Power Struggle in Ethiopia's Tigray Region Has Wide Implications

 The International Crisis Group published on 15 May 2026 an analysis titled "Power Struggle in Ethiopia's Tigray: Averting a Return to War" by Magnus Taylor.

The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) under the control of Debretsion Gebremichael has seized control of the federal government supported Tigrayan administration in Mekele in a power grab.  This is a direct challenge to the federal government of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.  

The situation is further complicated because the TPLF has the support of neighboring Eritrea and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) government in Khartoum.  For its part, the Abiy Ahmed government has been supportive of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, which is engaged in a civil war with the SAF.  Egypt may also join the fray on the side of the TPLF in order to complicate life for Addis Ababa as it builds dams on the Blue Nile, raising concerns in Cairo.  

Taiwan President's Secret Flight to Eswatini

 The New York Times published on 14 May 2026 an article titled "Inside the Secret Mission to Fly Taiwan's President to Africa" by Chris Buckley and Amy Chang Chien.  

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te's first attempt to visit Eswatini, the only African country that recognizes Taipei, was aborted when Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar at the last-minute revoked permission to overfly their airspace.  This account details how Lai Ching-te managed subsequently to circumvent these denials by flying secretly on the royal jet that brought Eswatini's deputy prime minister to Taiwan for a visit.  

What's Preventing Houthi Attacks on Red Sea Shipping?

 The American Security Project published on 7 May 2026 a commentary titled "What's Holding the Houthis Back in Bab al-Mandeb?" by Laura Bucci.

The Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have so far refrained from attacking international shipping in the Red Sea following U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran.  The author suggests this is due to ongoing reconstruction in Yemen following earlier attacks on the Houthis by the United States and Israel, an interrupted weapons supply chain from Iran, and concern that the U.S. and Israel would resume airstrikes.  The author does not, however, rule out a resumption of Houthi attacks.

South Africa and China Expand Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence Education

 Devdiscourse, a media platform for development stakeholders, posted on 13 May 2026 an article titled "SA and China Deepen Partnership in AI Education, Technical Skills and Student Mobility."

South Africa and China have agreed to expand significantly cooperation in digital education, artificial intelligence (AI), vocational training, and student mobility following discussions in Hangzhou.  This is part of a broader effort to align education systems with industrial transformation, technological innovation, and future workforce demands.

The Limits of Russia's Africa Corps

 The Soufan Center, a New York-based nonprofit organization, published on 12 May 2026 a commentary titled "The Limits of Russia's Africa Corps: Mali and the JNIM-FLA Offensive."

Coordinated attacks by al-Qaeda's Sahelian affiliate, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Musliman (JNIM), and the Tuareg-dominated separatists, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), have highlighted the limited capabilities of the Malian junta and its Russian mercenaries, the Africa Corps, to fend off the insurgency.

Russia's engagement in Mali also raises the question whether it has the resources to counter a genuine insurgency or if it is only in the country to ensure the survival of the military junta.  

Is Foreign Investment the Answer for American and Chinese Soft Power Influence in Africa?

Brookings published on 6 May 2026 a study titled "Foreign Investment Is Not Making Friends for China--or the US" by John F. McCauley, University of Maryland, Margaret M. Pearson, John L. Thornton China Center, and Xiaonan Wang, City University of New York - Baruch College. 

Drawing on over 750 Chinese and American foreign direct investment (FDI) projects in 23 African countries, the research challenges the assumption that it generates not only economic returns but also goodwill in the local community.  While proximity to a major power's investment increases its perceived influence in local communities and undermines that of its adversary, it also decreases affinity for the investing power.  

This reputational cost is not unique to China; U.S. investment triggers a strikingly similar backlash.  Unmet expectations around jobs and local economic benefits, heightened perceptions of corruption among local officials, and concerns about external influence erode the soft power dividends that both powers anticipate.  China and the United States must recognize that investing abroad can sabotage goodwill if projects are not constructed with local economic development in mind.   

 Comment: While the study offers a useful cautionary note about the impact of FDI, it is based on a narrow definition of the value of investment.  FDI can have positive effects on the economy that go well beyond the impact on the community in close proximity to the investment project.  FDI can add to a country's GDP, increase tax revenue, and have downstream economic benefits not captured in the nearby community.  While the negative results on reverse model preference identified in the study are revelatory, they are modest and probably skewed by a small number of egregiously flawed investment projects.   

China Supports Egyptian Military Modernization and Seeks Influence

 Modern Diplomacy published on 6 May 2026 a commentary titled "Egyptian Military Bases: A Strategic Linchpin for China's Interests in the Eastern Med and Red Sea" by Nadia Helmy, Beni Suef University.

China seeks to leverage the development of Egyptian military bases as centers for Chinese military technology, especially UAVs and advanced air defense systems.  By supporting Egyptian military modernization, China also weakens Cairo's military dependence on the United States.  

