Semafor published on 12 October 2026 an article titled "Ecobank Arees to Join Chinese Payment Platform."
Togo-based Ecobank has joined a growing number of African banks by agreeing to a partnership with the China Interbank Payments System (CIPS) to enable transaction settlements in the yuan currency.
The Council on Foreign Relations published on 8 October 2026 a background piece titled "Another Hormuz? What to Know About the Houthi Threat to the Red Sea" by Diana Roy.
Each year, approximately 12 to 15 percent of global maritime trade worth more than $1 trillion, including 30 percent of global container traffic transits the Red Sea. This is an excellent summary of the threat posed by the Iran-backed and Yemen-based Houthis to international shipping through the Red Sea.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 9 October 2026 an update titled "Ethiopia War Security Review" by Liam Karr.
This is a summary of the fighting in Ethiopia as of 9 October.
China Africa Security Radar posted on 11 October 2026 an analysis titled "Chinese Study Shows How African Agency Is Reshaping China's Critical Minerals Strategy."
China obtains 99 percent of its cobalt, 85 percent of its manganese, 81 percent of its chromium, and 70 percent of its bauxite from Africa. Policy shifts in African countries are forcing China to rethink its critical minerals strategy.
The International Crisis Group posted on 9 October 2026 a 39-minute podcast titled "How Close Are Ethiopia and Eritrea to All-out War?" with Richard Atwood and Alan Boswell.
Eritrean Defense Forces are aligned with the Tigray People's Liberation Front forces against the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and an opposition Tigrayan contingent. The war in Tigray Region is nearing the Ethiopia-Eritrea border as ENDF troops advance and raises the possibility of extending into Eritrea.
Landlocked Ethiopia remains committed to obtaining permanent access to the Red Sea, although Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed says he will seek maritime access through negotiation and not force. Does the war in Tigray change the equation?
The Emirates Policy Center published on 9 October 2026 an analysis titled "Visit of Somaliland's President to Washington: Testing Potential Shifts in US Policy and the Trajectory of Bilateral Ties."
Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi visited the US in September in hopes of advancing the country's goal of diplomatic recognition. A meeting with President Trump was not promised and it did not happen.
The analysis concludes that Washington is likely to adopt a policy of calculated openness toward Somaliland while stopping short of formal recognition. Bilateral relations could gradually evolve into a strategic partnership, with the path toward recognition potentially accelerating should sufficient security, political, and regional drivers converge.
Sixth Tone published on 5 October 2026 an article titled "The Transsion Story: How a Chinese Firm Conquered Africa's Tech Market" by Cai Yiwen.
China's Transsion makes nearly half of all the cell phones bought in Africa, beating competition from Samsung, Apple, and Huawei. The phones meet basic communication needs of low-income users with features adapted specifically for the African market.
The Guardian published on 8 October 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia Launches Drone Attack against Eritrean Troops Who Crossed into Tigray" by Rachel Savage.
Eritrean Defense Forces crossing into Ethiopia in support of a Tigrayan rebel force have been targeted by drones launched by the Ethiopian National Defense Forces as the conflict expands.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File published on 8 October 2026 an analysis titled "Egypt Forms Anti-Ethiopian Coalition" by Liam Karr.
Egypt hosted on 3 October a regional summit with the leaders of Eritrea, Somalia, and the head of Sudan's armed forces. The four countries agreed to the el Alamein joint declaration which did not mention Ethiopia but stated positions in direct response to Ethiopia's perceived policies in the region.
The joint declaration emphasized respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries in the region. It stated that governance of the Red Sea is the exclusive responsibility of the littoral states and denounced any action on dam construction that negatively impacts downstream countries.
Discovery Alert published on 8 October 2026 an analysis titled "Why China's Grip on DRC Copper Is Deepening, Not Loosening" by Muflih Hidayat.
China's share of imported copper from the DRC, the world's second largest copper producing nation after Chile, climbed to 45 percent in the first seven months of 2026. Chinese companies have spent years building vertical integration across the DRC's mining and refining sectors, controlling an estimated 70-80 percent of industrial-scale copper-cobalt production.
The DRC this year banned exports of copper and cobalt concentrate, forcing more domestic value-added processing. New smelter capacity in the DRC is largely backed by Chinese capital. This has the effect of strengthening Beijing's position, making it difficult for American and European companies to compete.
Nevertheless, US imports of DRC copper surged in 2026, although it remains to be seen if the surge is durable and whether the Lobito Corridor project can change the nature of US-China competition in the DRC.
