SABC News posted on 4 August 2026 an article titled "SA Moves to Complete R2 Billion Radioactive Waste Management Facility."
South Africa's National Radioactive Waste Disposal Institute signed a memorandum of understanding with the China National Nuclear Corporation to work together and share experiences.
The ChinaMed Project published on 5 August 2026 an analysis titled "Chinese Officials, Experts and Media Discuss the Ceuta Crisis" by Leonardo Bruni.
On 31 July, some 60,000 people crossed from Morocco into Ceuta, a Spanish enclave on the Moroccan coast. This analysis discusses how Chinese officials and media have framed the Ceuta crisis, and if Chinese analysts see it as evidence that internal European Union divisions could weaken the bloc's ability to respond to external threats, such as China's assertive trade policies.
By avoiding discussing responsibility or causes of the migrant surge, Beijing showed its interest in maintaining good relations with both Spain and Morocco. The weakness of European solidarity was, however, a recurring theme.
Business Insider Africa published on 30 July 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia's $12.5 Billion Airport Has Become the Latest Investment Battleground between the U.S. and China in Africa" by Solomon Ekanem.
The United States is seeking a role for its private sector companies in the development of Ethiopia's new $12.5 billion Bishoftu Airport as it challenges China's commanding position of building infrastructure projects in Africa by its state-owned companies.
The United States sees this as an opening for its construction and engineering companies and an opportunity to sell more Boeing aircraft to Ethiopian Airlines. In addition, the Bishoftu Airport is a gateway to influence Africa's fast-growing aviation, logistics, and technology sectors.
The Economist published on 30 July 2026 an article titled "How Many People Are Dying as a Result of USAID's Demise?"
Elon Musk, who is responsible for dismantling the US Agency for International Development (USAID), insists it has not cost any human lives. The influential publication, Lancet, estimates that by 2030, 14 million people will die as a result of USAID's demise.
The Economist explains that the drop in US health funding has been less cataclysmic than originally predicted and that early estimates of deaths drew on trends that may no longer be valid. While the early estimates of deaths are too high, Musk's notion of zero deaths is plainly wrong. Lives have been lost.
Serrari posted on 4 August 2026 an article titled "Stanbic Bank Kenya Launches RMB Payments Through CIPS" by Montel Kamau.
Stanbic Bank Kenya has introduced direct Renminbi payment processing through China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). Businesses importing goods or services from China can now settle eligible transactions without routing every payment through longer conventional correspondent-banking chains.
Comment: This is one more indication of China's currency making inroads in the banking system of the Global South.
China-Africa Security Radar published on 3 August 2026 an article titled "Fragmented Leverage: Why African States Call for Collective Bargaining but Prefer Bilateralism in Critical Minerals Negotiations" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.
The author explains how China and the United States seek advantage with African countries in bilateral negotiations in their quest for critical minerals. China exploits bilateral negotiations through processing dominance and bundled infrastructure-mineral deals. The United States pursues selective frameworks and corridor diplomacy.
Radio France Internationale posted on 3 August 2026 an article titled "Hundreds Flee Ethiopia to War-torn Sudan Following New Fighting in Tigray."
Hundreds of Ethiopians fled to Sudan following the outbreak of conflict on 1 August between federal government troops and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in western Tigray region. They joined thousands of Ethiopian refugees inside Sudan from the 2020-2022 war between the Ethiopian army and the TPLF.
Business Insider Africa published on 27 July 2026 an article titled "Africa's Second-largest Copper Producer Curbs Raw Copper Exports and Makes Demands of Chinese Firms" by Awogbemila Temitope.
The Zambian government has restricted unrefined copper exports to force foreign mining and industrial companies to build local processing plants. Chinese companies invest heavily in Zambia's mining sector and will be the most impacted by this policy change.
Netherlands-based Lighthouse Reports published on 30 July 2026 a report titled "Congo's Hidden Uranium Exports."
China imports 95 percent of the cobalt exported by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Uranium is present in significant quantities in DRC cobalt. Chinese companies mine the ore, which is then refined in China.
China has added significantly to its nuclear weapons stockpile in recent years. Lighthouse Reports argues that China's increase in weapons far exceeds the uranium it mines domestically or that which it receives on the basis of reported imports. It concludes that much of the uranium for nuclear weapons is imported surreptitiously from the DRC.
The Congressional Research Service published on 21 July 2026 a brief titled "Yemen: Conflict, Red Sea Security, and U.S. Policy" by Christopher M. Blanchard.
In March 2025, the Trump administration designated the Iranian-backed Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization. On March 15, 2025, U.S. forces began a military campaign against the Houthis which the administration said was intended to compel them to end attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. The United States and the Houthis agreed to a truce in May 2025, which continues to hold.
