The International Crisis Group published on 30 June 2018 a statement titled "Improving Prospects for Peace in South Sudan at the African Union Summit."
The 27 June Khartoum Declaration signed by South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and former First Vice President Riek Machar does not resolve major points of contention between the two leaders, deferring them to talks which are ongoing in Khartoum. African leaders at the upcoming AU Summit need to push both sides to resolve outstanding differences. The choice is not between this process and a better one, but between it and none at all.
Showing posts with label SPLM-in-Opposition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SPLM-in-Opposition. Show all posts
Saturday, June 30, 2018
Friday, September 29, 2017
Sudan and US Sanctions
The International Crisis Group (ICG) published on 29 September 2017 a commentary titled "A New Roadmap to Make U.S. Sudan Sanctions Relief Work."
The United States will decide by October 12 whether to lift permanently economic and trade sanctions that the Obama administration suspended in January 2017. The ICG concludes that lifting the sanctions is the wiser course. If the US declines to lift sanctions, it risks losing considerable future leverage with Sudan and reinforces Khartoum's belief that Washington cannot be relied upon to honor its commitments.
The United States will decide by October 12 whether to lift permanently economic and trade sanctions that the Obama administration suspended in January 2017. The ICG concludes that lifting the sanctions is the wiser course. If the US declines to lift sanctions, it risks losing considerable future leverage with Sudan and reinforces Khartoum's belief that Washington cannot be relied upon to honor its commitments.
Labels:
Blue Nile State,
Darfur,
sanctions,
South Kordofan,
South Sudan,
SPLM,
SPLM-in-Opposition,
SPLM-N,
Sudan,
US
Tuesday, August 19, 2014
Cost of Stalemate in South Sudan Peace Process
The Juba-based Sudd Institute published on 12 August 2014 an analysis titled "South Sudan's Crisis: Weighing the Cost of the Stalemate in the Peace Process" by Jok Madut Jok. He emphasized that the stalemate in the peace process has become costly and that the process lacks genuine intent to end the carnage as the warring parties appear fixated on political and military gains.
A "quick fix" peace agreement is not the answer. Any peace agreement that does not commit the warring parties to programs of institutional reforms, justice and accountability, national dialogue, healing and reconciliation programs, security sector enhancements, stricter oversight of financial institutions, the constitution and democratic processes, would be the same as continuing the war.
A "quick fix" peace agreement is not the answer. Any peace agreement that does not commit the warring parties to programs of institutional reforms, justice and accountability, national dialogue, healing and reconciliation programs, security sector enhancements, stricter oversight of financial institutions, the constitution and democratic processes, would be the same as continuing the war.
Labels:
IGAD,
peace,
Riek Machar,
Salva Kiir,
South Sudan,
SPLM,
SPLM-in-Opposition,
UN,
UNMISS
Thursday, August 14, 2014
Reforming the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
The Institute for Security Studies published in August 2014 an analysis titled "Reforming the SPLM: A Requisite for Peace and Nation Building" by Paula Cristina Roque, a specialist on South Sudan and Angola.
The author concludes that transforming the SPLM entails ensuring that politics become demilitarized; party structures reach the grassroots; and decision-making rules and leadership succession processes are established. The SPLM must neutralize the military legacy of being structured according to Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) seniority, demobilize private militias, and allow the SPLA to become a professional, depoliticized national army. It also requires more political consultation.
The author concludes that transforming the SPLM entails ensuring that politics become demilitarized; party structures reach the grassroots; and decision-making rules and leadership succession processes are established. The SPLM must neutralize the military legacy of being structured according to Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) seniority, demobilize private militias, and allow the SPLA to become a professional, depoliticized national army. It also requires more political consultation.
Labels:
CPA,
governance,
IGAD,
Pagan Amum,
Riek Machar,
Salva Kiir,
South Sudan,
SPLA,
SPLM,
SPLM-in-Detention,
SPLM-in-Opposition
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