Showing posts with label Gulf States. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gulf States. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 12, 2026

Africa's Geopolitical Realignment

 Global Views World published on 10 August 2026 a commentary titled "Africa's 2026 Geopolitics: China's $282B Pull" by Alonso Reyes.  

The author argues Africa's geopolitical alignment is undergoing significant transformation by moving away from traditional Western allies and towards emerging powers such as China, India, Russia, and the Gulf States.

But this is not a zero-sum game.  African leaders are not choosing sides.  They are diversifying their partnerships to maximize their own national interests.

Saturday, August 8, 2026

Podcast on Horn of Africa

 The Somali Media Network posted on 8 August 2026 a 42-minute podcast with me hosted by Ismail Gorse on the Horn of Africa.  

This is a wide-ranging discussion of current issues in the Horn of Africa and US policy with a special focus on Somalia and Somaliland.

Saturday, July 25, 2026

Is the West Losing Out in the Seychelles?

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 23 July 2026 an analysis titled "Losing Control of the West's Longstanding Interests in Seychelles" by Wojciech Pawlus.

The author suggests that the West is losing out in the democratic Indian Ocean archipelago of Seychelles to India, China, Russia, and the Gulf States.  He believes the current government is becoming more autocratic and urges Washington, Brussels, London, and Paris to reach out before it is too late.


Monday, May 18, 2026

Iran War Complicates Situation in Horn of Africa

 Foreign Policy posted on 18 May 2026 an article titled "The Gulf's African Aftershocks" by Liam Karr.

The war against Iran is deepening preexisting regional proxy conflicts in the Horn of Africa and making mediation in Sudan of ongoing conflict more difficult.  It has also resulted in a reduction of Gulf State investment in the region and beyond.

Saturday, April 18, 2026

Short Video Analysis of Sudan's Civil War

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies posted on 17 April 2026 an eight-minute video analysis titled "The Sudanese Civil War, Three Years On" by Michael Jones.

After three years of conflict the Sudan civil war has reached a political and military dynamic stalemate.  Diplomatic efforts to reach a ceasefire have achieved little progress.  The war is sustained by foreign powers, especially the Arab Gulf states.  The conflict threatens to become a regional war.

Sunday, April 5, 2026

The Iran War Reshapes the Red Sea Region

 The International Crisis Group posted on 2 April 2026 a 36-minute podcast titled "How the Iran War Is Reshaping the Region" with Alan Boswell and Hafsa Halawa, independent political analyst.

The war in Iran is already resulting in shortages of fuel, energy, and electricity in the Red Sea region.  Over the longer term, it will likely cause higher inflation and food shortages due to diminished access to imported food and fertilizer, 40 percent of which passes through the Strait of Hormuz.  The fertilizer issue is exacerbated because it does not have a long shelf life.

Large diasporas in the Gulf states from countries like Ethiopia may start returning home as jobs shut down.  Gulf state investment in the Horn of Africa, which had been growing rapidly, is likely to fall significantly.  

The war may force Gulf states to refocus their national security strategies as they assess freedom of navigation and support for factions or governments in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.  Saudi support for the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) may decline because of Iran's ties with the SAF. The UAE is likely to continue its support for Ethiopia.

The war is likely to exacerbate existing tension between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  Egypt and Turkey will need to reassess their strategies in the region.  The war comes on top of Israel's recognition of Somaliland, which already exacerbated Gulf state security relationships.  

Saudi Arabia has shifted oil exports to the port of Yanbu in the Red Sea.  If the Houthis decide to attack international shipping in the Red Sea, this could end the shipment of oil to Asia by closing the Bab el-Mandeb choke point.  It would still be possible to ship oil from Yanbu north through the Suez Canal to Europe.  

The Iran war makes clear that the regional security situation is now completely interconnected.  

Saturday, April 4, 2026

The Houthis Cautious Support for Iran

 AEI's Critical Threats published on 3 April 2026 an analysis titled "Houthi Escalation Calculus Following Cautious Entry into the Iran War" by Liam Karr and Brian Carter.

The Iran-backed Houthis threatened to join Iran's campaign with attacks across the region designed to coerce the United States and Israel to make concessions in negotiations with Iran and to deter further military escalation against Iran.  But the Houthis are unlikely to follow through on these threats unless the US and its allies cross certain Houthi or Iranian red lines, such as the Gulf states entering the war or ground operations against Iran, to avoid retaliation from the US and its allies that would jeopardize the groups domestic position. 

