The Complexities of the China-Libya Relationship

 The ChinaMed Project published on 30 January 2026 an analysis titled "China and the Libyan Crisis: Maintaining a Foot in the Door in a Changing Region" by Bianca Pasquier and Leonardo Bruni.  

This paper revisits the past decade of Chinese engagement in Libya, tracing Beijing's evolving relations with the country's factions and situating them within a regional context.  It concludes that China is unlikely to engage deeply in Libya's power struggles.  Beijing will likely keep its options open, be present but uncommitted.  

Turkey-Israel Tension in Horn of Africa and Beyond

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 6 January 2026 an analysis titled "From Syria to Somaliland: Turkey-Israel Competition Reshapes Region" by Burcu Ozcelik.

Turkey has a strong relationship with Somalia, increasing interests in the region, and opposes Israel's recent recognition of breakaway Somaliland.  This development adds to tension between Turkey and Israel in the Horn of Africa.  Turkish and Israeli interests also diverge sharply in Syria, Gaza, Cyprus, and Greece.

Iran Rearms Houthi Proxies for Red Sea Attacks

 CNN posted on 19 July 2025 an article titled "'Nothing Has Changed': Iran Tries to Rearm Proxy Groups as US Talks Stall" by Mostafa Salem and Nic Robertson.

Iran's Houthi allies in Yemen sank two Liberian-flagged commercial ships in the Red Sea last week.  Three days after Iran and Israel declared a ceasefire, forces in Yemen loyal to the internationally recognized government seized a vessel with 750 tons of Iranian missiles and military equipment destined for the Houthis.  Iran also continues to support proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.  

Egypt Buys Chinese Air Defense System; China Solidifies Position as Arms Supplier

 Military Africa published on 2 July 2025 an article titled "Egypt Confirms Acquisition of Chinese HQ-9B Long-range Air Defence System" by Darek Liam. 

Egypt is buying from China a long-range surface-to-air missile system designed to counter fighter jets, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles.  Frustrated by Western restrictions on arms sales, Cairo is turning increasingly to China, which is positioning itself as a reliable supplier of weapons to countries in the Middle East. 

Press Freedom Index: 10 African Countries Score Better than US

 Reporters without Borders posted recently its "RSF World Press Freedom Index 2025: Economic Fragility a Leading Threat to Press Freedom."

RSF ranked 180 countries for the 2025 index.  Ten African countries, led by South Africa, Namibia, and Cabo Verde scored better than the United States, ranked number 57, although Sub-Saharan Africa generally experienced a decline in press freedom.  The five lowest ranking countries were Eritrea, North Korea, China, Syria, and Iran.  

The 2025 RSF index shows that today's news media are caught between preserving their editorial independence and ensuring their economic survival.  

Is State Department Next in Line for Dismantlement?

The Washington Post published on 14 April 2025 an article titled "Trump Plan Would Slash State Dept. Funding by Nearly Half, Memo Says" by Adam Taylor and John Hudson.   

The Washington Post reviewed an internal memo prepared by the White House Office of Management and Budget that proposes a reduction by almost half in the State Department's budget for 2025.  Many of the reductions are funding for international organizations such as the UN and NATO.  The budget described in the memo is subject to deliberations in the Trump administration and in Congress.  

National Public Radio posted on 14 April 2025 a 10-minute podcast titled "Big Changes at the U.S. State Department" by Michele Kelemen, Lauren Frayer, and Greg Dixon.  

The podcast describes dramatic changes, including politicization, taking place at the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development.  

The Trump Administration Reverses Course and Reinstates Food Aid Programs in Six Countries

 Reuters published on 8 April 2025 an article titled "Trump Administration Moves to Restore Some Terminated Foreign Aid Programs, Sources Say" by Jonathan Landay, Daphne Psaledakis, and Humeyra Pamuk.  

The Trump administration reinstated at least 6 recently cancelled US foreign aid programs for emergency food assistance following pressure from inside the administration and from Congress.  The reversal allows food aid programs to continue in Somalia, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Ecuador.

USAID's Door Closing Quickly

 The Washington Post published on 7 April 2025 an article titled "Marco Rubio Said He'd Protect Lifesaving Aid Overseas.  DOGE Disagreed" by Annie Gowen.

