The International Crisis Group posted on 4 March 2026 a commentary titled "As Tensions Mount, Sudan Accuses Ethiopia of New Hostilities" by Alan Boswell.
Sudan has charged that Ethiopia is permitting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces to launch drones that strike locations inside Sudan and warned Addis Ababa of unspecified consequences. Tension in the Horn of Africa was already high; this just raises the temperature.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 5 March 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo, Liam Karr, and Elliot Nazar.
Sudan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation claimed that Ethiopia is allowing the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces to launch attack drones from Asosa airport in western Ethiopia against Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)-controlled territory in Sudan. Ethiopia has denied the charge.
If true, this situation could quickly get out of control and result in SAF retaliatory attacks against Ethiopia and encourage closer SAF relations with the Tigray People's Liberation Front.
The South China Morning Post published on 5 March 2026 an article titled "Africa Emerges as New Arena in US-China Competition over Artificial Intelligence" by Lucy Quaggin.
Africa is increasingly seen as a critical region for artificial intelligence development because of its population and economic growth. By 2050, one quarter of the world's population will be in Africa. American and Chinese companies are competing for the African market and support to set standards.
The Committee to Protect Journalists posted on 6 March 2026 a press release titled "Somaliland Journalist Ahmed-Zaki Ibrahim Mohamud Held Without Charge Since February."
The founder of Warrame Media has been held without charges since 22 February by Somaliland authorities, who have cracked down on press freedom over the past year.
The Associated Press published on 5 March 2026 an article titled "Families of Kenya Recruits Duped into Fighting in Russia's War on Ukraine Demand Their Sons Return" by Evelyne Musambi and Vivianne Wandera.
Russia has recruited mare than 1,000 Kenyans to fight in its war against Ukraine, many of them lured under false pretenses. Their family members and the government of Kenya want the Kenyans returned and the practice to stop.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 4 March 2026 an analysis titled "Iran War's Impact on the Red Sea and Horn of Africa" by Liam Karr.
The Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen could resume missile strikes on Israel or initiate strikes on the UAE but have not yet done so. The US military base in Djibouti is another possible target. For its part, Iran may engage in terrorist attacks on US interests in Africa.
Afro Barometer posted on 27 February 2026 a survey titled "Popular Perceptions of Russia Lag Even as Its Influence grows Across Africa" by Aubrey Ghambi, Alfred Kwadzo, and Carolyn Logan.
While most of the analysis is about the position of Russia in Africa, this survey of 38 African countries found that China received the best marks on positive influence (62 percent). The United States has fallen behind at 52 percent positive rating, the European Union at 50 percent, India 39 percent, and Russia 36 percent. The negative perceptions were more similar with China (17 percent), US (20 percent), EU (17 percent), India (20 percent), and Russia (23 percent).
Skillings Mining Review published on 3 March 2026 an article titled "The Indaba 2026 Legacy: Inside the New African Critical Minerals Framework" by Charles Pitts.
The most recent Cape Town conference on mining (Indaba 2026) demonstrated that three major African sources of critical minerals (DRC, Zambia, and South Africa) acted in a coordinated way to ensure that its raw mineral wealth is not just exported but more of it is refined in Africa for value added benefits. For example, the DRC produces about 70 percent of the world's cobalt but now refines less than 10 percent of it. The DRC intends to change that ratio.
The West's Lobito Corridor project for Angola, Zambia, and the DRC fits this new African narrative reasonably well, China's focus on importing raw material not so much.
Ethiopia Insight published on 3 March 2026 a commentary titled "Tigray and Eritrea Must Cooperate to Survive" by Negasi Awetehey, University of Aksum.
The author argues that successive governments in Addis Ababa view relations between Eritrea and Tigray with suspicion and find it in their interest to keep old wounds active. He calls for dialogue between Tigrayans and Eritreans, adding that Tigray and Eritrea must challenge war narratives by amplifying the public's desire for peace, rehabilitation, and economic cooperation.
