Al-Monitor published on 8 October 2026 an article titled "Why Renewed Egypt-Ethiopia Tensions Are a Problem for China" by Joyce Karam.
As Cairo and Addis Ababa trade diplomatic expulsions, revive disputes over Nile water usage and access to the Red Sea, Beijing faces mounting pressure to protect ties with two of its most important African partners.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File published on 8 October 2026 an analysis titled "Egypt Forms Anti-Ethiopian Coalition" by Liam Karr.
Egypt hosted on 3 October a regional summit with the leaders of Eritrea, Somalia, and the head of Sudan's armed forces. The four countries agreed to the el Alamein joint declaration which did not mention Ethiopia but stated positions in direct response to Ethiopia's perceived policies in the region.
The joint declaration emphasized respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries in the region. It stated that governance of the Red Sea is the exclusive responsibility of the littoral states and denounced any action on dam construction that negatively impacts downstream countries.
Eurasia Review published on 5 October 2026 a commentary titled "Egypt's 'Brotherhood' with Somalia Has Always Served Cairo First - OpEd."
Egypt's policy on Somalia has followed one consistent pattern: Somalia matters to Cairo chiefly as Ethiopia's border. Egypt's engagement with Somalia has been shaped by two concerns: the security of its Nile waters and its rivalry with Ethiopia. Brotherhood supplies the vocabulary. Strategy supplies the substance.
Egypt's approach is common practice; countries pursue their own national interests. The oped argues that the failure lies with Somali leaders who mistake another country's strategy for affection and allow foreign rivalry to set their national agenda.
Aljazeera published on 5 October 2026 an article titled "Ethiopian PM Abiy Demands Red Sea Access as Tensions with Neighbors Rise."
In a speech before Parliament, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed commented that "based on the principle of give and take, we will work diligently to ensure that Ethiopia has an outlet to the sea." The remark followed a meeting in Egypt by the leaders of Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia who said governance of the Red Sea was the exclusive responsibility of its coastal states.
Comment: While underscoring once again the need for landlocked Ethiopia to have maritime access, Abiy carefully avoided suggesting this goal would be achieved by military means.
Aljazeera published on 2 October 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia, Eritrea Break Ties: Does the Conflict Risk Becoming Regional War?" by Stephen Quillen.
The severance of diplomatic ties by Ethiopia and Eritrea follows months of worsening relations, driven by landlocked Ethiopia's push for access to the Red Sea and allegations that Eritrea is backing the rebel Tigray People's Liberation Front in Ethiopia.
Ethiopia and Egypt have also engaged recently in tit-for-tat expulsion of diplomats and continue to disagree on Nile water issues. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) are accusing Ethiopia of supporting the rival Rapid Support Forces in Sudan while Ethiopia accuses the SAF of supporting rebel groups in Ethiopia.
As the situation in the Horn of Africa moves increasingly out of control, the prospect for a wider regional conflict grows.
Time published on 11 September 2026 an article titled "The Power to Unite Africa" by Josh Wilson.
This is a highly positive article on the recently completed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the largest hydropower project in Africa. Constructed on the Blue Nile, which provides more than half of the fresh water reaching the Aswan Dam, Egypt has been highly critical of the project.
The author emphasizes that the GERD should be looked at in terms of the additional electricity the project brings to the wider region.
The Diplomat published on 8 September 2026 a commentary titled "The Strategic Calculus of Xi Jinping's Egypt Visit" by Ayesha Sikandar, National Defense University.
Xi Jinping's 1-2 September state visit to Egypt symbolized a broader shift among Middle Eastern states toward diversifying their foreign policy partnerships.
For Egypt, the visit signals not a pivot away from the United States, but rather a realignment to achieve more strategic autonomy amidst volatility in the Middle East.
The New Arab published on 4 September 2026 an article titled "A New Crisis Is Brewing over the Nile between Egypt and Ethiopia, Unless Mediators Step In" by Jonathan Fenton-Harvey.
