Caixin Global published on 17 March 2026 an article titled "Chinese Supertanker Changes Route and Takes Oil Without Passing through Hormuz."
A Chinese supertanker originally scheduled to load crude oil in the UAE rerouted to the Saudi Arabian Red Sea port of Yanbu. Other vessels are taking a similar action, causing a bottleneck at the port, which is served by an oil pipeline with limited capacity.
The International Crisis Group posted on 11 March 2026 a commentary titled "Sudan's Devastating War Rages on as Regional Rivalries Deepen" by Shewit Woldemichael.
As Sudan's civil war nears its fourth year, the conflict is steadily regionalizing into the Horn of Africa and Gulf States, making any settlement harder to achieve. Supporting the Sudan Armed Forces are Egypt, Eritrea, Turkiye, Qatar, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. The principal backer of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces is the UAE. The feud between the UAE and Saudi Arabia now risks deepening the intractable nature of the war.
Foreign Policy published on 11 March 2026 an analysis titled "Why Haven't the Houthis Fired?" by Fatima Abo Alasrar.
In 2025, Israeli airstrikes killed Iranian-backed Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed el-Rahawi and other key officials. US airstrikes significantly degraded their military capacity.
Iran is now bombing Arab cities, resulting is less enthusiasm by the Houthis to support Tehran. The Houthis also fear that Iranian attacks on the UAE and Saudi Arabia will drive them closer together, possibly recreating the original alliance against the Houthis. While this changing political situation in the region does not guarantee the Houthis will stay out of the conflict, it has given the leadership reason to tread carefully.
World Politics Review published on 10 March 2026 an analysis titled "War and Disorder Are Mobilizing the Middle East's Middle Powers" by Dalia Ghanem and Ahmed Morsy, both with the Middle East Council on Global Affairs in Doha.
A new loosely aligned "statist Quad" of traditional middle powers--Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey--is trying to reassert itself and actively coordinate on the region's most volatile crises. The four countries are fundamentally statist powers that view governing systems in which centralized authority, often with the military as its backbone, as the sole guarantor of social order.
Acting sometimes in concert, sometimes on their own, they are seeking to intervene in a regional order whose current chaos poses an existential threat to their national interests. They have focused so far on the crises in Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Somaliland, Libya, and the Sahel region of Africa.
Aljazeera published on 7 March 2026 an article titled "Why Yemen's Houthis Are Staying Out of Israel-US Fight with Iran--for Now."
Since the beginning of Operation Epic Fury, Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis have limited their support for Tehran to rhetoric and a mass protest denouncing the US-Israeli strikes. The Houthis seem to fear Israel intelligence and the possibility of leadership decapitation. At the same time, the Houthi leader, Abdel-Malik al-Houthi, said his group's engagement in the war could occur at any moment depending on developments.
The Hause of Saud, a Saudi Royal Family news and information platform, posted on 6 March 2026 an analysis titled "The Houthi Trigger--Why Yemen's Decision Could Be More Dangerous Than the Iran War Itself" by Abdul Mohammed.
In an excellent and timely analysis, the author explains that the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen are debating whether to join the Iran war. If they resume attacks on Red Sea international shipping alongside the Hormuz closure, 28 percent of global oil trade faces simultaneous disruption.
The Houthis are engaged in the single most important strategic decision facing any non-state actor in the current conflict. Their choice to enter or abstain from the Iran war will determine whether the world faces an unprecedented dual-chokepoint crisis, whether Saudi Arabia's $500 billion NEOM megaproject becomes a frontline target, and whether the global economy tips from disruption into recession.
The Houthis must decide whether to join Iran in opposing Operation Epic Fury or abandon Iran. There are apparently sharp disagreements among Houthi factions over how to respond.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 4 March 2026 an analysis titled "Iran War's Impact on the Red Sea and Horn of Africa" by Liam Karr.
The Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen could resume missile strikes on Israel or initiate strikes on the UAE but have not yet done so. The US military base in Djibouti is another possible target. For its part, Iran may engage in terrorist attacks on US interests in Africa.
The Congressional Research Service published on 20 February 2026 a brief titled "Yemen, Conflict, Red Sea Security, and U.S. Policy" by Christopher M. Blanchard.
This is a summary of U.S. policy during the Trump administration in Yemen and security issues in the Red Sea.
The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats published in March 2026 a major report titled "Fault Lines in the Horn of Africa: The Gulf States, Turkey and Israel Battle for Red Sea Influence" by Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo.
This is an extensive study on the current situation in the Horn of Africa with special reference to the roles of Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. It includes detailed recommendations for US policy.
Foreign Affairs published on 11 February 2026 an article titled "How the War in Sudan Could End" by Volker Perthes, German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
The author argues that both the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces may have reached the point where they believe it will be difficult to make more territorial gains at an acceptable cost. Consequently, coordinated international pressure on both belligerents could result in a ceasefire, a first step towards peace.
The National Institute Press published on 3 February 2026 a commentary titled "What Israel Sees in Somaliland" by Ilan Berman, American Foreign Policy Council.