The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies published in July 2026 a report titled "State of Somalia 2025."
The report reviews the major political, security, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, and regional developments that shaped Somalia in 2025. Somalia recorded notable gains in international diplomacy, institutional development, regional integration, and state visibility. It also experienced persistent political polarization, federal-state tensions, humanitarian vulnerability, and unresolved questions surrounding constitutional and electoral processes that continued to challenge state-building efforts.
Somalia demonstrated growing international relevance and achieved several important diplomatic and institutional milestones. Yet progress remained constrained by external interference, including Israel's violation of Somalia's sovereignty through its recognition of Somaliland, alongside political fragmentation, unresolved constitutional questions, persistent insecurity, and recurring humanitarian crises.
Pakistan's South Asian Chronicle published on 1 August 2026 an article titled "Houthi Red Sea Crisis."
This is a nice summary of the background of the Houthi blockade of the Red Sea and relations with Saudi Arabia.
The State Department published on 15 July 2026 an announcement titled "Realignment of U.S. Visa Services in Africa to Regional Hubs."
Effective August 1, the Department of State ended routine visa services at the following 25 US embassies and consulates in Sub-Saharan Africa: Antananarivo (Madagascar), Abuja (Nigeria), Asmara (Eritrea), Bamako (Mali), Banjul (The Gambia), Brazzaville (Republic of Congo), Bujumbura (Burundi), Conakry (Guinea), Cotonou (Benin), Durban (South Africa), Freetown (Sierra Leone), Gaborone (Botswana), Harare (Zimbabwe), Juba (South Sudan), Libreville (Gabon), Lilongwe (Malawi), Lusaka (Zambia), Maputo (Mozambique), Maseru (Lesotho), Mbabane (Eswatini), N'Djamena (Chad), Niamey (Niger), Nouakchott (Mauritania), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), and Windhoek (Namibia).
Instead, persons seeking visas to visit the United States in the countries cited above will have to travel to a regional visa hub in one of the following 20 cities: Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire), Accra (Ghana), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Cape Town (South Africa), Dakar (Senegal), Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania), Djibouti (Djibouti), Johannesburg (South Africa), Kampala (Uganda), Kigali (Rwanda), Kinshasa (DRC), Lagos (Nigeria), Lome (Togo), Luanda (Angola), Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), Monrovia (Liberia), Nairobi (Kenya), Port Louis (Mauritius), Praia (Cape Verde), and Yaoundé (Cameroon).
The Department of State said it is realigning visa operations in Sub-Saharan Africa as "part of a long-standing Department practice that strengthens national security by promoting more uniform screening, vetting, and adjudication standards, as well as improves efficiency."
Comment: The national security explanation is not convincing. For example, a consular officer located in Lusaka can adjudicate a visa application just as uniformly and accurately as one at a visa hub in Johannesburg. In fact, a consular officer located in the country of application has a better understanding of the applicant's background than a consular officer in another country. Nor is the realignment likely to save much money. US embassies and consulates are still expected to provide routine passport and protection services for American citizens. The consular sections in most embassies and consulates in Africa are small with one individual often handling both visa services and assistance to American citizens.
What the realignment will do is make it more difficult for many Africans to visit relatives in the United States, study at American universities, and travel for tourism and business. The geography of the realignment means, for example, that the entire Sahel region and all of southern Africa except South Africa and Angola will no longer have local non-immigrant and immigrant visa services provided by US embassies and consulates. This raises the question. Is the real reason for this realignment to make it more difficult for Sub-Saharan Africans to come to the United States? Whatever the rationale, the State Department has just handed another victory to China and Russia.
The Committee to Protect Journalists posted on 30 July 2026 a press release titled "CPJ Calls for Release of Ailing Sudanese Journalists Held by RSF, Protection of Darfur 24 Reporters."
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces kidnapped three Nyala radio station journalists in February and threatened Darfur 24 reporters. The Committee to Protect Journalists called for the release of the journalists and condemnation of the threats against Darfur 24 reporters.
The China Global South Project published on 31 July 2026 an analysis titled "Are Chinese and Turkish Drones Fueling Conflicts in Africa?" by Christian Geraud Neema Byamungu.
China and Türkiye are Africa's primary supplier of drones, which increasingly are used in conflict situations. Türkiye sells them directly to African militaries engaged in conflict, including in Libya, Sudan, DRC, and Rwanda. China sells them directly to both conflicting parties in the DRC and Rwanda but those used by Marshall Haftar's army in Libya and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan were transferred by the UAE.
The author concluded that while these drone sales do not start wars, both China and Türkiye insert themselves into pre-existing conflicts fueled by political rivalries, regional tensions, and economic interests.
Nanyang Technological University published on 6 July 2026 an article titled "Assessing Ethiopia's Economic Reform and Outlook" by Rafiq Raji.