Ethiopia announced earlier this year plans to construct three more hydropower dams on the Blue Nile, where the recently completed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is located. This announcement has alarmed downstream Egypt. The author suggests the solution to the disagreement between Egypt and Ethiopia may be mediation.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 3 September 2026 a commentary titled "The Two Key Takeaways from Xi's Egypt Visit" by Amr Hamzawy.
The author concluded that "China's influence in the Middle East is on the rise, and Egypt's international partnerships amid regional turmoil in the Middle East are growing. Those are the two key takeaways of Xi's visit to Egypt."
China's President Xi Jinping made a state visit to Egypt 1-2 September 2026. Both countries issued joint statements at the end of the visit. Curiously, the English translations of the two statements are different.
Egypt's version published by ahramonline and dated 2 September 2026 is titled "Egypt and China Joint Statement on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership."
China's version posted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and dated 2 September is titled "Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Arab Republic of Egypt on Further Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership."
Following are the different translations of three sections relating to African issues important to Egypt. While the meaning is essentially the same, there are some important differences in word choice.
China's translation of the section on Nile water:
"Both sides reaffirmed their firm mutual support on issues concerning each other's core interests and major concerns. China emphasized its understanding of the Nile's vital importance as Egypt's main lifeline and its legitimate rights to safeguard its water security, food security, and development interests. Both sides called on all Nile River basin countries to abide by international law, including avoiding harm."
Egypt's translation of the section on Nile water:
"The two sides reaffirmed their firm mutual support on issues concerning each other's core interests and major concerns. The Chinese side affirmed its recognition of the vital importance of the Nile River to Egypt as its principal lifeline and of Egypt's legitimate right to safeguard its water and food security and development interests. Both sides called on all Nile Basin countries to comply with international law, including the obligation not to cause harm."
China's translation of the section on Red Sea security:
"The governance and security of the Red Sea are primarily the responsibility of the Red Sea littoral states. The wishes of these countries should be fully respected. The Red Sea littoral states should strengthen regional cooperation, jointly address challenges, and ensure freedom of navigation and unimpeded international trade."
Egypt's translation of the section on Red Sea security:
"The primary responsibility for the governance and security of the Red Sea rests with its littoral states. The will of those states must be fully respected. Regional cooperation among the littoral states must be strengthened to address common challenges and safeguard freedom of navigation and international trade."
China's translation of the section on Sudan:
"Both sides emphasized that Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity should be respected, Sudanese state institutions should be upheld, and interference in its internal affairs should be avoided. Both sides stressed their willingness to work together to achieve a ceasefire in Sudan and initiate a Sudanese-led inclusive political process."
Egypt's translation of the section on Sudan:
"The two sides stressed the need to: Respect Sudan's unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Preserve Sudan's national institutions. Refrain from interfering in Sudan's internal affairs. Work jointly to end the war in Sudan and launch a comprehensive, Sudanese-owned political process."
Responsible Statecraft posted on 12 August 2026 an article titled "How the Egypt-Ethiopia Feud Could Upend Trump's Plans in Africa" by Jonathan Fenton Harvey.
The United States is sending mixed and confusing signals to Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, and Somaliland on complex relations in the region dealing with allocation of Nile waters and Ethiopia's quest for access to the sea.
The Somali Media Network posted on 8 August 2026 a 42-minute podcast with me hosted by Ismail Gorse on the Horn of Africa.
This is a wide-ranging discussion of current issues in the Horn of Africa and US policy with a special focus on Somalia and Somaliland.
Modern Diplomacy published on 5 August 2026 a commentary titled "Cairo's Shadow War in Sudan: Drones, Borders and a Fading Army Ally" by Carla Davies.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has been engaged in conflict with the Sudan Armed Forces for more than three years. Drones launched from inside Egypt have targeted the RSF inside Sudan for at least six months. Egypt's strong support for the Sudan Armed Forces is linked in part to a coordinated Egypt-Sudan effort to counter Ethiopia's position on Nile water issues.
The Emirates Policy Center published on 7 July 2026 an analysis titled "Ethiopia's Seventh Elections: Challenges of Internal Stability and Repercussions on Regional Politics."
The huge victory by the ruling Prosperity Party in Ethiopia's recent parliamentary elections did not resolve the crisis of political legitimacy, as the electoral process remained characterized by a precarious security environment, inequitable competition, and a significant lack of voter turnout in numerous regions.
