Turkey Extends Economic and Military Influence in Somalia

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 7 May 2026 an analysis titled "The New Scramble: Turkey, Somalia and the Battle for the Red Sea" by Matthew Chandler de Waal.

Turkey has become Somalia's foremost ally.  Camp TURKSOM, Ankara's largest overseas military base, has trained thousands of Somali special forces since 2017.  More recently, Turkey became engaged in a major project to develop Somalia's deepwater oil reserves.

Turkey is now looking to build a base in the Gulf of Aden at Laas Qoray, a port city that is contested by Somalia and the breakaway government of Somaliland.  A base in Laas Qoray would put Turkey in position to join a host of other nations with military bases at the south end of the Red Sea.

Turkey Expands Influence in Africa

 AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 16 April 2026 an analysis titled "Turkey Expands Influence in Africa" by Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo.  

Turkey recently advanced economic and security ties with Somalia and Niger.  Both countries now serve as Ankara's anchors for further advancing its strategic interests in Africa.  In the case of Somalia, Turkey has assumed responsibility for managing and protecting its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) while it helps rebuild the defunct Somali navy in exchange for 30 percent of EEZ revenues.

Will China Pursue a Military Base on Africa's Atlantic Coast?

 China-Africa Security Radar published on 10 March 2026 an article titled "Will China Pursue a Military Base in Africa's Atlantic Ocean?" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.  

The author argues that contrary to conventional wisdom in US military circles, China is not particularly interested in having a military base on Africa's Atlantic coast.  It would represent a massive logistical overextension at a time when China needs to concentrate naval power close to home.  Such a base would be highly exposed and vulnerable to attack, making it a strategic liability rather than an asset.  In any event, by investing extensively in West African commercial ports, China has access, at least in peace time, for PLA Navy port calls.  

Comment:  While the author makes some good points, it was generally thought that China, which professed publicly that it did not believe in military bases outside China, would not establish a military base in Djibouti--until it did.  

Chinese Military Detachment from Djibouti Marches in Madagascar Parade

 China Military Online published on 27 June 2025 an article titled "PLA Support Base in Djibouti Participates in Military Parade Marking 65th Anniversary of Madagascar's Independence."

A detachment of more than 50 People's Liberation Army troops from China's military base in Djibouti marched on 26 June in an Antananarivo military parade to mark the 65th anniversary of Madagascar's independence.  

China's Engagement in Djibouti

 The Congressional Research Service posted on 6 June 2025 an article titled "China's Engagement in Djibouti" by Lauren Ploch Blanchard.

This is a nice, updated summary of China's economic, security, and political relations with Djibouti and a discussion of US concerns.  

Turkiye's Growing Presence in Somalia Results in Supporters and Detractors

 The Emirates Policy Center published on 16 June 2025 a commentary titled "Stakes and Potential Consequences of the Growing Turkish Engagement in Somalia."

Turkiye has been steadily increasing its security, political, and economic engagement in Somalia.  This has resulted in a debate among Somalis.  Some view Turkiye's presence favorably, while others express concerns over its depth and implications.   

Somaliland: Diplomatic Recognition Remains Elusive

 The International Crisis Group posted on 19 June 2025 a 30-minute podcast titled "Somaliland's Moment?" with Guleid Ahmed Jama, lawyer and political commentator based in Hargeisa, and host Alan Boswell.  

The Somaliland-Ethiopia memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed in 2024 was never clear to most Somalilanders.  There was subsequently a change of government in Somaliland, making the situation even less clear although Hargeisa continues to seek diplomatic recognition.  In any event, the MOU is now on a back burner and negotiations with Ethiopia concerning the MOU have not yet resumed under the new government in Hargeisa.

The more recent question is whether the Trump administration is willing to give Somaliland diplomatic recognition in exchange for military use of air and port facilities at Berbera on Somaliland's coast.  The US military has expressed interest but there has been no movement so far by the Trump administration.  

Somaliland To Press Trump Administration for Recognition

 The New York Times published on 12 April 2025 an article titled "African Breakaway State Offers U.S. a Chance to Stick It to China" by Abdi Latif Dahir and Joao Silva.

Somaliland, which unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991, has reportedly offered the United States the option of establishing a military base in exchange for diplomatic recognition.  Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi plans to visit Washington in the coming months when he will make the case for recognition, which is already supported by some Republican members of Congress.  

