Geopolitical Implications of Rapprochement Between Ethiopia and Somaliland

 The Emirates Policy Center published on 1 July 2026 a paper titled "Between Maritime Access and Recognition: Geopolitical Implications of Rapprochement Between Ethiopia and Somaliland."

The prospect of landlocked Ethiopia securing maritime access through Somaliland highlights the intersection of Addis Ababa's structural need for a maritime outlet and Hargeisa's ambition to strengthen its legitimacy and bargaining power--without pressing for immediate formal recognition.

The most likely scenario in the foreseeable future is the gradual expansion of economic and logistical cooperation between Ethiopia and Somaliland, without sovereign arrangements or formal recognition.  While the option of recognition or sovereign maritime privileges remains possible, it is less likely and would require deeper regional and international transformations.  

Podcast of Somaliland's Culture and History

 Higher Education Today posted about a month ago a 29-minute podcast titled "Culture and History of Somaliland" hosted by Steven Roy Goodman with Jama Musa Jama, Hargeisa Cultural Centre, and Lee Cassanelli, professor emeritus at the University of Pennsylvania.  

This is a positive account filmed in Hargeisa of Somaliland's history and culture, interspersed with video clips of the country.  

Eswatini Sticks with Taiwan and Misses Out on China's Zero Tariffs

 African Arguments published on 25 June 2026 a commentary titled "Xi's Zero Tariff Offer to Africa and the Political Boundaries of Eswatini's Exclusion" by Francis Annagu, a freelance journalist.

China made imports from Africa duty free as of May 1 for all countries except Eswatini, which recognizes Taiwan.  The author suggests Eswatini decided to maintain its relationship with Taiwan because of its long friendship with Taipei that began well before China became a major economic power in Africa.  

Somaliland/Israel/Taiwan vs China

 The University of Nottingham Taiwan Research Hub's Taiwan Insight published on 23 February 2026 a commentary titled "Taiwan's Diplomatic Bridge: Taiwan-Somaliland-Israel vs China in the Horn of Africa" by Faisal Abdirashid Adam. 

Taiwan, which established a liaison office in Somaliland in 2020, has embraced Israel's diplomatic recognition of Somaliland, framing it as a major step forward for the emerging "democratic triangle" of Taiwan, Israel, and Somaliland, which now positions itself as a powerful new alliance for trilateral cooperation in technology, agriculture, and Red Sea security.  

Somaliland Seeks US Recognition

 Semafor published on 9 February 2026 an article titled "Somaliland Pitches Minterals, Strategic Location to Trump" by Mohammed Sergie.  

The President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, is encouraging the Trump administration to recognize Somaliland because of its strategic location at the south end of the Red Sea and oil and gas reserves.

Israel's Rationale for Recognizing Somaliland

 The National Institute Press published on 3 February 2026 a commentary titled "What Israel Sees in Somaliland" by Ilan Berman, American Foreign Policy Council.

The commentary concludes that Israel's recognition of Somaliland provides it with a strategic foothold across from Yemen, greater proximity to the ongoing threat posed by the Houthis, a deeper stake in Red Sea security, and the potential to expand its influence in Africa.  

Somaliland Just Became More Complicated

AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 29 January 2026 an analysis titled "Somalia" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.   

The federal government of Somalia in Mogadishu inaugurated North East state as a federal member state amid political disputes with Somaliland, which has claimed the territory since it declared independence from Somalia in 1991, and the autonomous neighboring state of Puntland, which has claims on parts of North East state.  North East state, which is home to a different clan than the rest of Somaliland, has been a location of periodic conflict for many years.  This situation significantly complicates the situation in Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland.

Somalia Cancels All Deals with the UAE

 Aljazeera published on 13 January 2026 an article titled "'Last Straw': Somalia Cuts UAE Ties after Yemen Separatist's Illegal Entry" by Faisal Ali.  

Somalia cancelled all deals with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) after UAE-backed Yemeni separatist leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi illegally entered Abu Dhabi through the breakaway region of Somaliland.  Mogadishu had other complaints against the UAE, but this was the final straw.  The two countries apparently did not break diplomatic relations.  

Israel's Recognition of Somaliland Changes Dynamic in Horn of Africa

 Ethiopia Insight published on 12 January 2026 a commentary titled "The Geopolitical Ripple Effects of Somaliland's Recognition" by Muktar Ismail, regional analyst.  

Israel's recognition of Somaliland sparked a largely negative international response, underscoring its isolation on the issue.  Of the 15 member states of the UN Security Council, only the United States defended Israel's right to recognize Somaliland.  The al-Shabaab terrorist organization, which controls parts of Somalia, cast the decision as a "Zionist crusader project."

Why Israel Recognized Somaliland

 ABC News posted on 31 December 2025 an article titled "The Strategic Plays that May Have Driven Israel's Recognition of Somaliland" by Eric Tlozek.

