Insurance Journal posted on 30 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis' Red Sea Attacks Prompt London Insurers to Widen High-Risk Zone" by Jonathan Saul.
As a result of Iran-backed Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, London insurers have expanded the area in the Red Sea subject to higher rates. Even small changes to war insurance add hundreds of thousands of dollars in extra costs for a seven-day voyage.
Al-Monitor published on 29 July 2026 an article titled "China in Touch with Yemen's Houthis to Allow Ships to Sail Through Red Sea, Sources Say" by Jonathan Saul, Parisa Hafezi, Timour Azhari, and Chen Aizhu.
Beijing has asked the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen to promise safe passage for its oil tankers transporting crude from Saudi Arabia's Yanbu terminal in the Red Sea south through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point. China clears each shipment with the Houthis, who have developed good relations with Beijing.
The New York Times published on 28 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis Claim Strike on Another Saudi Oil Tanker" by Pranav Baskar and Shipin Hakim.
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen said they targeted on 28 July a Saudi oil tanker, the NCC Ghazal, in the Red Sea with missiles. Saudi authorities did not confirm the attack.
The Hollings Center for International Dialogue published in July 2026 a brief titled "Securing Strategic Waters Across the MENA Region: The Red Sea."
The current threat in the Red Sea is not confined to the closure of the geographical Bab el-Mandeb choke point. It is shaped by persistent uncertainty caused by the security crises in the wider region.
The threat cannot be addressed through conventional naval tools alone, nor reduced to a piracy or law enforcement problem. The brief recommends incremental cooperation, capacity building, and risk mitigation measures.
Marine Radar posted on 24 July 2026 an article titled "Two Chinese Supertankers Exit Red Sea Despite Houthi Blockade."
Two Chinese-operated supertankers chartered by COSCO transported Saudi oil safely through the south end of the Red Sea in spite of the Houthi blockade. They carried about 4 million gallons of Saudi crude for destinations in China. The Houthis have not targeted Chinese-operated tankers.
AEIs Critical Threats posted on 23 July 2026 an analysis titled "Houthi Blockade in the Red Sea" by Michael DeAngelo, Liam Karr, and Alexsandar Wiebler.
The Iranian-backed Houthi blockade of the south end of the Red Sea has already disrupted shipping in the Red Sea, causing increased costs and transit delays. The Houthi blockade will further increase fuel shortages, negatively impact African countries that rely on Saudi fuel shipments, and strain the global economy.
The Hill published on 23 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis Say 2 Saudi Oil Tankers Attacked in Red Sea" by Max Rego.
Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen say they struck two Saudi oil tankers, named Encelia and Layla, using ballistic and cruise missiles in the Red Sea earlier this week. So far, they have forced at least 10 other ships to turn around rather than pass through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point.
CNBC posted on 22 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis Deploy Missiles and Drones to Attack Ships in Southern Red Sea, Naval Group Says" by Spencer Kimball.
Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen have completed preparations to attack shipping, including the deployment of missiles and drones positioned near the Bab el-Mandeb choke point at the south end of the Red Sea.
The European Union's naval mission in the Middle East warned commercial ships linked to Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States to avoid transiting the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden.
The Indian Express published on 22 July 2026 an article titled "India-bound Oil Tanker Takes U-turn in Red Sea after Houthi Threat."
Two oil tankers headed south for India and one for China toward the Bab el-Mandeb choke point from the Saudi oil terminal of Yanbu in the Red Sea turned around and headed north through the Suez Canal following threats from the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.
The tankers must now transit the Mediterranean Sea, sail around Africa, and pass the Cape of Good Hope before reaching India or China, adding significantly to shipping costs. These are the first Saudi oil laden tankers to respond to the Houthi threat.
Another oil tanker scheduled to load Saudi crude at Yanbu by entering the Red Sea through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point turned back off the coast of Oman.
The Council on Foreign Relations published on 20 July 2026 a background piece titled "Another Hormuz? What to Know About the Houthi Threat to the Red Sea" by Diana Roy.
The Yemen-based and Iranian-backed Houthis' decision to impose a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia opens a new front in the U.S.-Iran war and threatens to choke off the Red Sea's 20-mile-wide Bab el-Mandeb Strait, with potentially major consequences for the global economy.
Al-Monitor published on 20 July 2026 an article titled "As Houthis Declare Red Sea Blockade on Saudi Arabia, Oil Markets Brace for Impact" by Jack Dutton.
Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi rebels said on 20 July that it was imposing a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, as the regional war widens to threaten another key route for global oil supplies following disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. Because of the problems in the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia has redirected much of its crude exports by pipeline through its Red Sea terminal at Yanbu.
Ships sailing north of Yanbu for Europe through the Suez Canal will not be impacted by this Houthi action. Those headed south for Asia through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point will be impacted and the Saudis may put at risk a large percentage of current crude exports. If the Houthis successfully prevent the Saudis from passing through Bab el-Mandeb, global supplies could fall by as much as 7 percent.