World Politics Review posted on 8 October 2026 a commentary titled "The Red Sea Is the New Epicenter of Conflict in the Middle East" by Frida Ghitis.
While the Strait of Hormuz continues to be the focus of attention, the economically vital Red Sea with conflicts raging on both sides of the waterway could erupt into an out-of-control wildfire with global repercussions.
The Conversation published on 7 October 2026 a commentary titled "Missing Ambassadors, Inexperienced Appointees--Is Washington Dropping the Diplomatic Ball?" by Donald Heflin, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, and former ambassador.
Historically, about 30 percent of ambassadorial appointees are political and 70 percent career. In the first Trump administration and the Biden administration the percentage of political appointees increased to 40 percent. So far in the second Trump administration the percentage of political appointees has jumped to 80 percent and many of them are donors and personal friends with little overseas experience or knowledge of the country where they have been assigned.
Almost two years into the Trump administration, of the 196 U.S. ambassadorial positions, 92 remain vacant at a time when China and Russia are making an all-out effort to influence foreign governments.
Comment: I was a Foreign Service Officer for 37 years, appointed ambassador by Presidents Reagan and Clinton. It pains me to watch the decline of an organization where I spent most of my working career implementing the policies of Republican and Democratic administrations. The comments by Donald Heflin capture only some of the damage done to the Foreign Service by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the Trump administration. It will take years, perhaps decades, to reverse the decline and restore the Foreign Service to the professional organization that has loyally served both Republican and Democratic administrations.
And enough of this "deep state" nonsense. Yes, government bureaucracies, including the Foreign Service, are often slow to adapt and sometimes lethargic in new policy implementation. But they are not purposely thwarting an administration's directives and once there is new political leadership at the top of an agency, they fall in line. In the rare case where someone refuses to carry out a new administration's policy, that individual is removed, pushed aside, or retires. The argument that there is some secret, hostile organization within the bureaucracy opposing any administration is just a lot of trumpery.
Global China Pulse published on 22 September 2026 an essay titled "Buddhism Reconfigured through Language: Reflections from a Chinese Temple in Tanzania" by Mingyi Xiao.
This is an account of the Chinese Buddhist Tanhua Temple in Dar es Salaam established at the request of the Chinese community in Tanzania. The essay examines the role of language in the localization and adaptation of Chinese Buddhism through everyday experiences at the temple. The focus of the temple is the teaching of Buddhism and Mandarin.
Chinese Buddhist institutions are an emerging presence in Africa. There are similar temples in Zambia and Botswana. The author concludes that Chinese Buddhism in Africa remains a work in progress.
The New York Times published on 6 October 2026 an article titled "How the Houthis Triumphed on the Red Sea and Sparked a New War in Yemen" by Vivian Nereim, Saeed Al-Batiti, and Shuaib Almosawa.
This is an account of the seizure by Iranian-backed Houthi forces in Yemen of territory bordering Bab el-Mandeb, the southern choke point of the Red Sea. Yemeni government forces that were holding the territory requested assistance from Saudi Arabia and the United States to prevent the Houthi offensive. The United States provided intelligence support, but both Saudi Arabia and the United States failed to provide air support.
Semafor published on 6 October 2026 an article titled "Sahel States Launch Russia-backed TV Station" by Alexander Onukwue.
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger launched a joint television channel to offer programming that de-emphasizes Western viewpoints. Tafouk TV signed a cooperation agreement with the parent company of Moscow's RT to jointly cover events.
Tanzania's The Citizen published on 6 October 2026 an article titled "EAC, China Eye New Strategic Projects" by Bertha Ismail.
The East African Community and China are exploring a new framework for strategic regional projects in infrastructure, trade, digital technology, clean energy, and climate change. This would shift the focus from China's institutional support to projects with direct economic benefits.
Foreign Affairs published on 6 October 2026 an article titled "The New Red Sea Wars" by Alan Boswell.
Policymakers for too long treated the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula as separate strategic regions divided by the Red Sea. That distinction is evaporating as wars on one side of the sea increasingly alter the military calculations on the other. US policy rarely treated the two regions as linked.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 6 October 2026 an update titled "Ethiopia War Security Review."
This report summarizes the fighting in Ethiopia between 2 October and 6 October. The Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) have taken significant territory in Tigray Region and launched airstrikes on towns still held by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). The Fano militia continues to pose challenges to the ENDF in Amhara Region. The magnitude of Eritrean Defense Force engagement in support of the TPLF is unclear.
Eurasia Review published on 5 October 2026 a commentary titled "Egypt's 'Brotherhood' with Somalia Has Always Served Cairo First - OpEd."
