Partition Is Not the Answer to the Sudan Conflict

 Foreign Affairs published on 8 April 2026 an article titled "Don't Partition Sudan Again: Splitting It Didn't Work in the Past and Won't Work Now" by Francis M. Deng and Ahmed Kodouda.

Both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) insist they are fighting to preserve a unified Sudan, but the longer the current geographical division persists, the harder it will be to put the country together again.  

The 2011 independence of South Sudan offers a cautionary tale.  Any effort to formalize the split between the SAF and RSF-controlled parts of Sudan would not resolve the conflict's root causes.  Another partition of Sudan would also destabilize its neighbors.    

New China-Libya Shipping Route via Suez Canal

 The Libyan Express published on 4 April 2026 an article titled "New Maritime Corridor Links China to Libya via Suez."

China is opening a new shipping route from its port of Qingdao on the Yellow Sea through the Red Sea and Suez Canal to connect with the ports of Benghazi and Misrata in Libya. The route strengthens trade between Asia and the Mediterranean and offers an alternative to traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.   

Podcast on Prospects for a Cease Fire in Sudan

 The International Crisis Group posted on 7 April 2026 a 42-minute podcast titled "After Three Years of War in Sudan, What Hope for a Ceasefire" hosted by Richard Atwood with Shewit Woldemichael and Alan Boswell.  

The Iran war has not yet had a significant impact on the situation in Sudan beyond driving up prices of everything and causing fuel shortages.  If the Iran war continues, it could have a huge negative impact on the food situation in Sudan.  

The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) control most of Darfur and West Kordofan while the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) control most of the northeastern and eastern parts of the country.  Sudan is effectively partitioned between the RSF and the SAF.  The major battle fronts today are along the Chad border, South Sudan border, and Ethiopian border. 

The RSF political program has been a failure.  Noone has recognized the RSF government.  The SAF has improved its position and is the dominant actor in the country today.  While SAF fortunes have improved most Sudanese probably do not want the military to remain in power indefinitely.  

The RSF continues to receive strong support from the UAE while the SAF has a degree of support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Eritrea.  The most worrying new dynamic is the deterioration of relations between the SAF and Ethiopia.  Differences over Nile water usage and Egyptian and Eritrean support for the SAF contribute to Ethiopia's concerns.  

Massad Boulos, President Trump's special envoy for Africa, continues to seek a ceasefire as part of the Quad (US, Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia).  The effort is currently lacking high level pressure.  RSF and SAF positions on a ceasefire remain far apart.  Both sides believe they hold a strong military position.  Only major outside pressure on them will likely change the situation.

There is considerable concern among the outside actors about the role of Islamist forces in the SAF, which complicates a resolution.  In the meantime, the Sudan conflict continues to destabilize the Red Sea region.  

China-Africa Trade Increases, but So Do African Trade Deficits

 The Institute for Security Studies published on 2 April 2026 a paper titled "FOCAC Recycled: Preferential Access, Same Old Problem" by Marvellous Ngundu.  

Since 2000, Africa-China trade has expanded dramatically from less than $10 billion to over $348 billion in 2025.  Yet beneath this growth lies a persistent structural imbalance.  Africa's trade deficit with China has widened from negligible levels in the early 2000s to over $100 billion in 2025.

Beginning on 1 May 2026 China is implementing a zero-tariff policy for all but one African country in an effort to rectify this imbalance.  But the change risks entrenching existing trade patterns in which value addition occurs elsewhere.  As a result, higher trade volumes may not translate into more inclusive or structurally transformative outcomes for African economies.

The core issue is not tariffs, but industrialization.  Africa's trade position will only shift when it exports more manufactured and semi-processed goods.  China's duty-free initiative presents both an opportunity and a test.  It expands market access but highlights the limitations without the capability.

Limitations of Western Efforts to End War in Sudan

 Foreign Policy published on 6 April 2024 an analysis titled "Horrors in Sudan Highlight Deterioration of Western Diplomatic Corps."

There is little willingness by the West to end Sudan's conflict, but there is also little ability to do anything.  Western states have minimal leverage with the two major combatants: The Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.  

Ethiopia-China Debt Talks

 The Ethiopian News Agency posted on 3 April 2026 an article titled "Landmark Ethiopia-China Talks Unlock Debt Deal, New Airport Financing."

Discussions between the Ethiopian and Chinese ministers of finance "marked a meaningful step" in restructuring Ethiopia's existing debt stock.  They reportedly reached agreement on debt treatment but did not sign a final agreement.

Ethiopia Today published on 3 April 2026 an article titled "From Dollars to Yuan: Ethiopia and China Move Toward a New Era of Financial Cooperation."

