Radio France Internationale posted on 3 August 2026 an article titled "Hundreds Flee Ethiopia to War-torn Sudan Following New Fighting in Tigray."
Hundreds of Ethiopians fled to Sudan following the outbreak of conflict on 1 August between federal government troops and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in western Tigray region. They joined thousands of Ethiopian refugees inside Sudan from the 2020-2022 war between the Ethiopian army and the TPLF.
Business Insider Africa published on 27 July 2026 an article titled "Africa's Second-largest Copper Producer Curbs Raw Copper Exports and Makes Demands of Chinese Firms" by Awogbemila Temitope.
The Zambian government has restricted unrefined copper exports to force foreign mining and industrial companies to build local processing plants. Chinese companies invest heavily in Zambia's mining sector and will be the most impacted by this policy change.
Netherlands-based Lighthouse Reports published on 30 July 2026 a report titled "Congo's Hidden Uranium Exports."
China imports 95 percent of the cobalt exported by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Uranium is present in significant quantities in DRC cobalt. Chinese companies mine the ore, which is then refined in China.
China has added significantly to its nuclear weapons stockpile in recent years. Lighthouse Reports argues that China's increase in weapons far exceeds the uranium it mines domestically or that which it receives on the basis of reported imports. It concludes that much of the uranium for nuclear weapons is imported surreptitiously from the DRC.
The Congressional Research Service published on 21 July 2026 a brief titled "Yemen: Conflict, Red Sea Security, and U.S. Policy" by Christopher M. Blanchard.
In March 2025, the Trump administration designated the Iranian-backed Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization. On March 15, 2025, U.S. forces began a military campaign against the Houthis which the administration said was intended to compel them to end attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. The United States and the Houthis agreed to a truce in May 2025, which continues to hold.
The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies published in July 2026 a report titled "State of Somalia 2025."
The report reviews the major political, security, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, and regional developments that shaped Somalia in 2025. Somalia recorded notable gains in international diplomacy, institutional development, regional integration, and state visibility. It also experienced persistent political polarization, federal-state tensions, humanitarian vulnerability, and unresolved questions surrounding constitutional and electoral processes that continued to challenge state-building efforts.
Somalia demonstrated growing international relevance and achieved several important diplomatic and institutional milestones. Yet progress remained constrained by external interference, including Israel's violation of Somalia's sovereignty through its recognition of Somaliland, alongside political fragmentation, unresolved constitutional questions, persistent insecurity, and recurring humanitarian crises.
Pakistan's South Asian Chronicle published on 1 August 2026 an article titled "Houthi Red Sea Crisis."
This is a nice summary of the background of the Houthi blockade of the Red Sea and relations with Saudi Arabia.
The State Department published on 15 July 2026 an announcement titled "Realignment of U.S. Visa Services in Africa to Regional Hubs."
Effective August 1, the Department of State ended routine visa services at the following 25 US embassies and consulates in Sub-Saharan Africa: Antananarivo (Madagascar), Abuja (Nigeria), Asmara (Eritrea), Bamako (Mali), Banjul (The Gambia), Brazzaville (Republic of Congo), Bujumbura (Burundi), Conakry (Guinea), Cotonou (Benin), Durban (South Africa), Freetown (Sierra Leone), Gaborone (Botswana), Harare (Zimbabwe), Juba (South Sudan), Libreville (Gabon), Lilongwe (Malawi), Lusaka (Zambia), Maputo (Mozambique), Maseru (Lesotho), Mbabane (Eswatini), N'Djamena (Chad), Niamey (Niger), Nouakchott (Mauritania), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), and Windhoek (Namibia).
Instead, persons seeking visas to visit the United States in the countries cited above will have to travel to a regional visa hub in one of the following 20 cities: Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire), Accra (Ghana), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Cape Town (South Africa), Dakar (Senegal), Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania), Djibouti (Djibouti), Johannesburg (South Africa), Kampala (Uganda), Kigali (Rwanda), Kinshasa (DRC), Lagos (Nigeria), Lome (Togo), Luanda (Angola), Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), Monrovia (Liberia), Nairobi (Kenya), Port Louis (Mauritius), Praia (Cape Verde), and Yaoundé (Cameroon).
The Department of State said it is realigning visa operations in Sub-Saharan Africa as "part of a long-standing Department practice that strengthens national security by promoting more uniform screening, vetting, and adjudication standards, as well as improves efficiency."
Comment: The national security explanation is not convincing. For example, a consular officer located in Lusaka can adjudicate a visa application just as uniformly and accurately as one at a visa hub in Johannesburg. In fact, a consular officer located in the country of application has a better understanding of the applicant's background than a consular officer in another country. Nor is the realignment likely to save much money. US embassies and consulates are still expected to provide routine passport and protection services for American citizens. The consular sections in most embassies and consulates in Africa are small with one individual often handling both visa services and assistance to American citizens.