USAID's new 28-year-old deputy administrator from the DOGE team has ordered the termination of key medical and emergency assistance work across Africa and the Middle East.  His order seems to contradict Secretary of State Marco Rubio's promise to continue lifesaving USAID programs.  

Where US Foreign Aid Is Being Eliminated

 The New York Times published on 21 February 2025 an article titled "'We Are Seeing Complete Destruction': The Damage Done by U.S.A.I.D. Freeze" by Jeremy Konyndyk, president of Refugees International.  

The author comments that the Trump administration appears to be engaged in an effort to "almost entirely eliminate foreign aid programs."  He then summarizes programs around the world that will disappear if this initiative is allowed to go forward by the courts and Congress.  

US Suspends Funding for Counterterrorism in Africa and Middle East

 The Washington Post published on 16 February 2025 an article titled "Trump's Global Funding Freeze Leaves Anti-terror Programs in Limbo" by Katharine Houreld, Rachel Carson, Susannah George, and Mustafa Salim.  

The Trump administration's suspension of funding for the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program is leaving ongoing training programs in countries like Somalia in limbo.  This provides an opportunity for terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab to step up their efforts to topple legitimate governments.  

An Analysis of the Business Model of Russia's Wagner Group

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 6 February 2025 a study titled "Wagner's Business Model in Syria and Africa: Profit and Patronage" by Olivia Allison, Nick Connon, Antonio Giustozzi, and James Pascall.  

The paper examines whether the Wagner Group was profitable under its founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, what its business model meant for Russia and Russia's geopolitical rivals in the recent past, and what the model could mean for the future.  It draws primarily on three case studies: Syria, the Central African Republic, and Mali.  

It concludes that Wagner Group ventures in Africa and the Middle East did not contribute significantly to Russia's coffers, but that does not appear to have been the purpose.  Rather, they were intended to sustain Russia's foreign policy initiatives.

Prigozhin's death raised serious questions about the sustainability of the Wagner business model.  With Prigozhin gone and given the lack of appetite for his neocolonial approach among governments that might make use of Wagner's style of operations, a more feasible approach for achieving substantial profits in the future would be a focus on smuggling. 

Russia Looks at Ports in Libya, Algeria, and Sudan as Potential Alternatives to Syria

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 14 January 2025 an analysis titled "Russia's Options for Naval Basing in the Mediterranean After Syria's Tartus" by Edward Black and Sidharth Kaushal.

In the event that Russia must close its naval base at Tartus in Syria, Mediterranean replacement options are Libya and Algeria and Sudan on the Red Sea.  Tobruk in Libya is the most likely alternative, but it comes with significant downsides.  

Evaluation of Russia's Wagner Group in Mali, CAR, Mozambique and Syria

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published in January 2025 an analysis titled "Did Wagner Succeed in the Eyes of Its African and Middle Eastern Clients?" by Antonio Giustozzi, Joana de Deus Pereira, and David Lewis.  

This Whitehall Report looks at the Wagner Group from the perspective of its clients in four case studies: Mali, Central African Republic, Mozambique, and Syria.  In terms of support services such as training, advising and maintenance, Wagner's performance was rather undistinguished in the view of its clients.  After the mutiny in 2023, most of Wagner's support services contracts were taken over without much trouble by the Russian Ministry of Defense.  

With regard to Wagner's provision of ready-to-deploy combat units, as of 2024 it remained one of few entities willing to offer this service, as well as the most willing to deploy in very challenging environments.  Attempts by the Russian Ministry of Defense to replace Wagner in such tasks following the mutiny were met with stubborn resistance by the Malian and CAR governments.  The Syrian government, by contrast, was happy to see Wagner leave in 2023.  In Mozambique, it was Wagner's leader Yevgeny Prigozhin who decided to bail out.  

Overall, while Wagner was fairly successful in providing ready-to-deploy small armies in challenging environments, it was clearly exposed to the risk of ending up seriously embattled.  

Russia Moves from Syria to Libya; Beware the Implications

 The Atlantic Council posted on 2 January 2025 an analysis titled "Russia Is Making a Fragile Pivot from Syria to Libya.  The West Should Beware Falling into a New Trap" by Emadeddin Badi.  

