Insurance Journal posted on 30 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis' Red Sea Attacks Prompt London Insurers to Widen High-Risk Zone" by Jonathan Saul.
As a result of Iran-backed Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, London insurers have expanded the area in the Red Sea subject to higher rates. Even small changes to war insurance add hundreds of thousands of dollars in extra costs for a seven-day voyage.
The Ichikowitz Family Foundation just published its massive African Youth Survey 2026. It held face-to-face interviews with about 5,000 Africans aged 18-24 from 16 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
It covers many issues, but the focus here is perceptions of China and the United States. African youth see China (79 percent) and the United States (81 percent) as the most influential foreign actors, although China's influence is seen as somewhat more positive.
The survey looked at the influence of the US, China, Brazil, EU, UK, Germany, France, India, and Russia. The only country whose influence was seen as less positive than the United States (85 percent) was Russia (83 percent).
About 3 in 5 youth are optimistic about Africa's future during the Trump administration, especially on military support and security. Just under half believe the closure of USAID will negatively impact their country, with healthcare and disease prevention seen as the areas most affected.
China and India are increasingly viewed as more favorable partners than the United States, a sentiment shaped in part by the return of the Trump administration.
The South African Institute of International Affairs recently posted a 16-minute podcast titled "South Africa and Russia: It's Complicated."
The Russia-China relationship generates uncomfortable headlines today. It is based on the strong anti-apartheid position of the Soviet Union. In addition, Vladimir Putin and former South African President Jacob Zuma solidified the ties.
Russia's invasion of Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine complicated the relationship. South Africa fell back on a policy of non-alignment. By 2022, there was confusion in Pretoria concerning policy towards Russia.
Today, South Africa-Russia trade is negligible and Russian investment in the country is modest. South Africa and Russia, both members of BRICS, agree on the need to revise the world order but not much else.
Asia Times published on 27 July 2026 an article titled "China's Zero-tariff Play Aims to Lock in African Loyalty" by Bob Savic.
China's zero-tariff access for 63 countries--53 of them in Africa--is a deliberate geostrategic lever in Beijing's long-term competition with the United States and Europe for influence in the Global South. It is designed to offer unfettered, predictable, and large-scale access for African exports in contrast to protectionist markets in the United States and Europe.
The zero-tariff policy also positions Africa's growing population as a significant long-term market for Chinese goods and services and helps China to shape the rules of global commerce.
Comment: While this may be China's goal, it must still deal with the fact that Beijing exports far more to Africa than it imports from Africa, and the initial evidence suggests that the zero-tariff policy is not having a significant impact on this situation.
Ethio Negari published on 28 July 2026 an article titled "China-Africa Robotic Surgery Training Centre Opens in Addis Ababa."
The China-Africa Robotic Surgery Center that opened in Addis Ababa uses AI-driven healthcare techniques. The first round of training involved 40 healthcare professionals from Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, and Libya.
Al-Monitor published on 29 July 2026 an article titled "China in Touch with Yemen's Houthis to Allow Ships to Sail Through Red Sea, Sources Say" by Jonathan Saul, Parisa Hafezi, Timour Azhari, and Chen Aizhu.
Beijing has asked the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen to promise safe passage for its oil tankers transporting crude from Saudi Arabia's Yanbu terminal in the Red Sea south through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point. China clears each shipment with the Houthis, who have developed good relations with Beijing.
Reuters published on 28 July 2026 an article titled "US Backs Madagascar Rare Earths Project in Push to Loosen China's Supply Chain Grip."
The US International Development Finance Corporation agreed to commit up to $4.84 million for pilot plant work, laboratory testing, and environmental programs of a $150 million rare earths project in Madagascar. The deal highlights Washington's effort to develop alternative sources of minerals controlled by China.
The New York Times published on 28 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis Claim Strike on Another Saudi Oil Tanker" by Pranav Baskar and Shipin Hakim.
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen said they targeted on 28 July a Saudi oil tanker, the NCC Ghazal, in the Red Sea with missiles. Saudi authorities did not confirm the attack.
African Arguments posted on 21 July 2026 a commentary titled "Sudan's Peace Process Is Negotiating a War That No Longer Exists" by Ezzat Khairi, a Sudan political analyst.
Diplomatic assumptions for ending the war in Sudan remain where they were in April 2023. Peace initiatives approach Sudan as a two-sided conflict between a national army and a paramilitary rebellion. That model no longer fits the war. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) now contain armed movements, tribal formations, ideological brigades, local defense groups, and commanders with their own constituencies and expectations of the postwar order. The leaders of the SAF and RSF do not fully control the coalitions supporting them.
