The Associated Press published on 20 January 2025 an article titled "Yemen's Houthis Signal They'll Limit Attacks in Red Sea Corridor to Israeli Ships" by Jon Gambrell.
The Houthis in Yemen notified shippers on 19 January they will limit future attacks in the Red Sea corridor to Israeli-affiliated ships. The Houthis say they are ending attacks on other ships they previously targeted since November 2023.
The Guardian published on 22 January 2025 an article titled "China-Africa Trade Up 4.8pc to $295bn in 2024."
Total trade between China and Africa in 2024 grew by 4.8 percent over 2023 to $296 billion. Chinese exports to Africa rose 3.5 percent to $179 billion while African exports to China increased 6.9 percent to $117 billion.
This left the 54 African countries with a trade deficit of $62 billion in 2024, down from $64 billion in 2023. China exported finished goods to Africa while Africa exported raw materials and agricultural products to China.
China's elimination of tariffs on 98 percent of products imported from 21 African countries and zero tariffs on products from the 33 least developed Arican countries has done little to redress a persistent African trade deficit with China.
The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies published in January 2025 a study titled "Rule of Law and Independent Judiciary in Somalia" by Bashir M. Sheikh-Ali.
Somalia's judiciary has historically been weak and politically influenced, limiting its ability to uphold the rule of law. Somalia's Provisional Constitution does not resolve this problem.
The author advocates for the creation of strong legal frameworks and institutions, emphasizing that Somalia's cultural commitment to justice, if properly harnessed, can ignite a transformative legal renaissance in the country.
Defense Express published on 18 January 2025 an article titled "Algeria Chooses Chinese Type 056 Copy-Paste Warships Over Russian Corvettes."
About 85 percent of all equipment and weapons in the Algerian army are Russian made. In 2023, China delivered one Type 056 Corvette to Algeria to the consternation of Moscow. Algiers has now signed a deal with China for delivery of up to six corvettes, including one produced in an Algerian shipyard.
The International Crisis Group published on 21 January 2025 an analysis titled "Sudan's Calamitous War: Finding a Path Toward Peace."
This analysis looks at the role of outside countries in ending the catastrophe in Sudan. Outside actors working on a ceasefire may need to think in terms of a post-war government that makes difficult compromises on national and military leadership, as well as decentralized authority, while preserving space for civilian party representation.
The Washington Post published on 18 January 2025 an article titled "Sudan's Military Recaptured a City. Bodies Soon Filled the Streets" by Katharine Houreld, Hafiz Haroun, and Jonathan Baran.
After the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) recaptured the city of Wad Madani from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), there were reports of war crimes by the SAF, demonstrating that the Army engages in some of the same practices as the RSF. In this case, the victims were often migrants from South Sudan who had moved to Wad Madani.
The US Naval Institute News published on 17 January 2025 an article titled "Houthis Claim 7th Strike on Carrier Truman as Red Sea Conflict Continues" by Heather Mongilio.
Houthis in Yemen announced that they had carried out their 7th attack on the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group in the Red Sea. While the US has not officially responded to these claims, they appear to fall in the category of misinformation.
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 14 January 2025 an analysis titled "Russia's Options for Naval Basing in the Mediterranean After Syria's Tartus" by Edward Black and Sidharth Kaushal.
In the event that Russia must close its naval base at Tartus in Syria, Mediterranean replacement options are Libya and Algeria and Sudan on the Red Sea. Tobruk in Libya is the most likely alternative, but it comes with significant downsides.
The Atlantic Council published on 14 January 2025 a commentary titled "China Is Supporting the Houthis. Here's How the Trump Administration Can Respond" by Tuvia Gering and Jason M. Brodsky.
Chinese-linked ships stand out as being able to transit the Red Sea unimpeded by Houthi attacks. China is Iran's largest customer for exported oil and Iran is the most important supporter of the Houthis. China has not used its leverage over Iran and the Houthis to end their Red Sea attacks on international shipping. The article suggests why and offers recommendations for the Trump administration to counter the Houthis.
