Rebuilding Somalia's Broken Justice System

 The Mogadishu-based Heritage Institute for Policy Studies published in January 2021 a study titled "Rebuilding Somalia's Broken Justice System: Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures."

The study suggests Somalia's federal and state leaders need to agree on an inclusive and independent Judicial Services Commission and Constitutional Court.

Al-Shabaab in Somalia

Stig Jarle Hansen, associate professor at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, recently authored a book titled Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group.  He spoke about the book at Chatham House in London on 12 June 2013.  A summary of his remarks titled "Al Shabaab in Somalia" just appeared.  His remarks analyzed al-Shabaab's emergence as a powerful insurgent movement in Somalia in 2006 and its progress to control large parts of south central Somalia

Analysis of Somalia's al-Shabaab organization

Abdi Aynte, recently with the Voice of America Somali service and soon to join Al Jazeera in Doha, authored a solid analysis of the Somali jihadist organization, al-Shabaab that calls for an Islamic caliphate and now controls about half of Somalia. He published an earlier version of the paper in the March 2010 issue of the Horn of Africa Journal. You can access it here.

Aynte concluded that al-Shabaab evolved from a little known extremist group to a global jihadist offshoot with links to al Qaeda. It cleverly exploited the irredentist Islamist movement of Somalia to provoke Ethiopia to attack so that it could activate its ultimate jihadist agenda, marginalize its moderate allies in the Union of Islamic Courts and expand the territory under its control.

While al-Shabaab successfully brought all Somali clans into its leadership, it isolated itself from most Somalis by becoming closely tied to al-Qaeda and adopting an extremist agenda.

Quoted in IPS story on Somalia

I am quoted in the IPS story "Somalia: U.S. Should Accept Islamist Authority, Report Says" by Charles Fromm and Mohammed A. Salih. Here are the quotes:

However, David Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador to neighbouring Ethiopia in the 1990s, disagrees that the al-Shabaab leadership will be ready to join any future political arrangement in the country. "I think al-Shabaab has become more radicalised and I don't see any pragmatic leaders in al-Shabaab today. Many in the rank and file maybe pragmatic, the gun-carriers, but they are not the leaders," said Shinn, who also served as U.S. ambassador to Burkina Faso in the late 1980s. ... It was hoped that the installation of Sharif Ahmed, the former head of the Union of Islamic Courts, as president in January 2009 would attract a sufficient number of Islamist leaders to subdue or at least fragment al-Shabaab's forces. But Shinn says the TFG has become "marginally stronger" in recent months. "She [Bruton] seems to begin with the assumption that the TFG is doomed to fail. I am not convinced that it will fail," said Shinn, who was a member of the Advisory Committee to the report. "The fact the TFG under President Ahmed has now existed for more than a year has already surprised many so-called Somali experts. It's just wrong to make the assumption that it's going to fail."

Recommendations for dealing with Somali piracy

Twenty-five scholars, diplomats, lawyers, military officers, shipping industry officials and other experts on maritime piracy and Somalia convened at the Harvard Kennedy School in December 2009 under the auspices of the World Peace Foundation as the Cambridge Coalition to Combat Piracy. The final product from this event was a policy brief titled "Combating Maritime Piracy" (PDF file). I was one of the participants at the conference. While I agree with 90 percent of the recommendations, I take exception to several of them. My concerns follow.