Fronts, an independent online news source owned by a privately held Czech company, posted on 15 June 2026 a commentary titled "The Egypt-Ethiopia Cold War Is Key to the Horn's Growing Conflicts" by Liam Karr.
The author suggests a "cold war" between Ethiopia and Egypt is a battle for regional dominance, touches nearly every conflict in the Horn of Africa, and is fueling tensions in an already unstable region. Control over Nile waters and landlocked Ethiopia's desire to obtain access to the sea loom large in this cold war.
The International Crisis Group published on 15 May 2026 an analysis titled "Power Struggle in Ethiopia's Tigray: Averting a Return to War" by Magnus Taylor.
The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) under the control of Debretsion Gebremichael has seized control of the federal government supported Tigrayan administration in Mekele in a power grab. This is a direct challenge to the federal government of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
The situation is further complicated because the TPLF has the support of neighboring Eritrea and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) government in Khartoum. For its part, the Abiy Ahmed government has been supportive of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, which is engaged in a civil war with the SAF. Egypt may also join the fray on the side of the TPLF in order to complicate life for Addis Ababa as it builds dams on the Blue Nile, raising concerns in Cairo.
The New Arab published on 24 March 2026 an article titled "Egyptian Outrage as Ethiopia Announces Plans for More Dams on Blue Nile" by Saleh Salem.
Ethiopia has announced plans to construct 3 new dams on the Blue Nile, the location of the recently completed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The 3 dams will be constructed within 4 to 7 years and will be able to start operating simultaneously. Costing $3.5 billion each, the 3 dams will increase Ethiopia's electricity generation by 20 to 25 percent.
Egypt has reacted harshly to the announcement, arguing that the dams will further increase water shortages downstream when they begin operating as is the case with the GERD.
Comment: It is true that the GERD and the 3 new dams hold back water from downstream Sudan and Egypt during the period when Ethiopia is filling the reservoir behind the dams. But once the reservoir is full as in the case of the GERD today, Blue Nile River water flows normally. The only serious concern for downstream Sudan and Egypt occurs if there are several years of drought in the Nile Basin, reducing the water flow for all three countries, including the amount of water in the reservoirs of the dams that produce hydropower for Ethiopia.
The International Crisis Group published on 21 January 2026 an article titled "Egypt Applauds U.S. Promise to Mediate in Deadlocked Nile Dispute" by Michael Wahid Hanna.
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomed the 16 January letter from President Donald Trump to mediate the Nile waters dispute involving Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. The mediation offer reflects Egypt's core concerns while giving little detail as to how Washington could broker a settlement.
People's Dispatch published on 20 January 2026 a commentary titled "US Re-Engages in GERD Dispute as Tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt Escalate" by Nicholas Mwangi.
The author notes that so far Ethiopia has not publicly commented on the most recent US offer to mediate the dispute.
Comment: When the United States tried to mediate this dispute during the first Trump administration, Ethiopia perceived that Washington favored the Egyptian position and rejected the outcome. It has little incentive for accepting US mediation in a second Trump administration.
NBC News posted on 17 January 2026 an article titled "Egypt Welcomes Trump's Offer to Mediate Nile Water Dispute with Ethiopia" by Freddie Clayton.
In a letter to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, President Trump said he is "ready to restart U.S. mediation between Egypt and Ethiopia to responsibly resolve the question of "The Nile Water Sharing' once and for all."
Comment: When the Trump administration tried during its first term to mediate among Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan the Nile water issue, it did not end well. The Egypt-Ethiopia "war" is also one of the eight that President Trump has said he has already resolved.
The National published on 30 December 2025 an article titled "Egypt Finalises Deal to Develop Djibouti's Port in Bid to Pressure Ethiopia over Nile Dam" by Hamza Hendawi.
Egypt will upgrade Djibouti's Doraleh port and Eritrea's strategic Red Sea port of Assab to increase their capacity and create berths for warships and small military contingents. This is part of Egypt's strategy to build alliances with Ethiopia's neighbors and develop support for its position on Nile water disagreements.