Assessment of Chinese Financed and Built Light Rail Project in Addis Ababa

 The Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives journal published in March 2026 an in-depth assessment titled "The Road Divides: When Funding Shapes Form - Assessing the Connectivity Impacts of China-financed Light Rail in Addis Ababa" by Guibo Sun, The University of Manchester, and Kristen Zhao, Manchester Metropolitan University.  

Chinese loans provided $475 million for financing most of the Addis Ababa Light Rail Transit (AALRT), a system that rings the capital city.  Completed by Chinese companies almost ten years ago, the system was designed to move up to 60,000 passengers per hour.  AALRT was promoted as a showcase project for the Belt and Road Initiative.

The assessment concludes that AALRT fell far short of its promises.  Chronic service disruptions and limited maintenance funding mean only about a third of its 41 trains are operational, transporting just 55,000 passengers a day, a fraction of its projected capacity.  Instead of alleviating congestion in Addis Ababa, the system has contributed to the creation of new traffic bottlenecks, with daily life in Addis Ababa being impacted by both reduced connectivity and inadequate transfer capacity.

Algeria Serves as Hub for Russian Military Flights

 Defense News published on 30 April 2026 an article titled "Investigation: Russia Shadow Airlines Use Algeria as Base for Secretive Missions" by Linus Holler.

A fleet of Russian military-affiliated cargo aircraft is using Algeria as a hub to project Russia's power deeper into Africa and as far as Latin America.  In return, Algeria is receiving Russia's latest fighter aircraft.  

Mali Exposes the Limits of Russia's Expeditionary Warfare Model

 The Robert Lansing Institute published on 11 May 2026 an analysis titled "Russia's Setback in Mali: Intelligence Failures, Strategic Limits, and the Failure of Moscow's Africa Project."

Russia's Africa Corps retreat from Kidal in Mali exposed Moscow's operational fragility and weakened the mythology of Russia's expeditionary effectiveness.  Russia relied too heavily on coercion without sufficient understanding of local ethnic, tribal, and political realities.

Mali demonstrates Russia may struggle to control large territories, defeat insurgencies, or maintain durable legitimacy.  It exposed the limits of Russia's expeditionary warfare model.   

Can China's Approach to AI Offer Lessons for Africa?

 The Diplomat published on 4 May 2026 a commentary titled "What China's AI Push Can Teach Africa about the Future of Labor" by Hannah Ryder and Huiyi Chen.

The authors argue that Africa should look at China's approach to dealing with AI and robotics in the workplace rather than the approach taken by Western countries.  China works on the assumption that automation does not move in one direction, at one speed, or through one class of jobs.  It can shift jobs from factory floors to office desks, from routine administration to design studios, and from manual repetition to communications and performance roles.

Comment:  The authors draw sharper differences between China's response to AI in the job market and the approach of Western countries than the situation merits.  They also assume a transition by the African labor force that may be more difficult to achieve than they suggest.

Turkey Extends Economic and Military Influence in Somalia

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 7 May 2026 an analysis titled "The New Scramble: Turkey, Somalia and the Battle for the Red Sea" by Matthew Chandler de Waal.

Turkey has become Somalia's foremost ally.  Camp TURKSOM, Ankara's largest overseas military base, has trained thousands of Somali special forces since 2017.  More recently, Turkey became engaged in a major project to develop Somalia's deepwater oil reserves.

Turkey is now looking to build a base in the Gulf of Aden at Laas Qoray, a port city that is contested by Somalia and the breakaway government of Somaliland.  A base in Laas Qoray would put Turkey in position to join a host of other nations with military bases at the south end of the Red Sea.

Rising Tension in Ethiopia's Tigray Region

 AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 7 May 2026 an article titled "TPLF Takes Control of Tigray" by Michael DeAngelo.  

The Tigray People's Liberation Front reinstated the pre-Tigray war regional government, effectively voiding the Pretoria peace agreement that ended the Tigray war in 2022.  This action creates a rival body to replace the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA).  It also sets up a showdown with the Ethiopian federal government, which supports the TIA, and increases the risk of military confrontation.  

Drone Attacks in Sudan Heighten Tension with Ethiopia

 AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 7 May 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia-Sudan Tensions Rise over RSF Khartoum Strikes" by Michael DeAngelo.

In early May, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) launched a series of drone attacks across Sudan, including on the international airport of Khartoum.  The Sudan Armed Forces accused the UAE and Ethiopia of facilitating the drone strikes, including their launching from Bahir Dar airport and a RSF military base inside Ethiopia along the Sudan border.  

Taiwan President's Visit to Eswatini Strikes Nerve in Beijing

 Reuters published on 6 May 2026 an article titled "China Condemns Eswatini for Being 'Kept and Fed' by Taiwan in Travel Row" by Liz Lee, Ben Blanchard, and Lunga Masuku.

Beijing used strong language in condemning Eswatini, the only country in Africa that recognizes Taiwan, for receiving President Lai Ching-te.  Eswatini responded that Beijing's response falls short of the standards expected in respectful international discourse from a country that positions itself as a responsible global actor.

