Military Africa published on 2 July 2025 an article titled "Egypt Confirms Acquisition of Chinese HQ-9B Long-range Air Defence System" by Darek Liam.
Egypt is buying from China a long-range surface-to-air missile system designed to counter fighter jets, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles. Frustrated by Western restrictions on arms sales, Cairo is turning increasingly to China, which is positioning itself as a reliable supplier of weapons to countries in the Middle East.
The Center for Global Development published in June 2025 a paper titled "China's Investment Pivot and Africa's Industrial Prospects: Any Hope for African 'Flying Geese'?" by Charles Kenny.
The paper examines the changing shape of Chinese investment in Africa as it evolves from largescale infrastructure toward small scale manufacturing. It looks at the opportunity for the region in the context of a deepening manufacturing labor shortage in China; discusses barriers to that opportunity in both China and Africa; and the potential response of Western countries.
The London School of Economics and Political Science blog posted on 11 June 2025 a commentary titled "Military Takeovers in West Africa Are Reshaping Diplomatic Ties" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah and Christian Kaunert, both at Dublin City University.
Military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have upended democratic governance, enabling China to deepen economic and strategic engagement as Western influence wanes. At the same time, there is growing concern over China's policies on debt and labor relations.
Foreign Policy published on 31 March 2025 a commentary titled "Are China and Russia on a Collision Course in Africa?" by Jessica Moody.
China and Russia, although committed to countering Western influence, have fundamentally different objectives in Africa. China seeks political stability to protect and advance its economic investments. Russia thrives on instability and insecurity on the continent. The two countries typically do not work together in Africa but keep out of each other's way.
The China Global South Project published on 21 February 2025 a commentary titled "Beware False Idols: The Pitfalls of Copy-Paste Development Models" by Felix Brender, project associate at LSE Ideas.
The author concluded: "If Western economic prescriptions failed Africa, perhaps China's State-led model is the answer. Hardly. China's rise was predicated on conditions unlikely to be replicated elsewhere: a vast, disciplined labor force, an authoritarian state able to impose sweeping economic reforms, and, crucially, an era in which globalization was expanding, not faltering."
The Conversation published on 10 February 2025 a commentary titled "Power Vacuum in West Africa's Sahel: 3 Ways China Could Fill the Gap as West Exits" by Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi, Lagos State University.
As France and the United States pull back or are forced out of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Senegal, and Cote d'Ivoire, Beijing could take advantage by expanding investment in critical minerals, resolving the internal crisis in ECOWAS, and increasing arms sales in the region.
The Atlantic Council posted on 2 January 2025 an analysis titled "Russia Is Making a Fragile Pivot from Syria to Libya. The West Should Beware Falling into a New Trap" by Emadeddin Badi.
As Russian forces are being pushed out of Syria, Moscow is relocating troops and hardware in eastern Libya, controlled by Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army. Libya should not be seen as a fallback but as part of a long-standing strategy to expand Moscow's strategic hold in the region and to project power beyond it, especially in Africa. The West should avoid chasing a fleeting alliance with Haftar and focus on addressing the structural weaknesses that make Libya susceptible to external exploitation.
China-US Focus published on 13 December 2024 a commentary titled "China and Africa, Rekindling the Fates of Global Power" by Sebastian Contin Trillo-Figueroa, The University of Hong Kong, and Mohamed Ibrahim Hafez, General Authority for Investment and Free Zones in Egypt.
This highly sympathetic view of China concludes that in the contest for great power influence in Africa, "China's pragmatic vision steadily undermines the West's traditional partnership models" while Beijing's competitors are pursuing deeply flawed polices.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 21 November 2024 an analysis titled "What FOCAC 2024 Reveals About the Future of China-Africa Relations" by Christian-Geraud Neema.
China called for modernization in Africa or the right to industrialize according to one's own background without being forced to follow Western norms. China is promoting a variety of governance models and approaches to development and modernization that undercut the Western-led international order, norms, and values.
China is positioning itself as Africa's development partner and international ally. But there is no guarantee China's approach will be fairer or more advantageous for Africa. So far, the United States has not responded with a clear counter strategy.
The European Hub for Contemporary China posted on 21 October 2024 a commentary titled "China's Security Engagement with Africa & the 'Global South' Narrative" by Fatoumata Diallo and Maud Deschamps.
As African countries have grown increasingly disillusioned with Western security engagement, China has progressively assumed a more assertive role in African security, shifting from a norm-taker to a norm-shaper approach. China's influence presents challenges for the EU's engagement in Africa, necessitating a reassessment of its approach to security cooperation with African nations
The Washington Post published on 21 October 2024 an article titled "BRICS Is Key to Putin's Fight against the U.S. Not All Members Agree" by Robyn Dixon, Katharine Houreld, Francesca Ebel, and Karishma Mehrotra.
This is a particularly good analysis of the BRICS as it meets this week in Russia. This is the first gathering since the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) added Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia to its membership.
