The Associated Press published on 27 February 2026 an article titled "At Least 55 Ghanaians Killed Fighting for Russia in Ukraine War, Minister Says."
Ghana's foreign minister commented on 27 February that at least 44 Ghanaians have died fighting for Russia in Ukraine. He added that Russia has lured 272 Ghanaians into the battle since 2022. The foreign minister said Ghana would dismantle all the dark web illegal recruitment schemes.
Modern Diplomacy published on 27 February 2026 a commentary titled "Africa's Rise: The 21st Century Story that Leaves Russia Behind" by Kester Kenn Klomegah, an independent researcher.
Russia has focused on a limited part of Africa. About 80 percent of its trade is with North African countries and South Africa. It has sent the Africa Corps to Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. But it has largely ignored the rest of the continent.
Discovery Alert posted on 1 March 2026 an analysis titled "China Becomes World's Leading Chrome Processor Overtaking South Africa" by Muflih Hidayat.
Ferrochrome production, which is essential for stainless steel, requires consistent, energy-intensive processing. Although South Africa is the source of much of the world's chrome ore, China's coal-based power generation is more reliable and cheaper than South Africa's electricity. Consequently, processing of the ore has shifted from South Africa to China.
An Africanist Perspective posted on 27 February 2026 a commentary titled "Conflict in the Horn of Africa Isn't Inevitable. People Can Choose Peace" by Ken Opalo.
The fundamental drivers of conflict in the Horn of Africa are domestic. Once rebellions start, they tend to acquire lives of their own. A neighborhood of weak states with porous borders contributes to the problem, making it easy for regional rivals and foreign governments to interfere.
Too many people in the Horn are convinced that organized violence is a legitimate response to losing in the political arena. That has to change before there will be peace.
Nanyang Technological University posted on 24 February 2026 an article titled "The State of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Africa" by Amit Jain.
This is a nice summary of the current state of artificial intelligence in Africa, the sectors that are most likely to benefit in the coming years, and the countries that are best positioned to take advantage of it.
The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs published on 7 February 2026 an article titled "The United States, China, and AI Competition in Africa: Lessons for the Global South" by Alice Chen and Neel U. Sukhalme.
This article (also posted below on 11 February) is a useful addition to this topic, which is fast becoming important to Africa's development.
The New York Times published on 27 February 2026 an article titled "How a Call from Trump Ignited a Bitter Feud Between Two U.S. Allies" by Vivian Nereim.
Saudi Arabia reportedly asked the United States to impose sanctions on the UAE for its support of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan. A Saudi official said the request was to put additional sanctions on the RSF to prevent them from getting external support, not to impose sanctions directly on the UAE.
While the details of the phone call are in dispute, the episode resulted in a public feud between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Relations rapidly deteriorated in December when Saudi Arabia bombed an Emirati shipment to Yemen. Now, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are supporting opposing sides of conflicting groups in Yemen and Sudan.
The South China Morning Post published on 27 February 2026 an article titled "Why Beijing's US$4.5 Billion Niger-Benin Oil Pipeline Is Being Attacked by Rebels" by Jevans Nyabiage.
A rebel group has been attacking the oil pipeline from Niger's oilfields to an Atlantic port in Benin in an effort to restore a former elected president to power in Niger. China financed, built, and continues to have a management role in the pipeline, which provides a significant amount of revenue for Niger's military junta. Although the attacks are not aimed at China, the situation poses a dilemma for Beijing and its non-interference policy.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 26 February 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Elliot Nazar.
Chad closed its border with Sudan following two attacks by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on Chadian troops inside Chad. The RSF relies on supply lines through Chad for its weapons and equipment.
The Emirates Policy Center posted on 27 February 2026 an analysis titled "The Economics of Deterrence: How Corridors and Alliances Are Reshaping Geopolitics" by Ebtesam AlKetbi.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are frameworks for redistributing centers of gravity and influence, diversifying states' strategic options, and embedding long-term investment commitments.
