The New York Times published on 15 April 2026 a guest essay titled "I have Watched the Catastrophe of My Country Be Reduced to Nothing" by Mohammed Ahmed.
The author takes issue with those who call what is happening in Sudan a "civil war." He argues it is "a resource war fought by proxy, playing out against the world's indifference." About the only thing sustaining Sudan today is communal mobilization or self-help by ordinary Sudanese.
The New York Times published on 14 April 2026 a commentary titled "Is It Too Much to Ask to Care About Sudan?" by Ann Curry.
The author, a former international correspondent for NBC News, asks if it is too much for us to care about the world's largest humanitarian disaster. She concludes that when we care--as individuals, as a nation--we can make things happen.
Africa Business published on 13 April 2026 an article titled "China-Africa: The Removal of Tariffs Is Not Just a Trade Opportunity, but a Strategic Test for the Continent" by Cheikh Mbacke Sene.
Commenting on China's new zero tariff policy for African states, the author suggests three scenarios as to how it may impact the trade relationship. But to fully benefit from Beijing's policy, African states must invest in industrial transformation, improve their infrastructure, enhance production capacity, comply strictly with international standards, and identify market opportunities that anticipate Chinese demand.
The International Crisis Group published on 13 April 2026 an analysis titled "Divided Sudan, Elusive Peace."
Negotiations aimed at a cease fire in Sudan appear stalled amid a row between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and the distraction of the war in Iran. The Sudan civil war risks becoming a regional conflict. This is the occasion, however, for the Quad (US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) to step up efforts to revive the peace process.
UN News published on 10 April 2026 an update titled "Sudan: 14 Million Displaced; Hunger and Attacks on Health Continue as War Enters Fourth Year."
Some 14 million people, or a quarter of the population, have been forced to flee, with 9 million remaining displaced inside Sudan and 4.4 million as refugees mostly in Chad, South Sudan, and Egypt. In addition, 21 million Sudanese now face acute food insecurity, including 6.3 million in the direst state of food emergency. Over 40 percent of Sudan's population require urgent health assistance and disease outbreaks are widespread.
Most of the UN agencies have their main logistics hub in the United Arab Emirates. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is impacting their ability to respond as humanitarian supply routes have been cut and shipping aid has become slower and more costly.
Standard Digital posted on 10 April 2026 an article titled "Investigations Reveals Al-Shabaab Uses Cargo Firms to Import Military Gear from China via Kenya."
At least nine cargo companies in Kenya are importing drones, military boots, VHF radios, and other equipment for transfer to the al-Shabaab terrorist organization in Somalia.
Garowe Online published on 9 April 2026 an article titled "From China to the Frontlines: The Secret Logistics Network Fueling Al-Shabaab Disrupted in Nairobi."
Kenyan authorities also disrupted a supply chain of military uniforms to a neighborhood in Nairobi for onward shipment to al-Shabaab in Somalia.
Borkena published on 11 April 2026 an article titled "Chinese Special Envoy to Horn of Africa Meets Eritrean President."
Ambassador Hu Changchun, China's Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa, met this week in Asmara with Eritrean President Isaias Afeworki. While this appears to be a routine meeting, it follows a high-level Ethiopian visit to China to restructure its large debt. Landlocked Ethiopia has also approached China concerning mediation with Eritrea on access to the Red Sea.
Africa News published on 7 April 2026 an article titled "War in Ukraine: Cameroon Confirms Death of 16 Nationals Enlisted in Russian Army" by Sarah Miansoni.
Cameroon's Minister of External Affairs confirmed the death of 16 of its nationals fighting for Russia in its war against Ukraine.
Bloomberg published on 8 April 2026 an article titled "Russia Steps Up Its Courtship of Fragile African States" by Antony Squazzin.
Russia sent soldiers and weapons to prop up the military government that seized power in Madagascar last October.
