The African Union's Counterterrorism Architecture

The Institute for Security Studies published in March 2015 a policy brief titled "Good Talk, Not Enough Action: The AU's Counter-terrorism Architecture, and Why It Matters" by Simon Allison , a senior reporter for the South African-based Daily Maverick.

The African Union has implemented a fairly progressive counterterrorism framework, pushing states to coordinate their responses in order to close loopholes and shut down potential safe havens.  Some states have been reluctant to adopt the continental policy, as shown by the poor ratification of key legal instruments and the slow adoption of the model law.  A lack of resources prevents the terrorism research center from operating at full capacity, and there is still no functioning continental court.

Lessons from the Hunt for Joesph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army

The Joint Special Operations University at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida published in August 2014 a monograph titled "U.S. Military Deployments to Africa: Lessons from the Hunt for Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army" by James J.F. Forest, director of security studies program at the University of Massachusetts, Lowell.  The goal of the study is to contribute to the effectiveness of future U.S. military teams deploying to sub-Saharan Africa. 

Joseph Kony and the LRA

Human Rights Watch published an excellent basic analysis of the threat posed by Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) on 21 March 2012. In question and answer format, it deals with the key issues posed by the LRA. You can access the document here.

Comparing Al-Shabaab and the Lord's Resistance Army

Emmanuel Kisiangani, senior researcher in the Pretoria office of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), wrote an interesting analysis that compares al-Shabaab and the the Lord's Resistance Army. Published by ISS in December 2011, Kisiangani emphasizes the commonality of the two groups in that they espouse vicious patterns of violence buttressed by spiritual tactics. The report is titled Comparing Somalia's al-Shabaab and Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army.

In terms of responding to these threats, Kisiangani suggests it is short-sighted to rely only on eliminating suspected terrorists. This may not work if the structural conditions that motivate individuals to join these groups are not addressed. The key to successful counterinsurgency is winning over the local population. This calls for an integrated socio-economic and political approach designed to address the local population's needs and make them feel secure.

Kisiangani adds that external actors can only succeed in seizing the moral and political legitimacy from insurgents by addressing the local population's grievances. Relying on military responses alone will simply strengthen the appeal of militant groups and introduce new cycles of terrorism.