The world is shifting from rigid alignments to flexible alliances that integrate economy and technology with digital and maritime security. Power is no longer defined solely by territorial control but by the management of flows--trade, energy, data, and capital. A state that positions itself as a central node within these networks gains strategic weight.
In the Indian Ocean region, both the Indian-led IMEC and the better known and more expansive Chinese BRI are efforts to achieve these objectives.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 26 February 2026 a study titled "Russia in Africa: Examining Moscow's Influence and Its Limits" edited by Nate Reynolds, Frances Z. Brown, Frederic Wehrey, and Andrew S. Weiss.
The study explores Russia's role, its appeal, and its limitations across Africa since the 2010s, drawing on contributions from a range of scholars. It also looks at the agency and interests of African governments and citizens.
Opportunism continues to define Russia's approach to Africa, as Moscow hones a set of tools designed to take advantage of instability and state fragility. African actors can--and do--instrumentalize Russian engagement on the continent and advance their own agency in the relationship. Geopolitical competition in Africa is widening and intensifying as middle powers emerge as important external partners, in addition to traditional powers. The West must evolve its approach accordingly.
These essays point to a complicated and mixed record for Russia in Africa that defies simple characterizations. Russia's influence in Africa has undoubtedly grown, but there are outstanding questions about whether it can translate its gains into stable, lasting relationships; whether its tools and symbolic gestures will gain further traction; and whether it can outcompete a crowded field of external powers that can deliver more than Russia, should they choose to.
Channel News Asia published on 24 February 2026 an article titled "China Expands Economic Footprint in Turbulent South Sudan" by Patrick Oyet.
The article highlights China's continuing engagement in various sectors in South Sudan even as the country edges toward another civil war.
Comment: The article did not mention that the China National Petroleum Corporation informed Sudan and South Sudan in December 2025 that it is dissolving its long-standing partnership with Sudan's oil sector. See the Sudan Tribune's article dated 10 December 2025 titled "China's Exit from Sudan Oil Fields Deepens Crisis for War-ravaged Economy."
The South African Institute of International Affairs published in January 2026 a paper titled "Examining Integrated Chinese Mining-Energy Investments in Zimbabwe" by Yaseen Tayob and Adrian Joseph.
The paper assesses Chinese investments in Zimbabwe's mining and energy sectors and shows that they provide identifiable economic value to the Zimbabwean economy, particularly in the country's lithium mining sector.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 26 February 2026 an article titled "Sahel" by Liam Karr and Zoe Sommer.
Russia plans to send 1,000 more Africa Corps soldiers to Mali in the coming months, increasing Russian forces there to 3,500. The Africa Corps may also send more troops to Niger. Current Russian forces in the Sahel have failed to degrade the growing jihadi insurgencies in the region.
The University of Nottingham Taiwan Research Hub's Taiwan Insight published on 23 February 2026 a commentary titled "Taiwan's Diplomatic Bridge: Taiwan-Somaliland-Israel vs China in the Horn of Africa" by Faisal Abdirashid Adam.
Taiwan, which established a liaison office in Somaliland in 2020, has embraced Israel's diplomatic recognition of Somaliland, framing it as a major step forward for the emerging "democratic triangle" of Taiwan, Israel, and Somaliland, which now positions itself as a powerful new alliance for trilateral cooperation in technology, agriculture, and Red Sea security.
The Atlantic Council published on 24 February 2026 a commentary titled "In Guinea, the US Has a Rare Opportunity to Gain an Edge Over China" by Rose Keravouri and Maureen Farrell.
Recognizing the risks of overreliance on a single external partner and frustrated with Chinese firms' opacity and non-compliance with local requirements, its leadership has signaled a willingness to push back against China's mining domination.
The Trump administration invited President Mamady Doumbouya to Washington in early February and is encouraging the American private sector to invest in mining opportunities in Guinea. The US is also exploring security cooperation with Guinea, which now offers a good opportunity for increased engagement with the United States.