The Houthis have conducted several attacks targeting southern Israel since March 27, marking the group's first involvement in the war.  Attacks on Israel minimize the risk of entanglement with the Gulf states or the United States.  They draw retaliatory Israeli strikes on Yemen that only temporarily damage Houthi infrastructure while further rallying popular support for the group.

Friday, April 3, 2026

Yemen's Iran-Backed Houthis Continue to Eschew Attacks on Red Sea Shipping

 AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 2 April 2026 an article titled "Red Sea" by Liam Karr.

While the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have attacked Israel on several occasions since 27 March, they have not resumed attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, indicating a restrained approach that attempts to avoid major regional escalation.  

Thursday, March 19, 2026

Unpacking Instability in the Horn of Africa

 The International Crisis Group posted on 19 March 2026 a 36-minute podcast titled "What Is Really Going on in the Horn?" with Alan Boswell and Moses Chrispus Okello, Institute of Security Studies.

The drivers of conflict and instability in the Horn of Africa are no longer confined to the Horn, which is being absorbed into the geopolitical arena of the Red Sea and Gulf States.  External actors are contributing to fragmentation in the Horn that is rooted in domestic politics.  

Landlocked Ethiopia is key to stability in the region because it borders all other countries in the Horn, is the most populous, and is now trying to obtain access to the Red Sea.

Saturday, March 14, 2026

Regionalizing Sudan's Civil War

 The International Crisis Group posted on 11 March 2026 a commentary titled "Sudan's Devastating War Rages on as Regional Rivalries Deepen" by Shewit Woldemichael.  

As Sudan's civil war nears its fourth year, the conflict is steadily regionalizing into the Horn of Africa and Gulf States, making any settlement harder to achieve.  Supporting the Sudan Armed Forces are Egypt, Eritrea, Turkiye, Qatar, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.  The principal backer of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces is the UAE.  The feud between the UAE and Saudi Arabia now risks deepening the intractable nature of the war.  

Thursday, March 5, 2026

Implications of Iran War for Red Sea and Horn of Africa

 AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 4 March 2026 an analysis titled "Iran War's Impact on the Red Sea and Horn of Africa" by Liam Karr.

The Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen could resume missile strikes on Israel or initiate strikes on the UAE but have not yet done so.  The US military base in Djibouti is another possible target.  For its part, Iran may engage in terrorist attacks on US interests in Africa.

Sunday, March 1, 2026

Russia Lags Behind in Africa

 Modern Diplomacy published on 27 February 2026 a commentary titled "Africa's Rise: The 21st Century Story that Leaves Russia Behind" by Kester Kenn Klomegah, an independent researcher.  

Russia has focused on a limited part of Africa.  About 80 percent of its trade is with North African countries and South Africa.  It has sent the Africa Corps to Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.  But it has largely ignored the rest of the continent.

Saturday, February 28, 2026

Choosing Peace in the Horn of Africa

 An Africanist Perspective posted on 27 February 2026 a commentary titled "Conflict in the Horn of Africa Isn't Inevitable.  People Can Choose Peace" by Ken Opalo.  

The fundamental drivers of conflict in the Horn of Africa are domestic.  Once rebellions start, they tend to acquire lives of their own.  A neighborhood of weak states with porous borders contributes to the problem, making it easy for regional rivals and foreign governments to interfere.  

Too many people in the Horn are convinced that organized violence is a legitimate response to losing in the political arena.  That has to change before there will be peace.  

Friday, February 27, 2026

Indian Ocean: Economic and Strategic Corridors

 The Emirates Policy Center posted on 27 February 2026 an analysis titled "The Economics of Deterrence: How Corridors and Alliances Are Reshaping Geopolitics" by Ebtesam AlKetbi.  

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are frameworks for redistributing centers of gravity and influence, diversifying states' strategic options, and embedding long-term investment commitments.

The world is shifting from rigid alignments to flexible alliances that integrate economy and technology with digital and maritime security.  Power is no longer defined solely by territorial control but by the management of flows--trade, energy, data, and capital.  A state that positions itself as a central node within these networks gains strategic weight.

In the Indian Ocean region, both the Indian-led IMEC and the better known and more expansive Chinese BRI are efforts to achieve these objectives.