Devex Newswire posted on 4 March 2026 an article titled "US Aid Cuts Gut South Africa's HIV Fight" by Helen Murphy.
South Africa bears the world's largest HIV/AIDS burden. US foreign aid cuts and the dismantlement of USAID have ripped through its response to the disease, forcing clinics to close and leaving thousands of vulnerable patients scrambling for care. A State Department spokesperson responded that it is time for governments to take responsibility for the lives of people in their countries.
The Guardian published on 3 March 2026 an article titled "South Sudan Risks Return to Full-blown Civil War as Violence Escalates" by Carlos Mureithi.
Militia forces allied with suspended Vice President Riek Machar have increased their attacks on forces loyal to President Salva Kiir, threatening a return to full-blown civil war.
Ghana Web posted on 1 March 2026 an article titled "Two Ugandans Reported Killed in Ukraine-Russia War."
The article indicates that Russia has recruited Africans to fight in Ukraine from Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Egypt, Cameroon, Ghana, and South Africa.
Comment: This is not a complete list of African countries where Russia has recruited mercenaries.
Ethiopia Insight published on 2 March 2026 a commentary titled "The Welkait Quagmire Neither Bullets nor Ballets Can Resolve" by Zola Moges, PhD in international law.
Welkait is a district that has been part of Western Tigray since the Tigray People's Liberation Front annexed it following the demise in 1991 of the Derg regime. Prior to that, Welkait was part of Amhara Region.
Welkait's strategic location at the intersection of Ethiopia's borders with Sudan and Eritrea complicates the ability to find a solution that manages to overcome long-standing ethnic, language, and cultural differences.
The author suggests as a solution creation of a self-administered territory that might take the form of a special autonomous zone or even an additional regional state with bilingual Amharic and Tigrinya administration.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published in February 2026 a major study titled "Artificial Intelligence for Africa's Defense Forces: A Toolkit for Defense Sector AI Strategy and Adoption."
This toolkit is a resource for African defense professionals to develop and adopt artificial intelligence policies, strategies, guidance, systems, and tools. It defines and illustrates some of the most relevant use cases, discusses how to guide the development of AI systems, processes, and personnel, suggests how to adapt AI to Africa's security environment, and outlines good practices that can be used to inform the development of defense sector AI strategy.
AI is no longer a futuristic prospect for Africa's defense forces, but an increasingly embedded tactical reality shaping military operations from the Sahel to the Cape. Like past inventions such as steam power, electricity, and the internet, AI is fast becoming an essential technology that will underpin the future of warfare.
Semafor published on 2 March 2026 an article titled "China's Media Push in Africa Has Largely Failed, Analysts Say" by Jeronimo Gonzalez.
Although Africans perceived China's influence positively in a recent Afro Barometer poll, a Nigerian analyst believes Beijing's multi-billion media campaign to attract an audience has largely failed. African audiences still prefer news from the West.
Comment: The fact remains that the Afro Barometer poll of 29 countries indicates Africans have a more positive perception of China's influence in Africa than of US or EU influence. The negative perception of all three is about the same.
The Africa Report published on 26 February 2026 an article titled "Somalia: Hobyo Port Advances Amid Security Risks and Ethiopia Trade Scramble" by Mohamad Sheikh Nor.
Hobyo Investment Company has a 70 percent stake and a Turkish-owned construction company a 30 percent share in a new port at Hobyo, which is intended to support central Somalia and possible trade to and from Ethiopia. The new port faces challenges because it will strengthen certain local and foreign actors while sidelining those with interests in competing ports.
The Associated Press published on 27 February 2026 an article titled "At Least 55 Ghanaians Killed Fighting for Russia in Ukraine War, Minister Says."
Ghana's foreign minister commented on 27 February that at least 44 Ghanaians have died fighting for Russia in Ukraine. He added that Russia has lured 272 Ghanaians into the battle since 2022. The foreign minister said Ghana would dismantle all the dark web illegal recruitment schemes.