China Expands Military Influence in Africa and Beyond

 The London School of Economics blog posted on 22 January 2025 a commentary titled "China's Economic Boom Fuels Its Military Advancement and Influence in Africa" by Isaac Nunoo, University of Cape Coast, Ghana.

The commentary emphasizes the connection between China's economic and military influence in Africa in its effort to project global power.  The author concluded that it is not clear if China will become an offensive rising power or an ambitious but disciplined great power.

Impact of Red Sea Crisis on Chinese Investment in Djibouti

 The South China Morning Post published on 28 December 2024 an article titled "China's Faith in Djibouti Is Paying Off, But Could Red Sea Crisis Muddy the Waters?" by Enoch Wong.

The article notes that Chinese investments in Djibouti are generally profitable, but continuing Yemen-based Houth attacks on Red Sea shipping raise questions concerning the future of trade through Djibouti.  A Houthi-created crisis that continues for an extended period of time could have negative consequences for Chinese investments in the region.

Turkey Mediates Ethiopia-Somalia Crisis but Al-Shabaab May Still Benefit

 The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats published on 18 December 2024 an analysis titled "Africa File Special Edition: Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps" by Kathryn Tyson and Liam Karr.

Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the sea as part of a Turkish-mediated Ankara Declaration.  Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base deal with breakaway Somaliland.  This, in turn, may result in a reversal by Somalia to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia.  Nevertheless, the al-Shabaab terrorist organization could still benefit from these developments.  

Ethiopia and Somalia Reach Tentative Agreement on Port Access

 Deutsche Welle published on 11 December 2024 an article titled "Ethiopia, Somalia Reach Compromise to End Feud, Turkey Says."

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met in Ankara on 11 December at the invitation of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.  Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to work closely together on commercial arrangements and bilateral agreements that would ensure Ethiopia's "reliable, safe and sustainable" access to the sea "under the sovereign authority of the Federal Republic of Somalia."  Ethiopia and Somalia also agreed to begin technical talks no later than the end of February 2025 and to complete them within four months.

Comment:  No direct mention seems to have been made of Ethiopia's earlier MOU with Somaliland for a military base in exchange for diplomatic recognition of Somaliland.  Nor was Somaliland involved in the discussions.  This appears to be an effort by Ethiopia to resolve serious differences with Somalia while putting aside or ever annulling the MOU with Somaliland.  

Rising Somalia-Ethiopia Tensions

 Agence France Presse published on 26 September 2024 an article titled "Rising Somalia-Ethiopia Tensions Threaten Horn of Africa."

Egypt delivered this week a second shipment of arms to Somalia, causing Ethiopia to increase its concern about the Somali-Egyptian relationship. Ethiopian troops remain in Somalia as part of the African Union force to combat al-Shabaab.  If Ethiopia continues with plans to establish a naval base on the coast of Somaliland, Somalia will almost certainly demand that it withdraw its forces from the country, possibly leaving a vacuum for al-Shabaab to fill.

Egypt Is Cozying Up to Somalia to Thwart Ethiopia

 The Atlantic Council published on 19 September 2024 an analysis titled "Egypt Is Cozying Up to Somalia to Thwart Ethiopia" by Shahira Amin.

In August, Egypt sent two C-130 planes with weapons and ammunition to Mogadishu to improve relations with Somalia and send a message to Ethiopia.  Egypt has long opposed Addis Ababa's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile.  It grew increasingly concerned following Ethiopia's memorandum of understanding with Somaliland that includes a possible Ethiopian naval base on the Somaliland coast.  

Somalia Faces Regional Tensions

The International Crisis Group posted on 19 September 2024 a 39-minute podcast titled "Somalia Amid a Swirl of Regional Tensions" with Alan Boswell and Omar Mahmood.   

Somalia is insisting that Ethiopia renounce the memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, which Ethiopia refuses to do.  Somalia signed a new security agreement with Turkey and followed this with some kind of secret agreement with Egypt, which may include training of Somali soldiers.  Turkey and Egypt seem to be working to cooperate in Somalia.

If Ethiopia does not renounce the MOU, Somalia said Ethiopian troops will no longer be permitted to participate in the ATMIS stabilization mission.  There is speculation that Egyptian troops will replace them, which would be challenging for Egypt to do.  It could also result in a short-term security vacuum.  

