Deutsche Welle posted on 17 February 2024 an article titled "Somalia Accuses Ethiopia of Seeking to Annex Somaliland."
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud told reporters in Addis Ababa as he arrived for an African Union summit that the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland is "nothing more than annexing part of Somalia to Ethiopia and changing the borders of Somalia."
Al-Monitor published on 7 February 2024 an article titled "Turkey, Somalia Sign Defense Deal in Wake of Ethiopia-Somaliland Agreement" by Ezgi Akin.
Somalia and Türkiye signed this week an agreement on the fight against terrorism and military-financial cooperation. Türkiye reiterated its support for Somalia's territorial integrity and sovereignty in the wake of Ethiopia's willingness to consider the recognition of an independent Somaliland.
The Elephant published on 23 January 2024 an analysis titled "Unveiling the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU: Hopes and Uncertainties" by Mehari Taddele Maru, European University Institute in Florence, Italy.
Although the text of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland has not been made public, based on what is known the author analyzes the significance of the document for a wide variety of interested parties.
The author concludes that, for Ethiopia, the MOU diverts attention from internal conflicts, famine, and economic woes. For Somaliland, it potentially opens doors to international recognition, legitimizing President Muse Bihi Abdi's government, but it may also intensify conflicts in areas such as Laascaanood and Sool. For Somalia, it represents a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, necessitating an outright rejection of the MOU and the seeking of support from regional allies such as Egypt, Eritrea, and Saudi Arabia.
The Council on Foreign Relations published on 25 January 2024 a backgrounder titled "Somaliland: The Horn of Africa's Breakaway State" by Mariel Ferragamo and Claire Klobucista.
This is a useful update and background piece on the situation in Somaliland since its unilateral declaration of independence in 1991.
The Conversation published on 13 January 2024 a commentary titled "Ethiopia's Deal with Somaliland Upends Regional Dynamics, Risking Strife Across the Horn of Africa" by Alemayehu Weldemariam, Indiana University.
The unpublished Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland has created geopolitical tensions in the region that could exacerbate Ethiopia's internal problems. The author argues that the MOU risks conflict with Somalia and could lead to the renewal of a breakaway push within Ethiopia itself.
The South China Morning Post published on 14 January 2024 an article titled "China Set to Stay on Neutral Ground as a Red Sea Storm Brews Over Ethiopia's Port Deal with Somalia" by Jevans Nyabiage.
China supports the territorial integrity of Somalia and urges that countries in the Horn of Africa resolve their disagreement over the recent Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) through dialogue. The US position is similar. The MOU introduces, however, a new complicating factor in the politics of the countries in the Horn of Africa and those bordering the Red Sea.
Reuters published on 7 January 2024 an article titled "Somalia President Signs Law Nullifying Ethiopia-Somaliland Port Deal" by Abdi Sheikh.
Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud signed a law nullifying a memorandum of understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia to grant access to the Gulf of Aden and to lease land for a coastal military base in return for recognition of Somaliland as an independent nation. There was no immediate response from Ethiopia or Somaliland.
Comment: The legal implications of this nullification are not clear. On the one hand, Somaliland does not have international recognition. On the other hand, Somalia does not exercise physical control over Somaliland. This may be an issue for international lawyers.
The media consistently refer to this memorandum of understanding as providing Ethiopian access to the Red Sea without seeming to appreciate that the coast of Somaliland is on the Gulf of Aden. Of course, access to the Gulf of Aden will also permit access to the Red Sea, but Ethiopia's goal is not just access to the Red Sea but to cease being the world's most populous landlocked nation. Access to Somaliland's Berbera port and the Gulf of Aden would give Ethiopia access to the entire Indian Ocean and beyond.
The South China Morning Post published on 26 February 2023 an article titled "How Ukraine War Has Turned Africa into a Geopolitical Battleground for China, Russia and US" by Jevans Nyabiage.
Tension between China and Russia on the one side and the United States and West generally on the other is playing out in Africa because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
The Ethiopian Embassy in London published on 10 November 2022 a statement titled "The Peace Agreement Ending the Conflict in Northern Ethiopia."
Referring to the cessation of hostilities agreement as a "comprehensive peace deal," the statement highlights those parts of the agreement that are favorable to the central government. One important omission in the statement is any direct reference to Eritrean military forces in Ethiopia and what happens to them.
The UN General Assembly overwhelmingly passed a resolution calling on the international community not to recognize any of Russia's annexation claims in the Ukraine and demanding its immediate reversal. The vote was 143 in favor of the resolution, 5 against, and 35 abstentions.