The commentary concludes that Israel's recognition of Somaliland provides it with a strategic foothold across from Yemen, greater proximity to the ongoing threat posed by the Houthis, a deeper stake in Red Sea security, and the potential to expand its influence in Africa.
The Diplomat published on 27 January 2026 a commentary titled "BRICS Holds a Maritime Exercise at the Indo-Atlantic Crossroads - Without India" by Vrinda Malik, University of Delhi.
The BRICS--China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the UAE--held a maritime exercise in South African waters in January. This was the first time the BRICS expanded into the security domain.
India was the only member to totally absent itself from the naval exercise, suggesting a refusal to be part of a security exercise led by China. Enduring China-India rivalry limits the BRICS' ability to emerge as a cohesive force capable of shaping a new world order.
African Arguments published on 21 January 2026 a commentary titled "The Horn and the Gulf: How a New Geopolitical Confluence Is Emerging" by Ngala Chome, former research fellow at Ghent University.
Israel's recognition of Somaliland is reverberating across the Red Sea. Networks of influence in the Horn of Africa and Gulf States are resulting in new power configurations. This is impacting traditional outside powers and changing the relations of newer ones with major consequences for the future of the region.
Aljazeera published on 23 January 2026 an article titled "Why Is South Africa Upset about Iran Joining BRICS Naval Drills?" by Shola Lawal.
A BRICS naval exercise in South Africa that included 3 warships from Iran as its government crushed protestors at home sparked a sharp rebuke from the United States, prompted internal debates in South Africa, and caused India to point out that BRICS was not established to host war games.
The Washington Post published on 21 January 2026 an article titled "How Egypt Is Reviving the Suez Canal after Maritime Attacks Sank Traffic" by Claire Parker and Heba Farouk Mahfouz.
Attacks beginning in 2023 by the Houthis in Yemen on international shipping in the Red Sea interrupted maritime traffic through the Suez Canal, forcing most ships to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope. The Suez Canal provided Egypt in 2023 with $10.2 billion in revenue and accounted for 12 to 15 percent of global maritime trade.
The Houthis have ended most attacks, maritime traffic is increasing, and Suez Canal revenue for Egypt is picking up. If the Gaza ceasefire holds, international shipping through the Red Sea and Suez Canal is expected to increase further, adding to Egyptian revenue.
Armada International posted on 20 January 2026 an article titled "China and Russia in BRICS Naval Exercise Hosted by South Africa -- Iran Drops Out" by David Oliver.
South Africa hosted from 9 to 16 January a naval exercise for BRICS member states. China and Russia sent warships that participated. Iran sent three ships but was asked to drop out after their arrival. The UAE sent a naval vessel that did not participate. Brazil and India chose not to send ships.
The ships that participated conducted drills on communication, formation maneuver, maritime strike, hijacked vessel rescue, helicopter-borne casualty transfer and treatment.
Comment: If one of the goals of the BRICS is to create a military alliance, this event did not offer a good omen.
The Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies published on 16 January 2026 a policy brief titled "South Africa Eyes Confrontation with Trump over Growing Ties to China, Russia, Iran" by Max Meizlish and Daniel Swift.
South Africa's ANC-led government is testing the limits of cordial relations with the Trump administration by strengthening its ties with China, Russia, and Iran.
Newsweek published on 16 January 2026 an article titled "US Issues Strong Statement on China-led Naval Drills with Iran" by Micah McCartney.
Three Iranian warships--a corvette and two converted tankers--arrived in South Africa for the BRICS' naval exercise involving ships from South Africa, China, Russia, and the UAE.
The US embassy in Pretoria issued a statement that "it is particularly unconscionable that South Africa welcomed Iranian security forces as they were shooting, jailing, and torturing Iranian citizens engaging in peaceful political activity South Africans fought so hard to gain for themselves."
The South African government apparently asked the Iranians to keep the ships in the harbor and only participate in the naval exercise as observers.
The Daily Maverick published on 12 January 2026 an article titled "Iran Pulls Out of SA's Joint Naval Exercise Amid Political Tensions" by Peter Fabricius.
Three Iranian naval vessels joined warships from South Africa, China, Russia, and the UAE in Simon's Town, South Africa, to participate in a weeklong BRICS' naval exercise. The Iranian vessels will not, however, join the others as the exercise gets underway. Pretoria reportedly urged Iran to withdraw from the exercise to avoid antagonizing the United States.
Aljazeera published on 11 January 2026 an article titled "BRICS Wargames: Why They Matter, Why India Opted Out" by Yasraj Sharma.
Weeklong naval drills involving BRICS' members China, Russia, Iran, and the UAE opened in the waters off South Africa. China and Iran sent destroyers, Russia and the UAE sent corvettes, and South Africa deployed a mid-sized frigate. Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, and Ethiopia joined the drills as observers. India chose not to participate. The Trump administration accused some BRICS members of pursuing anti-American policies.