What the realignment will do is make it more difficult for many Africans to visit relatives in the United States, study at American universities, and travel for tourism and business. The geography of the realignment means, for example, that the entire Sahel region and all of southern Africa except South Africa and Angola will no longer have local non-immigrant and immigrant visa services provided by US embassies and consulates. This raises the question. Is the real reason for this realignment to make it more difficult for Sub-Saharan Africans to come to the United States? Whatever the rationale, the State Department has just handed another victory to China and Russia.
The Committee to Protect Journalists posted on 30 July 2026 a press release titled "CPJ Calls for Release of Ailing Sudanese Journalists Held by RSF, Protection of Darfur 24 Reporters."
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces kidnapped three Nyala radio station journalists in February and threatened Darfur 24 reporters. The Committee to Protect Journalists called for the release of the journalists and condemnation of the threats against Darfur 24 reporters.
The China Global South Project published on 31 July 2026 an analysis titled "Are Chinese and Turkish Drones Fueling Conflicts in Africa?" by Christian Geraud Neema Byamungu.
China and Türkiye are Africa's primary supplier of drones, which increasingly are used in conflict situations. Türkiye sells them directly to African militaries engaged in conflict, including in Libya, Sudan, DRC, and Rwanda. China sells them directly to both conflicting parties in the DRC and Rwanda but those used by Marshall Haftar's army in Libya and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan were transferred by the UAE.
The author concluded that while these drone sales do not start wars, both China and Türkiye insert themselves into pre-existing conflicts fueled by political rivalries, regional tensions, and economic interests.
Nanyang Technological University published on 6 July 2026 an article titled "Assessing Ethiopia's Economic Reform and Outlook" by Rafiq Raji.
Ethiopia's economic growth since 2022 has averaged about 8.5 percent and is projected to maintain that rate at least until 2030, assuming there are no catastrophic events such as a war in Tigray region or with Eritrea. Inflation is trending down and Ethiopia has restructured its significant level of debt. The country's exports are doing well.
The Associated Press published on 30 July 2026 an article titled "Child Soldiers Recount Horrors of Sudan's War and Presence of Colombian Mercenaries" by Sam Mednick, Isabel Debre, and Astrid Suarez.
Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have conscripted child soldiers, some of whom have been trained by Colombian mercenaries. The UAE allegedly recruited the Colombians to fight alongside the RSF.
Insurance Journal posted on 30 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis' Red Sea Attacks Prompt London Insurers to Widen High-Risk Zone" by Jonathan Saul.
As a result of Iran-backed Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, London insurers have expanded the area in the Red Sea subject to higher rates. Even small changes to war insurance add hundreds of thousands of dollars in extra costs for a seven-day voyage.
The Ichikowitz Family Foundation just published its massive African Youth Survey 2026. It held face-to-face interviews with about 5,000 Africans aged 18-24 from 16 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
It covers many issues, but the focus here is perceptions of China and the United States. African youth see China (79 percent) and the United States (81 percent) as the most influential foreign actors, although China's influence is seen as somewhat more positive.
The survey looked at the influence of the US, China, Brazil, EU, UK, Germany, France, India, and Russia. The only country whose influence was seen as less positive than the United States (85 percent) was Russia (83 percent).
About 3 in 5 youth are optimistic about Africa's future during the Trump administration, especially on military support and security. Just under half believe the closure of USAID will negatively impact their country, with healthcare and disease prevention seen as the areas most affected.
China and India are increasingly viewed as more favorable partners than the United States, a sentiment shaped in part by the return of the Trump administration.
The South African Institute of International Affairs recently posted a 16-minute podcast titled "South Africa and Russia: It's Complicated."
The Russia-China relationship generates uncomfortable headlines today. It is based on the strong anti-apartheid position of the Soviet Union. In addition, Vladimir Putin and former South African President Jacob Zuma solidified the ties.
Russia's invasion of Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine complicated the relationship. South Africa fell back on a policy of non-alignment. By 2022, there was confusion in Pretoria concerning policy towards Russia.
Today, South Africa-Russia trade is negligible and Russian investment in the country is modest. South Africa and Russia, both members of BRICS, agree on the need to revise the world order but not much else.
Asia Times published on 27 July 2026 an article titled "China's Zero-tariff Play Aims to Lock in African Loyalty" by Bob Savic.
China's zero-tariff access for 63 countries--53 of them in Africa--is a deliberate geostrategic lever in Beijing's long-term competition with the United States and Europe for influence in the Global South. It is designed to offer unfettered, predictable, and large-scale access for African exports in contrast to protectionist markets in the United States and Europe.
The zero-tariff policy also positions Africa's growing population as a significant long-term market for Chinese goods and services and helps China to shape the rules of global commerce.
