The Council on Foreign Relations published on 8 October 2026 a background piece titled "Another Hormuz? What to Know About the Houthi Threat to the Red Sea" by Diana Roy.
Each year, approximately 12 to 15 percent of global maritime trade worth more than $1 trillion, including 30 percent of global container traffic transits the Red Sea. This is an excellent summary of the threat posed by the Iran-backed and Yemen-based Houthis to international shipping through the Red Sea.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 23 September 2026 an analysis titled "The Impacts of the Houthis' Advance Could Extend Well Beyond Saudi Arabia" by Andrew Leber and Lesley Anne Warner.
Connections between the Houthis in Yemen and terrorist organizations in Somalia, renewed conflict and insecurity in the Horn of Africa, and a revival of Somali piracy raise the question whether the worsening situation in the Red Sea region will lead to increased US engagement.
The Rhodium Group published on 14 September 2026 an analysis titled "Monitoring China-Africa Trade Spillovers" by Jeremy Smith.
The analysis focuses on the impact of changes in China's economy on trade with South Africa, Angola, and the DRC. China's slowing growth and worsening trade imbalances are rapidly reshaping its economic relationship with Africa. China's export surge to Africa lowers the cost of goods for consumers but makes domestic industrialization harder. Africa should no longer expect the rising tide of Chinese demand to lift all boats for commodity exporters.
Time published on 11 September 2026 an article titled "Yemen's Houthis Capture Red Sea Port City, Threatening New Front in War" by Miranda Jeyaretnam.
Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi rebels seized the port of Mokha on the Red Sea, giving the Houthis greater ability to control the Bab el Mandeb choke point. The Houthis reportedly received weapons and instructions from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to escalate their attacks on Saudi Arabia. The Houthis say they will continue to confine their attacks on international shipping to Saudi vessels.
Aljazeera published on 8 September 2026 an article titled "Saudi-Houthi Fighting in Yemen Escalates: What Happened, and What's Next?" by Usaid Siddiqui.
Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen targeted Saudi oil facilities belonging to Aramco, wounding at least 73 people. The Saudis responded with air and cruise missile attacks on Houth-controlled territory in Yemen.
At the same time, the Houthis are trying to increase their control over Yemeni territory near the Bab el Mandeb Strait at the south end of the Red Sea in an effort to implement more effectively their blockade of Saudi shipping through the chokepoint. Yemeni government forces are responding with attacks on the Houthis.
The Washington Examiner published on 31 August 2026 an article titled "America Saw No More Oil. China Saw an Atlantic Military Fortress" by Yagiz Sullu.
After oil production in Equatorial Guinea peaked and began to decline, American oil companies began their departure. China remained and began helping Malabo diversify its economy. Beijing may have in mind longer term security interests and possibly even a military base in the Atlantic.
Horn Review published on 12 August 2026 a commentary titled "South Sudan and China's Evolving Overseas Security Strategy" by Abraham Abebe.
In July, China committed to deepening military cooperation with South Sudan by continuing its support for the UN peacekeeping mission as the backbone of its contribution. Beyond this, China's support seems to be limited to expanding its military dialogue with South Sudan and increasing military exchanges.
The International Crisis Group posted on 18 August 2026 an hour-long podcast titled "Sudan's Separation Fifteen Years Ago and Today's Disaster" with Alan Boswell, Alex de Waal, and Abdul Mohammed.
Alex de Waal and Abdul Mohammed review the background of South Sudan's independence from Sudan and the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki. They explained why negotiations ultimately failed to produce two viable states, and whether such coordinated high-level diplomacy is still possible in today's fragmented regional geopolitics.
Efforts to resolve the crises in Sudan and South Sudan today are experiencing greater involvement from the Gulf States and involve a larger number of competing actors. Mediation today is extremely difficult. The global environment is highly transactional. The situation also has the possibility of becoming a regional war. It is time for the African Union to step forward and play a stronger role in ending the conflicts.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 6 August 2026 an article titled "Red Sea" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.
Saudi Arabia announced on 30 July the formation of a Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance to protect shipping in the Red Sea and adjacent waterways following the Bab el-Mandeb Strait blockade of Saudi ships by the Houthi rebels in Yemen. So far, 14 nations have joined the task force.
Marine Radar posted on 24 July 2026 an article titled "Two Chinese Supertankers Exit Red Sea Despite Houthi Blockade."
Two Chinese-operated supertankers chartered by COSCO transported Saudi oil safely through the south end of the Red Sea in spite of the Houthi blockade. They carried about 4 million gallons of Saudi crude for destinations in China. The Houthis have not targeted Chinese-operated tankers.
Discovery Alert posted on 11 July 2026 an article titled "Namibia's Oil, Uranium & Lithium Strategic Partnership with China 2026" by Muflih Hidayat.