Modern Diplomacy published on 27 February 2026 a commentary titled "Africa's Rise: The 21st Century Story that Leaves Russia Behind" by Kester Kenn Klomegah, an independent researcher.
Russia has focused on a limited part of Africa. About 80 percent of its trade is with North African countries and South Africa. It has sent the Africa Corps to Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. But it has largely ignored the rest of the continent.
Discovery Alert posted on 1 March 2026 an analysis titled "China Becomes World's Leading Chrome Processor Overtaking South Africa" by Muflih Hidayat.
Ferrochrome production, which is essential for stainless steel, requires consistent, energy-intensive processing. Although South Africa is the source of much of the world's chrome ore, China's coal-based power generation is more reliable and cheaper than South Africa's electricity. Consequently, processing of the ore has shifted from South Africa to China.
An Africanist Perspective posted on 27 February 2026 a commentary titled "Conflict in the Horn of Africa Isn't Inevitable. People Can Choose Peace" by Ken Opalo.
The fundamental drivers of conflict in the Horn of Africa are domestic. Once rebellions start, they tend to acquire lives of their own. A neighborhood of weak states with porous borders contributes to the problem, making it easy for regional rivals and foreign governments to interfere.
Too many people in the Horn are convinced that organized violence is a legitimate response to losing in the political arena. That has to change before there will be peace.
Nanyang Technological University posted on 24 February 2026 an article titled "The State of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Africa" by Amit Jain.
This is a nice summary of the current state of artificial intelligence in Africa, the sectors that are most likely to benefit in the coming years, and the countries that are best positioned to take advantage of it.
The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs published on 7 February 2026 an article titled "The United States, China, and AI Competition in Africa: Lessons for the Global South" by Alice Chen and Neel U. Sukhalme.
This article (also posted below on 11 February) is a useful addition to this topic, which is fast becoming important to Africa's development.
The New York Times published on 27 February 2026 an article titled "How a Call from Trump Ignited a Bitter Feud Between Two U.S. Allies" by Vivian Nereim.
Saudi Arabia reportedly asked the United States to impose sanctions on the UAE for its support of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan. A Saudi official said the request was to put additional sanctions on the RSF to prevent them from getting external support, not to impose sanctions directly on the UAE.
While the details of the phone call are in dispute, the episode resulted in a public feud between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Relations rapidly deteriorated in December when Saudi Arabia bombed an Emirati shipment to Yemen. Now, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are supporting opposing sides of conflicting groups in Yemen and Sudan.
The South China Morning Post published on 27 February 2026 an article titled "Why Beijing's US$4.5 Billion Niger-Benin Oil Pipeline Is Being Attacked by Rebels" by Jevans Nyabiage.
A rebel group has been attacking the oil pipeline from Niger's oilfields to an Atlantic port in Benin in an effort to restore a former elected president to power in Niger. China financed, built, and continues to have a management role in the pipeline, which provides a significant amount of revenue for Niger's military junta. Although the attacks are not aimed at China, the situation poses a dilemma for Beijing and its non-interference policy.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 26 February 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Elliot Nazar.
Chad closed its border with Sudan following two attacks by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on Chadian troops inside Chad. The RSF relies on supply lines through Chad for its weapons and equipment.
The Emirates Policy Center posted on 27 February 2026 an analysis titled "The Economics of Deterrence: How Corridors and Alliances Are Reshaping Geopolitics" by Ebtesam AlKetbi.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are frameworks for redistributing centers of gravity and influence, diversifying states' strategic options, and embedding long-term investment commitments.
The world is shifting from rigid alignments to flexible alliances that integrate economy and technology with digital and maritime security. Power is no longer defined solely by territorial control but by the management of flows--trade, energy, data, and capital. A state that positions itself as a central node within these networks gains strategic weight.
In the Indian Ocean region, both the Indian-led IMEC and the better known and more expansive Chinese BRI are efforts to achieve these objectives.