As Russian forces are being pushed out of Syria, Moscow is relocating troops and hardware in eastern Libya, controlled by Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army.  Libya should not be seen as a fallback but as part of a long-standing strategy to expand Moscow's strategic hold in the region and to project power beyond it, especially in Africa.  The West should avoid chasing a fleeting alliance with Haftar and focus on addressing the structural weaknesses that make Libya susceptible to external exploitation.

Growing Concerns about Russia's Ability to Provide Security in Africa

 Foreign Policy published on 31 December 2024 an analysis titled "The Illusion of Russian Security in Africa Has Been Shattered" by Samuel Ramani, CEO of Pangea Geopolitical Risk.  

Due to Russia's setback in Syria, African autocracies are second-guessing Moscow's ability to serve as their last line of defense in a moment of crisis.  In any event, Russia's track record for providing security in Africa has been underwhelming.  

Libya and Sudan are highly problematic as replacement locations for Russian air and naval bases in Syria should they be asked to leave.

Russia's Africa Corps Encounters Limits

 The CTC Sentinel published in December 2024 an analysis titled "Africa Corps: Has Russia Hit a Ceiling in Africa?" by Christopher Faulkner, Marcel Plichta, and Raphael Parens.  

Russia's Africa Corps deployment in Africa's Sahel region has done little to curb jihadi violence.  It is not even clear that Moscow has a Sahel strategy. Russia's recent setback in Syria will make success in the Sahel even more questionable.  The Africa Corps is encountering significant challenges.  In Niger and Burkina Faso, the Africa Corps looks more like a Praetorian Guard to keep military regime leaders in power.  

Is the Wagner Group a Model for Mercenary Organizations?

 Stimson published on 25 October 2024 a commentary titled "Is Wagner a Model for Other Mercenary Groups?" by Brian Castner.  

Russia's mercenary Wagner Group gained much of its notoriety through its employment in African conflicts.  Wagner's strengths were its ability to recruit in Russia from military veterans and the prison population and to accomplish multiple lines of effort in a security-deficient space.  Wagner was both a military force and a business organization.  

Today, Wagner has split into multiple smaller organizations.  There are, however, situations where Wagner-like groups can thrive.  

Future of Russia's Wagner Group in Africa

 The Russia Program at George Washington University published in September 2024 a carefully researched study titled "After Prigozhin Does Wagner Group Have a Future?" by Antonio Giustozzi and David Lewis, Royal United Services Institute.

Following the assassination of Yevgeniy Prigozhin, his son Pavel, has been working to establish the Wagner business on more independent footing.  Th Russian government has accepted a compromise in the case of Mali and the Central African Republic and included the Wagner Group in its revised contracts.  Wagner proved irreplaceable as far as engaging in combat was concerned.  These African regimes showed a clear preference for trusting regime security to Wagner.  

After some months attempting to figure out how to move on from Wagner, the Russian Ministry of Defense accepted that there was no real alternative to Wagner in Mali and the CAR and that having Wagner take on the most controversial jobs might continue to serve Moscow's interests.  Pavel Prigozhin appears to have been exploring options for operating independently of the Ministry of Defense but, in the end, might not need to separate completely from it.

The Increasing Significance of the Islamic State in Somalia

 The September 2024 issue of the CTC Sentinel published an article titled "Islamic State-Somalia: A Growing Global Terror Concern" by Caleb Weiss and Lucas Webber.

The Somali branch of the Islamic State is becoming a growing concern.  It is recruiting globally and is now linked to international terrorist plots.  It has become one of the Islamic State's most important global branches.

Exclusive Report on Wagner Group Defeat on Mali-Algeria Border

 Reuters published on 11 September 2024 an article titled "Exclusive: Wagner Lost Veteran Fighters in Mali Ambush, in Setback to Russia's Africa Campaign" by Filipp Lebedev, Felix Light, and Jessica Donati.

Dozens of Russian Wagner mercenaries died in a battle with Tuareg rebels during a desert sandstorm in Mali near the Algerian border.  Some were Russian war veterans who survived tours in Ukraine, Libya, and Syria.