Comment: While this may be China's goal, it must still deal with the fact that Beijing exports far more to Africa than it imports from Africa, and the initial evidence suggests that the zero-tariff policy is not having a significant impact on this situation.
Ethio Negari published on 28 July 2026 an article titled "China-Africa Robotic Surgery Training Centre Opens in Addis Ababa."
The China-Africa Robotic Surgery Center that opened in Addis Ababa uses AI-driven healthcare techniques. The first round of training involved 40 healthcare professionals from Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, and Libya.
Al-Monitor published on 29 July 2026 an article titled "China in Touch with Yemen's Houthis to Allow Ships to Sail Through Red Sea, Sources Say" by Jonathan Saul, Parisa Hafezi, Timour Azhari, and Chen Aizhu.
Beijing has asked the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen to promise safe passage for its oil tankers transporting crude from Saudi Arabia's Yanbu terminal in the Red Sea south through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point. China clears each shipment with the Houthis, who have developed good relations with Beijing.
Reuters published on 28 July 2026 an article titled "US Backs Madagascar Rare Earths Project in Push to Loosen China's Supply Chain Grip."
The US International Development Finance Corporation agreed to commit up to $4.84 million for pilot plant work, laboratory testing, and environmental programs of a $150 million rare earths project in Madagascar. The deal highlights Washington's effort to develop alternative sources of minerals controlled by China.
The New York Times published on 28 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis Claim Strike on Another Saudi Oil Tanker" by Pranav Baskar and Shipin Hakim.
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen said they targeted on 28 July a Saudi oil tanker, the NCC Ghazal, in the Red Sea with missiles. Saudi authorities did not confirm the attack.
African Arguments posted on 21 July 2026 a commentary titled "Sudan's Peace Process Is Negotiating a War That No Longer Exists" by Ezzat Khairi, a Sudan political analyst.
Diplomatic assumptions for ending the war in Sudan remain where they were in April 2023. Peace initiatives approach Sudan as a two-sided conflict between a national army and a paramilitary rebellion. That model no longer fits the war. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) now contain armed movements, tribal formations, ideological brigades, local defense groups, and commanders with their own constituencies and expectations of the postwar order. The leaders of the SAF and RSF do not fully control the coalitions supporting them.
The Conversation published on 16 July 2026 a discussion summary titled "Africa's Greater Horn Region Is Facing a Looming Polycrisis Fueled by Conflict, Prices, Climate and Disease" by Daniel Maxwell, Alex de Waal, Luka Kuol, Merry Fitzpatrick, and Peter Hailey.
The impacts of a strengthening El Nino and effects of the war in Iran combined with existing prolonged crisis and conflict in the Horn of Africa are leading potentially to a major, multicountry polycrisis.
The Diplomat published on 24 July 2026 a commentary titled "As the World Courts Beijing, Namibia Shows How Africa Can Sharpen Its China Strategy" by Huiyi Chen and Ovigwe Eguegu.
Namibian President Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah made a weeklong state visit to China in early July. She arrived with a clear agenda, negotiated a Namibia-relevant itinerary, and left with numerous tangible agreements. The authors urge other African leaders to follow her example.
The Hollings Center for International Dialogue published in July 2026 a brief titled "Securing Strategic Waters Across the MENA Region: The Red Sea."
The current threat in the Red Sea is not confined to the closure of the geographical Bab el-Mandeb choke point. It is shaped by persistent uncertainty caused by the security crises in the wider region.
The threat cannot be addressed through conventional naval tools alone, nor reduced to a piracy or law enforcement problem. The brief recommends incremental cooperation, capacity building, and risk mitigation measures.
Foreign Affairs published on 27 July 2026 an article titled "Can Renewables Industrialize Africa? The Iran War Is Driving the Continent Toward Chinese-Backed Green Energy" by Mohamed Adow, director of Power Shift Africa, a climate think tank in Kenya.
The war on Iran is accelerating a determination among African countries to reduce their dependence on imported fossil fuels and to turn toward renewable power. As a result, African countries are now leaning toward the model advanced by China, in which abundant, low-cost electricity from renewables underpins industrialization and economic growth.
In the meantime, the United States is ceding a role in Africa's clean energy transition to China and risks losing diplomatic influence on the continent. Washington has not grasped Africa's new energy reality.
Ethiopia Insight published on 27 July 2026 a commentary titled "Amhara Nationalism Faces Historic Choice in National Dialogue" by Henok Ambachew, a pseudonym for a former lecturer at Bahir Dar University.
Ethiopia's ruling Prosperity Party has replaced the EPRDF coalition model with a single national party, which the author says is based on a different organizing principle called "demographic majoritarianism."
The Prosperity Party increasingly reflects the numerical weight of Ethiopia's population. The 45-member executive committee consists of 10 Oromo members, 8 Amharas, 4 Somalis with the remaining distributed among other regional constituencies. This was not the outcome desired by many Amhara elites.