Time published on 16 January 2025 a commentary titled "Locals in Sudan Are Saving Lives that International Aid Agencies Can't Reach" by Karl Vick.
Sudan faces the world's largest humanitarian crisis, and the government has ceased to function. A grass roots campaign has created more than 600 pop-up community centers known as Emergency Response Rooms (EERs) to do what would normally be expected of a government.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury posted on 16 January 2025 a press release titled "Treasury Sanctions Leader of Sudanese Armed Forces and Weapons Supplier."
The US placed sanctions on Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the Defense Industries System, a procurement arm of the SAF. The sanctions resulted from "egregious war tactics" that constituted war crimes.
The New York Times published on 16 January 2025 an article titled "Sudan's Military Has Used Chemical Weapons Twice, U.S. Officials Say" by Declan Walsh and Julian E. Barnes.
Although not mentioned in the Treasury Department announcement, this report quotes US officials as stating that the SAF also used chemical weapons in Sudan.
The International Crisis Group posted on 16 January 2025 a 40-minute podcast titled "What to Expect from the New AU Mission in Somalia" with Paul Williams, George Washington University, and Omar Mahmood.
This is a discussion of the newly authorized five-year African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). It is arguably the most complex international peace mission in the world today. This is the third African Union peace mission in Somalia. AUSSOM is smaller in size compared to previous missions, but its purpose has not changed significantly from earlier missions. Williams discusses the challenges the Somali National Army faces working with AU peace forces.
The Council on Foreign Relations held on 16 January 2025 an hour-long podcast titled "Genocide in Sudan: A Conversation with U.S. Special Envoy Tom Perriello on the Ongoing War" hosted by Reuben Brigety.
This is a wide-ranging, thoughtful conversation with U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello based on his one-year role in this position just days before he finishes his service. He also brings into the discussion previous experience in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The Associated Press published on 15 January 2025 an article titled "India's Navy Launches Submarine, Warships to Guard against China's Presence in Indian Ocean" by Rafiq Maqbool and Ashok Sharma.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi commissioned this week at a Mumbai shipyard an India-made submarine, destroyer, and frigate in response to China's major naval buildup and growing effort to extend power into the Indian Ocean.
Aljazeera published on 14 January 2025 an article titled "Sudan Faces Possible Darfur Division as War Progresses, Say Analysts" by Mat Nashed.
Darfur, a region in western Sudan nearly the size of France, may become a separate entity under the control of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. If this happens, it could lead to additional geographical divisions in Sudan and the eventual collapse of the state.
Seatrade Maritime News published on 14 January 2025 an article titled "Over One Month since Last Confirmed Red Sea Attack on Shipping" by Gary Howard.
The last confirmed Houthi attack on Red Sea shipping took place on 10 December. This has been the quietest period for Houthi attacks since they began in late 2023. The likely explanation is the reduced availability of suitable targets and the military intervention by the United States and United Kingdom.
The Maritime Executive published on 13 January 2025 an article titled "China Wins Release of Fishing Boat Held off Somalia."
A Chinese fishing boat and its crew seized off Somalia by pirates in November has been released. The pirates demanded $10 million ransom for its release; China offered $1 million. It is unclear if China ultimately paid a ransom.
The Voice of America published on 13 January 2025 an article titled "Sahel Vacuum Provides Opportunity for China, Analysts Say" by Kate Bartlett.
As Western, especially French and American, influence decreases in Africa's Sahel region, China may be in a position to take advantage although, so far, Russia has been more aggressive. China is in a strong position to increase arms sales and military and police training but remains uninterested in kinetic military engagement.
The Hill published on 13 January 2025 an article titled "Sudan's Descent into Chaos Demands Urgent Global Action" by Imran Khalid.