Russia in Africa: Influence and Its Limits

 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 26 February 2026 a study titled "Russia in Africa: Examining Moscow's Influence and Its Limits" edited by Nate Reynolds, Frances Z. Brown, Frederic Wehrey, and Andrew S. Weiss.

The study explores Russia's role, its appeal, and its limitations across Africa since the 2010s, drawing on contributions from a range of scholars.  It also looks at the agency and interests of African governments and citizens.

Opportunism continues to define Russia's approach to Africa, as Moscow hones a set of tools designed to take advantage of instability and state fragility.  African actors can--and do--instrumentalize Russian engagement on the continent and advance their own agency in the relationship.  Geopolitical competition in Africa is widening and intensifying as middle powers emerge as important external partners, in addition to traditional powers.  The West must evolve its approach accordingly.

These essays point to a complicated and mixed record for Russia in Africa that defies simple characterizations.  Russia's influence in Africa has undoubtedly grown, but there are outstanding questions about whether it can translate its gains into stable, lasting relationships; whether its tools and symbolic gestures will gain further traction; and whether it can outcompete a crowded field of external powers that can deliver more than Russia, should they choose to.

Tuesday, February 24, 2026

China in Al-Qaeda's Crosshairs

 War on the Rocks published on 18 February 2026 an analysis titled "China Now Finds Itself in Al-Qaeda's Crosshairs" by Colin Clarke and Lucas Webber, both with the Soufan Center.

Al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations in the Arabian Gulf and Africa are now including China as part of its enemy hierarchy due in large part to Beijing's treatment of the Muslim Uyghur population in Xinjiang Province.  


Monday, February 2, 2026

African Countries Have More Policy Options: West, China, Russia, Gulf States

 Politics Today published on 23 January 2026 an article titled "Africa's Quiet Power Shift: From Russian Gold Deals to China's Training Push" by Goktug Caliskan, International University of Rabat.  

The author concluded the question among African governments is no longer whether Russia's Africa Corps, China's training offensive, Trump's transactional policy or Europe's climate money is most attractive.  The question is how African governments use these choices to maneuver and quietly rewrite the rules.  Africa is learning to say yes, no, or not yet--and to make everyone wait.  


Monday, January 26, 2026

Geopolitical Change in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf States

 African Arguments published on 21 January 2026 a commentary titled "The Horn and the Gulf: How a New Geopolitical Confluence Is Emerging" by Ngala Chome, former research fellow at Ghent University.

Israel's recognition of Somaliland is reverberating across the Red Sea.  Networks of influence in the Horn of Africa and Gulf States are resulting in new power configurations.  This is impacting traditional outside powers and changing the relations of newer ones with major consequences for the future of the region.  


Friday, January 9, 2026

Trump Administration's National Security Strategy and Africa

 The Foreign Policy Research Institute published on 6 January 2026 an analysis titled "The Africa Blind Spot: The US National Security Strategy and the Risks of Retreat" by Christopher Faulkner and Raphael Parens.  

The Trump Administration's National Security Strategy document represents a significant shift in how the United States will approach Africa in the near term.  It reflects a preference for transactionalism, driven by the president's pursuit of the Nobel Peace Prize.  

The limited discussion devoted to Africa (about a half a page) does not inherently reflect a lack of interest in the continent.  Instead, it demonstrates that the administration's interest in Africa will be constrained, selective, and dependent on what Africa can offer in an increasingly competitive world.  This effectively constitutes strategic disengagement.

The authors conclude that navigating between selective engagement and strategic retreat will not likely reduce the pressures that will draw the United States to the continent.  Instead, it risks deferring engagement, ensuring that future interventions, when they become unavoidable, are costlier and less effective.  

Thursday, December 18, 2025

Ten African Security Trends in 2025

 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published in December 2025 an infographic titled "Ten African Security Trends from 2025 in Graphics."

The paper covers the following issues:

--Sudan Fragmentation Strains Region

--Militant Islamist Group Momentum

--Impunity and Abuses of Power

--China and Russia Expand Foothold

--Growing Gulf Actor Competition

--Escalated Fighting in the DRC

--Regional Instability Impacts Nigeria

--Evolving Warfare Technology

--Urbanization and Youth Protests

--Progress toward Agenda 2063