The South China Morning Post published on 15 February 2026 an article titled "How a 'Military Vacuum' in West and Central Africa Opened New Markets for China" by Jevans Nyabiage.
As France retreats from parts of Africa and Russia is preoccupied with its war against Ukraine, Chinese companies have stepped up their arms transfers and military training. China's equipment is affordable and comes without conditions.
China-Africa Security Radar published on 16 February 2026 an analysis titled "Beijing Rejects U.S. Allegations of Financing Terror in Nigeria's Illegal Mining Sector--The Reality Is More Complex."
Prominent Republican members of the US Congress have sponsored a bill that alleges Chinese individuals and companies involved in illegal mining pay "protection money" to Fulani militias and other armed groups to secure access to lithium and gold deposits. The bill links these militias to terrorist violence that has impacted Nigerian Christian communities.
The Chinese embassy in Abuja issued a strongly worded statement refuting allegations that Chinese nationals are funding militant groups to gain access to minerals in Nigeria's Middle Belt and northwestern region.
China-Africa Security Radar concludes that it is generally agreed there is illegal Chinese mining in Nigeria, but the culprits are pragmatically paying "rent" to armed groups to access the minerals.
Ethiopia Insight published on 15 February 2026 a commentary titled "Judging the Tigray Genocide Backwards" by Girmay Weldedawit, who now resides in Belgium, and Ella Atsbeha, who also lives outside Ethiopia.
This is an "in the weeds" analysis of what went wrong in the Tigray War. The authors take issue with the views of analysts such as Alex de Waal and Mulugeta Gebrehiwot.
Chatham House published on 13 February 2026 a commentary titled "The AU Summit Is an Opportunity for Decisive Action to End the War in Sudan" by Hubert Kinkoh.
The author argued that the 14-15 February African Union Summit was an opportunity for decisive leadership on Sudan. The AU has been increasingly peripheral to competing diplomatic tracks. The AU must assert its primacy and enforce diplomatic coherence.
The Diplomat published on 14 February 2026 an article titled "The Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway: Still Growing 8 Years Later" by Istvan Tarrosy, Zoltan Voros, and Ali Miganeh Hadi.
Inaugurated in 2017, the Chinese-built railway is a lifeline for landlocked Ethiopia. In 2024, Ethiopia and Djibouti took responsibility from China for managing the railway. Projects are underway to construct spur lines and pressure remains to improve profit margins.
Kenya's The Star published on 14 February 2026 an article titled "China to AU: Xi Pledges Full Rollout of Zero Tariff Treatment for Africa" by Moses Ogada.
President Xi Jinping informed the African Union on 14 February that China starting on 1 May 2026 will fully implement zero-tariff treatment for the 53 African countries that recognize Beijing. This means that Eswatini, which recognizes Taiwan, is the only African country that will not benefit from zero tariff treatment.
Geeska posted on 14 February 2026 an article titled "Getachew: Ethiopia Won't Be a 'Passive Bystander' after Reuters Report."
The Ethiopian government declined to renew the accreditation of three Addis Ababa-based journalists working for Reuters following an in-depth Reuters report about a training camp near the Sudan border for the Sudanese paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. See the story posted below on 10 February. Ethiopian authorities did not publicly cite the reasons for the decision.
Ethiopia Insight published on 13 February 2026 a commentary titled "Reimagining Ethiopia's Constitutional Architecture" by Nagessa Dube, a lawyer in Seattle, Washington.
The author argues that Ethiopia needs constitutional reform. Courts now have almost no authority to interpret the constitution; it is in the hands of a political body. He believes constitutional interpretation needs to be transferred to an independent judiciary and the ongoing National Dialogue offers a rare chance to make this change.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 12 February 2026 an article titled "South Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo.
The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) and the Nuer White Army militia launched a new offensive in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states in South Sudan. Forces from the government of South Sudan responded with a counteroffensive. Competing Sudan Armed Forces and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan may try to exploit the situation in South Sudan for advantage in their own civil war.
Reuters published on 12 February 2026 an article titled "Can Africa Win as the West and China Scramble for Minerals?" by Clyde Russell.
Competing Western and Chinese rail projects in a mineral rich part of Africa emphasize the competition for Africa's critical minerals. A question remains, however, if the African countries will benefit significantly from this competition.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File published on 12 February 2026 an analysis titled "Ethiopia" by Michael DeAngelo, Liam Karr, and Anahita Asudani.
The Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa is increasing its troop strength near Tigray Region indicating this may be a prelude to a military campaign. Eritrea is backing the Tigray People's Liberation Front and has troops inside Tigray Region. In the event of a government attack, Eritrea is expected to side with the Tigray Defense Forces,
Ethiopia Insight published on 12 February 2026 a commentary titled "Can a People's Pact Heal a War of Elites?" by Giday Amare, a public servant in the health care sector.
The author wants ordinary Tigrayans and Eritreans to come together at the people-to-people level in an effort to heal old wounds and overcome divisive actions of elites on both sides of the border.
The Telegraph published on 12 February 2026 an article titled "'Mine, Baby Mine': Trump Races to Catch Up to China in New Scramble for Africa's Minerals" by Ben Farmer.
Washington is trying to overturn more than 20 years of Chinese dominance in which Beijing has taken control of mining and refining of critical minerals. This competition is playing out this week at a major mining meeting in South Africa.
The Lagos-based African Finance Corporation recently posted its "Compendium of Africa's Strategic Minerals 2026."
This is a major study of Africa's critical minerals, industrial minerals, uranium, and rare earths. It also noted that China controls about 90 percent of global manganese refining, approximately 90 percent of rare earth separation and refining, and dominates battery-grade graphite processing.