The situation in Sudan is dire as the world continues to focus on crises such as Gaza and Ukraine. Sudan's path to stability hinges on its people, the engagement of regional powers, and the international community to craft a political solution that ends the chaos.
The conservative American Enterprise Institute published on 6 January 2025 a commentary titled "Eritrea Is the North Korea of Africa: America Must Act" by Michael Rubin.
The author argues that while U.S. forces have no business in Eritrea nor would their deployment be wise, "the United States should openly support regime change." He adds that incoming President Donald Trump should empower his National Security Council and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs "to help Eritreans rid the world of one of its worst regimes."
Comment: While Eritrea is poorly governed and no friend of the United States, U.S. government supported regime change is not the answer. This is a task for Eritreans themselves. Any concerted effort by the United States to change the government in Eritrea will almost certainly end badly and even be resented by many Africans who also have a negative opinion of the regime.
The Sudan Tribune published on 11 January 2025 an article titled "Sudan's RSF Leader Admits Defeat in Al Jazirah State, Vows to Fight On."
The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) recaptured Wad Madani, a strategic crossroads 170 kilometers southeast of Khartoum, from the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This was a major victory for the SAF just as it was for the RSF more than a year ago when it captured the town from the SAF. The RSF claimed the SAF victory was due to the use of Iranian drones, Eritrean forces, and Ethiopian Tigray militia fighters.
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published in January 2025 an analysis titled "Did Wagner Succeed in the Eyes of Its African and Middle Eastern Clients?" by Antonio Giustozzi, Joana de Deus Pereira, and David Lewis.
This Whitehall Report looks at the Wagner Group from the perspective of its clients in four case studies: Mali, Central African Republic, Mozambique, and Syria. In terms of support services such as training, advising and maintenance, Wagner's performance was rather undistinguished in the view of its clients. After the mutiny in 2023, most of Wagner's support services contracts were taken over without much trouble by the Russian Ministry of Defense.
With regard to Wagner's provision of ready-to-deploy combat units, as of 2024 it remained one of few entities willing to offer this service, as well as the most willing to deploy in very challenging environments. Attempts by the Russian Ministry of Defense to replace Wagner in such tasks following the mutiny were met with stubborn resistance by the Malian and CAR governments. The Syrian government, by contrast, was happy to see Wagner leave in 2023. In Mozambique, it was Wagner's leader Yevgeny Prigozhin who decided to bail out.
Overall, while Wagner was fairly successful in providing ready-to-deploy small armies in challenging environments, it was clearly exposed to the risk of ending up seriously embattled.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 7 January 2025 a commentary titled "What to Expect from Africa-China Relations in 2025" by Paul Nantulya.
China will continue to promote its governance model in Africa, enlist support to reshape global norms, secure the supply of critical minerals, strengthen party-to-party ties, and increase military outreach. The major items on the agenda of African countries are market access, balanced trade with China, and adding value to exports.
The China Global South Project published on 9 January 2025 a commentary titled "From 1991 to Today: The Significance of the Chinese Foreign Minister's Annual Africa Tour" by Christian Geraud Neema Byamungu.
Every year since 1991, China's foreign minister has made his first overseas visit to Africa. On his current visit, Wang Yi is visiting Namibia, Republic of Congo, Chad, and Nigeria. Each year much ink is spilled by China-Africa analysts trying to explain why the foreign minister visits the particular countries on the itinerary. The author rightly points out that these trips may simply be about normal, run-of-the-mill diplomacy and have no deeply strategic geopolitical or economically motivated explanation.
Deutsche Welle published on 8 January 2025 an article titled "Chinese FM's Africa Tour Is More than Symbolic" by Cai Nebe.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is making the 35th first overseas visit of the year to an African country. On this occasion, he is visiting Namibia, Republic of Congo, Chad, and Nigeria. This tradition has served China's African policy well over the years, especially when it is compared to the practices of Western governments.