The Conversation published on 16 July 2026 a discussion summary titled "Africa's Greater Horn Region Is Facing a Looming Polycrisis Fueled by Conflict, Prices, Climate and Disease" by Daniel Maxwell, Alex de Waal, Luka Kuol, Merry Fitzpatrick, and Peter Hailey.
The impacts of a strengthening El Nino and effects of the war in Iran combined with existing prolonged crisis and conflict in the Horn of Africa are leading potentially to a major, multicountry polycrisis.
The Diplomat published on 24 July 2026 a commentary titled "As the World Courts Beijing, Namibia Shows How Africa Can Sharpen Its China Strategy" by Huiyi Chen and Ovigwe Eguegu.
Namibian President Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah made a weeklong state visit to China in early July. She arrived with a clear agenda, negotiated a Namibia-relevant itinerary, and left with numerous tangible agreements. The authors urge other African leaders to follow her example.
The Hollings Center for International Dialogue published in July 2026 a brief titled "Securing Strategic Waters Across the MENA Region: The Red Sea."
The current threat in the Red Sea is not confined to the closure of the geographical Bab el-Mandeb choke point. It is shaped by persistent uncertainty caused by the security crises in the wider region.
The threat cannot be addressed through conventional naval tools alone, nor reduced to a piracy or law enforcement problem. The brief recommends incremental cooperation, capacity building, and risk mitigation measures.
Foreign Affairs published on 27 July 2026 an article titled "Can Renewables Industrialize Africa? The Iran War Is Driving the Continent Toward Chinese-Backed Green Energy" by Mohamed Adow, director of Power Shift Africa, a climate think tank in Kenya.
The war on Iran is accelerating a determination among African countries to reduce their dependence on imported fossil fuels and to turn toward renewable power. As a result, African countries are now leaning toward the model advanced by China, in which abundant, low-cost electricity from renewables underpins industrialization and economic growth.
In the meantime, the United States is ceding a role in Africa's clean energy transition to China and risks losing diplomatic influence on the continent. Washington has not grasped Africa's new energy reality.
Ethiopia Insight published on 27 July 2026 a commentary titled "Amhara Nationalism Faces Historic Choice in National Dialogue" by Henok Ambachew, a pseudonym for a former lecturer at Bahir Dar University.
Ethiopia's ruling Prosperity Party has replaced the EPRDF coalition model with a single national party, which the author says is based on a different organizing principle called "demographic majoritarianism."
The Prosperity Party increasingly reflects the numerical weight of Ethiopia's population. The 45-member executive committee consists of 10 Oromo members, 8 Amharas, 4 Somalis with the remaining distributed among other regional constituencies. This was not the outcome desired by many Amhara elites.
The American Conservative published on 22 July 2026 a commentary titled "The Fight Inside Trump's State Department Is About Power--Not Expertise" by Phillip Linderman.
The author argues that the Trump administration is trying to salvage the US Foreign Service from the "globalist and woke values" that dominate professional diplomatic services. But the "old guard" in the State Department is stymieing this effort in the belief that the situation in the Department will return to normal after Trump leaves office.
For decades, the State Department's machinery has reflexively favored the globalist or internationalist Foreign Service officer over the American First officer. Now an administration is trying to rebalance the institution.
The old guard understands that accepting Trump's approach would mean surrendering much of its power to shape foreign policy. That is why its members defended "the corrupt and dysfunctional USAID." He concludes: "This is a fight about Washington power, not diplomatic expertise."
Comment: There is a grain of truth to the author's core argument. Foreign Service officers tend to be globalist and internationalist in their approach to foreign affairs. That has also been the approach of all post-World War II administrations with the exception of the first Trump administration. Foreign Service officers, especially at the senior level, also want to have an impact on the foreign policy decision making process and not meekly parrot every decision that comes from on high.
This is where his analysis falls apart. There is a role for offering a slightly different approach or even a contrary point of view backed up by sound knowledge and analysis. If it is not accepted, then obviously the decision from "on high" must be accepted. In the vast majority of cases in my experience, this has been the response from the Foreign Service. If significant differences remained, the Foreign Service officer was moved to a different position or resigned.
A Foreign Service officer has every right to disagree, for example, with the author's definition of USAID as "corrupt and dysfunctional" because he is flat-out wrong and the administration erred in dismantling the organization. But the Trump administration made the decision to shut USAID down, and it is up to the Foreign Service to implement the new policy on foreign assistance. I suspect the overwhelming majority of Foreign Service officers today are doing just that.
The author argues that the "public record" suggests senior Foreign Service officers' reluctance to implement the president's decisions fully and faithfully is widespread. The "public record" he cites is a flawed analysis titled "Why Does Trump Hate the State Department" published by The American Conservative on July 20 and reposted below on July 21.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 21 July 2026 an analysis titled "Ghana's Illegal Gold Mining Crisis: A National Security Threat with Regional Implications" by Edem Srem.
