Ministry of Defense accepted that there was no real alternative to Wagner in Mali and the CAR and that having Wagner take on the most controversial jobs might continue to serve Moscow's interests.  Pavel Prigozhin appears to have been exploring options for operating independently of the Ministry of Defense but, in the end, might not need to separate completely from it.