Reuters published on 14 July 2026 an article titled "After Hormuz, Iran Turns to Red Sea Gateway as New Pressure Point" by Samia Nakhoul.
Depending on US and Saudi actions related to the Strait of Hormuz, Iran may ask its Houthi allies in Yemen to shut down the Bab el-Mandeb choke point, which controls international shipping through the Red Sea and Suez Canal.
Foreign Policy posted on 18 May 2026 an article titled "The Gulf's African Aftershocks" by Liam Karr.
The war against Iran is deepening preexisting regional proxy conflicts in the Horn of Africa and making mediation in Sudan of ongoing conflict more difficult. It has also resulted in a reduction of Gulf State investment in the region and beyond.
The American Security Project published on 7 May 2026 a commentary titled "What's Holding the Houthis Back in Bab al-Mandeb?" by Laura Bucci.
The Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have so far refrained from attacking international shipping in the Red Sea following U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran. The author suggests this is due to ongoing reconstruction in Yemen following earlier attacks on the Houthis by the United States and Israel, an interrupted weapons supply chain from Iran, and concern that the U.S. and Israel would resume airstrikes. The author does not, however, rule out a resumption of Houthi attacks.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 30 April 2026 an article titled "Somalia" by Michael DeAngelo.
Somali pirates have hijacked 3 vessels in Somali waters off Puntland since 21 April, the most in a 10-day period since 2012. The problem could get worse if the pirates renew ties with the al-Shabaab terrorist organization in Somalia or Houthi rebels in Yemen.
The Wall Street Journal published on 22 April 2026 an article titled "U.S. Seeks to Reset Ties with Reclusive but Strategically Vital African State" by Robbie Gramer and Summer Said.
The Trump administration is exploring ways to reset relations with Eritrea, beginning with the lifting of sanctions. The administration's special envoy for Africa, Massad Boulos, first met with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki late last year in Cairo.
The US war in Ian has elevated the importance of freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, where Eritrea has a long coastline.
The Independent published on 14 April 2026 an article titled "What Is the 'Gate of Tears'? Key Shipping Route that Could Be Attacked by Houthis and Disrupt Global Economy" by Bryony Gooch and Harry Cockburn.
The authors speculate on the possibility of Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis attacking international shipping in the Red Sea following a US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Oman.
The International Crisis Group posted on 2 April 2026 a 36-minute podcast titled "How the Iran War Is Reshaping the Region" with Alan Boswell and Hafsa Halawa, independent political analyst.
The war in Iran is already resulting in shortages of fuel, energy, and electricity in the Red Sea region. Over the longer term, it will likely cause higher inflation and food shortages due to diminished access to imported food and fertilizer, 40 percent of which passes through the Strait of Hormuz. The fertilizer issue is exacerbated because it does not have a long shelf life.
Large diasporas in the Gulf states from countries like Ethiopia may start returning home as jobs shut down. Gulf state investment in the Horn of Africa, which had been growing rapidly, is likely to fall significantly.
The war may force Gulf states to refocus their national security strategies as they assess freedom of navigation and support for factions or governments in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Saudi support for the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) may decline because of Iran's ties with the SAF. The UAE is likely to continue its support for Ethiopia.
The war is likely to exacerbate existing tension between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Egypt and Turkey will need to reassess their strategies in the region. The war comes on top of Israel's recognition of Somaliland, which already exacerbated Gulf state security relationships.
Saudi Arabia has shifted oil exports to the port of Yanbu in the Red Sea. If the Houthis decide to attack international shipping in the Red Sea, this could end the shipment of oil to Asia by closing the Bab el-Mandeb choke point. It would still be possible to ship oil from Yanbu north through the Suez Canal to Europe.
The Iran war makes clear that the regional security situation is now completely interconnected.
AEI's Critical Threats published on 3 April 2026 an analysis titled "Houthi Escalation Calculus Following Cautious Entry into the Iran War" by Liam Karr and Brian Carter.
The Iran-backed Houthis threatened to join Iran's campaign with attacks across the region designed to coerce the United States and Israel to make concessions in negotiations with Iran and to deter further military escalation against Iran. But the Houthis are unlikely to follow through on these threats unless the US and its allies cross certain Houthi or Iranian red lines, such as the Gulf states entering the war or ground operations against Iran, to avoid retaliation from the US and its allies that would jeopardize the groups domestic position.
The Houthis have conducted several attacks targeting southern Israel since March 27, marking the group's first involvement in the war. Attacks on Israel minimize the risk of entanglement with the Gulf states or the United States. They draw retaliatory Israeli strikes on Yemen that only temporarily damage Houthi infrastructure while further rallying popular support for the group.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 2 April 2026 an article titled "Red Sea" by Liam Karr.
While the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have attacked Israel on several occasions since 27 March, they have not resumed attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, indicating a restrained approach that attempts to avoid major regional escalation.