Reporting on a meeting between the governors of the National Bank of Ethiopia and the People's Bank of China, this account said the two countries are exploring an aggressive shift toward the Chinese Renminbi (RMB) to bypass the U.S. dollar in bilateral trade.

Chinese Buying Luxury Houses in Zimbabwe

 Bloomberg published on 3 April 2026 an article titled "For China's Rich, The New Must Have Is a Luxury Home in Zimbabwe."

Chinese companies have been drawn to Zimbabwe for its mineral wealth.  Increasingly, wealthy Chinese immigrants are paying cash for luxury homes in the capital of Harare, driving up housing prices in the process.  

Russian Trade and Investment Lags in Africa

 The Intel Drop posted on 31 March 2026 an article titled "Russia-Africa Summit: Russia's New Chapter on Africa Trade and Economic Collaboration" by Kester Kenn Klomegah.

If Russia intends to be a major player in Africa, it must open Russia to imports from Africa and increase significantly Russian foreign direct investment in the continent.  Otherwise, it will increasingly fall behind the economic engagement efforts of China, the United States, and India.  

The Iran War Reshapes the Red Sea Region

 The International Crisis Group posted on 2 April 2026 a 36-minute podcast titled "How the Iran War Is Reshaping the Region" with Alan Boswell and Hafsa Halawa, independent political analyst.

The war in Iran is already resulting in shortages of fuel, energy, and electricity in the Red Sea region.  Over the longer term, it will likely cause higher inflation and food shortages due to diminished access to imported food and fertilizer, 40 percent of which passes through the Strait of Hormuz.  The fertilizer issue is exacerbated because it does not have a long shelf life.

Large diasporas in the Gulf states from countries like Ethiopia may start returning home as jobs shut down.  Gulf state investment in the Horn of Africa, which had been growing rapidly, is likely to fall significantly.  

The war may force Gulf states to refocus their national security strategies as they assess freedom of navigation and support for factions or governments in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.  Saudi support for the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) may decline because of Iran's ties with the SAF. The UAE is likely to continue its support for Ethiopia.

The war is likely to exacerbate existing tension between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  Egypt and Turkey will need to reassess their strategies in the region.  The war comes on top of Israel's recognition of Somaliland, which already exacerbated Gulf state security relationships.  

Saudi Arabia has shifted oil exports to the port of Yanbu in the Red Sea.  If the Houthis decide to attack international shipping in the Red Sea, this could end the shipment of oil to Asia by closing the Bab el-Mandeb choke point.  It would still be possible to ship oil from Yanbu north through the Suez Canal to Europe.  

The Iran war makes clear that the regional security situation is now completely interconnected.  

Africa and Global Terrorism Index 2026

 The Institute for Economics and Peace posted on 30 March 2026 its "Global Terrorism Index 2026."

Of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism globally in 2025, six were in Africa: Burkina Faso (2), Niger (3), Nigeria (4), Mali (5), Somalia (7) and Democratic Republic of Congo (8).  Nevertheless, deaths in sub-Saharan Africa fell in ten countries while rising in just four.  Deaths in the Sahel region, however, accounted for more than half of all terrorism-related deaths globally.

Terrorism remains highly concentrated.  Just under 70 percent of deaths from terrorism occurred in only five countries: Pakistan, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, and the DRC.  Nigeria recorded the largest increase in 2025, with fatalities rising by 46 percent to 750.  Islamic State West Africa Province and Boko Haram were responsible for 80 percent of all terrorism deaths in Nigeria.

The DRC also reported a significant increase in terrorism, reaching its worst ever position on the index.  Deaths in the DRC rose by nearly 28 percent to 467, driven by attacks carried out by the IS-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces, which targeted civilians, churches, hospitals, and funerals.

Somalia's al-Shabaab, while experiencing a decline in terrorist deaths for the third consecutive year, launched its Shabelle Offensive in early 2025.  

The Houthis Cautious Support for Iran

 AEI's Critical Threats published on 3 April 2026 an analysis titled "Houthi Escalation Calculus Following Cautious Entry into the Iran War" by Liam Karr and Brian Carter.

The Iran-backed Houthis threatened to join Iran's campaign with attacks across the region designed to coerce the United States and Israel to make concessions in negotiations with Iran and to deter further military escalation against Iran.  But the Houthis are unlikely to follow through on these threats unless the US and its allies cross certain Houthi or Iranian red lines, such as the Gulf states entering the war or ground operations against Iran, to avoid retaliation from the US and its allies that would jeopardize the groups domestic position. 

The Houthis have conducted several attacks targeting southern Israel since March 27, marking the group's first involvement in the war.  Attacks on Israel minimize the risk of entanglement with the Gulf states or the United States.  They draw retaliatory Israeli strikes on Yemen that only temporarily damage Houthi infrastructure while further rallying popular support for the group.