World Politics Review published on 9 April 2026 a commentary titled "Turkey's High-Risk, High-Reward Wager in the Horn of Africa" by Elfadil Ibrahim.
Turkey is investing billions of dollars in oil and gas development, advanced weaponry, and expanding security cooperation in the Horn of Africa, especially Somalia. The Horn of Africa is a risky neighborhood facing a number of actual and potential conflicts.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 9 April 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia-Egypt" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.
Ethiopia has solicited bids from international companies to build three dams on the Blue Nile upstream from the existing Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam at a total cost of $10.5 billion over seven years. Downstream Egypt opposes the construction and sent a letter from President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi to President Trump promising "a firm and decisive response" to any future dams. Theoretically, the United Sates is trying to mediate the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia.
The Brief posted on 9 April 2026 an article titled "China to Build Kenya's Foreign Affairs Headquarters in Landmark Aid Deal."
Kenya has signed a grant agreement with the China International Development Cooperation Agency paving the way for Beijing to construct a new headquarters for the Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs.
While the project underscores deepening bilateral ties, it raises sovereignty concerns. Critics warn that allowing a foreign power to finance and construct the headquarters of a ministry responsible for diplomacy and the handling of classified communications could pose security and sovereignty risks.
The Wire, a digital news magazine, posted on 5 April 2026 an article titled "China's Solar Industry Follows the Sun to Africa" by Noah Berman.
Based on the current trend of Chinese solar panel sales to Africa, China will become the critical supplier of energy infrastructure to Africa by the end of the decade. There is concern, however, that this may result in dependency on China with Africa becoming a dumping ground for Chinese solar products.
Prospect published on 1 April 2026 an article titled "Sudan's War in the Mountains" by Sophie Neiman.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is using the Nuba Mountains as a thoroughfare to take territory controlled by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in the eastern part of Sudan. The Nuba Mountains have become a new frontline in the civil war. The RSF is aligned with the SPLM-N against the SAF.
The AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 9 April 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia - Tigray" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.
The Ethiopian Federal Government extended the mandate of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) by one year on 8 April. This may buy time for both sides and avert a return to war in Tigray Region.
Bankable posted on 7 April 2026 a commentary titled "Zijin, CMOC Back Competing Alternative to Lobito Corridor" by Pierre Mukoko.
China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation and four Chinese companies are financing a $1.4 billion project to rehabilitate the Tanzania-Zambia railway that will transport critical minerals from the DRC to the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam.
The Tanzania-Zambia railway will compete with the American and European Lobito Corridor project that will transport critical minerals from the DRC to an Atlantic Ocean port in Angola.
Foreign Affairs published on 8 April 2026 an article titled "Don't Partition Sudan Again: Splitting It Didn't Work in the Past and Won't Work Now" by Francis M. Deng and Ahmed Kodouda.
Both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) insist they are fighting to preserve a unified Sudan, but the longer the current geographical division persists, the harder it will be to put the country together again.
The 2011 independence of South Sudan offers a cautionary tale. Any effort to formalize the split between the SAF and RSF-controlled parts of Sudan would not resolve the conflict's root causes. Another partition of Sudan would also destabilize its neighbors.
The Libyan Express published on 4 April 2026 an article titled "New Maritime Corridor Links China to Libya via Suez."
China is opening a new shipping route from its port of Qingdao on the Yellow Sea through the Red Sea and Suez Canal to connect with the ports of Benghazi and Misrata in Libya. The route strengthens trade between Asia and the Mediterranean and offers an alternative to traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
The International Crisis Group posted on 7 April 2026 a 42-minute podcast titled "After Three Years of War in Sudan, What Hope for a Ceasefire" hosted by Richard Atwood with Shewit Woldemichael and Alan Boswell.
