War on the Rocks posted on 4 March 2022 an analysis titled "China's Strategic Assessment of Russia: More Complicated Than you Think" by Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center.
This is an excellent analysis of how China views its current relationship with Russia. The author argues that two factors bring Russia and China together. The first and most important is the shared threat posed by the United States. The second is President Xi Jinping's respect for Vladimir Putin's leadership skills and nostalgia for the Sino-Soviet partnership.
On the other hand, the prospects for long-term Sino-Russian cooperation are limited by four important factors. First, China and Russia have different visions of the international order. Second, China believes that Russia's ambitions outpace its capabilities. Third, China fears a Russian betrayal of China. Fourth, the Chinese and Russian economies are not complementary in the long run.
Russia's military and diplomatic power, and hybrid warfare approach, resides in its strategy of chaos to maximize Russian leverage and bargaining power. Russia benefits from instability, while China prefers stability. Both China and Russia seek to revise the international order, but differ in the process by which they want to change it and the magnitude of changes they prefer.
The author concludes that it is hard to predict the longevity and stability of the current Sino-Russian alignment. It begins and ends with China's anti-U.S. agenda and is strengthened by Xi's personal preferences.
Comment: There is no mention of Africa in Yun Sun's analysis, although it has implications for the China-Russia relationship in Africa. Almost half of the countries in Africa joined China in abstaining or failed to vote on the UN General Assembly resolution that condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine. (Eritrea was the only African country to side with Russia; a majority of African countries condemned Russia.) China and Russia routinely oppose sanctions proposed in the UN Security Council against African countries. There has been limited security sector cooperation such as the trilateral naval exercise off South Africa in 2019. All three countries are members of BRICS. China and Russia are committed to diminishing Western, and especially American, influence in Africa.
But the differences in how China and Russia see the world may be more important for Africa than where their interests overlap. Beijing's preference for development and political stability in Africa, which actually coincides with Washinton's interest, does not align with Moscow's preference for instability and even chaos in some situations. Russian examples of this are use of Wagner Group mercenaries in countries such as Libya and the Central African Republic. Russia has minimal ability to contribute to development in Africa while China has substantial resources for this purpose. In those areas where Russia can make an important contribution such as nuclear power development, space cooperation, and investment in mining, it is in direct competition with China.