Russian Military Trafficking in Africa

 The American Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) published on 2 April 2026 a paper titled "False Promises: Russian Military Trafficking in Africa" by Sarahelena Marrapodi, FPRI.

Some 1,800 African men signed contracts to work in Russia as drivers, security guards, and other civilian jobs only to find themselves shipped off to the frontlines of Russia's war against Ukraine.  The story provides background on the recruitment efforts and suggests that it may constitute human trafficking.  

The Sexual Violence Crisis in Sudan's Darfur

 Medicins san Frontieres just published a study titled "'There Is Something I Want to Tell You . . .'  Surviving the Sexual Violence Crisis in Darfur."

Accounts of sexual violence in Darfur have surfaced most visibly during moments of intense fighting in Sudan's Darfur region, often along ethnic lines as a form of collective punishment, part of the broader pattern of atrocities inflicted on civilians.  But in the long shadow of conflict, women and girls continue to face sexual violence as a routine and inescapable reality even after the fighting subsides: on roads, in markets, in fields, in their homes, and during displacement.

The testimonies shared in this report demonstrate that sexual violence in Darfur is both woven into daily life and has become a defining feature of the war itself.  These voices leave no doubt as to the gravity of this crisis, revealing the scale, pervasiveness, and deliberate nature of sexual violence in Darfur.

Most of the perpetrators were armed, non-civilian men and the survivors often identified paramilitary Rapid Support Force fighters as the attackers.

Yemen's Iran-Backed Houthis Continue to Eschew Attacks on Red Sea Shipping

 AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 2 April 2026 an article titled "Red Sea" by Liam Karr.

While the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have attacked Israel on several occasions since 27 March, they have not resumed attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, indicating a restrained approach that attempts to avoid major regional escalation.  

Iran War Increases China's Interaction with North Africa

 The Stimson Center published on 27 March 2026 a paper titled "How Iran War Is Reshaping China's Geo-Economic Cooperation with North Africa" by Chuchu Zhang, Fudan University.

The war in Iran and closure of the Strait of Hormuz have caused China to pursue a dual-track strategy of multi-source procurement and accelerated green transformation, deliberately broadening its oil and gas import footprint while fast tracking the development of new energy technologies.  North Africa has emerged as a pivotal arena for deepened geo-economic cooperation.  

Beijing Shows Different Look in Africa Compared to US

 China-Africa Security Radar posted on 2 April 2026 a commentary titled "Beijing Capitalizes on Washington's Aggression" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.  

China's Vice President Han Zheng visited Kenya, South Africa, and Seychelles in March.  The author argues the visit was timed in the context of Washington's capture of the Venezuelan president and the US/Israeli war against Iran.  

Both developments demonstrated US willingness to deploy military power unilaterally and with little deference to international law.  This juxtaposition of events permitted Han Zheng to underscore to an African audience China's message of South-South solidarity, sovereign equality, and development partnership.   

Chinese Infrastructure Projects in Africa Leave No Role for Local Urban Planners

 The Conversation published on 30 March 2026 a commentary titled "China Is Helping Build Africa's Cities, but Its Approach Sidelines Local Urban Planners and Residents" by Ding Fei, Cornell University.

Chinese-financed infrastructure projects are transforming skylines and daily life across Africa.  While China delivers an impressive volume of infrastructure, it risks reinforcing Africa's national government dominance in decision-making on urban infrastructure development.  African local governments and residents are excluded from the project planning and negotiating process.  

The Communist Party of China Reaches Out to Africa

 E-International Relations posted on 1 April 2026 my short paper titled "The Communist Party of China Reaches Out to Africa."

This is a post-COVID-19 update of efforts by the International Department of the Communist Party of China (ID-CPC) to strengthen ties with political parties in Africa.  COVID-19 significantly interrupted the ID-CPC's interaction with African political parties. The ID-CPC has now returned to a high degree of engagement with them.     

Russia's Security Program in Africa after the Wagner Group

 The South African Institute of International Affairs published in February 2026 a study titled "Back to the Shadows: Russia's African Security Engagements Since Prigozhin" by Ivan U. Klyszcz, Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn, Estonia.  

Russia continues to deploy military personnel and conduct information operations to shape regional politics in Africa.  Since 2023, Moscow has taken tighter control, with Kremlin-linked figures, state agencies, and federal funding driving these efforts.  Russian activities reflect the Kremlin's top foreign policy priorities but are constrained by competing demands, especially the war in Ukraine.