Ethiopia's economic growth since 2022 has averaged about 8.5 percent and is projected to maintain that rate at least until 2030, assuming there are no catastrophic events such as a war in Tigray region or with Eritrea. Inflation is trending down and Ethiopia has restructured its significant level of debt. The country's exports are doing well.
The Associated Press published on 30 July 2026 an article titled "Child Soldiers Recount Horrors of Sudan's War and Presence of Colombian Mercenaries" by Sam Mednick, Isabel Debre, and Astrid Suarez.
Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have conscripted child soldiers, some of whom have been trained by Colombian mercenaries. The UAE allegedly recruited the Colombians to fight alongside the RSF.
Insurance Journal posted on 30 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis' Red Sea Attacks Prompt London Insurers to Widen High-Risk Zone" by Jonathan Saul.
As a result of Iran-backed Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, London insurers have expanded the area in the Red Sea subject to higher rates. Even small changes to war insurance add hundreds of thousands of dollars in extra costs for a seven-day voyage.
The Ichikowitz Family Foundation just published its massive African Youth Survey 2026. It held face-to-face interviews with about 5,000 Africans aged 18-24 from 16 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
It covers many issues, but the focus here is perceptions of China and the United States. African youth see China (79 percent) and the United States (81 percent) as the most influential foreign actors, although China's influence is seen as somewhat more positive.
The survey looked at the influence of the US, China, Brazil, EU, UK, Germany, France, India, and Russia. The only country whose influence was seen as less positive than the United States (85 percent) was Russia (83 percent).
About 3 in 5 youth are optimistic about Africa's future during the Trump administration, especially on military support and security. Just under half believe the closure of USAID will negatively impact their country, with healthcare and disease prevention seen as the areas most affected.
China and India are increasingly viewed as more favorable partners than the United States, a sentiment shaped in part by the return of the Trump administration.
The South African Institute of International Affairs recently posted a 16-minute podcast titled "South Africa and Russia: It's Complicated."
The Russia-China relationship generates uncomfortable headlines today. It is based on the strong anti-apartheid position of the Soviet Union. In addition, Vladimir Putin and former South African President Jacob Zuma solidified the ties.
Russia's invasion of Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine complicated the relationship. South Africa fell back on a policy of non-alignment. By 2022, there was confusion in Pretoria concerning policy towards Russia.
Today, South Africa-Russia trade is negligible and Russian investment in the country is modest. South Africa and Russia, both members of BRICS, agree on the need to revise the world order but not much else.
Asia Times published on 27 July 2026 an article titled "China's Zero-tariff Play Aims to Lock in African Loyalty" by Bob Savic.
China's zero-tariff access for 63 countries--53 of them in Africa--is a deliberate geostrategic lever in Beijing's long-term competition with the United States and Europe for influence in the Global South. It is designed to offer unfettered, predictable, and large-scale access for African exports in contrast to protectionist markets in the United States and Europe.
The zero-tariff policy also positions Africa's growing population as a significant long-term market for Chinese goods and services and helps China to shape the rules of global commerce.
Comment: While this may be China's goal, it must still deal with the fact that Beijing exports far more to Africa than it imports from Africa, and the initial evidence suggests that the zero-tariff policy is not having a significant impact on this situation.
Ethio Negari published on 28 July 2026 an article titled "China-Africa Robotic Surgery Training Centre Opens in Addis Ababa."
The China-Africa Robotic Surgery Center that opened in Addis Ababa uses AI-driven healthcare techniques. The first round of training involved 40 healthcare professionals from Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, and Libya.
Al-Monitor published on 29 July 2026 an article titled "China in Touch with Yemen's Houthis to Allow Ships to Sail Through Red Sea, Sources Say" by Jonathan Saul, Parisa Hafezi, Timour Azhari, and Chen Aizhu.
Beijing has asked the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen to promise safe passage for its oil tankers transporting crude from Saudi Arabia's Yanbu terminal in the Red Sea south through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point. China clears each shipment with the Houthis, who have developed good relations with Beijing.
Reuters published on 28 July 2026 an article titled "US Backs Madagascar Rare Earths Project in Push to Loosen China's Supply Chain Grip."
The US International Development Finance Corporation agreed to commit up to $4.84 million for pilot plant work, laboratory testing, and environmental programs of a $150 million rare earths project in Madagascar. The deal highlights Washington's effort to develop alternative sources of minerals controlled by China.
The New York Times published on 28 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis Claim Strike on Another Saudi Oil Tanker" by Pranav Baskar and Shipin Hakim.
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen said they targeted on 28 July a Saudi oil tanker, the NCC Ghazal, in the Red Sea with missiles. Saudi authorities did not confirm the attack.
