AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 13 August 2026 an article titled "Somalia--AUSSOM" by Michael DeAngelo.
The African Union Stabilization and Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) has begun an accelerated handoff of responsibility to the Somali National Army. AUSSOM's mission end date is December 2029, but the goal is to complete most of the handoff in 2028. Al-Shabaab will likely exploit any lapse in counterterrorism efforts that might result from this decision.
This is the full text of the interview by Omar Faruk Osman, Secretary-General of the National Union of Somali Journalists, with General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, the Commander of U.S. Africa Command in Mogadishu and posted on 31 July 2026.
Most of the interview focuses on US-Somali cooperation in combatting al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia. This is the interview where General Anderson also said, "there are no plans to build a base in Somaliland" and "U.S. policy is, and remains, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia. That has not changed."
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 6 August 2026 an article titled "Somalia" by Michael DeAngelo and Aaryaman Shah.
The United States is pursuing an increased dual track engagement with local Somali governments in Puntland and Jubaland together with unilaterally independent Somaliland as it continues to recognize the sovereignty of the central Somali government in Mogadishu.
Somalia Today published an article dated 1 August 2026 titled "AFRICOM Chief Rules Out US Military Base in Somaliland" by Mohamed Bashir.
General Dagvin Anderson, head of the US Africa Command, said in an interview published by the US embassy in Mogadishu on 31 July that "there are no plans to build a base in Somaliland." He added that "US policy is and remains the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia. That has not changed."
The United States has maintained contact with Somaliland officials and supported development and security programs in the region without recognizing it as a separate state.
The Congressional Research Service published on 21 July 2026 a brief titled "Yemen: Conflict, Red Sea Security, and U.S. Policy" by Christopher M. Blanchard.
In March 2025, the Trump administration designated the Iranian-backed Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization. On March 15, 2025, U.S. forces began a military campaign against the Houthis which the administration said was intended to compel them to end attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. The United States and the Houthis agreed to a truce in May 2025, which continues to hold.
The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies published in July 2026 a report titled "State of Somalia 2025."
The report reviews the major political, security, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, and regional developments that shaped Somalia in 2025. Somalia recorded notable gains in international diplomacy, institutional development, regional integration, and state visibility. It also experienced persistent political polarization, federal-state tensions, humanitarian vulnerability, and unresolved questions surrounding constitutional and electoral processes that continued to challenge state-building efforts.
Somalia demonstrated growing international relevance and achieved several important diplomatic and institutional milestones. Yet progress remained constrained by external interference, including Israel's violation of Somalia's sovereignty through its recognition of Somaliland, alongside political fragmentation, unresolved constitutional questions, persistent insecurity, and recurring humanitarian crises.
Foreign Affairs published on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Who Is Winning Africa's Drone Wars?" by Nate Allen and Rida Lyammouri.
Inexpensive drones are fast becoming the weapon of choice in African conflicts. They are being deployed by both governments and insurgent groups. China is now Africa's largest supplier of drones, accounting for a quarter of those procured.
Foreign drones have turned African conflicts such as the civil war in Sudan into destabilizing proxy wars. At least eleven African countries now produce drones including Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Morocco.
The Rift Valley Institute recently published a report titled "The New Geopolitics of Eastern Africa."
The British Institute of Eastern Africa, Chatham House, and the Rift Valley Institute convened a group of experts to discuss the ongoing transformation of geopolitics in the Horn of Africa. This paper summarizes their conclusions, noting that the region is experiencing profound multi-decade shifts in its relationship with the wider world.
The International Crisis Group published on 30 June 2026 an analysis titled "New Chapter, Same Stalemate: Somalia's War with Al-Shabaab."
This analysis describes the ebb and flow of al-Shabaab's war with the Somali government since 2022. It concludes that while Mogadishu faces several big challenges, it retains the military capability, in terms of personnel and resources, to hold the line, provided that external support does not abruptly disappear.
Meanwhile, despite al-Shabaab's pragmatic shifts in its approach to ruling areas under its control, its unpopularity among those it governs remains a roadblock for its attempts to supplant the Somali government.
With neither side able to defeat the other, the war in Somalia is fundamentally at a stalemate with no end in sight.
Foreign Affairs published on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Who Is Winning Africa's Drone Wars?" by Nate Allen and Rida Lyammouri.
Conflicts in Mali, Somalia, Libya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Burkina Faso and Niger have experienced or continue to experience the use of armed drones. Increasingly, insurgent groups are making as effective use of drones as national armies. China, Turkey, and Iran provide most of the drones, but at least 11 African countries now produce them.