No African country voted with Russia but the following 19 abstained: Algeria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Guinea, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.
Comment: While one might expect some of these countries to abstain for special reasons or little commitment to state sovereignty and territorial integrity, how does one explain the abstention of Eswatini, Ethiopia, Namibia, South Africa, and Uganda?
The Atlantic Council published in August 2022 a study titled "Chinese Discourse Power: Aspirations, Realty, and Ambitions in the Digital Domain" by Kenton Thibaut.
China believes that the United States currently dominates the international system, and sees growing Western opposition to China as evidence that the current world order is a threat to the continued security of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
For the CPC, gaining "discourse power" translates into increased geopolitical power by creating consensus around an alternative, China-led international order--one that privileges state sovereignty over civil liberties, and subordinates human rights to state security. China has identified both the digital realm, for example the Digital Silk Road, and the Global South, including Africa, as prime areas of opportunity.
The Diplomat published on 10 March 2022 a commentary titled "Does China's Position on the Russia-Ukraine War Matter to African Countries?" by Ovigwe Eguegu, Development Reimagined.
The author argues that China's position on Russia's invasion of Ukraine influenced the position of some African countries. Many African governments do not see as contradictory China's strong support for state sovereignty and non-interference, on the one hand, and its unwillingness to condemn Russia for its violation of state sovereignty and its interference in Ukranian internal political affairs, on the other.
The Brenthurst Foundation posted on 1 March 2022 a commentary titled "Lessons and Consequences for Africa from Putin's Moves and Missteps in Ukraine" by Greg Mills.
The commentary explores some of the different motivations coursing through African countries as they reflect on Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
War on the Rocks posted on 4 March 2022 an analysis titled "China's Strategic Assessment of Russia: More Complicated Than you Think" by Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center.
This is an excellent analysis of how China views its current relationship with Russia. The author argues that two factors bring Russia and China together. The first and most important is the shared threat posed by the United States. The second is President Xi Jinping's respect for Vladimir Putin's leadership skills and nostalgia for the Sino-Soviet partnership.
On the other hand, the prospects for long-term Sino-Russian cooperation are limited by four important factors. First, China and Russia have different visions of the international order. Second, China believes that Russia's ambitions outpace its capabilities. Third, China fears a Russian betrayal of China. Fourth, the Chinese and Russian economies are not complementary in the long run.
Russia's military and diplomatic power, and hybrid warfare approach, resides in its strategy of chaos to maximize Russian leverage and bargaining power. Russia benefits from instability, while China prefers stability. Both China and Russia seek to revise the international order, but differ in the process by which they want to change it and the magnitude of changes they prefer.
The author concludes that it is hard to predict the longevity and stability of the current Sino-Russian alignment. It begins and ends with China's anti-U.S. agenda and is strengthened by Xi's personal preferences.
Comment: There is no mention of Africa in Yun Sun's analysis, although it has implications for the China-Russia relationship in Africa. Almost half of the countries in Africa joined China in abstaining or failed to vote on the UN General Assembly resolution that condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine. (Eritrea was the only African country to side with Russia; a majority of African countries condemned Russia.) China and Russia routinely oppose sanctions proposed in the UN Security Council against African countries. There has been limited security sector cooperation such as the trilateral naval exercise off South Africa in 2019. All three countries are members of BRICS. China and Russia are committed to diminishing Western, and especially American, influence in Africa.
But the differences in how China and Russia see the world may be more important for Africa than where their interests overlap. Beijing's preference for development and political stability in Africa, which actually coincides with Washinton's interest, does not align with Moscow's preference for instability and even chaos in some situations. Russian examples of this are use of Wagner Group mercenaries in countries such as Libya and the Central African Republic. Russia has minimal ability to contribute to development in Africa while China has substantial resources for this purpose. In those areas where Russia can make an important contribution such as nuclear power development, space cooperation, and investment in mining, it is in direct competition with China.
The Reporter (Addis Ababa) published on 28 August 2021 an article titled "Ethiopia Stands Firm at the UNSC."
China, Russia, and India essentially supported Ethiopia's handling of the humanitarian crisis in Tigray Region in the face of criticism from the United States, UK, Estonia, France, Ireland, and Norway. China emphasized the need to respect Ethiopia's national sovereignty.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed addressed in a seven-minute video on 25 March 2021 the Russia-Africa Interparty Conference in Moscow. This event precedes the Russia-Africa summit later this year. The Prime Minister's comments were especially warm towards the Russian Federation and warned of the dangers of "interference from others near and far."