The Iran war has not yet had a significant impact on the situation in Sudan beyond driving up prices of everything and causing fuel shortages. If the Iran war continues, it could have a huge negative impact on the food situation in Sudan.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) control most of Darfur and West Kordofan while the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) control most of the northeastern and eastern parts of the country. Sudan is effectively partitioned between the RSF and the SAF. The major battle fronts today are along the Chad border, South Sudan border, and Ethiopian border.
The RSF political program has been a failure. Noone has recognized the RSF government. The SAF has improved its position and is the dominant actor in the country today. While SAF fortunes have improved most Sudanese probably do not want the military to remain in power indefinitely.
The RSF continues to receive strong support from the UAE while the SAF has a degree of support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Eritrea. The most worrying new dynamic is the deterioration of relations between the SAF and Ethiopia. Differences over Nile water usage and Egyptian and Eritrean support for the SAF contribute to Ethiopia's concerns.
Massad Boulos, President Trump's special envoy for Africa, continues to seek a ceasefire as part of the Quad (US, Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia). The effort is currently lacking high level pressure. RSF and SAF positions on a ceasefire remain far apart. Both sides believe they hold a strong military position. Only major outside pressure on them will likely change the situation.
There is considerable concern among the outside actors about the role of Islamist forces in the SAF, which complicates a resolution. In the meantime, the Sudan conflict continues to destabilize the Red Sea region.
The Institute for Security Studies published on 2 April 2026 a paper titled "FOCAC Recycled: Preferential Access, Same Old Problem" by Marvellous Ngundu.
Since 2000, Africa-China trade has expanded dramatically from less than $10 billion to over $348 billion in 2025. Yet beneath this growth lies a persistent structural imbalance. Africa's trade deficit with China has widened from negligible levels in the early 2000s to over $100 billion in 2025.
Beginning on 1 May 2026 China is implementing a zero-tariff policy for all but one African country in an effort to rectify this imbalance. But the change risks entrenching existing trade patterns in which value addition occurs elsewhere. As a result, higher trade volumes may not translate into more inclusive or structurally transformative outcomes for African economies.
The core issue is not tariffs, but industrialization. Africa's trade position will only shift when it exports more manufactured and semi-processed goods. China's duty-free initiative presents both an opportunity and a test. It expands market access but highlights the limitations without the capability.
Foreign Policy published on 6 April 2024 an analysis titled "Horrors in Sudan Highlight Deterioration of Western Diplomatic Corps."
There is little willingness by the West to end Sudan's conflict, but there is also little ability to do anything. Western states have minimal leverage with the two major combatants: The Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.
The Ethiopian News Agency posted on 3 April 2026 an article titled "Landmark Ethiopia-China Talks Unlock Debt Deal, New Airport Financing."
Discussions between the Ethiopian and Chinese ministers of finance "marked a meaningful step" in restructuring Ethiopia's existing debt stock. They reportedly reached agreement on debt treatment but did not sign a final agreement.
Ethiopia Today published on 3 April 2026 an article titled "From Dollars to Yuan: Ethiopia and China Move Toward a New Era of Financial Cooperation."
Reporting on a meeting between the governors of the National Bank of Ethiopia and the People's Bank of China, this account said the two countries are exploring an aggressive shift toward the Chinese Renminbi (RMB) to bypass the U.S. dollar in bilateral trade.
Bloomberg published on 3 April 2026 an article titled "For China's Rich, The New Must Have Is a Luxury Home in Zimbabwe."
Chinese companies have been drawn to Zimbabwe for its mineral wealth. Increasingly, wealthy Chinese immigrants are paying cash for luxury homes in the capital of Harare, driving up housing prices in the process.
The Intel Drop posted on 31 March 2026 an article titled "Russia-Africa Summit: Russia's New Chapter on Africa Trade and Economic Collaboration" by Kester Kenn Klomegah.
If Russia intends to be a major player in Africa, it must open Russia to imports from Africa and increase significantly Russian foreign direct investment in the continent. Otherwise, it will increasingly fall behind the economic engagement efforts of China, the United States, and India.