Both Ethiopia and Somalia are engaged in brinkmanship.  This situation leaves openings for al-Shabaab to expand its influence in Somalia.  The Islamic State remains operationally insignificant inside Somalia but is playing a larger external role.  

Does China Want a Military Base in Gabon?

 Africa Business Insider published on 7 September 2024 an article titled "US Proposes Strategic Deal to Block Chinese Military Expansion in Africa" by Adekunle Agbetiloye.  

The United States will train Gabon's special forces and offer a $5 million package that includes radars to assist the country in monitoring illegal fishing, pay for collaboration with the West Virginia National Guard, and support conservation efforts in national parks.  There is speculation Washington offered the package to preempt China's goal of establishing a military training facility in Gabon.  

The Diplomat published on 20 February 2024 a commentary titled "China Continues Its Search for a Maritime Military Presence in West Africa" by Lea Thome.

This earlier commentary reviews China's rumored efforts to establish a military presence on Africa's Atlantic coast.  

Turkey Agrees to Support Somali Navy

 The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats published on 8 August 2024 an analysis titled "Turkey Prepares to Ship Out to Somalia" by Liam Karr and Lilya Yatim.

Turkey has agreed to deploy an unspecified number of naval forces to Somalia to build the Somali navy's capacity.  This will improve Somalia's ability to compete with Ethiopia's goal to develop a naval base in Somaliland.  The Somali-Turkish naval agreement could also complicate Ankara's relations with Addis Ababa and give added incentive for the UAE to strengthen relations with Ethiopia.  

Another Look at the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU

 The Nanyang Technological University in Singapore published on 27 June 2024 an analysis titled "Ethiopia's Red Sea Gambit: A Landlocked Nation in Search of an Alternative Port" by Johan Burger.  

The author reviews Ethiopia's current standing in the Horn of Africa and the impact of its memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Somaliland to establish a port and naval base there.  He concludes implementation of the MOU could destabilize the region.

Political Faction Leader Analyzes Current Mess in Sudan

 Dabanga, an independent Sudanese broadcaster/publisher now operating outside the country, posted on 9 June 2024 an analysis titled "Russian Red Sea Base and RSF 'Government' in Darfur Will Prolong War and Condemn Sudan" by Yassir Arman, founder and secretary-general of the SPLM-N Democratic Revolutionary Movement and member of the Coordination of the Civil Democratic Forces (Tagadom).  

Yasir Arman argues that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) cannot achieve a military solution to Sudan's divisions.  Both sides are preparing to dismember or partition their homeland for their own advantage.  They do not care if they destroy the country's entire population and infrastructure in the process.  The RSF has hinted that if it takes control of El Fasher, the capital and largest city in North Darfur, it might form its own government independent of the SAF government based in Port Sudan, causing Sudan to follow the example of divided Libya.  

Arman urges Sudan to link the civilian-political peace process with the military track in Jeddah to reach a long-term humanitarian ceasefire, with regional and international monitoring on the ground.  The goal should be rebuilding the state, establishing a single professional army, and completing the December Revolution.  

Russia and Sudan Reopen Talks on Possible Red Sea Military Base

 The Sudan Tribune published on 7 June 2024 an article titled "Sudan Vows to Activate Military, Economic Cooperation with Russia."

The deputy head of Sudan's Transitional Sovereign Council told Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov in St. Petersburg that Khartoum is interested in reviving the agreement on constructing a Russian naval base on the Red Sea while acknowledging the need to consider the opinions of other countries.  Red Sea littoral countries, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and the United States have expressed opposition to the base.  Speaking on Russia's Arabic-language TV service, Sudan's finance minister said the discussions focus on a service center for Russian ships to obtain supplies.

The Middle East Eye published on 4 June 2024 an article titled "Sudanese Delegation Visits Russia as Red Sea Base Moves Forward" by Oscar Rickett.

Commenting on the same visit to St. Petersburg, the article points out that Russia's mercenary Wagner Group has been supportive for years of Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which is currently at war with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).  The Sudanese delegation in St. Petersburg speaks for the SAF, which has requested weapons and ammunition from Moscow.

Comment:  It will be interesting to see how Sudan and Russia deal with Moscow's conflicting support for both the RSF and the SAF.  Nor does there appear to be agreement yet on what a Russian naval base on Sudan's Red Sea coast would look like.