Russia and China envisage the BRICS as an anti-West organization to overturn the US-led international order. Brazil, India, and South Africa have different objectives. The addition of new members further complicates the purpose of the organization. The article concludes that "expansion of the group has fueled internal tensions, diluting the clout of the original founders and entrenching China's dominance."
The Daily Maverick published on 6 October 2024 a commentary titled "Ramaphosa's Russia Flirtation Imperils More than South Africa's Image" by Ray Hartley and Greg Mills, both with the Brenthurst Foundation.
The authors argue that an increasingly cozy relationship between President Cyril Ramaphosa, the African National Congress, and Russia risks South Africa's trade and investment with the West and may even open Pretoria to international legal action.
The Foreign Policy Research Institute published on 11 September 2024 a commentary titled "Can Democracies Deliver? Thoughts Following the 2024 China-Africa Summit" by Nicolas K. Gvosdev.
The author lamented the disappointing lack of in-depth discussion in the US national security community of the issues raised during the recently concluded 9th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing. For example, China's focus on green energy at FOCAC is an issue that the West needs to engage more effectively with Africa and the Global South generally.
The South China Morning Post published on 8 September 2024 a commentary titled "China-Africa Summit a Fitting Showcase of Global South's Rise" by David Dodwell.
The author argued that events like the recently completed Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing are accelerating change in the global balance of economic and diplomatic power as Western countries continue to keep Africa on the periphery of their foreign policy concerns.
Deutsche Welle posted on 30 August 2024 a 13-minute podcast titled "Can China Regain Its Foothold in Africa?" with me and narrated by Clifford Coonan.
As the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation approaches in early September, Deutsche Welle asked for my comments on China's Belt and Road program in Africa and especially the current status of Chinese foreign direct investment and loans to the continent.
The Review of African Political Economy posted on 24 July 2024 a commentary titled "Africa and China: Counter-Hegemonic Narratives --An Introduction" by Ying Chen and Corinna Mullin.
This piece is a summary of a symposium that took place in December 2023 at The New School titled "The African Continent and China: Counter-Hegemonic Narratives." It assesses "the reductionist, orientalist and often racist depictions that dominate mainstream media and scholarly spaces on China-Africa relations." It attributes African underdevelopment to "policies imposed by western dominated multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank under the neoliberal 'Washington Consensus'."
Comment: Much of the jargon used in the symposium took me back to my African study days in the 1960s and 1970s when Cold War terminology was the predominate rhetoric. The summary suggests that the presentations were quick to praise China's positive activities in Africa and gloss over or even ignore the negative ones. While it is useful to assess accurately China's limited role in Africa's debt crisis, was there any discussion of China's mercantilist trade policy toward the continent where it sells almost entirely finished goods and buys almost exclusively natural resources? And in recent years, China has consistently had a large trade surplus!
After reading this summary, it is all smiles in Beijing, and Moscow.
The New Left Review published on 25 July 2024 a commentary titled "Evil Empires?" by Elizabeth Schmidt.
The author looks at the plusses and minuses of China's engagement in Africa since the end of the Cold War.
War on the Rocks posted on 26 June 2024 comments titled "In Brief: The War in Sudan." Six individuals who follow Sudan closely made brief remarks on the civil war.
My pessimistic contribution concluded: As bad as the situation is today in Sudan, a year from now it will likely be worse with the Sudan Armed Forces controlling parts of the country, the Rapid Support Forces other parts, and Sudanese civilians the big losers.
Dabanga, an independent Sudanese broadcaster/publisher now operating outside the country, posted on 9 June 2024 an analysis titled "Russian Red Sea Base and RSF 'Government' in Darfur Will Prolong War and Condemn Sudan" by Yassir Arman, founder and secretary-general of the SPLM-N Democratic Revolutionary Movement and member of the Coordination of the Civil Democratic Forces (Tagadom).
Yasir Arman argues that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) cannot achieve a military solution to Sudan's divisions. Both sides are preparing to dismember or partition their homeland for their own advantage. They do not care if they destroy the country's entire population and infrastructure in the process. The RSF has hinted that if it takes control of El Fasher, the capital and largest city in North Darfur, it might form its own government independent of the SAF government based in Port Sudan, causing Sudan to follow the example of divided Libya.
Arman urges Sudan to link the civilian-political peace process with the military track in Jeddah to reach a long-term humanitarian ceasefire, with regional and international monitoring on the ground. The goal should be rebuilding the state, establishing a single professional army, and completing the December Revolution.
Critical Threats published on 6 June 2024 an analysis titled "Russian Diplomatic Blitz Advances the Kremlin's Strategic Aims in Africa" by Liam Karr.
High-level Russian officials are meeting with Russian partners across Africa, seeking to advance the Kremlin's strategic goals of projecting greater Russian influence to supplant the West and better positioning Russia for prolonged confrontation with the West.
Russia is trying to create a pro-Russian bloc that advances its military, economic, and political goals in Africa in the Alliance of Sahel States (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger). It is pursuing this program with very modest economic resources and vulnerabilities that eventually risk backfiring.