Comment:  Ouch! Score one for Eswatini.

China Scores Points in Africa as US, EU, and Japan Fall Behind

 The Japan Times published on 7 May 2026 an article titled "Into Africa: China Continues Its Dominance on the Continent" by Brad Glosserman.  

The author writes that "as the United States creates barriers to trade and treats Africa with contempt and disdain, China scores points with a key diplomatic bloc and source of vital raw materials."  He argues that both Japan and the European Union need to do more to balance Beijing's determined effort in Africa.  

Mozambique Considers Converting Dollar Debt for Chinese Yuan

 Bloomberg published on 5 May 2026 an article titled "Mozambique Weighs Swapping Dollar Debt for Yuan in China Talks" by Tavares Cebola.

Mozambique is considering converting the $1.4 billion it owes China into yuan loans as part of a debt restructuring with its biggest bilateral creditor.  

Evolution of China's Policy on the Western Sahara

 The ChinaMed Project published on 7 May 2026 an analysis titled "From Neutrality to Strategic Ambiguity: China and the Western Sahara Conflict" by Imane Ezzehouany, Bianca Pasquier, and Amanda Chen.  

This analysis examines the evolution of China's position on the Western Sahara and the growing tension between diplomatic neutrality, geoeconomics, and geopolitical competition in the Maghreb.  The rapid expansion of Sino-Moroccan relations in recent years raise questions whether Beijing may be adopting a calibrated ambiguity compatible with Morocco's autonomy plan, allowing China to safeguard its strategic interests without incurring meaningful political costs.  

Russia's Africa Recruitment Web for Mercenaries in Ukraine

 Foreign Policy published on 5 May 2026 an article titled "Russia's Africa Recruitment Web Is Expanding" by Maurice Oniang'o, a Kenyan journalist.

This article looks across Africa at Russia's successful program to recruit, usually based on disinformation, men to come to Russia for work but are then given minimal military training and sent to the front lines in the war against Ukraine.

China Establishes Direct Shipping Route with Benghazi, Libya

 The Libya Review published on 4 May 2026 an article titled "China Launches Direct Shipping Route to Libya's Benghazi in Trade Boost."

China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) has established a new shipping route between Benghazi in eastern Libya and ports in East Asia. Service has begun with two voyages per month and is expected to expand to four per month. 

US to Lift Sanctions on Eritrea

 Reuters published on 5 May 2026 an article titled "US to Lift Eritrea Sanctions as Red Sea Tensions Reshape Alliances, Document Says" by Giulia Paravicini.  

The United States is set to remove sanctions against Eritrea imposed by the Biden administration in 2021.  The decision is aimed at improving relations with Eritrea, which has a long Red Sea coastline, while sending a message to landlocked Ethiopia not to use military force to seek an outlet to the sea through Eritrea.  

Sudan Claims Drone Attacks from Ethiopia

 The Associated Press published on 5 May 2026 an article titled "Sudan Recalls Ambassador to Ethiopia over Drone Attack on Khartoum Airport."

Sudan claims it has been targeted on 4 occasions by drones originating in Ethiopia since March 1.  Sudan said it intercepted the most recent drone targeting Khartoum airport.  It blamed the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and claimed the UAE supplied the drones.  Ethiopia issued a statement denying the accusation.

Somalia's Role in the UN Security Council

 The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies published in April 2026 a study titled "Somalia's Mandate in the UN Security Council 2025-2026."

The study provides a comprehensive assessment of Somalia's performance during its non-permanent term in 2025-2026 on the UN Security Council.  It evaluates Somalia's institutional capacity, diplomatic engagement, and strategic positioning within the Council. The study also identifies key gaps and offers practical recommendations to strengthen Somalia's diplomatic effectiveness.

US Ambassadorships: Career Diplomats Need Not Apply

 2paragraphs published on 2 May 2026 an article titled "Former U.S. Ambassador to China Says Just 7% of U.S. Ambassadors Are Career Diplomats, 'Our Country Deserves Better'" by Lisandra Gomez-Tate.

In previous administrations, about 70 percent of U.S. ambassadors came from the career Foreign Service.  In the second Trump administration, that number is currently just over 7 percent, i.e. minus the zero.  Most of the ambassadorial positions are now occupied by friends, family members, and large political donors.

Comment:  This statistic demonstrates the low regard the Trump administration and Marco Rubio State Department hold the career diplomatic service.  What a waste of talent!  

How Russia Lures Africans to Fight in Ukraine

 The New York Times published on 4 May 2026 an article titled "'The Death Zone': How Russia Is Luring Africans to Ukraine" by Matthew Mpoke Bigg, John Eligon, and Zimasa Matiwane.

An estimated 1,000 Kenyans went to Russia and ended up in the war against Ukraine.  Only 30 have returned to Kenya alive.  In addition, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Botswana, Mali, and Cameroon have reported men being falsely recruited into the Russian army.