The Diplomat published on 24 July 2026 a commentary titled "As the World Courts Beijing, Namibia Shows How Africa Can Sharpen Its China Strategy" by Huiyi Chen and Ovigwe Eguegu.
Namibian President Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah made a weeklong state visit to China in early July. She arrived with a clear agenda, negotiated a Namibia-relevant itinerary, and left with numerous tangible agreements. The authors urge other African leaders to follow her example.
Discovery Alert posted on 11 July 2026 an article titled "Namibia's Oil, Uranium & Lithium Strategic Partnership with China 2026" by Muflih Hidayat.
The China-Namibia strategic partnership entered a new chapter in July 2026 when Namibian President Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah made a state visit to China. She signed 8 cooperation agreements that focus on green minerals, uranium, lithium, oil and gas, ports, technology transfer, and clean energy.
Pan African Television posted on 8 July 2026 an article titled "Namibia's President Visits China for Talks on Minerals, Green Hydrogen, and Manufacturing" by Victoria Wilson.
Namibian President Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah is on a state visit to China. Her priority is attracting investment in minerals processing and downstream manufacturing. Namibia aims to process 57 percent of its exported minerals locally by 2030.
The Namibian published on 28 June 2026 an article titled "Namibia in Numbers: Namibia's Uranium Output" by Ida Williams.
Namibia produces 12 percent of the world's uranium output and is the third ranking producer after Kazakhstan and Canada. The two largest mines in Namibia are owned by Chinese companies: the Husab mine by China General Nuclear Power and the Rossing mine by China National Uranium Corporation. An Australian company owns the third mine, which accounts for less production.
Modern Diplomacy published on 21 May 2026 an article titled "Geology Meets Geopolitics: The Global Race for Critical Minerals in the Climate Transition" by Marta Rehnman, Trinity College Dublin.
China dominates the processing of critical minerals in Africa and Latin America. Beijing has mining partnerships with 44 African countries. But the United States and European Union are stepping up competition for unexploited mineral reserves in both Africa and Latin America.
The Respondents posted on 20 May 2026 an article titled "CCM, China's CPC Deepen Ties with Southern African Liberation Parties."
Tanzania's ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi hosted a meeting with the head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China and senior leaders from the ruling political parties in Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The parties launched the Research Centre for Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.
E-International Relations posted on 1 April 2026 my short paper titled "The Communist Party of China Reaches Out to Africa."
This is a post-COVID-19 update of efforts by the International Department of the Communist Party of China (ID-CPC) to strengthen ties with political parties in Africa. COVID-19 significantly interrupted the ID-CPC's interaction with African political parties. The ID-CPC has now returned to a high degree of engagement with them.
China-Africa Security Radar published on 10 March 2026 an article titled "Will China Pursue a Military Base in Africa's Atlantic Ocean?" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.
The author argues that contrary to conventional wisdom in US military circles, China is not particularly interested in having a military base on Africa's Atlantic coast. It would represent a massive logistical overextension at a time when China needs to concentrate naval power close to home. Such a base would be highly exposed and vulnerable to attack, making it a strategic liability rather than an asset. In any event, by investing extensively in West African commercial ports, China has access, at least in peace time, for PLA Navy port calls.
Comment: While the author makes some good points, it was generally thought that China, which professed publicly that it did not believe in military bases outside China, would not establish a military base in Djibouti--until it did.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies published on 15 January 2026 a report titled "In China's Orbit: Beijing's Space Diplomacy in the Global South" by Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs.
China is engaging in space cooperation across the Global South and Africa has emerged as a focal point of its efforts, especially Egypt, Ethiopia, and Namibia. This study provides satellite photography to document China's facilities in all three countries.
Lokmat Times published on 5 December 2025 an article titled "Africa Faces Growing Cybercrime as China Linked Syndicates Expand Operations."
Nigeria is emerging as the epicenter of a cybercrime crisis that is engulfing Africa. In late 2024 and early 2025, coordinated raids in Lagos and Abuja resulted in the arrest of nearly 1,000 suspects, including 177 Chinese nationals. These syndicates siphon tens of billions of dollars annually through fake investments, romance schemes, and cryptocurrency fraud.
African governments are operating in an uncomfortable situation. They are dependent on Chinese economic partnerships while they need to confront criminal networks that involve Chinese nationals.
The LSE Blog posted on 6 August 2025 a commentary titled "China is Reshaping Global Power Dynamics through Diplomatic Ritual" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah, Lingnan University, and Christian Kaunert, Dublin City University.