The Congressional Research Service published on 20 February 2026 a brief titled "Yemen, Conflict, Red Sea Security, and U.S. Policy" by Christopher M. Blanchard.
This is a summary of U.S. policy during the Trump administration in Yemen and security issues in the Red Sea.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File published on 25 February 2026 an analysis titled "Ethiopia Prepares for War: Africa File Special Edition" by Michael DeAngelo, Liam Karr, and Anahita Asudani.
The analysis concludes that the Ethiopian federal government will likely launch an offensive against the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) within the next month to neutralize the TPLF and its role in an emerging, loose anti-Ethiopian federal government coalition consisting of Eritrea, the TPLF, and other Amhara and Oromo ethnic nationalist groups.
Angolan Mining Oil & Gas published on 26 February 2026 an article titled "Sonangol Seeks $4.8 Billion Loan from China to Fund Lobito Refinery Expansion" by Makungu Coco.
Sonangol, Angola's state oil company, is pursuing a $4.8 billion loan from Chinese financial institutions to accelerate construction of its new refinery at the Atlantic port of Lobito. This would be Sonangol's first major loan from China in seven years.
The Associated Press published on 25 February 2026 an article titled "UN Sanctions 4 Commanders in Sudan's Paramilitary Force Accused of Atrocities in Sudan" by Edith M. Lederer."
The UN Security Council imposed sanctions on 4 commanders of Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces suspected of atrocities against civilians. They face UN travel bans and financial freezes.
US Africa Command's Africa Defense Forum magazine published on 10 February 2026 an article titled "Rebels Target Niger Junta's Oil Revenue."
The Patriotic Movement for Freedom and Justice is engaged in a campaign to topple the military junta in Niger and restore elected President Mohamed Bazoum. A significant part of the junta's revenue is generated by the oil pipeline from Niger to Benin. The China National Petroleum Corporation and its subsidiary West African Oil Pipeline Company constructed the pipeline and continue to be engaged in its operations. Most of the exported crude goes to China.
China's involvement in the project has put Chinese oil companies in harm's way. Beijing now seeks to find a way to protect both its investment and personnel still involved in the project from attacks by the Patriotic Movement for Freedom and Justice.
The Committee to Protect Journalists published on 24 February 2026 a news release titled "Ethiopia Revokes Addis Standard's License Amid Escalating Crackdown on Independent Media."
The Ethiopian Media Authority (EMA) revoked the Addis Standard's online media registration certificate effective 24 February. The EMA accused the Addis Standard of violating Ethiopian laws and endangering the national interests of the country. The action is part of a crackdown on independent media in Ethiopia.
The Sentry published in February 2026 a report titled "Dubai Properties Linked to Hemedti."
Mohamed "Hemedti" Hamdan Dagalo, the leader of Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is closely linked to a $1.7 million property portfolio in the United Arab Emirates.
The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats published in March 2026 a major report titled "Fault Lines in the Horn of Africa: The Gulf States, Turkey and Israel Battle for Red Sea Influence" by Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo.
This is an extensive study on the current situation in the Horn of Africa with special reference to the roles of Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. It includes detailed recommendations for US policy.
War on the Rocks published on 18 February 2026 an analysis titled "China Now Finds Itself in Al-Qaeda's Crosshairs" by Colin Clarke and Lucas Webber, both with the Soufan Center.
Al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations in the Arabian Gulf and Africa are now including China as part of its enemy hierarchy due in large part to Beijing's treatment of the Muslim Uyghur population in Xinjiang Province.
Religion News Service posted on 17 February 2026 an article titled "Watchdogs Say Russian Church Helped Recruit Young Kenyans Who Have Fought in Ukraine" by Frederick Nzwili.
There are reports that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) branch in Kenya played a role in a few cases recruiting Kenyans to go to Russia and who eventually ended up on the front line of the war against Ukraine. The ROC denies that it sent any Kenyans to Russia to fight in Ukraine.