Israel probably recognized Somaliland for the following reasons: to establish a presence to monitor Houthi activity in nearby Yemen, as a location for possible resettlement of Gazans from Palestine, and to counter the influence of Turkiye in the region.

Israel's Recognition of Somaliland Creates Challenges in Horn of Africa (in Arabic)

 Egypt's Al Dostor published on 29 December 2025 an article titled "A Dangerous Gamble. Two International Experts: Israeli Recognition of 'Somaliland' Turns It into a Military Base."

The Arabic-language article draws on analysis by me and an analyst at the Atlantic Council in Washington on the implications of Israel's formal recognition of Somaliland, the first such recognition by another country.  It raises the question of possible recognition by other countries and identifies some of the challenges and new strategic considerations in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region.

China Strongly Opposes Israel's Recognition of Somaliland

 The South China Morning Post published on 29 December 2025 an article titled "China Hits Out at 'Support for Separatist Forces' After Israel Recognizes Somaliland" by Jevans Nyabiage.

China has strongly criticized Israel's recognition of Somaliland, which declared unilateral independence from Somalia in 1991.  Israel is the first country to formally recognize Somaliland.  China has taken a strong position on the Somaliland issue because it coincides with its position on Taiwan.  

China Strongly Opposes Recognition of Somaliland

 Turkey's Anadolu Agency posted on 29 December 2025 an article titled "China Opposes Israeli Recognition of Somaliland, Slams Foreign Interference" by Riyaz ul Khaliq.

China firmly opposed Israeli recognition of Somaliland, supported Somalia's territorial integrity, and said no country should encourage separatist forces.

Comment:  This statement on Somaliland supports China's policy of establishing control over Taiwan, which happens to maintain a liaison office in Hargeisa, capital of Somaliland, and has close relations with the government.

Israel First Country to Formally Recognize Somaliland

 The New York Times published on 26 December 2025 an article titled "Israel Becomes the First Nation to Recognize Somaliland" by Abdi Latif Dahir and Richard Perez-Pena.

Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland.  The government of Somalia called the recognition an "unlawful step" by Israel, adding that Somaliland is an integral part of Somalia.  The African Union took the same position.  Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel plans to offer extensive cooperation with Somaliland in agriculture, health, technology, and the economy.

The Pros and Cons of Diplomatic Recognition of Somaliland

 Newsweek posted on 9 September 2025 an article titled "This Aspiring Nation Wants to Be Trump's New Weapon Against China in Africa" by Tom O'Connor.  

The author examines the arguments for and against recognition of the breakaway Somaliland government, which now hosts almost a dozen liaison offices but has not been officially recognized by any country.  One theme in the argument favoring US recognition of Somaliland is that it would provide an ally for Washington in its competition with Beijing in Africa.   

Senator Cruz Calls for Recognition of Somaliland

 Senator Ted Cruz, Republican of Texas and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, sent a letter to President Trump on 14 August 2025 urging that the administration formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent state.

Eswatini Recognizes Taipei but Beijing Constructs Dam

 The South China Morning Post published on 8 August 2025 an article titled "Beijing Strengthens Ties with eSwatini Despite Diplomatic Dispute over Taiwan" by Jevans Nyabiage.

Eswatini is the only country in Africa that recognizes Taiwan.  Yet, China's state-owned PowerChina is constructing a $146 million dam in the country.  China has a long history of economic ties with eSwatini and is playing the long political game, assuming that economic engagement will strengthen the political relationship.

Sudan: Rapid Support Force Government Fails To Get African Union Support

 Deutsche Welle posted on 1 August 2025 an article titled "Sudan: Is a Rival Government Splitting the Country in Two?" by Jennifer Holleis.

Rapid Support Force (RSF) General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo claims to have jurisdiction over all of Sudan following formation in Darfur of his Transitional Peace Government. Sudan Armed Forces General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan quickly rejected the RSF government as an illegitimate entity.  The African Union said it will not recognize the RSF regime.

China Pressures South Africa to Downgrade Taiwan Office

 The South China Morning Post published on 24 May 2025 an article titled "South Africa Downgrades Taiwan's Representative Office as It Deepens Ties with Beijing" by Jevans Nyabiage.

Under pressure from Beijing, South Africa has asked Taiwan to move its office from the political capital of Pretoria to the commercial capital of Johannesburg and downgrade it from a liaison office to a trade office.  Taipei has resisted the move so far.   

Somaliland, US, China, and Taiwan

 The China Global South Project posted on 16 May 2025 a 55-minute podcast titled "Somaliland's Strategic Gamble: Betting on Trump, Backing Taiwan, Defying China" hosted by Eric Orlander and Cobus van Staden with Moustafa Ahmad and Sacad Muhumed, both Somaliland foreign policy researchers in Hargeisa.

Most of the podcast, which also includes a written transcript, focuses on the complex nexus of Somaliland's relationship with Taiwan, Beijing's reaction to that relationship, speculation that the Trump administration might recognize Somaliland, and how all of this would play out in the Horn of Africa and in China.  It's complicated.