Ethiopia Announces Construction of Three New Dams on Blue Nile

 The New Arab published on 24 March 2026 an article titled "Egyptian Outrage as Ethiopia Announces Plans for More Dams on Blue Nile" by Saleh Salem.  

Ethiopia has announced plans to construct 3 new dams on the Blue Nile, the location of the recently completed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).  The 3 dams will be constructed within 4 to 7 years and will be able to start operating simultaneously.  Costing $3.5 billion each, the 3 dams will increase Ethiopia's electricity generation by 20 to 25 percent.

Egypt has reacted harshly to the announcement, arguing that the dams will further increase water shortages downstream when they begin operating as is the case with the GERD.  

Comment: It is true that the GERD and the 3 new dams hold back water from downstream Sudan and Egypt during the period when Ethiopia is filling the reservoir behind the dams.  But once the reservoir is full as in the case of the GERD today, Blue Nile River water flows normally. The only serious concern for downstream Sudan and Egypt occurs if there are several years of drought in the Nile Basin, reducing the water flow for all three countries, including the amount of water in the reservoirs of the dams that produce hydropower for Ethiopia.   

Ethiopia Says It Attracted $13 Billion in Mostly Chinese Investment

Ethiopia's Institute of Foreign Affairs posted on 30 March 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia's Investment Surge and the Strategic Repositioning of Addis Ababa as Africa's Diplomatic-Economic Nexus" by Kena Seyife.  

The "Invest in Ethiopia 2026 Forum" attracted over 800 investors from more than 50 countries and secured over $13 billion in investment commitments.  China's Ming Yang Smart Energy Group Ltd. committed to invest $10 billion in green ammonia and electrical equipment.  The article cautions that Ethiopia's success will depend on its ability to translate investments into tangible economic transformation. 

Comment: Ethiopia is facing several internal security challenges that must be addressed before this kind of investment actually materializes.  It will be important to monitor how many of these commitments valued at $13 billion result in completed projects.    

China's Zero Tariffs for Africa Provide Positive Publicity at Little Cost (in French)

 Thierry Pairault posted on 28 March 2026 a working paper titled "Tarif zero: un petit geste qui ne coute presque rien."

This is the first of two analyses Thierry Pairault has posted on the impact of Beijing's decision to allow imports from 53 African countries to enter China duty free beginning 1 May.  He explains this is an inexpensive gesture that will not have much practical impact. The second working paper was reposted on 30 March below.

China's trade surplus with Africa continues to grow.  China exports value-added goods to Africa while Africa exports mostly raw materials and some agricultural products to China.  A small number of African countries account for most of the continent's exports to China.  

China's zero tariff treatment of African imports may benefit some agricultural products such as coffee and tobacco, but it will not change significantly existing China-Africa trade patterns.  

US-China Competition for Minerals in DRC

 Mining Focus Africa published on 30 March 2026 an article titled "Democratic Republic of Congo and China Deepen Mining Ties Amid Global Minerals Race" by Michael Van Wyk.

The focus of the most recent China-DRC minerals collaboration includes geological data sharing, investment protection, and ensuring that more raw materials are processed in the DRC rather than exported in unrefined form.  The agreement coincides with a US strategic partnership with the DRC aimed at boosting Western investment and reducing reliance on Chinese-controlled supply chains.  

Why Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis Have Not Yet Resumed Attacks on Red Sea Shipping

 The House of Saud published on 27 March 2026 an analysis titled "The Houthis Could End Saudi Arabia's War in Forty-Eight Hours" by Abdul Mohammed.

Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis have not resumed attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea since the United States and Israel began bombing Iran.  The Houthis did recently resume attacks, however, against Israel.  The question is why the Houthis have not supported Iran by resuming the disruption of shipping through the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb choke point, putting even greater pressure on oil prices.

The reasons why the Houthis have held back so far include (1) they may be holding fire in order to serve as a strategic card to be played later by Iran; (2) they experienced earlier bombing by the United States that resulted in significant damage and don't want to deal with that situation again; (3) they see value in maintaining the detente they have with Saudi Arabia; and (4) they control a large civilian population which they don't want to endanger by attacks from Saudi Arabia or the United States.

The author also identifies four possible triggers that could lead to a resumption of Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.  

China's Zero Tariffs in Africa Likely to Have Minimal Impact (in French)

 Thierry Pairault posted a working paper on 30 March 2026 titled "Tarif zero: Bruxelles face a Pekin."

Beginning on 1 May 2026, China will implement a zero-tariff policy for African countries.  Pairault argues that in the few sectors where the zero tariff could theoretically encourage African exports of processed or manufactured goods to China, Beijing has little interest in allowing them to develop as they would compete with actively protected industries.  He then demonstrates that the import structures of the European Union and China shed light on this asymmetry.