The China-Namibia strategic partnership entered a new chapter in July 2026 when Namibian President Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah made a state visit to China. She signed 8 cooperation agreements that focus on green minerals, uranium, lithium, oil and gas, ports, technology transfer, and clean energy.
The Diplomat published on 8 July 2026 an article titled "Three Decades in, China Is Cashing in on Sudan's Collapse" by Paul Mwirigi.
In the midst of a three-year-long civil war, most Western countries have abandoned Sudan. China, on the other hand, is investing in projects such as copper mining.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 1 July 2026 an analysis titled "In the Middle East and North Africa, America and China Converge More Than They Diverge" by Amr Hamzawy and Kathryn Selfe.
Competition between the United States and China in the Middle East and North Africa is less a threat and more an opportunity. The region has important geostrategic significance for both countries. As great power competition develops globally, Washington and Beijing's positions in the region are increasingly converging.
The United States and China are united by their primary interest in maintaining free trade in the region. For both countries, a stable, peace-driven order is key. Washington is also driven by interest in Israel's security; Beijing is similarly driven by China's need for oil and liquid natural gas. These two interests are compatible and underscore the need for peace and stability in the region.
The Stimson Center published on 24 June 2026 a report titled "The UN Mission in South Sudan in the Context of Changing Security and Regional Dynamics."
The report concludes that the combined effects of a fragile peace process, heightened political tensions, economic deterioration, the spillover of conflict from Sudan, the emerging Ebola crisis in the neighboring DRC, and growing humanitarian pressures have created a volatile environment in South Sudan.
South Sudan continues to grapple with unresolved questions surrounding the political transition and the lack of implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), which remains the primary political framework for addressing the conflict and advancing sustainable peace.
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 7 May 2026 an analysis titled "The New Scramble: Turkey, Somalia and the Battle for the Red Sea" by Matthew Chandler de Waal.
Turkey has become Somalia's foremost ally. Camp TURKSOM, Ankara's largest overseas military base, has trained thousands of Somali special forces since 2017. More recently, Turkey became engaged in a major project to develop Somalia's deepwater oil reserves.
Turkey is now looking to build a base in the Gulf of Aden at Laas Qoray, a port city that is contested by Somalia and the breakaway government of Somaliland. A base in Laas Qoray would put Turkey in position to join a host of other nations with military bases at the south end of the Red Sea.
The International Crisis Group posted on 30 April 2026 a 35-minute podcast titled "Somalia's Election Standoff and New Inflection Point" with Alan Boswell and Omar Mahmood.
Issues discussed include Somalia's latest electoral crisis, tensions with federal member states, the future of the African Union mission in Somalia, the fight against al-Shabaab, and the growing role of external powers, especially Türkiye in Somali politics, and Israel in Somaliland.
Omar Mahmood offers an especially clear explanation of the current electoral situation in Somalia. Technically, 15 May is the end of the current government's term, but the situation is actually more complicated. The current government argues it has one more year in power; the opposition says it ends on 15 May. In any event, there will not be elections on 15 May.
Ecofin Agency published on 20 April 2026 an article titled "China-Africa Trade: Windfall Gains for Resource Giants in Q1 2026, but a Deeper Structural Reality Behind" by Idriss Linge.
A small number of African countries--DRC (cobalt), Angola (oil), Guinea (bauxite), and South Africa (critical minerals) in the first quarter of 2026 captured the bulk of the gains in exports to China. The deeper story points to a structural shift in how Africa is being integrated into China's global economic strategy.
The growing trade between China and Africa is driven by Africa's extractive sectors with limited industrial spillovers and constrained economic transformation. Africa is becoming a critical outlet for Chinese industrial exports. The key question going forward is whether African economies can leverage this situation to move up the value chain.
The New York Times published on 15 April 2026 a guest essay titled "I have Watched the Catastrophe of My Country Be Reduced to Nothing" by Mohammed Ahmed.
The author takes issue with those who call what is happening in Sudan a "civil war." He argues it is "a resource war fought by proxy, playing out against the world's indifference." About the only thing sustaining Sudan today is communal mobilization or self-help by ordinary Sudanese.
Foreign Affairs published on 8 April 2026 an article titled "Don't Partition Sudan Again: Splitting It Didn't Work in the Past and Won't Work Now" by Francis M. Deng and Ahmed Kodouda.
Both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) insist they are fighting to preserve a unified Sudan, but the longer the current geographical division persists, the harder it will be to put the country together again.
The 2011 independence of South Sudan offers a cautionary tale. Any effort to formalize the split between the SAF and RSF-controlled parts of Sudan would not resolve the conflict's root causes. Another partition of Sudan would also destabilize its neighbors.
Business Insider Africa published on 10 March 2026 an article titled "Africa's Second-largest Oil Producer Says China Dominated $21.88 Investment Proposals Over Five Years" by Solomon Ekanem.
Angola has received 596 investment proposals worth an estimated $21.8 billion over the past five years. with Chinese investors accounting for 80 percent of the total.