In January 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made his first overseas trip of the year to Africa--Chad, Republic of Congo, Namibia, and Nigeria--a practice the Chinese foreign minister has done every year since 1991. The author argues that Wang Yi's trip represents a systematic erosion of Western influence in Africa.
The South China Morning Post published on 3 August 2025 an article titled "Beijing Builds Influence with Help for African Space Sector" by Jevans Nyabiage.
China funded and built a satellite data receiving ground station on the outskirts of Namibia's capital of Windhoek. Together with other stations, it could provide China with continuous telemetry, tracking and command capabilities for its expanding space missions.
China has bilateral agreements with over a dozen African countries for space technology, training, and infrastructure. African countries are increasingly partnering with China in space technology.
Reporters without Borders posted recently its "RSF World Press Freedom Index 2025: Economic Fragility a Leading Threat to Press Freedom."
RSF ranked 180 countries for the 2025 index. Ten African countries, led by South Africa, Namibia, and Cabo Verde scored better than the United States, ranked number 57, although Sub-Saharan Africa generally experienced a decline in press freedom. The five lowest ranking countries were Eritrea, North Korea, China, Syria, and Iran.
The 2025 RSF index shows that today's news media are caught between preserving their editorial independence and ensuring their economic survival.
Reuters published on 11 February 2025 a special report titled "China Builds Space Alliances in Africa as Trump Cuts Foreign Aid" by Joe Roulette, Eduardo Baptista, Sara El Safty, and Joe Brock.
China has forged nearly two dozen pacts with African countries in its bid to surpass the US in space investments in satellites and infrastructure. This is winning friends and giving China more eyes on the skies as the US slashes foreign aid for developing countries.
The space equipment that Beijing is placing in developing countries may help China create a global surveillance network. China has democratized space to enhance its authoritarian capabilities, and it is doing so effectively. As China advances its relationships in Africa with technology incentives, the US is pulling back.
The China Global South Project published on 9 January 2025 a commentary titled "From 1991 to Today: The Significance of the Chinese Foreign Minister's Annual Africa Tour" by Christian Geraud Neema Byamungu.
Every year since 1991, China's foreign minister has made his first overseas visit to Africa. On his current visit, Wang Yi is visiting Namibia, Republic of Congo, Chad, and Nigeria. Each year much ink is spilled by China-Africa analysts trying to explain why the foreign minister visits the particular countries on the itinerary. The author rightly points out that these trips may simply be about normal, run-of-the-mill diplomacy and have no deeply strategic geopolitical or economically motivated explanation.
Deutsche Welle published on 8 January 2025 an article titled "Chinese FM's Africa Tour Is More than Symbolic" by Cai Nebe.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is making the 35th first overseas visit of the year to an African country. On this occasion, he is visiting Namibia, Republic of Congo, Chad, and Nigeria. This tradition has served China's African policy well over the years, especially when it is compared to the practices of Western governments.
The European Council on Foreign Relations published on 7 November 2024 a paper titled "Material World: How Europe Can Compete with China in the Race for Africa's Critical Minerals" by Sarah Logan.
The author argues the European Union must enhance support to European companies to invest in securing access to critical raw materials. This should include new financial incentives and measures to protect against China manipulating prices on international markets.
The South China Morning Post published on 18 September 2024 an article titled "How China Is Showing Its Development and Governance Experience" by Jevans Nyabiage.
China has stepped up its efforts to export its governance and development model to countries in Africa. At the level of African ruling political parties, there is the Herbert Chitepo School of Ideology in Zimbabwe, which China refurbished and where it provides training. An even better example is the CPC-funded Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School in Tanzania for the ruling political parties in Tanzania, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique.
S&P Global Commodity Insights published on 12 April 2024 an article titled "FACTBOX: China Set to Raise African Lithium Output in 2024 with Diversification Plans" by Lucy Tang.
China has been making substantial investments in the African lithium sector, making the region a key supplier and thereby helping reduce Beijing's heavy reliance on Australian lithium. China is the dominant player in Africa. Zimbabwe has become the second largest supplier to China after Australia, accounting in 2023 for 9 percent of China's spodumene import market share.
The Daily Maverick published on 13 November 2023 a commentary titled "Power above Rights - China's More Sinister Role in Africa" by Greg Mills and Ray Hartley, Brenthurst Foundation.
China financed and built the $40 million Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School in Tanzania for the ruling political parties in Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. These six political parties have ruled their countries continuously since independence and share an open disdain for their opponents. They have stifled democratic threats to their rule and are banding together to preserve their political control.