Egypt's policy on Somalia has followed one consistent pattern: Somalia matters to Cairo chiefly as Ethiopia's border. Egypt's engagement with Somalia has been shaped by two concerns: the security of its Nile waters and its rivalry with Ethiopia. Brotherhood supplies the vocabulary. Strategy supplies the substance.
Egypt's approach is common practice; countries pursue their own national interests. The oped argues that the failure lies with Somali leaders who mistake another country's strategy for affection and allow foreign rivalry to set their national agenda.
Aljazeera published on 5 October 2026 an article titled "Ethiopian PM Abiy Demands Red Sea Access as Tensions with Neighbors Rise."
In a speech before Parliament, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed commented that "based on the principle of give and take, we will work diligently to ensure that Ethiopia has an outlet to the sea." The remark followed a meeting in Egypt by the leaders of Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia who said governance of the Red Sea was the exclusive responsibility of its coastal states.
Comment: While underscoring once again the need for landlocked Ethiopia to have maritime access, Abiy carefully avoided suggesting this goal would be achieved by military means.
The International Crisis Group posted on 1 October 2026 a 58-minute podcast titled "Inside Sudan's War" with Alan Boswell and Sudanese national Yousra Elbagir, Sky News Africa correspondent.
The podcast draws on Yousra Elbagir's visits to Port Sudan, ransacked family home in Khartoum, road trip from Khartoum to El Obeid following a sustained aerial attack on the city, and other locations in Sudan. Some of her insights involved the personal impact of the war on her reporting.
Russia has long been rumored to have obtained agreement from Sudanese authorities to establish a naval base in Port Sudan. During an escorted visit to the Sudan Navy's base in Port Sudan, she saw no evidence of a Russian presence but understood that Russian military personnel had been at the facility in recent years. She also learned that Saudi Arabia strongly opposes any foreign naval base in the Red Sea, whether by Russia, Turkey, Iran or any other country. Saudi Arabia has considerable influence over the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) that controls Port Sudan.
There have been recent rumors of SAF cooperation with the rebel Houthis in Yemen. She neither saw nor heard any evidence of such cooperation, which would also be strongly opposed by Saudi Arabia and is effectively at war with the Houthis.
When asked about an end to the war between the SAF and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), she commented that the RSF is eroding internally. Consequently, it is possible the RSF may choose to negotiate with the SAF. But the SAF has no plan to achieve a lasting peace. Both sides increasingly realize that they cannot fight forever. In the meantime, the Sudanese people see themselves as pawns at the mercy of the SAF and RSF.
Bastille Post published on 5 October 2026 an article titled "Chinese Navy Hospital Ship Auspicious Ark Arrives in Guinea on Medical Mission."
The PLA Navy's hospital ship Auspicious Ark has begun a seven-day goodwill visit in Conakry, Guinea following a seven-day stop in Nouakchott, Mauritania as part of Mission Harmony 2026. The staff on Auspicious Ark will provide medical services at each of its stops. Additional African port visits have not yet been announced.
China's Ministry of National Defense published on 22 July 2026 an article titled "Chinese Navy Hospital Ship Sets Sail for Humanitarian Medical Mission in Africa, South Asia."
It noted this is the 12th iteration of Mission Harmony since 2010 and is scheduled to last over 200 days. This is the first such mission by Auspicious Ark. The PLA hospital ship Peace Ark conducted the first 10 missions and Silk Road Ark the 11th mission.
World Today Journal published on 30 September 2026 an article titled "South Africa Air Traffic Control Hit by Ransomware Malware and Data Exfiltration" by Linda Park.
South Africa's Air Traffic and Navigation Services organization discovered ransomware-linked malware inside an operational technology network. Internal technical teams identified indicators pointing toward potential data exfiltration diverted at external Internet Protocol addresses located in China.
The US State Department issued a press release on 3 October 2026 titled "U.S. Statement on Increased Tensions Between Ethiopia and Eritrea."
Washington urged Ethiopia and Eritrea to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their neighbors, exercise maximum restraint and return to dialogue. The State Department added that a conflict jeopardizes ongoing U.S. collaboration on shared interests with both countries.
Aljazeera published on 4 October 2026 an article titled "Ethiopian Government Forces Seize Tigray Capital Mekelle as TPLF Withdraw."
Ethiopian National Defense Forces and an allied Tigrayan militia took control of Mekelle, capital of Tigray Region, as Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) forces abandoned the city. Although Ethiopia charged that Egypt supported TPLF forces in Tigray, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi called for dialogue not confrontation in Ethiopia.