1. Recommendation #10: "If local authorities are to take charge, they will need justice systems, policy forces, jails and so on. The forces of world order should assist local developmental and institutional building efforts that appear sincere and plausible." I have no problem with the recommendation itself, but disagree with part of the analysis that led to the recommendation. The analysis concludes that the leaders of al-Shabaab have been publicly critical of pirate operations because the pirates support separate sources of power and, supposedly, because Islam does not condone piracy. I am not aware that al-Shabaab has ever been critical of pirate operations and, in fact, there are a couple of reports that link elements of al-Shabaab with at least one of the pirate operations. The former Islamic Courts did a good job of clamping down on piracy. There is no evidence that al-Shabaab has made any effort to stop piracy.
2. Recommendation #11: "If African states and the AU can be persuaded to recognize the now independent but otherwise unacknowledged polity of Somaliland, doing so will strengthen the incentives for Puntland, which aspires to greater autonomy, and parts or all of the remainder of Somalia to make similar progress in terms of political institution building. Recognition of Somaliland will thus assist in strengthening accountability and governance in regions that are now pirate infected. Indeed, if Puntland knew that international engagement were possible, following on a full recognition of Somaliland, a powerful incentive would exist for Puntland to exert control over and reduce the threat from pirates on its soil." While I am sympathetic to Somaliland and believe African states and the AU should give serious consideration to its formal recognition, I fail to see the connection between this possibility and a positive impact on the situation in Puntland. On the contrary, it could encourage the further breakup of Somalia, which I do not believe is in the long-term interest of the Somali people or the United States. The legal background of Somaliland is totally different. Puntland and Somaliland also have conflicting claims on Sool and parts of Sanag regions.
3. Recommendation #14 (in part): "We also urge the forging of a compact among ocean carriers, insurance companies, individuals and states to cease paying ransoms. If every major shipping firm is on record forbidding the paying of ransoms, and/or if the leading maritime nations agree to deter their own firms from responding to ransom requests, the profits of piracy will ebb." In theory, this is a fine recommendation. It is totally unrealistic and only detracts from the many good recommendations in this policy brief. Once pirates capture a ship, they have the owners over a barrel. The owners must either pay the ransom or the pirates hold the ship and crew. What are the owners to do? I agree that no government should ever pay a ransom, but ship owners should be allowed to take whatever action they believe is in their best interest.
4. Recommendation #19: "Ocean carriers and flag states should agree publicly that reasonable force may be used to combat attacks. Indeed, the crews, along with high value and/or highly vulnerable cargo, may merit armed security. Flag states (or, if necessary, the ship owners or operators) should issue rules for the use of force and escalation of force policies. In that context, properly trained sharpshooters, under the direction of the ship’s master and with clear rules for the use of force, should be authorized to shoot when menacing skiffs approach within 300-400 yards of a target vessel and present an imminent threat to a vessel or its crew. Those sharpshooters should be prepared to continue firing, if necessary." This was perhaps the most controversial recommendation. Many of the participants favored a softer response. I was in a tiny minority that favored a tougher response when these pirate attacks occur in international waters. In most cases, pirates on fast approaching skiffs are firing AK-47s and RPGs at the bridge of the vessel singled out for capture in order to encourage the ship’s master to stop. If the attacked ship has an armed security team on board, it should be authorized to respond with live ammunition as soon as the pirates begin firing at the targeted ship and/or when the skiffs are within 300-400 yards. Nor do I see any reason why these teams must consist of "sharpshooters." If they are trained in the use of automatic weapons, that is sufficient. This more robust response will send a powerful message to the pirates and significantly raise the cost of their criminal business.
5. Recommendation #31: "Task Force 151 and Operation Ocean Shield should consider the feasibility of blockading known piracy bases along the Somali and Yemeni coasts. Systematic surveillance, advanced reconnaissance, and blockades—if they could be enforced—could prevent mother ships from plying their trade far out to sea, or in the Gulf of Aden. Legal authority should flow from new UN resolutions." I agree with the recommendation, but do not believe it is realistic. I don’t see any willingness to implement such a recommendation and, therefore, question including it in the policy brief.

Image: "U.S. Coast Guardsmen with Maritime Safety and Security Team 91104 and visit, board, search and seizure team members approach a rigid-hull inflatable boat during a simulated boarding in the Gulf of Aden near the guided-missile cruiser USS Anzio (CG 68) Aug. 26, 2009. Anzio is the flagship for Combined Task Force 151, a multinational task force established to conduct counter-piracy operations under a mission-based mandate to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. (DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Brian K. Fromal, U.S. Navy/Released)." Licensed through creative commons on Flickr.

"Ethiopia leaves Somalia with many questions unanswered"

My interview with VOA about the Ethiopian troops in Somalia is now online. Here's part of what I told Joe De Capua:

I think the Transitional Federal Government is so weakened at this point and in such disarray that it’s almost difficult to refer to it as any sort of governing unit. I think that it is possible, with the departure of the Ethiopians, that clan leaders, civil society representatives, moderate Somalis, who just want a return to some sort of stability in the country, could theoretically come together and agree upon some kind of new leadership … and agree to effectively put their guns down and try and reconstitute some kind of viable regime. That’s a very optimistic scenario ... But it is possible.”