Ethio Negari published on 28 July 2026 an article titled "China-Africa Robotic Surgery Training Centre Opens in Addis Ababa."
The China-Africa Robotic Surgery Center that opened in Addis Ababa uses AI-driven healthcare techniques. The first round of training involved 40 healthcare professionals from Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, and Libya.
TrendsNAfrica published on 1 July 2026 an article titled "China's New Gold Strategy Runs Through Africa: How Beijing Is Rewriting the Global Bullion Market."
Beijing is quietly reshaping the mechanics of the international gold trade. Its strategy involves dismantling speculative domestic paper-gold trading while building an international ecosystem centered on physical bullion, yuan-based settlements, and African mineral wealth.
About 40 percent of the world's remaining underground gold reserves are located in Africa. China is reducing its holdings of US Treasury securities and replacing them with gold purchases, especially in Africa.
Thierry Pairault posted on 11 July 2026 an analysis titled "The African Coffee Industry and the Chinese Tariff Exemption."
This working paper examines how China's coffee market has evolved and the role that Africa has played in it. Africa is a modest source (7.4 percent in 2024) for Chinese coffee imports. Five African countries export green coffee beans to China: Ethiopia (70 percent of the African total), Uganda (20 percent), Tanzania (5 percent), Kenya (3 percent), and Rwanda (2 percent).
China is a minor customer for African coffee and all five countries except Kenya paid no tariffs prior to China's recent Africa-wide zero tariff policy. The zero-tariff policy will benefit Kenya. In addition, African producers are confronted with importer-processors who set the conditions of the market. China's tariff exemption matters little in terms of shaping of their industrial and commercial strategies given that it affects only minimal quantities.
Thierry Pairault published on 30 June 2026 an article titled "The African Sesame Industry and the Chinese Tariff Exemption."
China obtains from Africa more than 80 percent of its imported sesame seeds. Six countries account for 95 percent of African sesame exports to China: Niger, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.
China's recent zero tariff policy for African countries will primarily benefit Chinese importers-processors rather than African producers. The tariff advantage is captured at the point of entry into China by companies whose shareholders are Chinese, Singaporean, and Taiwanese.
Launch Base Africa published on 22 June 2026 an article titled "NewTrails Capital, Backed by Africa's Leading Smartphone Manufacturer, Invests $55M in EV Startup Spiro."
China's Transsion Holdings, Africa's biggest smartphone seller, currently commands nearly half of the continent's market. Through its stake in a Chinese growth-stage fund called NewTrails Capital, Transsion is investing $55 million in Spiro, Africa's largest electric vehicle and battery-swapping company. For Spiro, the relationship opens doors to Chinese suppliers that could be decisive as it scales.
Global Witness published on 10 June 2026 a major report titled "Who Buys Rwanda's Smuggled Coltan? The Global Journey of Conflict Coltan from DRC to the World's Electronics."
Most of the conflict coltan mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo and smuggled through Rwanda is processed by companies in China. A few companies in Kazakhstan and Thailand are also involved. The refined tantalum often unwittingly ends up in the products of major Western companies.
Africa-Press published on 3 June 2026 an article titled "Tanzania: Historic Russia Visit Amid Tensions."
Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan made an official visit to Russia 3-5 June, the first visit by a Tanzanian leader in over five decades. The visit takes place following disputed elections in Tanzania in October 2025, deteriorating relations with the West, and during Russia's war with Ukraine.
A June 2 article in Tanzania's Taufa Daily titled "10 Reasons President Samia's Russia Visit Is a Major Win for Tanzania" goes to considerable lengths to justify the timing of the visit.
The Respondents posted on 20 May 2026 an article titled "CCM, China's CPC Deepen Ties with Southern African Liberation Parties."
Tanzania's ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi hosted a meeting with the head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China and senior leaders from the ruling political parties in Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The parties launched the Research Centre for Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.
The New York Times published on 4 May 2026 an article titled "'The Death Zone': How Russia Is Luring Africans to Ukraine" by Matthew Mpoke Bigg, John Eligon, and Zimasa Matiwane.
An estimated 1,000 Kenyans went to Russia and ended up in the war against Ukraine. Only 30 have returned to Kenya alive. In addition, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Botswana, Mali, and Cameroon have reported men being falsely recruited into the Russian army.
Africa at LSE published on 15 April 2026 a paper titled "Critical Mineral Transport Infrastructure Is the Latest Theater of Geopolitical Competition in Africa" by Stephen Nduvi.
Rehabilitation of the Chinese-funded Tanzania-Zambia railway is competing with the Western-funded Lobito Corridor (Angola, DRC and Zambia) infrastructure project to transport critical minerals to ports on the Atlantic or Indian Oceans. The big challenge for African countries is converting corridor competition into sustainable development outcomes.
Bankable posted on 7 April 2026 a commentary titled "Zijin, CMOC Back Competing Alternative to Lobito Corridor" by Pierre Mukoko.