Ghana is experiencing an environmental crisis due to illegal, small-scale, and unregulated gold mining known locally as galamsey. According to one account, an estimated 50,000 illegal Chinese miners are now operating in Ghana, supported by broader networks of financiers, equipment suppliers, transporters, intermediaries, and informal refiners. Chinese operators and equipment have accelerated the mechanization of mining, which has led to an increase in environmental damage.
Comment: The estimate of 50,000 Chinese miners in the country seems too high, but galamsey has been a long-standing irritant in Ghana-China relations.
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 23 July 2026 an analysis titled "Losing Control of the West's Longstanding Interests in Seychelles" by Wojciech Pawlus.
The author suggests that the West is losing out in the democratic Indian Ocean archipelago of Seychelles to India, China, Russia, and the Gulf States. He believes the current government is becoming more autocratic and urges Washington, Brussels, London, and Paris to reach out before it is too late.
The New Humanitarian published on 16 July 2026 an article titled "As War Fears Grow in Ethiopia, Women Soldiers Recount the Sexual Violence They Experienced" by Mehret Okubay Berehe and Hilary Matfess.
During the 2020-2022 conflict in Tigray, females suffered sexual violence by Ethiopian federal government forces, Eritrean Defense Forces, and Amhara militia. This article, however, focuses on sexual abuse of female Tigrayan soldiers at the hands of commanders and officers in the Tigray Defense Force, the organization where they served.
The New York Times published on 24 July 2026 an article titled "New Tariffs as Old Ones Expire: The Latest on Trump's Trade War" by Tony Romm, Edison Wu, and Lazaro Gamio.
On 24 July, the Trump administration imposed new duties on imports from more than 80 countries as previous 10 percent global duties expired. The new tariffs range between 10 and 12.5 percent.
All five countries in North Africa now face the 12.5 percent tariff but sub-Saharan Africa seems to benefit from the new situation as only Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa are impacted--all at the 12.5 percent rate.
Marine Radar posted on 24 July 2026 an article titled "Two Chinese Supertankers Exit Red Sea Despite Houthi Blockade."
Two Chinese-operated supertankers chartered by COSCO transported Saudi oil safely through the south end of the Red Sea in spite of the Houthi blockade. They carried about 4 million gallons of Saudi crude for destinations in China. The Houthis have not targeted Chinese-operated tankers.
Aljazeera published on 21 July 2026 an article titled "Who Is Driving Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, and Why?"
US senior adviser for Africa, Massad Boulos, recently held meetings in Cairo with the foreign ministers of Somalia and Eritrea as part of an effort to prevent another regional crisis or build a broader diplomatic framework.
Comment: These meetings may well have been routine diplomacy, constituting less than is implied in the Aljazeera lead to the article.
AEIs Critical Threats posted on 23 July 2026 an analysis titled "Houthi Blockade in the Red Sea" by Michael DeAngelo, Liam Karr, and Alexsandar Wiebler.
The Iranian-backed Houthi blockade of the south end of the Red Sea has already disrupted shipping in the Red Sea, causing increased costs and transit delays. The Houthi blockade will further increase fuel shortages, negatively impact African countries that rely on Saudi fuel shipments, and strain the global economy.
The Hill published on 22 July 2026 a commentary titled "The Dismantling of USAID and the Firing of Its Staff Was Illegal" by J. Brian Atwood and Kevin E. Burns.
The Trump administration has violated the Civil Service Reform Act of 1883, updated in 1978, by firing most USAID personnel without offering an opportunity for due process.
The Merit Systems Protection Board ruled that the president can remove career officials without due process. Fired USAID employees are appealing this decision through the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
The South African Government News Agency posted on 20 July 2026 a press release titled "South Africa, China Deepen AI and Science Partnership at Global Summit."
South Africa and China recently agreed to expand cooperation in the fields of artificial intelligence, joint research centers and laboratories, space science and astronomy, quantum computing, cybersecurity, and the Young Scientists Exchange Program.
The Environmental Justice Foundation published on 16 July 2026 a report titled "Cut and Run: Exposing Senegal as a Gateway for the Global Shark Fin Trade."
This report examines the nature and extent of shark finning on board foreign vessels that call at Dakar, Senegal. Shark finning is the practice of cutting off a shark's fins before throwing the body overboard. The fins are then sold for human consumption.
The Environmental Justice Foundation conducted 124 interviews with Indonesian and Filipino fishers who worked on board Chinese and Taiwanese tuna longliners operating in the region. The Chinese and Taiwanese fleets are repeatedly linked to shark finning in the region.