The Royal United Services Institute published on 18 June 2026 a study titled "Masculinities and Violence in the Horn of Africa Borderlands" by Christopher Hockey and Claudia Wallner.
This paper reveals how masculinity norms fuel conflict, violent extremism, and gender-based violence in the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia borderlands, shaping al-Shabaab's recruitment and deepening insecurity. It is based on interviews with experts and community members in two communities: one at the tripoint where Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia meet and the other at the Kenya-Somalia border on the Indian Ocean coastline.
It offers actionable recommendations for defense and security practitioners to address these interconnected challenges.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 30 April 2026 an article titled "Somalia" by Michael DeAngelo.
Somali pirates have hijacked 3 vessels in Somali waters off Puntland since 21 April, the most in a 10-day period since 2012. The problem could get worse if the pirates renew ties with the al-Shabaab terrorist organization in Somalia or Houthi rebels in Yemen.
The International Crisis Group posted on 30 April 2026 a 35-minute podcast titled "Somalia's Election Standoff and New Inflection Point" with Alan Boswell and Omar Mahmood.
Issues discussed include Somalia's latest electoral crisis, tensions with federal member states, the future of the African Union mission in Somalia, the fight against al-Shabaab, and the growing role of external powers, especially Türkiye in Somali politics, and Israel in Somaliland.
Omar Mahmood offers an especially clear explanation of the current electoral situation in Somalia. Technically, 15 May is the end of the current government's term, but the situation is actually more complicated. The current government argues it has one more year in power; the opposition says it ends on 15 May. In any event, there will not be elections on 15 May.
The Conversation published on 15 April 2026 a commentary titled "China's Military Support for Somalia Is on the Rise--What Taiwan and Somaliland Have to Do with It" by Brendon J. Cannon, Khalifa University.
Beijing has promised equipment, training, and closer security cooperation with Mogadishu. The author argues that China is increasingly involved in Somalia because breakaway Somaliland has established close ties with Taiwan.
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 15 April 2026 a paper titled "Instability in the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia Borderlands" by Christopher Hockey, Timothy Kimaiyo, and Martine Zeuthen.
The paper provides critical insights into the complex dynamics of instability in the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia borderlands. It highlights the interconnected challenges of violent extremism, gender-based violence, ethnic tensions, political instability and resource pressures, offering practical recommendations for future interventions.
Standard Digital posted on 10 April 2026 an article titled "Investigations Reveals Al-Shabaab Uses Cargo Firms to Import Military Gear from China via Kenya."
At least nine cargo companies in Kenya are importing drones, military boots, VHF radios, and other equipment for transfer to the al-Shabaab terrorist organization in Somalia.
Garowe Online published on 9 April 2026 an article titled "From China to the Frontlines: The Secret Logistics Network Fueling Al-Shabaab Disrupted in Nairobi."
Kenyan authorities also disrupted a supply chain of military uniforms to a neighborhood in Nairobi for onward shipment to al-Shabaab in Somalia.
World Politics Review published on 9 April 2026 a commentary titled "Turkey's High-Risk, High-Reward Wager in the Horn of Africa" by Elfadil Ibrahim.
Turkey is investing billions of dollars in oil and gas development, advanced weaponry, and expanding security cooperation in the Horn of Africa, especially Somalia. The Horn of Africa is a risky neighborhood facing a number of actual and potential conflicts.
The Institute for Economics and Peace posted on 30 March 2026 its "Global Terrorism Index 2026."
Of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism globally in 2025, six were in Africa: Burkina Faso (2), Niger (3), Nigeria (4), Mali (5), Somalia (7) and Democratic Republic of Congo (8). Nevertheless, deaths in sub-Saharan Africa fell in ten countries while rising in just four. Deaths in the Sahel region, however, accounted for more than half of all terrorism-related deaths globally.
Terrorism remains highly concentrated. Just under 70 percent of deaths from terrorism occurred in only five countries: Pakistan, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, and the DRC. Nigeria recorded the largest increase in 2025, with fatalities rising by 46 percent to 750. Islamic State West Africa Province and Boko Haram were responsible for 80 percent of all terrorism deaths in Nigeria.
The DRC also reported a significant increase in terrorism, reaching its worst ever position on the index. Deaths in the DRC rose by nearly 28 percent to 467, driven by attacks carried out by the IS-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces, which targeted civilians, churches, hospitals, and funerals.
Somalia's al-Shabaab, while experiencing a decline in terrorist deaths for the third consecutive year, launched its Shabelle Offensive in early 2025.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 2 April 2026 an article titled "Red Sea" by Liam Karr.
While the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have attacked Israel on several occasions since 27 March, they have not resumed attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, indicating a restrained approach that attempts to avoid major regional escalation.