China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation and four Chinese companies are financing a $1.4 billion project to rehabilitate the Tanzania-Zambia railway that will transport critical minerals from the DRC to the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam.
The Tanzania-Zambia railway will compete with the American and European Lobito Corridor project that will transport critical minerals from the DRC to an Atlantic Ocean port in Angola.
E-International Relations posted on 1 April 2026 my short paper titled "The Communist Party of China Reaches Out to Africa."
This is a post-COVID-19 update of efforts by the International Department of the Communist Party of China (ID-CPC) to strengthen ties with political parties in Africa. COVID-19 significantly interrupted the ID-CPC's interaction with African political parties. The ID-CPC has now returned to a high degree of engagement with them.
The South African Institute of International Affairs published in February 2026 a study titled "Back to the Shadows: Russia's African Security Engagements Since Prigozhin" by Ivan U. Klyszcz, Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn, Estonia.
Russia continues to deploy military personnel and conduct information operations to shape regional politics in Africa. Since 2023, Moscow has taken tighter control, with Kremlin-linked figures, state agencies, and federal funding driving these efforts. Russian activities reflect the Kremlin's top foreign policy priorities but are constrained by competing demands, especially the war in Ukraine.
Discovery Alert posted on 25 March 2026 an article titled "DRC Lithium Project: $1.4B Investment Transforming Africa's Mining Sector" by Muflih Hidayat.
China's Zijin Mining Group will have a 55 percent controlling interest in a $1.4 billion joint investment with the DRC government in a lithium mining project that will potentially contribute almost 5 percent of global mined lithium output by 2028.
The DRC project represents a paradigm shift in how international mining companies approach African mineral extraction. Rather than focus on raw material export, this approach integrates downstream processing capabilities directly into mining operations.
The Washington Post published on 2 February 2026 an article titled "Kenyan Job Seekers Were Lured to Russia, Then Sent to Die in Ukraine" by Rael Ombuor and Katharine Houreld.
The story is based on interviews with four Kenyans who fought for Russia in Ukraine and family members of nine other Kenyan recruits. Ukraine sources have identified 1,436 nationals from 36 African countries fighting for Russia. Some of the Africans were recruited to fight on the side of Russia while others were lured to Russia for civilian employment and forced to fight for Russia.
The African Center for Strategic Studies published on 30 January 2026 a paper titled "China's Military Footprint in Africa Deepens with People's Liberation Army-led BRICS Naval Drills" by Paul Nantulya.
The January 2026 BRICS Plus naval exercise in South African waters led by China's People's Liberation Army underscored Beijing's use of military power in Africa to advance Chinese geostrategic objectives. China views BRICS Plus as part of an alternative global security and geopolitical architecture intended to counterbalance Western and US-led initiatives.
Beijing has invested heavily in securing African participation in Chinese-led global initiatives to enhance its legitimacy, build regional voting blocs, and strengthen China's leverage amid global rivalries. It accomplishes this through military exercises, naval port calls, creating security architecture, arms sales, and military training.
Mizzima, a non-profit foundation that supports social change and development in Myanmar, published on 28 January 2026 a commentary titled "Weaponising the Trawl: China's Maritime Militia, Distant-Water Fishing, and the Strategic Contest in the Indian Ocean."
Chinese fishing fleets maintain a massive presence in the Indian Ocean region. What appears on the surface as fishing is, in practice, a grey-zone strategy, blending economic exploitation, intelligence gathering, and coercive presence to reshape the maritime realities without triggering open conflict.
In addition, see Sweekriti Pathak's "Fishing and Force: China's Dark Fleets and Maritime Militias" dated 29 January 2026 published by India's Observer Research Foundation.
The Development Watch Centre, an independent think tank in Uganda, published on 20 January 2026 an article titled "Making Sense of China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi's 2026 Tour of Africa" by Musanjufu Benjamin Kavubu.
The visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Africa reinforces Beijing's goal to be seen as an attractive and more reliable geopolitical and geoeconomic partner than is the case for the United States.
The Indian website Firstpost published on 16 January 2026 a commentary titled "China Recalibrates Its Africa Outreach: Insights from Wang Yi's Tour" by Gurgit Singh, former Indian ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, ASEAN, and the Africa Union.
China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi has just completed a visit to Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Lesotho and skipped Somalia at the last minute. Wang Yi's visit demonstrated that China is adjusting its methods in Africa to reflect debt fatigue, security volatility, and intensifying great power competition.
Kenya's The Star published on 13 January 2026 an article titled "(Understanding China) Wang Yi's Africa Visit and China's Long Game in a Fractured World" by Stephen Ndegwa.
The author argues that Africa is not just China's partner for growth but a "co-architect of a new global narrative." Increasingly, the relationship is rooted in "strategic coherence, institutional cooperation and global multilateral engagement."
Comment: This highly favorable analysis of the China-Africa relationship conveniently ignores Africa's large and continuing trade deficit with China and the mercantilist policy whereby China sells mostly value-added goods to Africa while importing almost entirely raw materials from Africa.