The South China Morning Post published on 11 February 2026 an article titled "China Sends Envoy to Libya after Embassy Shuttered for More Than a Decade" by Jevans Nyabiage.
China has appointed a new ambassador to the Libyan Government of National Unity in Tripoli following the reopening of its embassy there last November. The embassy closed in 2014 for security reasons.
Foreign Affairs published on 11 February 2026 an article titled "How the War in Sudan Could End" by Volker Perthes, German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
The author argues that both the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces may have reached the point where they believe it will be difficult to make more territorial gains at an acceptable cost. Consequently, coordinated international pressure on both belligerents could result in a ceasefire, a first step towards peace.
The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs published on 7 February 2026 an article titled "The United States, China, and AI Competition in Africa: Lessons for the Global South" by Alice Chen, Kobre & Kim LLP, and Neel U. Sukhatme, University of Michigan Law School.
The article compares US and Chinese approaches to artificial intelligence (AI) exports in Africa and examines how these disparate approaches have produced both downstream benefits and challenges for the region. Overall, the United States focus on domestic policy and corporate activity and China's focus on state strategy and infrastructure have presented unique opportunities and risks for African countries. It concludes with policy recommendations for countries in the Global South to maximize benefits and mitigate risks associated with US-China AI competition.
Semafor published on 19 January 2026 a commentary titled "The Flaws of 'Trade Not Aid'" by Daniele Nyirandutiye, Desmos Capital Partners.
The State Department unveiled early last year a "Commercial Diplomacy Strategy for Africa" that focused on trade and investment as the centerpiece of engagement. The author of the commentary in Semafor argues that trade and aid were never meant to compete. When strategically aligned, they unlock Africa's growth. But commercial diplomacy without development capacity is not viable. US private direct investment can play a more useful role, but only if there are adequate incentives in Washington and technical capacity at embassies to assist the private sector.
Comment: The author makes a particularly good point when it comes to trade. US goods trade with sub-Saharan Africa peaked in 2008 and has generally declined since, due primarily to the sharp reduction by the United States in the importation of African oil. But US goods exports to sub-Saharan Africa have never been impressive, peaking at $25 billion in 2014 and remaining at less than $20 billion in subsequent years. While increased US-Africa trade is an important goal for both parties and should be encouraged, it is utter fantasy to conclude that trade will replace aid.
The Rift Valley Institute published in 2026 a paper titled "Rethinking Aid in Sudan and South Sudan."
More than 30 grassroots and international non-governmental organizations convened in Kampala, Uganda, in November 2025 to discuss the future of development and humanitarian aid to Sudan and South Sudan in view of the dramatic contraction of assistance, especially as a result of the dismantlement of USAID. They proposed numerous recommendations to deal with the crisis.
The New Arab published on 9 February 2026 an article titled "The Growing Saudi-UAE Power Struggle in the Horn of Africa" by Jonathan Fenton-Harvey.
The author reviews the Horn of Africa from the standpoint of Saudi-UAE involvement in the numerous disputes in the region and increasing competition, especially in Sudan and Somalia/Somaliland.
China-Africa Security Radar published on 9 February 2026 a commentary titled "Can Chinese Peacekeepers Actually Change Anything in Abyei?" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.
Abyei is an oil rich region along the Sudan-South Sudan border where the China National Petroleum Corporation has been the major operator. A UN peacekeeping force (UNISFA) with Chinese participation is stationed there. The author questions whether the newest Chinese peacekeeping unit assigned to UNISFA will make any difference in the outcome.
Modern Diplomacy published on 9 February 2026 an article titled "U.S. Tests China's Grip on African Minerals Ahead of Cape Town Indaba" by Sana Khan.
The US strategy for accessing African critical minerals relies on trading structures that steer African mineral output into US-aligned supply chains still dominated by Chinese refiners. Washington is seeking to influence mineral flows without replicating China's capital intensive, asset-heavy model. This approach reduces political and operational exposure but also limits control.
The China Global South Project published on 9 February 2026 an article titled "China's Export Surge to Africa in 2025 Complicates Efforts to Rebalance Trade" by Christian Geraud Neema Byamungu.
In 2025, China's exports to Africa rose 25.8 percent while imports from Africa grew only 5.4 percent. The dollar value of Chinese exports to Africa was $225 billion versus $123 billion worth of imports from Africa, leaving Africa with a major trade deficit.
Africa's five largest recipients of Chinese goods were Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Liberia, and Algeria. Africa's five largest exporters to China were South Africa, DRC, Angola, Guinea, and Zambia, all oil and/or mineral exporting countries.
Reuters published on 10 February 2026 a major report titled "Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train RSF Fighters, Sources Say" by Giulia Paravicini and Reade Levinson.
The journalists report that Ethiopia is hosting a secret camp to train thousands of fighters for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group in neighboring Sudan. Located inside Ethiopia about 32 kilometers from the Sudan/South Sudan border, the camp had 4,300 RSF fighters undergoing military training as of early January. The recruits are mainly Ethiopian but also include nationals from Sudan and South Sudan, including from the SPLM-N militia that controls territory in Sudan's neighboring Blue Nile State.
Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp's construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the camp. Satellite imagery confirms existence of the camp and has also detected new drone operations in the vicinity. The camp constitutes the first direct evidence of Ethiopia's involvement in Sudan's civil war.
Nigeria's Newstimes published on 8 February 2026 an article titled "FG Issues Deadlines to Chinese Road Contractors."
The government of Nigeria warned China Harbour Engineering Company and its sister firm, China Harbour Engineering and Maintenance Company, that it has received complaints of substandard work, slow mobilization, and environmental hazards on key road projects across the country. The government called on the Chinese companies to take remedial measures, adding it would no longer tolerate poor execution, undue delays, or disregard for contractual standards.
